The civil service, the State and the Irish Revolution, 1886-1938 by Maguire, Martin
  
 








Supervisor: Professor Eunan O’Halpin. 





Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Ph.D. degree of the 











This thesis has not been submitted previously as an exercise for a degree at 
University of Dublin, Trinity College or any other University and is entirely my 
own work.  I agree that the library of the University of Dublin, Trinity College 





Signed: Martin Maguire. 
 
SUMMARY. 
The thesis is about the relationship between the Irish civil service and the state in 
the long period of Irish state-formation.  It offers an analysis of the Irish 
revolution as a state-centred rather than the more usual nation-centred event, by 
focussing on the civil service experience of that revolution.  The Irish civil service 
is examined in the context of changes in the state that began with the first home 
rule bill and culminated in the partitioning of the existing state and the creation of 
an independent Irish Free State and a devolved administration of Northern Ireland.  
In Great Britain reform of the civil service was seen as part of a broader reform of 
the state, which was expected to deliver a smaller and less costly service.  In 
Ireland much more was expected of civil service reform; to make the British state 
popular and respected for the good it did.  This led to a tendency for the civil 
service to expand in Ireland and become more complex.  Dublin Castle became a 
byword for a bloated, unaccountable and bureaucratic administrative apparatus.  
Home rule, in so far as it applied to the Irish civil service, implied that an Irish 
government would adopt the British view that the civil service ought to be 
reduced in cost and numbers.  Before the advent of home rule the Irish civil 
service had organised on the usual issues of pay and conditions.  Its main demand, 
parity with London rates of pay, was implicitly unionist.  The policy of home rule 
necessitated a realisation that the Irish civil service, despite being part of the 
United Kingdom service, was different and dispensable.  Organisation became 
more unified and directed toward securing the greatest security for the civil 
service in the further home rule proposals.  In pursuit of this objective the civil 
service adopted techniques of political lobbying that would ordinarily have been 
unacceptable in a civil servant.  The result was the civil service clauses of the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, which were largely shaped in response to their 
campaigns.  Whilst maintaining its own specific organisation, the Irish civil 
service also participated in the wave of organisation that swept through the British 
service in the years of World War 1 and after.  The leadership of the Irish civil 
service drew from the campaign on home rule and from the British-led surge of 
civil service trade unionism but was also influenced by the transformation of Irish 
nationalism through the cultural movement and the Rising of Easter 1916.  This 
led to a complex response by the civil service to the years of revolution and 
partition.  It is argued that in the claim by Dáil Éireann to legitimate statehood, 
success was due to the failure of the British state rather than to any action by the 
republican state itself.  The thesis examines the relationship between the state and 
the civil service in Northern Ireland, but concentrates on that relationship in the 
Irish Free State.  The accepted view that the Free State simply inherited, intact and 
unchanged, the civil service of the former regime is refuted.  A largely new civil 
service, organised on new lines, had to forge a new relationship with a 
government that regarded it with great suspicion.  This led eventually to a court 
case that defined that relationship in constitutional terms and coincidentally led to 
the revision of the Treaty.  Finally, under the Fianna Fail government, the civil 
service secured the position within the state which accorded with its own view of 
its role; as technocratic leaders in social transformation.   
The thesis utilises the records of the British and the Irish states, including the 
revolutionary Dáil Éireann state, the records generated by civil service 
organisations and early trade unions, and the personal papers of the key political 
and civil service figures.  These records are preserved in archives, libraries and 
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The thesis investigates the civil service experience of revolutionary transformation of 
the state in Ireland.  In nineteenth-century Great Britain, civil service reform set out to 
curtail the growth of the state by abolishing patronage appointments and by centralising 
recruitment and qualification in the Treasury, a civil, non-political and non-spending 
arm of the state.  This was achieved through a series of inquiries that conferred 
Treasury control on the numbers and salaries of the civil service and introduced exam-
based recruitment.  Reform of appointment to the civil service traded off permanence 
for neutrality, the civil service would loyally serve the state regardless of whichever 
party was in power and in return the state conferred permanent status with pension on 
retirement.  The civil service was becoming "established" as a non-political 
administrative class, a professional bureaucracy.  Political neutrality, even indifference, 
was the highest value of the civil servant. 1  In time this, it was expected, would destroy 
the corruption of patronage and lead to the rise of a politically neutral bureaucratic 
authority based on reason and objectivity.2  Structural reform was achieved by shifting 
from a vertical division of the different departments of state to a horizontal division 
across the whole of the civil service.  Each horizontal level, spanning all the 
departments of government, was to be staffed by civil service grades in which 
intellectual ability matched the tasks of that particular level. The purpose of reform was 
                                                
1 For a review of the historiography of the debate on administrative reform in the nineteenth century 
see John R. Greenaway,’Parliamentary reform and civil service reform: a nineteenth-century debate 
reassessed’ in Parliamentary History, vol.4 (1989) pp 157-69.  For a recent reservation on the concept 
of an administrative revolution see Philip Harling, ‘The State’ in Chris Williams (ed) A Companion to 
Nineteenth-Century Britain (2004) pp 110-24. 
2 Roy McLeod (ed) Government and Expertise: Specialists, Administrators and professionals, 1860-
1919 (1988). p.3. 
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to make the civil service a more effective instrument of state policy by ensuring that 
only the best qualified would succeed in entry to a civil service career.  The civil 
service, guided by respectable moral standards, would display disinterested neutrality in 
their task of analysing and applying public policy.  The civil service as a politically 
neutral, anonymous, rational, bureaucratic apparatus, delivering efficient service to the 
government in power regardless of party and in the name of the state, became a British 
national institution.3   
With periodic reform becoming the norm in Great Britain it became apparent 
that Ireland presented a different sort of problem and civil service reform took on very 
different meanings on the other side of the Irish Sea.  Despite the legislative Union 
and the presence of Irish MPs at Westminster, the administration of Ireland was 
‘distinctly colonial in form and function’.4  Exiled from political power, Dublin Castle 
developed as a bureaucratic authority out of touch with both the people and the state it 
purported to serve.  Reform in Ireland was intended to legitimise British rule and 
make evident the benefits of the Union.  It meant therefore something more ambitious 
than simply improving recruitment and re-grading civil service posts.  The earliest 
target of this Irish version of administrative reform was the lord lieutenancy.  
Increasingly however the analysis expanded to include the entire “Castle” system. 
Just as in Britain, in Ireland the choice of a civil service career was first and 
foremost the way to secure a respectable livelihood and a secure family life.  For the 
Irish civil servants Dublin Castle represented dead-end departmentalism in which 
promotions often disappeared into the maw of patronage.  Nationalist critics often 
accused the Castle of being dominated by Masonic cliques.  However, a search of the 
                                                
3 Jonathan Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain (1993), p.18; Harling, 
‘The State’. 
4 David Fitzpatrick, ‘Ireland and the Empire’ in Andrew Porter (ed) The Oxford History of the British 
Empire Volume III, The Nineteenth Century (1999) pp494-521, p.495. 
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Dublin Masonic lodge records, particularly St Patrick’s lodge, shows no consistent 
pattern of membership and civil service positions.5  Political patronage, influence and 
personal connections were more important than freemasonry in getting advancement 
in an administration that was becoming a byword for nepotism.  Reform, or more 
correctly the irrelevance of reform, fed anxiety and alienation in the civil service 
ranks in the Castle.  Even before the emergence of home rule the Castle bureaucracy 
had developed a corporate consciousness of itself as an ‘Irish civil service’.  Feeding 
this growing sense of corporate identity was the failure of the Irish civil service to 
fulfil personal ambitions and the failure to secure equality with London in pay and 
conditions.  The failure of examination entry to open up the Irish higher posts to 
genuine competition and the continuance of patronage, whether ‘Green ‘ or ‘Orange’ 
in the elite division of the Castle became a major source of dissatisfaction.  Even 
nationalist and Catholic civil servants preferred a meritocratic system to the 
corruption of preferential patronage.6  Frustrated by the narrow field of opportunity 
offered in the Castle, the Irish civil service sense of corporate identity was based on a 
general and widespread sense of shared grievance and disappointment.   
Home rule, whilst being presented as a political reform, was also shaped to 
deliver administrative reform.  This had profound consequences for the Irish civil 
service.  As part of their training civil servants become invested with a profound sense 
of obligation to give their undivided allegiance to the state.7  This thesis investigates 
how the Irish civil service responded to the growing uncertainty attached to the state in 
Ireland during the first and second home rule debates and then the revolutionary 
                                                
5 Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of Ireland, Molesworth Street Dublin 2, membership 
register, minute book of the St Patrick’s lodge. 
6 Mary E. Daly,’The formation of an Irish nationalist elite?  Recruitment to the Irish civil service in the 
decades prior to independence 1870-1920’ in Paedogogica Historica (Belgium), vol.30, no.1, 1994, 
pp281-301. 
7 Richard A. Chapman, Ethics in the British Civil Service (1988) pp 92-107. 
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situation created by the 1912 Act.  Prior to home rule the Irish civil service had 
organised on the usual issues of pay and conditions. Their agitation was implicitly 
unionist in as much as it demanded parity with the British civil service.8    The home 
rule debate necessitated a new level of organisation and different demands.  The great 
achievement of that period of civil service organisation was a “written constitution” in 
the clauses of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act that gave the civil service an 
unprecedented constitutional guarantee on status and conditions.   
The thesis then investigates the relationship that developed between that civil 
service and the revolutionary administration of Dáil Éireann, the response of the civil 
service to partition and then the relationship between the new state and its civil service.  
Though the research concentrates on the Irish Free State it does examine the process 
whereby the civil service of Northern Ireland was created and the relationship between 
that civil service and the Unionist government.  Whilst the civil service organised to 
secure protection of their status under home rule it also organised to frustrate partition.  
As a result the Unionist government of Northern Ireland had a largely free hand in 
constructing its civil service 
R.B. McDowell, Ronan Fanning, John McColgan, Eunan O’Halpin and 
Lawrence McBride have previously examined the administrative system in Ireland and 
its fate in the revolutionary period.9  McDowell’s is a descriptive history of the array of 
government departments in Dublin Castle from the Union to 1914.  McColgan analyses 
the administrative history of partition between 1920 and 1922, including a chapter on 
the civil service.  However McColgan does not fully recognise the extent to which the 
                                                
8 Report of the commissioners appointed…to enquire into the condition of the civil service in 
Ireland…Parl. Papers 1873, XXII, [c-789]. 
9 R.B. McDowell, The Irish Administration 1801-1914 (1964); Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department 
of Finance 1922-58 (1978); John McColgan, British Policy and the Irish Administration 1920-22 
(1983); Eunan O'Halpin, The Decline of the Union British Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (1987); 
Laurence W.McBride The Greening of Dublin Castle The Transformation of Bureaucratic and Judicial 
Personnel in Ireland 1892-1922 (1991).   
 5 
Irish civil service was already different to the rest of the UK service.  Nor was it as 
resigned to accepting whatever decision the British government made as he suggests.  
O’Halpin details the actual working of the Castle system, noting the links between 
failed administrative reform and failed political reform.  His work is at the level of high 
administrative politics, dealing with the senior officials and not the lower ranks.  
McBride looks at the changing policy of recruitment to the Irish bureaucracy, from one 
dominated by Protestant Unionists to one dominated by Catholic Nationalists.  He 
suggests that this change gave the stability necessary to found the new state out of civil 
war.  Only Fanning deals with the civil service of the independent state.  However 
Fanning accepts the view that for the civil service it was business as usual.  This is a 
view that I challenge.  Arthur Mitchell has written on the revolutionary government of 
Dáil Éireann with great detail and insight.10  However he concentrated on the elite of 
that administration.  This research seeks to add to his work by reconstructing the 
experience of the ordinary men and women who found themselves acting as the civil 
service of the revolutionary government.    
This research seeks to build on what has been done already, by utilising new 
sources and advancing new interpretations.  Firstly, all these histories have stopped at 
the moment of the creation of the two new states in Ireland.  This research will take the 
history forward to the de Valera government and the 1937 constitution.  Secondly, these 
histories have generally viewed the Irish administration from the ‘top-down’.  By 
looking at the experience of the civil servants themselves this thesis offers a ‘bottom-
up’ perspective.  The emphasis will therefore be on the previously under-used records 
generated by the civil servants themselves.  It also uses the records of the state made 
available by the opening of the National Archives of Ireland, which were unavailable to 
                                                
10 Arthur Mitchell, Revolutionary Government in Ireland Dáil Éireann 1919-22 (1995). 
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the previous historians of the subject.  The civil service sources that are utilised are the 
records of early organisations still retained by their later descendants, the civil service 
trade unions.  Also used are the records of the Irish branches of the British civil service 
associations held at the Modern Records Centre at Warwick.  Besides the records of the 
British Treasury, the Establishment division of the Department of Finance and other 
departments of the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland, a new source is an 
uncatalogued collection of early establishment material of the Free State amounting to 
some thirty boxes and covering the period 1922-5.  This includes the records of the 
Wylie committee on the discharged and retiring civil servants of the former British 
regime.  Personal records include not only the papers of government ministers and civil 
servants but also the recently opened statements of the Bureau of Military History, 
which offer many insights into the everyday working of the revolutionary Dáil 
administration.  By investigating in detail the experience of revolution from the 
perspectives of both the state and the civil service and by treating the revolution as a 
‘state’ rather than ‘nation’ event, the research will offer a fresh perspective on the civil 









GLADSTONIAN HOME RULE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. 
     
 
By the 1880s it was apparent to Gladstone that the Irish administration, instead of 
acting as a restraint on expenditure, had evolved into a mechanism for extracting 
money from the British Treasury.  Few in the Conservative or Liberal ranks would 
have disagreed with his view that the ability of the poorer country to draw without 
restraint from the pocket of her wealthier sister was greatly assisted by the Irish 
administrative system.  Therefore, as Gladstone argued privately, because ‘under the 
present highly centralised system of government, every demand, which can be started 
on behalf of a poor and ill-organised country, comes directly on the British 
government and Treasury’, the efficient (that is, cheaper) government of Ireland was 
as much a British as an Irish problem.1  Gladstone’s list of the recent Irish initiatives 
paid for by Britain, which had led to the expansion of the Castle administration, 
included tenant reform, winter distress of labourers, loans to farmers, public works to 
relieve poverty, subsidies to encourage fisheries and the promotion of emigration.2  
H.C.E. Childers, expressing the Treasury view, was prepared to support home rule for 
Ireland with reserve for imperial affairs as a ‘welcome relief for the British taxpayer’.3  
                                                
1 Agatha Ramm (ed) The political correspondence of Mr Gladstone and lord Granville 1876-1886 
vol.11, 1883-1886 (1962) p.10  
2 Ibid. 
3 ibid., p. 396, Granville to Gladstone 11 Sept. 1885. 
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Hartington was prepared to admit the necessity for the reform of the Castle and the 
need for devolved administrative authority.4  Even Chamberlain, who was to break 
from the Liberal party on the home rule issue, was prepared in late 1884 and early 
1885 to argue for a hugely ambitious programme of administrative reform in Ireland.5   
As civil service rationalisation and reform were becoming normal and 
recurrent administrative procedures in Britain, the Irish administration in Dublin 
Castle appeared increasingly abnormal.  Simply abolishing the lord lieutenancy, 
which had been regularly proposed, was no longer reform enough.  The urgent need to 
fundamentally recast the Irish administration was admitted on all sides and so had no 
politically divisive implications.  None could have opposed a proposal to compel the 
Irish themselves to pay the cost of the reforms that they now constantly demanded.6  
Had Gladstone presented Irish home rule as a necessary and long overdue reform of 
Dublin Castle administration, rather than as an historical mission to redress ancient 
wrongs inflicted on the Irish nation, he probably would have succeeded in getting it 
passed by parliament.  Scattered throughout his great introductory speech of 8th April 
1886 there is an argument that ought to have been presented as a coherent whole, 
which linked legislative reform with the universally admitted necessity of 
administrative reform.  Ireland had for many years the benefit of the best 
administrative heads, in the post of chief secretary, that England could send and yet 
these men could not command the allegiance of the Irish people because the ‘motor 
muscle’ as Gladstone called it, was English and not Irish.  A home rule assembly 
would provide that Irish muscle to deliver administrative reform. 7   Later in the 
speech, in a brief reference to the civil service, Gladstone made it clear that reform of 
                                                
4 A.B. Cooke & John Vincent, The Governing Passion Cabinet Government and Party Politics in 
Britain 1885-86 (1974) p111. 
5 C.D.H. Howard (ed) A political memoir 1880-92 by Joseph Chamberlain, p.136-7. 
6 Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation, p673-4; Jackson, Home Rule, pp63-4.  
7 Hansard’s Parliamentary debates Third Series, CCCIV, 8 April 1886, cols 1050-51. 
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the administration by an Irish legislative body would mean economy and 
retrenchment in an already absurdly expensive system.8       
Comparing the 1886 and 1893 home rule bills it is again apparent that the 
unchanging core objective was not the proposal to devolve legislative authority, but 
rather the determination to reduce the ability of an Irish executive to draw on the 
British Treasury.  The legislative body went through radical changes.  Kendle lists 
seven significant ways in which the later 1893 proposal differed to that of 1886.9  But 
in contrast to woolliness on legislative structures, Gladstone showed determination on 
limiting the ability of an expansionary Irish state to draw from the British Treasury.10  
It is clear that despite the rhetoric of “God’s Judgement on England” and “Justice for 
Ireland”, Gladstone’s primary objective was financial rather than legislative autonomy 
for Ireland.  In fact Ireland was to be made pay for the services of the British civil 
service under Home Rule.  The financial clauses of the 1886 bill imposed a prior 
annual charge on the Irish budget of £110,000 for the “imperial civil service” in 
Ireland.  These were the non-transferred departments such as customs or the ordnance 
survey, thus charging the Irish taxpayer for the privilege of imperial rule.  Had 
Gladstone presented home rule as a necessary first step toward essential 
administrative reforms then it would have been better argued and achieved greater 
success.  A Gladstonian moral purpose of teaching the Irish frugal self-government 
would have been more popular than righting historic English wrongs, whilst 
compelling the Irish to carry the odium of future administrative failure would have 
promised a neat turning of the tables.  
                                                
8 Ibid., cols 1072-3. 
9 John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution the debate over the United Kingdom Constitution 
1870-1921 (1989) p75. 
10 Jackson, Home Rule, pp82-3. 
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 The pursuit of cheap government in Ireland was expected to bear down 
especially hard on the Irish civil service.  As he prepared the 1886 home rule proposal 
one of the immediate benefits Gladstone anticipated was that it would free the British 
state of a large part of the cost of the Irish civil service.  In apologising to his 
chancellor Lord Herschell for the 'very good pecuniary terms' offered to civil servants 
by the 1886 bill Gladstone point out that the British exchequer 'shall be well paid in 
being relieved from the constantly growing charge of the Irish civil service and in the 
reversion of a large part of that very claim upon our money'.11  As the bill was being 
discussed at cabinet amongst the cardinal points agreed was that civil government 
would continue as it was until altered by arrangement, with some protection for the 
Dublin civil servants when those inevitable alterations did occur.12  Gladstone 
indicated that to 'meet the case of the civil service' he envisaged a provision to fix the 
compensation that might be given to persons dismissed by the new Irish government, 
suggesting that he expected a significant number of such dismissals.13  Earl Spencer, 
lord lieutenant of Ireland, suggested that the legislation ought to contain 'a better 
refuge for civil servants who may be driven out by the new Government of Ireland'.14  
James Bryce MP, the former Professor of Law at Oxford, suggested a clause to 
maintain the civil service unchanged for three years, with provision thereafter to retire 
on pension.15  In introducing the bill Gladstone’s initial suggestion was that the civil 
service would be retained for two years only, to ensure stability.  After the two years 
both parties, the civil service and the Irish government, would be ‘free to negotiate 
afresh’.16 
                                                
11Matthews, Gladstone Diaries, XI, p.524, 'Gladstone to Lord Herschell 4 Apr, 2886'. 
12Cooke and Vincent, Governing Passion, p.395. 
13'Matthews, Gladstone Diaries, XI, 525, 'Gladstone to Lord Herschell 5 Apr. 1886'. 
14 Gordon (ed) The Red Earl, p112, Lord Spencer to Lord Herschell 5 April 1886 ' 
15NLI, ms. 11,009, Bryce papers, 'observations on legal points connected with the home rule bill'. 
16Hansard’s  Parliamentary Debates Third Series, CCV, col 1072-38, April 1886. 
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In the initial draft of the home rule bill under the heading "civil powers" 
Gladstone envisaged that the Irish assembly should have complete power to pass 'any 
bill touching civil offices in Ireland and the mode of appointment thereto'.  Under the 
heading "executive powers" he provided that all the civil appointments already made 
would continue unchanged until altered by statute, except that the costs would now be 
charged upon the consolidated fund for Ireland.17  Thus there was generally expected, 
and accepted, that a home rule government would have complete control of its civil 
service and that this would lead to a significant reduction in numbers.  
 In the 1886 bill sections 28, 29 and 30 dealt with the civil servants.18  Section 
28 expressly stated that the Irish civil service would continue to hold the same offices, 
with the same or analogous duties, at the same salaries, allowances and pensions as 
before but the cost to be charged to Irish custom and excise receipts or to the 
consolidated funds.  Section 29 provided for voluntary retirement, but after only two 
years of service under the home rule government, a year less than suggested by Bryce, 
perhaps to ensure finality and to meet the possibility of the return of a Conservative 
government in the next general election.  Pensions in the cases of retiring or dismissed 
civil servants were to be calculated by the Treasury according to the never completed 
fourth schedule.  Section 30 provided that existing pensions would so far as possible 
be drawn out of Irish revenues. It is clear that the main concern in drafting the bill was 
to ensure that the Irish parliament would bear the future cost of the Irish civil service 
plus any pensions consequent on dismissals, thus ensuring a prudent and cautious 
approach to both dismissals and recruitment.  In doing that Gladstone may well have 
been responding in part to the fears of the Irish Unionists.  In February their 
parliamentary leader Major Saunderson had outlined their objections to home rule.  
                                                
17Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, XI, 671-2, 31 March 1886. 
18A bill to amend the provision for the future government of Ireland [49 Vict.] 
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Acknowledging that the question of whether home rule would be good or bad for 
Ireland was, in itself, a matter of opinion, he forcefully outlined his objections to the 
home rulers themselves and his fear that once in control of the administration they 
would make a total sweep of all appointments and re-introduce the worst evils of 
corrupt patronage appointments.19 
 The 1886 home rule bill did not reflect any analysis of the function of an Irish 
administration; it contained no provision for any ministerial or departmental structures 
but simply proposed to distribute the government of Ireland between Dublin and 
imperial administrations.  Clearly it was expected that the vast bulk of the civil 
service in Ireland would be transferred to the home rule administration.  When asked 
for a list of the civil appointments which would be ‘put at the disposal of the Irish 
government’ Morley, the chief secretary Ireland, indicated that the intention was that 
'the whole of the Irish civil service would be transferred, with the exception of those 
who may be in the service of the imperial government', though he assured 'provision 
was made for those whose service may be dispensed with'.20  Four days later when 
pressed by Leighton to list the government departments that would be transferred to 
the Dublin government, Morley remained quite vague, indicating that the answer 
depended on the view that would be taken by an Irish executive of its requirements.  
Leighton’s suggested list of departments and services may be taken as indicative of 
those to be transferred.  If his comprehensive list was accurate, and Morley did not 
suggest that it wasn’t, then the only services that were to be retained as imperial were 
the geological survey, the ordnance survey and customs and excise.  In terms of 
personal and grades those transferred would include heads of departments, superior 
appointments, clerical staff, servants and messengers.  Morley also referred briefly to 
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a problem that was to become more intractable; what exactly was a “civil servant”?  
Morley offered three qualifications of a civil servant; an official whose whole salary 
is voted by parliament, whose whole time is at the disposal of the public and whose 
appointment carries a pension or gratuity.21  As was to become apparent that neat 
definition did not even approach the reality of the Irish civil service.          
 During the 1886 debate Randolph Churchill pointed out the difficulty that 
would follow handing the civil service over to an Irish executive.  Sir Henry James, 
the Liberal Unionist jurist, took up this point again in the 1893 debate.  With an Irish 
parliament and executive in charge of the civil service in Ireland, the British state 
would have no instrument, apart from the military, to enforce its theoretically supreme 
authority in the event of a disagreement with the Irish government.  Making the will 
of a British minister prevail in a ‘home rule’ Ireland would be a ‘bitter struggle’.22  Sir 
James presciently anticipated the dilemma of the British government in the aftermath 
of the formation of Dáil Éireann in 1919, when it became apparent that the only 
instrument available to the state was the military.   
Civil servants, it was axiomatic, would always support a government policy, 
even if they disagreed with it.  The Dublin civil servants seemed to have been ill-
prepared for the 1886 home rule bill.  Some, no doubt, could anticipate improved 
promotional prospects.  There was some home rule sympathy at the top of the Castle 
bureaucracy; E.G.Jenkinson the head of the Criminal Investigation Division, and Sir 
Robert Hamilton the under-secretary, were considered very pronounced home rulers 
during the caretaker ministry of 1885.23  On his appointment as under-secretary 
Hamilton had been considered one of the best civil servants in Whitehall.24  However 
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for the lower ranks the emphasis which the Liberal government put upon economy, 
and the virtual certainty as it seemed of wholesale dismissals by an Irish government 
wholly dependent on its own financial resources, can only have been threatening.  In 
concrete terms what the bill offered the Irish civil service, in a relatively mean-
spirited “severance package” to use current terminology, was nothing more than 
security for pensions already earned.  The best that the civil servants could hope for 
was an improvement in the terms of that severance package.  However during the 
protracted 1886 home rule debate it became apparent that the Irish civil service as a 
whole had few political friends and the treatment of the civil service failed to make an 
impact on the debate.  Any project of reform that hopes to succeed should not begin 
by undermining the system that it seeks to replace.  Unfortunately for the Irish civil 
service this was not the case and there was a general cross-party agreement that, 
whatever about the political merits of home rule, the Irish administration was in need 
of a thorough shake-up.  The duty of the British state extended no further than making 
sure that that shake-up was not any more painful for the civil servants concerned than 
was necessary.  The bill itself and the debate in the parliament brought home to the 
Irish civil servants their dispensability and separate status within the United Kingdom 
and encouraged a consciousness of that status.  Previous organisation and agitation by 
them as a body had been fitful, focussed on pay, and conducted under the hostile eye 
of the Treasury.25  The 1886 bill touched on fundamental issues of security and status 
and yet the Irish civil service proved slow to react.  Luckily the 1886 bill failed, but 
the continuance of the home rule debate necessitated, and made acceptable, the 
emergence of a more organised Irish civil service representation. The fact was that 
despite being a tradition-laden service civil servants had no rights as such, all were 
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employed “at the pleasure of the crown” liable to be dismissed at any time without 
notice or redress.  Under the Superannuation Acts civil servants were pensionable but 
nevertheless had no absolute right to a pension.  Pensions remained as granted by 
grace and favour.  The security enjoyed by civil servants was based on the good faith 
and practice of the government, which any cynic within the Irish civil service might 
justly set at nought.  The fate of Sir Robert Hamilton was a further lesson on the 
fundamentally insecure status of the Irish civil service as well as a warning that it 
would be a foolish civil servant that became too closely identified with government 
policy.  When Hamilton, a Scotsman in the admiralty, took the post of under-secretary 
after the murder of Burke he had been acclaimed for his courage and sense of duty.  
Thereafter however, to Irish Unionist eyes, he became too closely identified with a 
policy of conciliation to the National League.  In the home rule debate Nationalists 
often cited him as a supporter and advisor to Gladstone.  With the defeat of the home 
rule bill The Times began a campaign to have him removed from the Irish under-
secretaryship, though this was now a post considered part of the permanent civil 
service.  Despite the opposition of Lord Lingen of the Treasury and of some few 
supporters from within the Irish civil service, who were alarmed that a civil servant 
would be punished for too enthusiastically supporting government policy, Hamilton 
was kicked upstairs to become governor of Tasmania.  This was about as far away 
from Ireland as he could be posted.  In fairness it ought to be noted however that most 
Irish civil servants, who feared being driven out by a National League government 
precisely because they would not be seen as supporters, would have had little 
sympathy for Hamilton who at least secured a better post and was assured a generous 
pension.26   
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With the return of the Liberals to government in 1892 a second home rule 
proposal was expected.  The new chief secretary for Ireland, John Morley, was under 
pressure from the Irish MPs T.M. Healy and William O'Brien who had been 
advocating a different strategy for the Irish administration since the failure of the 
1886 home rule proposal.  Instead of waiting for a successful home rule act to 
transform the Irish government they had been separately urging executive use of the 
power of patronage to eradicate unionist power in Dublin Castle through the 
recruitment and promotion of Catholic nationalists as civil servants.27                
The Irish civil servants' fear of the 1893 home bill went much deeper than 
McBride’s suggestion of a simple distrust of the future integrity and goodwill of the 
Nationalist leaders.28  In framing the second home rule bill Gladstone was even more 
vehement on the necessity to reduce the cost of the Irish civil service.  In July 1892 in 
correspondence with Lord Spencer he referred to the need to fundamentally recast the 
administration in Dublin Castle.29  In cabinet Gladstone stated as one of the principles 
of the home rule bill that it must achieve savings in the cost of the Irish civil service.30  
Introducing the second reading of the bill he returned once again to the theme of the 
cost of the Irish civil service, describing it as 'incredibly, almost immeasurable 
wasteful' and asserting that 'the civil government of Ireland costs twice as much per 
head as that of the greater country'.31  George Trevelyan, Scottish secretary and son of 
the reforming civil servant of the 1850s, further developed this theme.  In answer to 
the opposition taunt that, in creating a new parliament and a new executive, the home 
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rule bill rather than make any savings would double expenditure, Trevelyan 
minimised the probable cost of the new parliament. Pointing out that Ireland already 
had an executive he then detailed the scope for savings in the administration, where 
'very large economies' could be made even taking account of the cost of pensions for 
retired civil servants.  Trevelyan insisted that 'there is everywhere a field for 
economy, which will endure long after these temporary pensions have passed away’.32  
Thus it was absolutely clear that home rule would and must mean a steep reduction in 
the size of the Irish civil service and therefore dismissals on a large scale.  This 
insistence that the Irish civil service was over-manned and due a severe reduction 
raised in the mind of every individual civil servant the question as to whether he 
would himself be retained.  It was the seemingly virtual certainty of dismissals that 
was foremost in the minds of the Irish civil service as they began to organise a 
response to the second home rule bill.   
 The 1893 bill, as first introduced to the House of Commons in February, 
provided that the permanent civil servants of the crown would continue to receive the 
same salaries, gratuities, and pensions and be required to perform the same duties or 
analogous duties as before for a transitional period of three years.  After the three 
years the officers might retire, or might be required to retire by the Irish government, 
on terms which would be in accordance with the fifth schedule of the bill, which 
remained blank.33  Though the language of the bill might imply that those civil 
servants who were retained would retain their status and conditions, Morley, the Chief 
Secretary Ireland, made it absolutely clear that there could be no guarantee of 
continuance of current conditions or status beyond the transitional period.34  After the 
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transition period the Castle apparatus was on its own and could anticipate a “clean 
sweep” when full authority was passed to an Irish executive.  For the civil servants 
who were retained after the transition period their situation would be that they would 
cease to be servants of Her Majesty and would be starting afresh with a new 
government with whom they would have to bargain anew.  The second division clerks 
of the Irish civil service, though almost certain to face a dramatic reduction in 
numbers, had the security that they were, since the Playfair reforms, the servants of 
the civil service commissioners of the United Kingdom and would be therefore 
entitled to re-deployment within Great Britain, should they not be required by the 
Irish government.  Their agitation, taken up by Horace Plunkett, aimed to secure some 
gratuity upon dismissal to compensate them for the disturbance that would follow 
their necessary move to Britain, and for the loss of prospects.  When Plunkett moved 
his amendment to compensate the second division clerks for disturbance, at a point in 
the debate when the argument was about compensation for civil servants dismissed 
with no prospects, it was ridiculed on all sides and quickly withdrawn.35   
The agitation amongst, and on behalf of, the Irish civil service arose mainly 
amongst the relatively small number of higher civil servants, the heads of 
departments and senior officials, and included the professional grades, about five 
hundred in all.36  This represents a highly conscious organisation at the top levels of 
the Irish administrative apparatus.  As a result of their campaign the impact of the 
home rule bill on the Irish civil service received a much wider debate, and greater 
sympathy, than had been the case in the 1886 bill.  With the first reading of the bill a 
delegate 'Committee of Permanent Civil Servants in Ireland' was formed, numbering 
eighty in all, elected by and representing virtually every profession, grade, 
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department and office of the Irish administration.37  Though the Treasury continued 
to refuse to countenance any trade union organisation within the civil service as a 
whole, the question of what protection and pensions would be offered to Irish civil 
servants in the proposed home rule legislation was allowed to become the key issue 
organising and mobilising those civil servants.   
 At the request of the civil service committee Morley delayed the publication of 
the schedule setting out the compensation terms for the Irish civil servants.38  On the 1 
of April the civil service delegation, led by George Morris of the LGB and composed 
of some of the highest-ranking civil servants in Dublin Castle met with Morley.39  
They carried a list of suggested amendments to the bill, designed to protect the 
interests of the Irish civil service.  It was generally supposed that an Irish government 
would purge the civil service, with every encouragement from the British 
government, and that the role of the legislation was to guarantee pension entitlements.  
The legislation was framed as if home rule was a standard abolition of a government 
department.  Such abolitions had become more usual within British administration.  
Abolition terms offered security for pensions already earned and usually also offered 
additional years as compensation for loss of office.  As well as fighting for better 
terms for abolished offices the committee wanted to include an option for civil 
servants who did not wish to serve a Nationalist executive to retire voluntarily with 
compensation.  They also wanted additional compensation for professionally qualified 
civil servants who had abandoned private practice to enter government service.  The 
committee was also unhappy that the Treasury retained ultimate discretion over the 
decisions on all pensions awarded.  Thus the strategy adopted by the civil service 
committee was to accept the government view that home rule was, administratively 
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speaking, a process of departmental abolition and to fight for the best terms possible.  
With the publication of the fifth schedule, it became clear that though the terms on 
offer to the civil service were an improvement on those of 1886 the improvements 
were minimal.40  The civil service committee had requested that officers forced to 
retire should get a pension equivalent to three-fourths of his salary if he had less than 
twenty-five years service, along with a gratuity of one year’s salary.  If the length of 
service was over twenty-five years then a pension should be equal to his salary at the 
date of retirement.  Where an officer was not forced but still opted for retirement then 
a pension should be granted, depending on length of service, of one-half to three-
fourths of salary.  What the government offered was a pension varying from one-
seventh to two-thirds of salary, with no gratuities, and an absolute limit of two-thirds 
of pay on any pension awarded.   
For the professional civil servants the committee also wanted a facility for 
calculating added years for professionally qualified persons who had left practices in 
order to take up government employment, but this was not granted.  Nor were they 
offered, as they asked, that those civil servants kept on by the Irish government would 
retain the option to retire at any point in the future.  The committee also wanted some 
guarantee from the United Kingdom government, with whom after all they had some 
sort of contract of employment, for the salaries and pensions of civil servants retained 
under any home rule administration.  But at the same time the committee retained a 
deep distrust of the Treasury and its discretionary powers in regard to pensions, which 
were all retained in the legislation.  What the civil servants wanted in summary, were 
guarantees as to status, salary and pensions, and security for any future salaries and 
pensions which would be dependent on the votes of an Irish legislature, which meant 
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therefore some sort of continuing imperial guarantee.  What the civil servants did get 
was an increase in the transition period from three to five years.  They also got a 
useful innovation in the shape of a joint committee of the Treasury and the Irish 
government with the power to determine claims of wrongful dismissal brought by 
civil servants against the Irish executive during the five years.  Though the civil 
servants of 1893 did not yet see the potential of this joint committee, the monopoly on 
civil service matters enjoyed by the Treasury had been broken.41 
 The Committee of Permanent Civil Servants in Ireland then prepared a very 
detailed and substantial 'response to the government proposals on home rule as 
regards the effect on civil servants', and despatched the chairman, T.W. Grimshaw 
and the secretary, Arnold Graves to London, to begin a political lobby at 
Westminster.42  In comparing the points in the civil servants’ own response and the 
points made by the Conservatives in debate it is apparent that these Irish civil servants 
were very effective lobbyists.  As well as relentlessly pushing the demand for 
enhanced security, even to the extent of pensions at full pay for those compelled to 
retire, and arguing against the government proposals line by line, the civil service 
response also made a general statement of the sense of grievance felt by the Irish civil 
service.  The theme running through their statement is that it was the permanent status 
of the employment that induced most, if not all, civil servants into service.  This was 
especially true of professionally qualified men who had exchanged the possibilities of 
advancement in a private career for the securities of a civil service position. With the 
government speakers all suggesting that large reductions would have to be made in 
the Irish establishment, and that a large number of civil servants would be retired at 
the same time, most of them could not hope to gain employment in a poor country 
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like Ireland.  Many, confident of secure lifetime employment, had taken out leases on 
property and insured their lives and undertaken other responsibilities which, on the 
terms offered, they could not afford to sustain.   
 The civil service statement wanted better compensation for the ordinary civil 
servants, more generous terms for the many professionals who had been recently 
recruited in the many new posts created in recent years, and better commutation terms 
for those who opted to capitalise their pensions and thus begin a new career.  They 
wanted also the option for civil servants to transfer to England to analogous posts.  
The threat was also implied that the entire body of civil servants, faced with the 
choice of an inadequate but secure imperial pension if they choose to retire 
immediately, or an unsecured future salary from an Irish government, would choose 
retirement now, thus denuding the administration of all its experienced officers.43              
 The second reading debate opened with the fifth schedule, which detailed the 
terms on which civil servants would be compensated on retirement, still blank.44 
Much the most effective and cynical use of the question of the Irish civil servants was 
made by A.J. Balfour who, when he was formerly Conservative chief secretary for 
Ireland, had been contemptuous of their abilities.  During the second reading he 
travelled to Dublin to speak at a meeting of the Irish Unionist Alliance at the Leinster 
Hall.  The main and best point he made was that strictly speaking there was no such 
thing as an "Irish" or "English" or "Scottish" civil servants, all were imperial civil 
servants in a single civil service not divided by nationalities.  This was true for the 
mass of the second division clerks, but for the rest of the Irish civil service it was not 
true. The Irish civil service, it had been long maintained by commentators, was 
anomalous and the boards, which were the mainstay of the Irish administration, were 
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largely an Irish device.  Nonetheless the point was well made and received with 
cheers.  In condemning the plan to hand the Irish civil service over to 'their deadliest 
and most determined enemies', many of the points he made were taken from the Irish 
civil servants statement; emphasising the betrayal of the implied exchange of low pay 
for security and a pension, the destruction of chances of promotion, the burden of 
commitments entered into in the expectation of a life-long career which would be 
unsustainable on the terms of compensation offered.45  The Times took up these points 
and, repeating the theme that the civil servants were officials of the imperial service, 
linked the 'shameful betrayal of the landlords' (a reference to the land purchase acts) 
with the 'abandonment of the civil servants of the Crown'.46  The presence of at least 
one senior civil servant at the Leinster Hall meeting was raised in the House of 
Commons, but the cheers that Balfour’s eulogy of the Irish civil service raised 
indicates that there were a great many more of them present.47      
 The committee stage on the civil service clause 28 and the related schedule, 
which the government might have hoped would be relatively non-controversial and 
therefore brief, took a full three days of debate from the 17th to the 19th of July.  As 
the debate progressed it grew more and more fractious.  Morley, in introducing the 
clause admitted that the terms were not acceptable to the civil servants affected but 
that, whilst he felt a responsibility to be fair, equitable and generous to the civil 
service, he was bound not to impose an unreasonable or excessive load of financial 
responsibility on the Irish government.  Morley offered as guiding principles for the 
clause that the civil servants were to be protected from capricious dismissal or 
reductions in salary whilst the Irish government had to be protected from sudden en 
masse retirement and from a sullen and inefficient service.  To meet this principle the 
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bill gave de facto control to the Treasury of the number of civil servants that might 
resign or be required to resign, for five years.  The scales for calculating 
compensation payment for those civil servants either dismissed or who choose to 
resign within the five-year period, though based on the standard abolition terms, were 
generous in the extent to which they exceeded those terms.  A civil servant with 
twenty five years service could opt to retire on a pension of two-thirds of the salary he 
would have reached at the end of the five year transition period, even if he choose to 
retire immediately.48       
   The Unionist opposition attacked the clause from two directions.  Firstly, the 
Irish Unionists put the case for expanding the class of civil servant included in the 
clause.  Plunkett’s case for the second division clerks was, as we have seen, dismissed 
on all sides as contradictory, but the Ulster Unionists put a strong case for the 12,000 
national school teachers or at least those of them who were Protestant.  Secondly the 
Conservatives, taking up a theme of the Irish Civil Service Committee, returned again 
and again to the implicit contract between government and civil service and the 
breach of faith that home rule entailed.  A.J Balfour began by refusing to accept that 
home rule was simply a departmental reconstruction.  It was, he insisted, a great 
official revolution in which there would be a vengeful clearing out of the Castle under 
the guise of economy and that therefore the terms on offer were wholly inadequate as 
compensation.  His amendment proposed that all dismissed or resigned civil servants 
would have a right of relocating to a corresponding post in England or Scotland.  
Randolph Churchill and T.W Russell supported the theme of a breach of the rights of 
civil servants, their “freehold” in office.  Gladstone, Morley and Fowler of course 
vehemently denied the very concept of civil servants having any “rights”, nonetheless 
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government amendments tended to extend the security offered to the Irish civil 
servants, thus granting the effect whilst denying the fact of “rights”.  This in turn 
infuriated both Liberals and Irish Nationalists.  Labouchere worked himself into a 
fury at the thought of a legion of Irish ex-civil servants living lives of pensioned 
idleness because they happened to dislike government policy.  The Nationalist MPs 
Hayden and Clancy exposed the contradictions in the compensatory clause.  The very 
foundation of the home rule case was that Ireland was inefficiently administered 
under the British regime.  Since Gladstone’s 1886 bill it had been asserted without 
contradiction that Ireland was burdened by an expensive and bloated apparatus and 
that home rule addressed that problem by substituting native rule for Castle 
misgovernment.  Logically therefore it was Britain ought to pay any compensation 
offered to their imposed, inefficient and superfluous civil servants.  The whole 
tendency of the government was to erode the already small Irish budgetary surplus by 
saddling the Irish executive with a burden of compensation created by British 
misgovernment.  The anxiety of the government to assuage the fears of the Irish civil 
service did lead to one extraordinary innovation.  Morley, to meet the anomalous case 
of model schoolteachers and petty session clerks, introduced an amendment to include 
any officer who ‘though not in the permanent Civil Service, is in the public service of 
the Crown’ within the terms of compensation.49  This new category ‘the public service 
of the Crown’ was extremely vague and once introduced had the potential to expand 
endlessly.  For instance, it was a category that could and would be successfully 
applied later to the servants of the CDB and the education boards.50  It was apparent 
that the tendency of the debate was for the opposition to agree with the government in 
any amendment that enhanced civil service security or enlarged the categories entitled 
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to compensation, much to the fury of the Irish Nationalists who could see the meagre 
Irish surplus disappearing in pensions.         
By any measure the Irish civil service could be pleased with its progress 
during the home rule debate of 1893.  An organisation was formed which had lobbied 
a reluctant chief secretary and had succeeded in making the status and security of the 
Irish civil service an issue of debate.  Intense political lobbying by civil servants, 
which formerly had been considered gross insubordination at best and subversion at 
worst, had been recognised and accepted in the Irish case.51  The separate interests of 
the Irish civil servants, it had been indirectly admitted, were not guarded adequately 
either by the Treasury or by the government.  The government had been made to offer 
some significant improvements in the terms of the bill, but this had been mainly in 
extending those civil service grades covered by the terms.  Civil servants might not, in 
strict terms, have ‘rights’ but Irish civil servants had secured protection for something 
that looked sufficiently like rights as to make the term not worth quarrelling over.  
However a significant setback had to be recorded in their failure to make the 
government offer any concession on the transition period of five years.  Had the 1893 
home rule bill succeeded the Irish civil service would have been faced with the choice 
of either opting for such terms of retirement as were offered within five years or 
forgoing them altogether.  A more permanent guarantee remained an unrealised 
objective.  There is no doubt that home rule weakened civil service loyalty to the state 
by introducing an element of conditionality to a relationship that had hitherto seemed 
as permanent as the state itself. 
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However with the defeat of the 1893 bill, home rule seemed to have passed 
into history.  Parnell was already dead and his political party was tearing itself apart in 
the bitter divisions brought on by the O'Shea divorce and Parnell's tragic final 
struggle.  Gladstone, the sponsor of two attempts to pass a home rule measure for 
Ireland, retired and his Liberal party retreated from its commitment to Irish home rule.  
After the failure of the second home rule bill Morley, the Irish chief secretary, was 
still convinced that the only effective reform of Irish government would be home rule 
and did not attempt any significant changes in the way the Irish administration 
functioned.  He reverted to the strategy of O'Brien and Healy and concentrated on the 
'reduction of the old Protestant Ascendancy' through the recruitment and advancement 
of Catholics.52  The 1895 general election returned the Conservatives to power. 
 Though the home rule proposals remained the most significant issue 
driving civil service trade organisation in Ireland, the impulse to organise was aided 
by a general rise of trade union organisation that followed the expansion of the civil 
service as a whole. The Committee of Permanent Civil Servants in Ireland continued 
as an informal body, but the Treasury procedure of representation through heads of 
departments was strictly applied and the civil servants looked once again to their own 
occupational or grade organisations to forward their interests.  The most useful 
weapon available to the civil servant was the House of Commons question.  
Politicising the issue of civil service pay and conditions was easy amongst MPs who 
were only too happy to be given issues on which to attack the Treasury secretary.  
Parliamentary questions could be used to force an issue into the public domain, to 
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compel the Treasury to make a statement, or best of all, to make commitments.  In 
these parliamentary sessions the Treasury usually had no friends.53 
The long-standing demand of civil service organisations was that the Treasury 
should cease hiding behind departmental heads, playing off one department and grade 
against another, and agree to direct negotiations with the representative bodies of the 
civil service.  In 1902 the assistant clerks in Dublin Castle met to discuss a recent 
revision of their pay scales.  It was agreed that the Treasury in London be informed of 
the inadequacy of the revision.  It was also agreed that the assistant clerks of 
Edinburgh and London should be invited to join in rejecting the pay offer.  Out of this 
Dublin initiative the Assistant Clerks Association (ACA) was formed in March 1903, 
the rootstock of the Civil and Public Services Association of today.54  At the same 
time the Inland Revenue officers were organising in the National Excise Federation.55  
The Inland Revenue officers attempted to politicise the issue of civil service pay by 
demanding a standing committee of the House of Commons on the question.  In 1911 
a conference, which represented the great mass of civil servants of the whole of the 
United Kingdom, agreed to establish a federation to agitate as a single body and 
present a united front against the Treasury refusal to engage in service-wide 
negotiation.  In response the Prime Minister Asquith conceded a Royal Commission 
chaired by Sir Antony MacDonnell to inquire into the civil service.   
The MacDonnell commission was overtaken by the First World War but its 
recommendation that all civil servants of the administrative class should enjoy a 
common salary scale and be transferable across the service was adopted.  Other key 
recommendations, which were also overtaken by the war, were firstly that an 
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establishment division should be created within the Treasury, and an establishment 
officer be appointed within each department of government to sanction rates of pay, 
control salaries and to issue general regulations for the service and secondly for 
formal procedures should be established for negotiation, arbitration and conciliation 
within the civil service.56  It is against this background of a general rise in agitation 
and organisation within the civil service, and the emergence of a demand for the 
Treasury to concede centralised wage bargaining, that the Irish civil service fought the 
re-emergence of the home rule issue during the third home rule crisis.  During this 
period the character of the Irish civil service was also changing as it became a much 
more professionalised body.     
Under the Conservative policy of “Killing Home Rule By Kindness” the 
British state in Ireland took on the task of becoming a development agency.  New 
departments were created, such as the DATI, the CDB, the ILC and the LGB.  Apart 
from an increase in the number of bureaucratic functionaries these new departments 
also required a growing number of professional staff such as lawyers, engineers, 
architects, valuers, agricultural scientists and instructional experts to oversee land 
reform, or social and agricultural development.  New duties were added to an existing 
post where possible otherwise a new position was created.  The DATI absorbed the 
officials of the Veterinary Department and the Inspectors of Irish Fisheries whilst also 
being made responsible for the supervision and control of the National Museum, the 
National Library, the Metropolitan School of Art, the National Botanic Gardens and 
the new Royal College of Science; all institutions staffed largely by professional or 
technical civil servants.  The DATI usually had about seventy professionally qualified 
officials.  One of the biggest employers of professional civil servants was the Board 
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of Works, which engaged hundreds of surveyors and engineers.  The ILC grew out of 
the 1881 land courts and its professional civil service was dominated by solicitors and 
land valuers engaged in assessing fair rents.  Between 1885 and 1914 its staff had 
grown from 120 to 560.57  The LGB, nominally under the chief secretary Ireland, 
appointed its own staff to deal with the supervision of the laws on public health, local 
government and the relief of poverty.  The CDB with its own budget and the power to 
appoint its own staff was the most independent of the government departments.  In 
1912 a new department was added to the Dublin administration, the Irish National 
Health Insurance Commission (NHIC), to administer old age pensions and the new 
labour exchanges.   
Many of these new posts that demanded some sort of professional 
qualification could not be filled by competitive examination.  The practice grew of the 
Civil Service Commissioners recruiting by limited competition, or substituting 
professional qualifications for a qualifying examination, or recruiting by nomination.  
Inspectors in the LGB were typical of such posts for which it was considered that 
professional medical qualifications rather than the ordinary competitive examination 
would be appropriate.  Inspectors were required to travel a great deal, carrying out 
duties under various sanitary, town improvements, local government, or poor law 
acts.  They were also, it was argued, required to possess exceptional tact in advising 
local elected bodies and therefore required qualities not ascertained by an open 
competitive examination.58  Most of these professional appointments, if not all, were 
in effect patronage appointments at the gift of the political establishment.  Thus the 
Irish administration grew as a scattering of many different boards, offices and 
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departments, each recruiting its own specialised staff to deal with specific problems, 
each to a greater or lesser degree committed to social transformation but none 
concerned with wider areas of major policy and administration.59  
With the return of the Conservatives to power in 1895 and the retirement of 
Gladstone, home rule was now a faint and receding prospect.  Nationalists therefore 
turned their attention to the existing Irish administration.  The recruitment policy of 
Dublin Castle came under intense scrutiny as pressure was brought to bear on the 
notoriously nepotistic administration to open up positions in the civil service to 
Catholics.  The leading voice in this campaign was the Leader newspaper of David 
Patrick Moran.  For Moran the central struggle in Ireland was not between the Irish 
and the English but between Catholic and Protestant.  Moran's watchful campaign on 
job placements in the government posts and his vigorous denunciations of Protestant 
dominance of the professional and higher levels of the civil service was very popular 
with an ambitious but frustrated Catholic middle class.60   
 In 1903, on the hundredth anniversary of Robert Emmet's rebellion, his 
descendent Thomas Addis Emmet published his History of Ireland under English 
Rule in which he detailed how every appointment that was made by nomination (most 
of which were professional appointments) went to a Protestant, in contrast to the 
lower posts filled by competitive examination, which went to Catholics.61  For the 
professional civil servants these accusations were an embarrassment, particularly 
where they were correct.62  In his evidence to the MacDonnell commission Sir Henry 
Robinson admitted quite frankly that all the professional outdoor staff in the LGB 
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were patronage appointments.63  The clerks of the RGO complained to MacDonnell 
about patronage appointments within their office.  They instanced work previously 
done by the second-class clerks on promotion that had been professionalised and then 
filled by patronage.64   
Though Robinson dressed up his policy in windy rhetoric about the gains to 
the administration of mixing the national characteristics of the 'solid and sensible 
Englishman, the accurate and cautious Scotchman and the brilliant and resourceful 
Irishman', what was not admitted by Robinson was that these patronage appointments 
were being used to block any advance by the 'brilliant and resourceful' Catholics who 
filled the lower administrative grades.  If seniority was allowed operate then within a 
short space of time the entire Irish civil service would be staffed by Catholics, 
nationalist in sentiment and disaffected to the state.65   
Investigations by a parliamentary committee confirmed that in Ireland 
appointments by qualifying examination to civil service positions were a rarity and 
that the vast majority of the higher civil servants, many of them professionals, were 
appointed by nomination.66  By 1912 there were over forty departments in an Irish 
administration that was run in parallel by Whitehall and by Dublin.  The eleven 
United Kingdom departments run by Whitehall co-existed with the twenty-nine 
wholly Irish departments.  The great developmental departments were managed by 
unpaid boards and were therefore independent of the political head of the Irish 
administration, the chief secretary Ireland. 
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A recurrent complaint of administrative reformers was the lack of coordination 
between these various departments and boards.  Yet whatever popularity the state 
enjoyed in Ireland was due in large part to the activities of the civil servants in those 
very boards.  Whereas it is axiomatic that the primary loyalty of the civil servant is to 
the state, the civil servants who staffed these new boards and departments were 
imbued with a strong ethos of service to the people rather than to the state, and often 
emphasised their distance from the unpopular Dublin Castle administration.  In fact a 
great deal of their time was spent in the field, keeping as much distance as possible 
from Dublin.   Under these departments the idea of the state apparatus as a 
developmental service rather than an instrument of domination began to take on real 
institutional shape.  The CDB was the most popular government department in Ireland 
because it was not identified with Dublin Castle, and the people welcomed its 
officials. However, because civil servants staffed them, these newer government 
departments, though free of Dublin Castle supervision, were subject to the direct 
control of the Treasury in London.   
 Though their distance from Dublin Castle might be of advantage in 
emphasising the non-political work of these departments it did have the disadvantage 
of exposing them to the glare of the Treasury demand for economy.  In the Treasury 
mind all spending was "extravagance" and tight-fistedness prevailed.  In the context 
of Irish policy it required a single-minded departmental chief to ensure that politics 
overrode economy.  The Treasury served its function as it saw it by pursuing the Irish 
departments for "savings".  As the civil servants have long known, the policy of the 
Treasury was a reasoned and sympathetic refusal to any proposal to spend money 
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until pressurised into consent.67  W.L. Micks, the secretary and later historian of the 
CDB was of the opinion that the '...much trouble in Ireland was caused by the unjust 
and penny-wise "policy" of the Treasury'.68   
However the Treasury was strongest in preventing new expenditure and was 
less effective in cutting back established expenditure.  The Treasury found the task of 
curbing the expansion of administration and expenditure, its primary task in Britain, 
impossible in Ireland where the function of the state seemed to be to spend on a vast 
scale.  The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Commons was just as 
unsuccessful in curbing Irish expenditure.  In 1902 the PAC was clearly infuriated by 
unauthorised and excessive expenditure in the Irish departments.  When it was 
pointed out that these departments were all autonomous and there was no single 
official who could answer for them, and that the PAC would have to have all the 
separate accounting officers to London if it wished to pursue the question, it decided   
to retreat.  The Irish accounts became a torture that the PAC had to undergo each year 
and from which it seemed there was no relief.69   Following the election of a Liberal 
government in 1906 there was an immense expansion in state activity within the 
United Kingdom.  This led in turn to a dramatic rise in the number of civil servants, 
virtually tripling between 1891 and 1911.70  In the fifty years between 1861 and 1911, 
when the Irish population declined by 32 per cent, the number of Irish civil servants 
grew by at least 350 per cent.71 
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  In the aftermath of Gladstonian home rule the character of the Irish 
civil service changed with a much more professional and interventionist ethos 
becoming apparent.  The dominance of the legal offices was weakened.  The state 
began to seem less an apparatus of domination over Irish society and more one of 
service.  However the home rule debate had irrevocably broken the close identity 
between the Irish civil service and the state.  Despite the insistence that there was a 
single United Kingdom civil service no civil servant could be in doubt that Ireland 
was different and that the apparatus in Ireland was considered not only separate but 
also dispensable.  Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century, civil servants were 
isolated from all shades of Irish opinion.  Unionists such as Horace Plunkett and Lord 
Dunraven, and Nationalists such as Dillon and Redmond, all agreed that the Irish civil 
service was bloated, inefficient and a barrier to the better government of Ireland, 
whatever form that might take.  All in all, the legitimacy of the British state in Ireland 
(and therefore the state apparatus) was either questioned or nonexistent.  Irish civil 
servants had nonetheless developed considerable organisational ability.  This had 
been in part due to the general rise of white-collar organisations that had spread from 
England into Ireland, but also and most importantly due to the tenor of the home rule 
debate.  The Irish civil service had very quickly learned to think of itself as a 
corporate body united across all ranks by the threat of dismissal implied in the 
rhetoric of the home rule.  On the eve of the third home rule crisis the civil service 
though assailed on all sides had the organisational foundations to withstand the 
assault.     
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‘A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION’: HOME RULE 1912-1914. 
 
Though Ulster Unionist resistance eventually overwhelmed the third home rule bill, it 
was the financial question that initially dominated the debate.  In 1912 government 
spending in Ireland, boosted by enormously expensive developments in national 
insurance, land transfers, congested districts relief, regional development and an old 
age pension, already exceeded Irish revenues by £2 million a year and continued to 
grow.  The immediate, and it seemed insurmountable problem, was how to grant 
executive and financial autonomy to an Ireland that was technically bankrupt.1  
Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-General, was given the task of drawing up the 
financial aspects of the home rule bill, thus separating the financial from the 
constitutional aspects of Irish self-government.  His financial proposals were so 
complex that it was said that only he himself could understand them fully.  However, 
in essence what was proposed was that Ireland should be given a grant of £6 million 
to meet national expenditure, including administrative costs, and would be then 
expected to live within that budget.  The Liberal government thus hoped to use the 
financial provisions of the bill to encourage the Irish to stop looking to London for 
money and learn to govern themselves cheaply.2  It was therefore generally accepted 
that a home rule government would be compelled to reduce its administrative costs by 
rationalising its civil service.  The Castle civil servants had no involvement in 
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 37 
drawing up the 1912 bill nor did Francis Greer the parliamentary draftsman for 
Ireland prepare it.  To enable the Treasury keep a firm grip on the Irish administration 
the bill provided for a strengthened Treasury presence in Dublin.3  Home rule as 
shaped by the 1912 bill was a system of indirect rule with local administrative 
responsibility.  Initial Ulster Unionist opposition to the bill which, constitutionally 
speaking was actually a very modest proposal, concentrated on objecting to the 
control of the Irish civil service being handed over to the Irish government.  Fears 
were expressed about the future of Protestant civil servants and the potential for 
administrative rather than legislative discrimination.4   
However, as Ulster exclusion came to dominate the debate, in contrast to the 
1893 bill, the clauses relating to the civil service in the 1912 bill generated little 
debate in a ‘sparsely filled and languid house’.5  The assumptions that underlay the 
contributions to the debate by Birrell and Redmond were of broad continuity in the 
civil service allied with necessary reductions.  The reason that the civil service clauses 
generated so little debate was the Irish civil service had not waited for the home rule 
proposals but had itself seized the initiative at the earliest opportunity.  In May 1911, 
when it was clear that the Liberal government was committed to bringing in a home 
rule bill, three prominent civil servants; A.R. Barlas, secretary to the LGB, P.E. 
Lemass, secretary to the NEB and Alfred Beckett, chief clerk to the Valuation Office; 
circularised the staff of the government departments with a proposal that the Irish civil 
service should immediately organise in readiness for the home rule bill.  Lemass was 
uncle to Seán Lemass, revolutionary, later Fianna Fáil minister and Taoiseach.  After 
his arrest in 1916 Lemass, when questioned on this relationship, wryly remarked that 
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there were ‘two types in the family’.6   In the circular these civil servants explained 
how they had attempted to meet with Birrell to discuss the implications of any home 
rule legislation for existing officers, but that he had refused on the grounds that a 
meeting would be premature in advance of a definite bill.  Nonetheless, rather than 
wait for when the home rule bill would emerge, they had decided to press ahead with 
the formation of a general committee representative of the government departments.  
This general committee would draw up an authoritative statement of the views of the 
officers as to the safeguards they considered necessary in the event of a home rule bill 
being submitted to parliament.7  Both Barlas and Beckett had been active on the 1893 
committee of the Irish civil service so it might be supposed that the 1911 initiative 
represented simply the reactivation of that committee.  However the new committee 
was in several respects different to that of 1893.  We shall now explore the innovative 
strategy that the 1911 committee represented in three areas; its representative nature, 
its eschewal of political lobbying at parliament in favour of influencing the key 
administrative and political figures; and its success in setting the terms of the civil 
service clauses of the 1912 bill. 
The initial circular emphasised that any committee must have the authority to 
represent the views of the entire service.  It therefore suggested, as a preliminary, the 
formation of a ‘provisional committee consisting of one delegate from each 
department to determine the proportion in which the several classes of civil servant in 
each office should be represented’.  The provisional committee, made up of a 
representative delegate from each department, then decided the number of delegates 
that each department and class should return to the general committee.8   The 1911 
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general committee was therefore very different to that of 1893.  The earlier committee 
was composed of nominated rather than elected delegates and was dominated by 
senior civil servants, one from each department.  It therefore implied that a senior 
officer from any particular department adequately represented the interests and views 
of the whole department.  The elected General Committee of Irish Civil Servants 
(GCICS) that emerged after the meeting of the 8 June 1911 was almost entirely 
composed of newly active representative officers elected by the departmental staffs.  
Of the fifty-three members (later expanded to sixty-eight) only four (or perhaps five) 
had served on the 1893 committee.  Only three of the seventeen-member executive 
committee were former 1893 committee members, though two of that three did 
occupy the key positions of chairman held by Barlas and vice-chairman held by 
Graves.9  Although the Irish administration defied any attempt at precise analysis the 
1911 committee had close to full saturation with representatives from all departments; 
(Appendix. Table1: The Civil Service General Committee 1911 by Departments).  The 
only substantial section of the civil service not represented on the committee were the 
postal workers, however as they had their own organisation, and previous home rule 
bills had always excluded the postal service from the authority of the Irish executive, 
their absence was not significant.  The committee did have representatives from the 
GPO, the administrative core of the postal system in Ireland. 
The general committee was also carefully constructed so as to represent not 
only each government department but also all grades within each department, again a 
marked difference to the 1893 committee.  As can be seen (Appendix. Table 2: The 
Civil Service General Committee by Grades) the intent was not that it should be 
strictly proportionate to the relative size of each department, but that it should be fully 
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representative of each grade within each department.  Thus the same number of 
delegates represented both the department of agriculture and the land commission, 
though the commission had less than half the number of officers.  Each department 
had at least one representative on the committee, but the principle of representation is 
clearer when we examine the delegates for each department.  For the purposes of 
determining departmental delegations the provisional committee divided the service 
into the classes of professional, higher grades, second division, abstractors, temporary 
clerks, lady clerks and, finally, a catch-all “all-grades” class that was used to co-opt 
officers not covered by the other categories, such as Leach of the LGB, or to 
incorporate the entire organisation of the Customs and Excise Federation (CEF).  
Departmental representation was allocated on the basis that each of these grades 
within the department ought to be represented.  Thus the six representatives of the 
land commission were two professional officers, one higher grade, one second 
division, one abstractor and one temporary clerk.  The six representatives of the DATI 
were one professional officer, one higher grade, two second division, one abstractor 
and one temporary clerk.  The number of representatives for each department 
reflected the complexity of the grades within the department rather than simply its 
size. This was an innovative form of civil service organisation in as much as the trade 
unions and associations tended to replicate the hierarchical grading of the civil service 
itself, keeping recruitment within particular grades.  The 1911 committee was 
simultaneously a vertical and horizontal organisation.  The land commission was 
represented by its professional, higher grade, second division and clerical officers, all 
sitting around the same table.  At the same time the professional officers of the land 
commission, or its second division officers, were working with the professional and 
second division officers of the other government departments.  For some, such as 
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Vereker of the CDB and Sloan of the DATI, the 1911 committee was an introduction 
to later civil service trade union organisation.  The committee was financed by a levy 
of 6d (2.5p) for every £50 of annual income of each civil servant member to create a 
fighting fund.  An executive committee was then formed from the general committee.  
The executive committee had three professional officers, three of the higher grades, 
two of the second division, three abstractors, two temporary clerks and two from the 
all-grades class; thus preserving the cross class nature of the general committee.  The 
single representative of the lady clerks marks the hesitant emergence of women civil 
servants’ organisation.  Since 1894 women civil servants (mostly typists) enjoyed the 
same tenure as men so long as they remained single but it remained an ‘understood’ 
thing that they should resign on marriage.  In the Treasury the only policy discussion 
on the status of women civil servants had been on the level of gratuity that ought be 
paid to women on resignation.10   Among the more interesting names on the 
committee is that of John J. Taylor, future under-secretary Ireland, in the “all-grades” 
class and Sam Sloan, who was the leading figure in the organisation of the clerical 
grades in the 1920s, in the second division class.  
      The 1911 GCICS represented a new wave and style of activism 
within the Irish civil service, even though the issue of home rule was by now an old 
one.  Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 1911 committee was that across a 
wide spectrum of grades and departments it succeeded in securing agreement on a 
response to the implications of home rule for the civil service.  The explanation for 
this emphasis on cross-service, representative mobilisation lies not only in the 
previous mobilisations of 1886 and 1893, but also in the growth of trade union or 
quasi-trade union organisation and consciousness within the civil service.  That the 
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committee could demonstrate its representative base proved vital in the committee 
stage of the debate on the civil service clauses.  Just a week before the debate a 
section of Belfast-based civil servants, in a ‘mud-slinging operation’, denied that the 
Dublin committee was in any sense representative of Irish civil servants.  Barlas was 
able to detail to Francis Greer the fully representative membership of the committee 
and to underline the considerable financial outlay made by each civil servant’s 
donation as illustrative of the commitment of the vast majority to its success.11  
In assessing the innovatory aspects of the 1911 GCICS, we may turn next to 
the method of agitation.  In contrast to 1893, the 1911 committee preferred to exercise 
influence within the administrative system to make their views known and win 
concessions, rather than using political pressure through parliamentary questions.  
Birrell placed a lot of emphasis on the many meetings he had held with the Irish civil 
service committee and the extent to which he had endeavoured to meet their fears.12  
The preliminary statement of the civil servants, initially sent to Birrell, found its way 
to Greer and, as we shall see, the legislation was generally shaped to meet their points.  
Barlas kept Greer informed by personal letter of civil service sentiment at each key 
stage.  The letters suggest a frank relationship in which Barlas felt secure that Greer 
could be trusted with confidential disclosures.  In December 1912, when the key civil 
service clauses were coming up for debate in the committee stage at the House of 
Commons, Barlas wrote to Greer to assure him (and Birrell) that though ‘a lot of 
stupid amendments have been put on the order paper…they merely expressed the 
views of individual civil servants in very small sections’.13  During the debate the 
committee of the Irish civil service met to pass a motion expressing support for the 
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government on the clauses in the home rule bill touching on the civil service, support 
which Birrell used to good effect.14          
The final innovatory aspect to the 1911 committee was its decision not to wait 
for the legislation and then reacting to it, but instead to shape it before it emerged into 
the public arena.  In November 1911 the committee was ready to issue a Preliminary 
Statement of Irish Civil Servants as to their position, having regard to contemplated 
legislation dealing with the Government of Ireland.15  The statement began by setting 
down a clear and unambiguous commitment that the Irish civil servants wanted it to 
be clearly understood that as a body they ‘were anxious to continue to work under the 
new Government of Ireland to be established under the Bill, provided that their 
interests are safeguarded as regards tenure of office, remuneration, prospects of 
promotion, and pension rights’.16   What the civil servants wanted was that the status 
quo should be preserved and that civil servants would be ‘liable to perform the same 
duties as heretofore or duties analogous thereto, and should continue to receive the 
same salaries, gratuities and pensions, paid out of the Exchequer of the United 
Kingdom’.17  Having established that the civil service would wish to continue to 
serve, the committee statement then concentrated on securing the best terms for those 
civil servants either compelled to retire by the new Irish government, or who choose 
to retire voluntarily.  The usual protest that what induced civil servants to enter state 
service was security and the promise of a pension, was made more firmly contractual 
rather than moral by extensive quotations from the official Civil Service 
Commissioners circulars.  These circulars promised to successful candidates for civil 
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service posts secure salaries starting at specific amounts, rising to certain maxima by 
definite yearly amounts and with rights to standard pensions on retirement.  Many of 
the Irish civil servants would regard these as definite promises contingent only on 
good behaviour.  The breach of such promises deserved better than usual 
compensation.18 
The position of professional civil servants also demanded better compensation 
than the usual abolition of office terms.  These were men that had entered the service 
of the crown late in life and, in some cases, after abandoning private practice in favour 
of what they had been assured was a secure civil service position.  Other professional 
and permanent officers serving in Dublin were there simply because it happened that 
they had been assigned to Ireland though recruited to the United Kingdom civil 
service.  Many of these were organised in the “all-grades” class of the committee.  
These officers (mostly Englishmen) the committee statement argued, ought in fairness 
be offered the opportunity to transfer to Great Britain and be compensated for the 
expenses connected with removal.  The claims of the temporary civil servants were 
pressed with high moral outrage.  Many of them too old to secure other employment, 
they had served the state well and faithfully in poorly paid posts in the belief that so 
long as there was government work to be done, and they did it well, they would 
continue to be employed despite their temporary status.  It should be borne in mind 
that the key practical difference between temporary and established civil servants was 
that the latter were entitled to a pension and the former were not.  The case that the 
committee was making was that temporary civil servants not retained by the Irish 
government ought in fairness be offered a pension, even though in strict regulation 
they were not entitled to one.  Compulsory retirement would also mean that civil 
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servants who, by implication, had been promised annual increments would be at the 
loss of those increases and also the increases that would have followed any 
promotion.  The committee wanted compensation not only for loss of salary but also 
for loss of prospective increases and promotions.19     
Just as it is an article of faith in common law jurisprudence, precedents is a 
fetish in the civil service.  Conflating these, and no doubt drawing from its own 
reserves of legal expertise, the committee statement detailed two and a half pages of 
precedents where far higher than statutory compensation had been conceded on 
abolition of offices.  These ranged from the obscure to the obvious but the most 
telling precedent cited was the Act of Union itself.  Under the Act of Union all 
displaced officers were pensioned on full pay.  These precedents supported the civil 
service case that those compelled to retire should not suffer ‘undue loss’.20  It then 
remained to set out what the civil service committee regarded as undue loss.  Having 
set out their case that the Irish civil servants had an implied contract with the 
‘imperial’ government, and that in order to facilitate a constitutional change those 
contracts were to broken, the committee then devoted the remainder of the statement 
to suggestions for better than usual compensation for those civil servants either 
compelled to retire, or who volunteered to retire, in order to facilitate the 
constitutional change.  The structure of the suggestions in the 1911 statement 
supposed that the 1893 bill would provide the model for the anticipated legislation.  
The civil servant’s statement listed what were in effect fourteen suggested changes to 
the scheme of the 1893 bill with alterations made necessary by the intervening 1909 
Superannuation Act.  The 1909 Act offered civil servants the option of accepting a 
reduced final rate of pension in exchange for a payment of one year’s salary to his 
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representatives if he died in service, or a lump sum payment on ordinary retirement.   
The rate of pension under the 1859 Act was one-sixtieth, under the 1909 Act one-
eightieth, of final salary, times years of service.  Most of the Irish civil servants had 
opted to change over to the 1909 Act in the belief that they would be working to the 
normal retirement age and that the new scheme offered some security to their 
families.  However if the civil servants were to be compelled to retire at an earlier age 
they would suffer a loss by being on the lower rate of pension.  The civil service 
committee wanted any officer compelled to retire to have the option of reverting to 
the terms of the 1859 Act.  Other suggested changes were added years for professional 
officers in recognition of qualifications; facilities for exchange between Great Britain 
and Ireland; that the vague reference in clause 27 of the 1893 bill to “officers in the 
service of the crown” should be clarified so as to offer temporary officers the same 
pensions as “officers in the permanent civil service of the crown”; and that 
commutation terms based on the Irish Church Disestablishment Act, which were more 
generous than the usual Treasury commutation terms, be allowed; and that a 
committee should be established to settle the retiring allowance rather than leave it to 
the tender mercies of the Treasury.21   
In summary, the preliminary statement of the Irish civil service staff 
representatives offered to transfer allegiance to the new government provided that 
those civil servants continuing service with the new Irish government ‘should be in no 
worse position as respects tenure of office, terms of service, salary, or pension’.  As 
some civil servants may be dismissed to facilitate constitutional changes, and not 
because of any failure or incompetence on their own part, the statement argued that 
they were entitled to expect more generous compensation than the usual abolition of 
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office terms.  Based on a presumption that the 1912 bill would follow the terms of the 
1893 bill, the statement suggested what those more generous terms ought to be. 
Although there was no specific mention of it, the Irish civil servants must have 
been conscious of the example and precedent of the Transvaal.  The Liberal 
government elected in 1906 inherited a defeated and abysmally administered 
Transvaal and Orange River Colony, the former Boer republics.22  The Liberal 
government’s Transvaal bill established a self-governing Transvaal with a 
government responsible to a parliament and a permanent civil service.  So successful 
were the Liberals in reconciling the former Boer republicans that in 1910 all four 
South African provinces were able to come together in the Union of South Africa, 
apparently reconciling English and Dutch, Boer and Uitlander whilst securing British 
imperial interests.  For the Milnerite imperialists this was a brilliant achievement, 
which no doubt also provided a practical example of the reconciliation of imperial and 
local interests that could be applied to Ireland.23  However for the Irish civil service 
the Transvaal example, far from being exciting, was deeply depressing. Within a year 
of the granting of self-government the defeated Afrikaners dominated the Transvaal 
parliament.  Legislation was passed making Dutch of equal status to the English 
language and most significantly to the Irish civil service, securing control of the 
Transvaal civil servants.  Under the guise of retrenchment there followed a purge of 
English civil servants and their replacement by Afrikaners.24  Most alarming to the 
Irish civil servants was that the British government accepted without question the 
Transvaal government’s bland assurance that the retrenchment was necessary and that 
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there was no victimisation of British civil servants.  A few of the retrenched officers, 
“Milner’s Kindergarten”, managed to secure employment in the other colonies.  
Lionel Curtis found himself within a few years at the centre of what must have 
seemed oddly familiar negotiations on Ireland.  For the remainder there was an 
inadequate gratuity and some sympathetic noises from London but little else.25         
In gauging the success of the Irish civil servants’ committee in shaping the 
relevant clauses of the 1912 bill, it must therefore be borne in mind that no civil 
servant held office by any sort of secure tenure; all were “during pleasure” and civil 
servants had no legal rights arguable in courts of law.  The demand that the status quo 
be preserved was a demand, in reality, for very little.  As Greer reminded the chief 
secretary the security of the civil service ‘merely rests on the good faith and practice 
of the Government of the United Kingdom’.26  Nevertheless when the bill was 
published it was clear that the civil servants had been able to exercise considerable 
influence on the shape of clauses 33 to 36 and the attached schedules on the civil 
service.  The previous home rule bills had assumed that within a five year transition 
period there would be a clean sweep of the entire existing service, with officers either 
resigning, being compelled to resign, or managing to make a new agreement with the 
Irish government.  The civil service in 1886 and in 1893 faced the certainty of 
dismissal with only a possibility of re-employment.  The 1912 bill instead offered the 
certainty of continued employment with only a possibility of dismissal.  The bill, in 
terms taken from the Irish civil servants statement, proposed to transfer the existing 
Irish officers of the civil service to the Irish government with the ‘same tenure and 
upon the same terms and conditions (including conditions as to remuneration and 
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superannuation) as heretofore’.27  Sections 33 to 36 of the Government of Ireland Act, 
1912 guaranteed continuity of tenure on like terms as to salary, conditions of 
employment, and pension as those in existence on the day appointed for the transfer of 
authority.  The third schedule offered compensation for removal from office, or for 
retirement due to material alteration in the nature of the duties to be discharged.  An 
officer in the Irish civil service retained the right to retire within a five year period, 
but only if he could convince a Civil Service Committee established by the Act that he 
was retiring because the duties were neither the same nor analogous to the duties 
under the old regime, or his conditions had materially altered to his detriment.28  This 
Civil Service Committee, consisting of one Treasury representative, one 
representative of the Irish executive and a chairman appointed by the Lord Chief 
Justice of England represented a dilution of Treasury authority, though not necessarily 
to the advantage of the civil servants.  An officer opting for retirement, as opposed to 
being required to retire, could only expect a pension such as he would get if retiring 
on medical grounds rather than on the more generous abolition of office terms.  These 
terms could be, and were, interpreted as being formulated to allow the Irish 
government to economise by driving out expensive senior officials on cheap pensions 
and filling the vacancies with lower paid officials, though Redmond denied this.  
However the insistence within the bill that the cost of any pension would be deducted 
from the Irish budget does underline the assumption of continuity in the civil service.   
Allied with the assumption of continuity remained an insistence on the need to 
cut the numbers of civil servants.  This insistence was shared by all commentators and 
not nationalists only, as is suggested by McDowell.29  To take an extreme example, if 
the Irish government dismissed the entire existing civil service and recruited a new 
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staff on starting salaries, it would immediately reduce its expenditure on 
administration by about one-third; the difference between the salaries of new officers 
and the pensions of dismissed officers.  The implication persisted that the Irish 
administration was overstaffed, wasteful and that home rule would lead to 
considerable savings.  This was particularly so, according to Birrell, in the case of 
‘large number of non-established officers, quite out of proportion to the rest of the 
United Kingdom’ recruited to the new departments ‘which had been somewhat hastily 
created by the House of Commons'’.  A great many of these were professional civil 
servants whose status was sometimes doubtful.  To meet their case Birrell proposed 
an innovation in empowering the three-man Civil Service Committee to define 
whether any particular officer was or was not a civil servant (a power normally 
reserved to the Civil Service Commission), what was an “Irish” as opposed to an 
“imperial” officer, and to determine the claims or pension to which such an officer 
was entitled.30  The opposition contribution to the debate in the Commons on these 
clauses lacked focus and was easily dealt with.  Clearly the Conservatives were 
concentrating on Ulster opposition to destroy the bill and had lost interest in the 
administrative details of home rule.   
When the home rule bill was published the GCICS committee welcomed it, 
but suggested a series of amendments that would ‘render the terms of compensation 
satisfactory to the service generally as well as to safeguard interests not covered by 
the Clauses as they stand’.31    The most important changes the civil servants asked 
was that the normal age of retirement mentioned in the bill should be sixty-five (as 
was customary in Ireland) and not sixty as regulated by the Treasury.  The reason was 
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to prolong the period of employment of the retained civil servants and therefore 
increase their final retiring salary.32  But this was mainly to benefit dismissed officers.  
In the case of premature dismissal, which it was anticipated would be the case for a 
great many officers, the compensation for anticipated loss provided for in the bill 
would also be greater by the increments of an additional five years of service.  The 
statement also asked that the scale of abolition years should be altered so as to benefit 
second division officers recruited at age eighteen.  This would involve simply 
tinkering with the age at which abolition years could be added.  The bill provided that 
an officer under 36 years of age should get additional seven years and for an officer 
under 30 the additional years should be five.  The civil servants’ statement asked that 
the ages should be reduced slightly to 33 and 28 years.  This would in effect 
automatically grant all younger officers ten additional years compensation on 
abolition.   Greer wrote to Birrell that these changes were reasonable and, if conceded, 
would give general satisfaction.  Greer was content to urge concessions to the 
persistent though discreet pressure from the Irish officers, so long as the concessions 
did not offer markedly better conditions to the Irish officers than to British officers.  
For Greer this was a fundamental principle and one that made sense when it is borne 
in mind that there would still be in Ireland some sections of an “Imperial” civil 
service.33  A cynic might note in passing that Greer had no difficulty in imposing on 
the Irish government charges that would never be imposed on a British government 
In early 1914, as home rule was being put through its final passage of the 
houses of parliament, it became clear that an amendment to deal with Ulster exclusion 
would be necessary.  This amendment further confused an already complicated 
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measure.34  The GCICS used the introduction of the amendment to push for further 
concessions. Arguing that the division of the Irish departments, which must follow the 
amendment, represented a serious and detrimental alteration to their conditions of 
work, the committee requested that the terms for voluntary as opposed to compulsory 
retirement should be liberalised and improved.  Instead of five years of a transitional 
period they asked for seven years, along with additional added years in the case of 
those with long service, which would bring them within the compensation terms 
attendant on abolition of office.  In addition, to compensate for the lack of 
promotional opportunities in a diminished Irish civil service, they asked for special 
facilities for exchanges between the imperial and Irish service.35   
These negotiations and discussions on essentially technical details were 
conducted against a background of political crisis as the Tories and the Ulster 
Unionists combined to destroy the home rule bill and the Asquith government.  With 
the bitterness of the debate sharply dividing British and Irish society it would have 
been impossible for the civil service to escape its influence.  The British civil service 
tradition had no difficulty in giving unswerving loyalty to the government in power.  
In Ireland the third home rule debate plumbed deeper loyalties of religion and 
nationality and the civil service could not but be influenced by the opinions of their 
own families, relatives and upbringing.36  The inevitability of home rule and the 
growing threat of civil war over Ulster overcame professional impartiality and, in the 
general anticipation of the transfer of power, self-interest demanded hard thinking 
about where personal security lay.  Duggan in the chief secretary’s office concluded 
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that he would have to resign if the Ulster crisis ‘reached a climax of force’.37  Maurice 
Headlam, the Treasury Remembrancer in Dublin Castle, thought the crisis was so 
grave that he was justified in doing the unthinkable and leaked government 
memoranda to the opposition politicians.38  The inability of the government to offer 
clear direction to the civil service also added to the sense of disarray.  The 
pusillanimous response of the Asquith government to the arming of the UVF followed 
by the humiliating dismissal of W.V. Harrel, assistant commissioner of the DMP, 
after his handling of the Howth gun-running was clear enough warning of the danger 
of showing initiative.39 
The 1912-14 royal commission on the civil service chaired by the former Irish 
under-secretary Sir Antony Patrick MacDonnell provides a last insight into the culture 
of the Irish civil service before war and rebellion swept over it.40  MacDonnell had 
already experience of the Irish civil service and had very strong opinions on the need 
for reform of that service.  MacDonnell was of the view that Ireland required the 
discipline of self-management more than it required self-government.  The keystone 
of his policy was not to abolish but rather to strengthen the position of the Castle by 
giving it real control over the many board and departments, with some independence 
from the Treasury.  This model of administrative reform had been first circulated by 
David Harrel, under secretary in 1898, after the reform of local government.41   
MacDonnell arrived in Dublin Castle as under-secretary in 1902 with the clear 
objective to reform the Irish administration.42  His pursuit of administrative reform 
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was embodied in the 1904 devolution proposal and the even more ambitious Irish 
Council bill of 1907.  In both cases his model was India, where he had blazed a 
dazzling trail with the autonomous provincial councils that he had set up there.43   His 
pursuit of ambitious plans for reform of the Irish administration, with a greatly 
strengthened chief secretary’s office working in co-ordination with locally elected 
representatives and with financial autonomy, brought down the two chief secretaries 
Wyndham and Bryce and ended the policy of constructive unionism. Because he 
thought administrative reform was a non-political question he assumed that everybody 
else would think the same.  In his view the Irish administration system was 
uncoordinated, irrational, profligate and inefficient.44  The Irish Council bill failed and 
MacDonnell retired but he never lost faith in his own wisdom and, in his contribution 
to a series of essays on the 1912 home rule bill, returned once again to his argument 
that the problem with the Irish government was the lack of centralised control over the 
many state agencies working in the country.45   
MacDonnell’s method on the royal commission was to examine the heads of 
departments first and then to listen to representations from that head’s departmental 
staff after.  His first witness was his successor as under-secretary Sir James Brown 
Dougherty.  The confusion as to the authority exercised by the lord lieutenant over the 
Castle apparatus is evident in the presentation of Dougherty.  Their inability to agree 
on which departments were inside and which outside the control of the lord lieutenant 
underlines the fact that despite the decades of debate the Castle was still a labyrinth of 
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dispersed authority.46  MacDonnell quickly took up where he had left off on his 
departure from the Castle and he and Dougherty debated at some length the pros and 
cons of the diffusion of authority within the Irish government.  Dougherty was willing 
to concede that though the chief secretary answered to parliament for most of the Irish 
departments the Castle actually exercised very little control over the Irish government; 
he had responsibility but no authority.  The DATI was independent of the chief 
secretary and the CDB acted as if it was independent of everybody.  The LGB 
answered to the Treasury and was outside the jurisdiction of the lord lieutenant, as 
were the various educational boards, the Commissioners of Public Works, the clerical 
establishment of the Four Courts and of course all the Whitehall departments which 
operated in Ireland.  These were all government organisations that operated in Ireland 
but were free of Castle control.47  However Dougherty was not prepared to concede to 
MacDonnell on the implied irrelevance of the Castle.  Noting that the ‘young 
gentlemen’ of the Treasury (and perhaps by implication MacDonnell) could never 
grasp that the Ireland was in fact a ‘quasi-separate government’ and that ‘the people 
of Ireland look to what they call “The Castle” despised as it is by many, for advice 
and guidance, and above all, they make it the repository of their complaints’ 
Dougherty emphasised the symbolic importance of the Castle in Irish government.48   
For all its faults it alone embodied the state in Ireland.   
For Dougherty the main problem in the Irish government was not the dispersal 
of authority but rather the power of a tight-fisted Treasury.  He had only five first 
class clerks to handle the entire judicial, financial and administrative work of the 
office and two of these were in London during the parliamentary session.  Despite 
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repeated appeals to the Treasury for more first class officers they had actually 
attempted to cut Dublin’s higher establishment.  The paucity of first class posts meant 
that ambition was stifled.  Dougherty was utterly opposed to the Treasury’s preferred 
option of appointing temporary clerks to deal with extra work but he did agree with 
MacDonnell that there was no marked line of division between the work of the first 
and the second division men in his office.49      
Sir Henry Robinson was one of the Castle unionists who ran a frankly 
sectarian department disguised as a mix of ‘sensible’ English, ‘accurate and cautious’ 
Scottish and ‘brilliant and resourceful’ Irish.50  Robinson ignored the treasury 
gradations of first and second division clerks, retaining his own upper and lower 
division and abstractor class.  He made no bones about preferring English and 
Scottish in his upper division, men who ‘looked upon our political dissensions with a 
certain amount of indifference’.  His main complaint was against the Treasury attitude 
that maintained pay scales in the Irish LGB substantially below those in the English 
LGB, frustrating his desire to see his department as a first division office.51 Lemass 
confined himself to answering MacDonnell’s queries with points of information on 
the staff of his office, as did Sir John Barton of the Commissioners of Valuation and 
Arnold Graves, though Lemass did offer an opinion that the clerks of his department 
were doing well.  T.P Gill represented the DATI, the most modern of the Irish 
departments.  Gill had a strong dislike of the first division civil servants that ‘come in 
with a notion from the manner in which they have been brought in and the privileged 
position in which they are placed in the service from the first, that they are, so to 
speak, of superior clay to the men of the other divisions they find in the office’.  He 
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preferred a single entry grade with promotion to the top of the service through ability 
and time.52  In this he was close to the opinion of the civil service representatives.    
Civil servants, who described themselves as delegates of various classes and 
grades, presented the views of the staff of Dublin Castle (Appendix. Table 3: Irish 
civil service witnesses to the McDonnell commission on the civil service).  A few of 
the staff representatives were already prominent on the 1911 committee; John  J. 
Duffy and A.E. Ashley, assistant clerks and Patrick McGuinness, Sam Sloan, J.M. 
Flood and R.Kent, second division officers; others were to become so in the 
organisations of the war years.  Most of those who gave evidence to MacDonnell had 
not previously acted as staff representatives.  However in contrast to the 1911 
committee which was dominated by the higher division and departmental heads, the 
representatives who gave evidence to the MacDonnell commission were from the 
temporary clerks, lower grades and second division. 
It has been said that it takes three things to fit out a civil servant; a bowler hat, 
an umbrella and a grievance.53    The Dublin Castle civil servants were exceptionally 
well fitted-out with grievances.  These were the lack of promotional opportunities and 
the related problem of patronage appointments, lower grades doing work 
indistinguishable from the higher grades, and the chronic insecurity of the temporary 
clerks.  As well as supporting Patrick McGuinness, the second division clerks’ 
delegate, the second division staff of the RGO submitted their own memorial.  The 
memorial complained that the work that they were doing was not routine but required 
highly technical and specialised knowledge that would be more properly described as 
the work of first division officers.  They were also unhappy that posts that formerly 
were promotional posts open to the second division had been professionalised and 
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turned into patronage appointments in the gift of the departmental head.  T.W. Smith, 
representing the second division officers of the General Valuation Office, echoed the 
complaint of promotional posts being closed of by re-grading them as professional 
grades.  Smith was an Englishman who had been transferred to Dublin and found 
himself in a promotional dead-end.  The lack of promotional opportunities was also 
the complaint of the second division officers of the education boards, the land 
commission and the DATI.  These officers all placed the blame for this at the door of 
departmental heads exercising patronage by professionalising former promotional 
posts.  The outdoor posts of the LGB were a notorious case of patronage as all were in 
the gift of Robinson.  MacDonnell got quite annoyed at the insistent reference to 
professional posts as patronage posts and the implication that corruption was at work.  
In his view the increasing professionalisation of higher posts was exactly the sort of 
direction he favoured the Castle administration taking.  The alternative was an 
amateur service in which, by merely waiting long enough, the passage of time would 
deliver the higher posts.  The assistant clerks of the LGB also complained that there 
was no distinction between the work they did, and they were all examination entry, 
and the work of the second division men and that therefore there ought not be any 
distinction of pay or rank.  Another block on promotion alluded to, and one that in 
some sense contradicted the picture painted by the civil service witnesses, was the 
popularity of the Castle amongst the Irish civil servants working in England who all 
competed for any Dublin posts that came available.54  
Most of the Irish civil service witnesses represented departments and grades 
within departments and none claimed to speak on behalf of a permanent organisation.  
The grades that did make such a claim were the most marginal within the service; the 
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temporary clerks and the women clerks of the post office. The temporary clerks 
occupied a difficult position, and perhaps because of this were the best organised.  
The Irish Temporary Clerks’ Association (ITCA) claimed to represent two hundred 
and fifty of the four to five hundred temporary clerks in Dublin Castle.  Their demand 
was for permanent status, a demand that was bound to be resisted by both the 
permanent staff and the Treasury.  As temporary clerks they had entered the civil 
service without any examination.  The permanent officers assumed that they had all 
got their posts by either political influence or through the patronage of the 
departmental heads and saw them as a further block to promotion.  The Treasury 
reluctantly allowed temporary appointments as a compromise with the demands of the 
Irish government for increased staff.55    
Not only was the Association of Post Office Women Clerks (APOWC) the 
only women’s association to represent Irish opinion to the MacDonnell commission, it 
was also the only British-based one to do so.  Women were employed in large 
numbers by the post office.  In 1903 the women clerks had responded to a cut in pay 
by organising the association.  The association, along with the Federation of Women 
Clerks, later amalgamated to form the first women civil servants’ trade union, the 
Federation of Women Civil Servants. 
MacDonnell recommended that all of the administrative, formerly first 
division, class of civil servants should be recruited on common scales of salary with a 
strict adherence to the principle of open competition and that the Irish administration 
should have more administrative officers.  He also recommended an inquiry into the 
question of trade union organisation within the civil service with formal machinery 
for assessing staff grievances on pay and conditions.  These recommendations were 
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suppressed with the outbreak of war but they established a benchmark for the civil 
service organisations. 
In 1913, as MacDonnell was investigating the civil service, another inquiry 
was being conducted by a select committee into the staffing of the post office.56  The 
post office trade unions were considered the most militant and best-organised branch 
of the civil service.  That militancy may well have been a consequence of the 
unequalled reputation of the post office as the most reactionary and autocratic 
government department, a reputation it retained into the post-war years.57  In 1906 the 
Association of Post Office Servants had been given official recognition by the 
government and was allowed to submit memorials in individual cases on behalf of its 
members.  This had been conceded in the hope that it would curb the practice of using 
parliamentary question time to pursue these cases.  It did not in fact end the use of 
parliamentary questions but it did encourage the spread of organisation.  The 
government used recognition, or the threat of the withdrawal of recognition, to 
discipline and control the post office organisations.  The Irish branch of the Irish 
Postal Clerks Association (IPCA) had its own journal, the Irish Postal and Telegraph 
Guardian.  In the January 1909 edition the Guardian had attacked a supervisor in the 
Dublin sorting office in extremely intemperate language, describing him as a ‘Petty 
tyrant and official crawler who out-Herods Herod’.  This led to the withdrawal of 
recognition of the association but that did not inhibit the Guardian.  As the select 
committee met the journal published another attack on the vindictive and over-heavy 
supervision in Dublin, as well as shady practices in the management who, it was 
alleged, gave unfair promotions even to illiterates.  Mr. J. Normile, representing the 
IPCA, in giving evidence to the select committee dismissed recognition as a ‘barren 
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concession’ because appeals to London by the Irish postal staff were ignored anyway.  
The demands of the Irish staff were for open competition for jobs, an end to female 
employment so far as possible, higher wages, and promotion by seniority as a right 
instead of by favouritism or through the religious bias of either Catholic and 
Protestant officials.58        
By a happy coincidence four of the more prominent civil servants in the Castle 
wrote memoirs of this period.59  The memoirs of Robinson betray his condescension 
toward the Irish peasantry whose dependency on his largesse confirmed his position.  
His memoirs are a striking contrast to those of W.L. Micks of the CDB, which reveal 
a passionate advocate of local autonomy and who valued local initiative, though he 
was unpopular with both his staff and the Treasury.  Andrew Magill’s memoir is 
relentlessly anecdotal and largely unaware of the larger forces at work within the state 
administration, a characteristic that he shares with Maurice Headlam.  Headlam’s 
reminiscences reveal a functionary for whom the business of administration was an 
unwelcome interruption to his fishing expeditions.  The impression conveyed by these 
several memoirs is of an administration crumbling under the pressure of sectarian 
suspicions and the corrosive effect on the state of political civil servants.  With 
officials like these Dublin Castle could no longer facilitate political or administrative 
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WAR, REBELLION AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, 1914-18. 
 
 
The First World War clarified the role of the state as it took on the task of mobilising 
the entire resources of the nation to win the war.  This new role dwarfed the previous 
expansion of the state under the Liberal government of 1906 and the civil service was 
tested to near-destruction by the demands of ‘total war’.  New tasks could not be 
accomplished by old methods and the Treasury lost control of staffing in the new 
departments created to fight the war, especially the vast Ministry of Munitions which 
grew from nothing to a staff of 25,000 by 1918, controlling 250 factories and 
employing 2 million workers.1  Administrative revolution also occurred at the other 
end of the scale with the creation of the inner cabinet office.2     
A new British army was quickly recruited as hundreds of thousands 
volunteered.  By war’s end five million men had enlisted.  The uncontrolled 
volunteering of 1914-16 rapidly distorted the labour force and necessitated the 
recruitment of young boys, women and temporary and part-time workers.  These were 
rapidly “skilled-up” as trade unions were forced to relax demarcation boundaries, 
though these new workers continued to be paid unskilled labourer rates. The long war 
caused inflation in food prices and rents, which in turn led to wage militancy with 
waves of strikes in 1917 and 1918 as it became apparent that the war was profiting the 
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owners of the war industries who had guaranteed prices and markets along with a 
skilled workforce on unskilled wages.  The government was forced to intervene by 
introducing food rationing, price controls, and centralised wage bargaining.  These 
controls led in turn to a further expansion in the size of the civil service.  One of the 
most striking changes in the culture of the civil service due to the war was the 
growing employment of women in every department as they were substituted for 
enlisted men.  Segregation between men and women broke down and most 
departments had some women working alongside men by war’s end.  The rapid and 
uncontrolled expansion of the service also led to a big influx of temporary civil 
servants who were far less deferential and respectful of the civil service traditions 
than those they replaced.3  For all grades of workers, not least the civil service, the 
pervasiveness of the state meant that the highest gains were to be made by a closer 
engagement with the state and a race developed to exert the greater pressure on the 
government.  
The wartime growth in the size and complexity of the state in Great Britain 
was not matched in Ireland.  This was an era of bold experiment in the organisation of 
the state in Britain, but not in Ireland, where any attempt to improve the 
administration ran the danger of being interpreted as an attempt to pre-empt the 
decisions of the now imminent home rule government.  The general expectation of 
home rule and the marginal importance of Ireland to the war economy meant that in 
an era when the strong state emerged, the Irish state atrophied.  Many of the 
professional civil servants in Ireland were transferred to war work.  The DATI 
enjoyed a new status as it led the drive for increased food production.4  Branches of 
two new departments were established in Ireland, the Ministry of Food and the 
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Ministry of National Service.5  At the same time, as expenditure not related to the war 
effort was severely curtailed, most of the other Irish departments faced paralysing 
cuts, in particular the CDB land redistribution plans, though the government remained 
aware of the political dangers of too severe an economy drive.6  Eventually, as the 
war dragged on, even the DATI that initially was so important in the drive to increase 
food production faced cuts in budget and staff.7   
The most immediate result of the outbreak of war was the suspension of home 
rule. As the war dragged on and the Ulster Unionists entered the war cabinet in May 
1915 the likelihood of it ever being realised diminished.  However that home rule was 
not likely was never admitted and the Castle remained in the limbo of anticipated 
change that forever receded into the future.  As war transformed the British state the 
Castle became anachronistic because it remained the same.  The war and the 1916 
Rising also revealed that the civil service harboured elements hostile to the state that 
previously could assume their loyalty. 
In September 1914 the new under-secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, arrived to a 
difficult situation.  Although home rule had passed into law the outbreak of war had 
led to its immediate suspension ‘for the duration’.  From the beginning Nathan was 
unpopular with the Castle civil servants not only because he was a Liberal home-ruler 
amongst die-hard Tories but also because he brought G.P. Kurten from London as his 
own private secretary with him, snubbing the established staff in the under-secretary’s 
department for whom this was an eagerly sought-after promotional post.  In the world 
of Dublin Castle, with limited opportunities for promotion, civil servants usually 
distinguished themselves by acting as private secretary to the permanent head of a 
department, or to a minister, or by acting as secretary to a commission or 
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departmental committee.8  As soon as he arrived Nathan was the recipient of 
complaints at the lack of opportunity that Dublin presented and requests to be 
transferred to London where prospects were better.9  Brennan, who as first division 
officer in the CSO was effectively passed over, was warned by J.P. Crowley, a fellow 
Corkman in the London service, to act with circumspection because a private 
secretary brought in to the Castle ‘is … a dangerous person to talk to with any 
expansiveness’.10  This wise advice neatly illustrates the contradictions that were 
undermining the Castle administration.  The fundamental basis of the relationship 
between the British civil service and the government was that a minister would 
always be clear as to what his senior civil servants thought on any issue, even if he 
choose to disregard their views.   
A protégé of Joseph Chamberlain, Nathan had served on the Imperial Defence 
Committee and arrived in Ireland with a list of steady achievements as a Royal 
Engineer and administrator in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Hong Kong and 
Natal Province.  Nathan was also Jewish and therefore, being neither Catholic nor 
Protestant, an unwelcome exotic.  His new duties in Dublin ‘proved more difficult 
than any he had yet undertaken’.11   Walter Long sent him a ‘friendly’ warning to 
avoid the fate of Lord MacDonnell who tried and failed to reform the Irish civil 
service and succeeded only in destroying the confidence of the ordinary civil 
servant.12  
Nathan’s job as under-secretary was twofold; firstly to cut expenditure in the 
Irish administration and secondly to prepare it for transfer to a future home rule 
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government which would come to power after the war.13  The former was achieved by 
delegating the duties of retired officials to lower-ranking civil servants, and by 
freezing recruitment and promotions.  In the CSO Laurence Dowdall was pensioned 
off and his post suppressed.  Though Duggan had to do Dowdall’s work with no extra 
pay, the assistant under-secretary Edward O’Farrell received an extra £150 extra per 
annum to supervise Duggan.  Leave was suppressed to as few days as possible.14  The 
ILC was instructed to end the temporary contracts of barristers working on land 
transfers as the commission had its moneys for land purchase cut off by the 
Treasury.15  But there were some limits to the economies that Nathan could enforce.  
Sir Henry Robinson reacted with alarm to the news that Nathan claimed only third 
class fare for journeys undertaken for official purposes.  Robinson nervously queried 
whether the journey had in fact been in the third class carriage or whether it was only 
the claim was made at this rate.  He was relieved to be assured that although Nathan 
himself always travelled third class he was not intending to lay down any rule for the 
civil service generally in the matter.16  
To prepare for home rule and to brief them on the mechanics of government 
(on which, to the amusement of Nathan, they were wholly ignorant) he had a series of 
meetings from February to September 1915 with Dillon and Redmond, along with the 
Irish party’s financial expert J.J. Clancy.  For some of the meetings Francis Greer 
accompanied Nathan.17  These meetings had to take place in Dillon’s own home in 
North Great George’s Street such was the almost pathological hatred of the Irish 
nationalist leaders for Dublin Castle.18   
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The discussions were principally concerned with rationalising and reducing 
the staff in the many and varied departments of the Irish government.  Nathan had 
little interference from Redmond or Dillon as he pushed forward with his own plans 
for a drastic reduction and reshaping of the Castle machine.  These would have 
brought the Irish government into line with the evolving British model of each 
department of state being under a political head answerable to parliament, advised by 
his permanent officials.  David Harrel had suggested these changes earlier to 
Wyndham when he took up the post of chief secretary, so they were well known and 
un-controversial.19  Nathan suggested a government of eight ministers; prime 
minister, finance, justice, local affairs and public health, lands and agriculture, trade 
and industry, education, posts and telegraphs.  The minister of finance was to assume 
immediate responsibility for civil service pay and conditions and departmental 
administration.20  As Greer pointed out, the home rule act did not transfer any of the 
existing department to the Irish government. Instead it empowered the lord lieutenant 
to establish new departments for the administration of Irish services except those for 
which the Irish government has no power to make laws.  However as many of the 
existing Irish departments performed both Irish and imperial services, it would be 
necessary for the two governments to make agreements to divide up the work hitherto 
performed by a single Irish department.21  This would of course be of vital concern to 
the civil servants in those departments, who could end up working for either 
government.  Would they be allowed choose?  The secretary of the Board of Works 
had already signalled his bafflement as to how he could allocate the work of the board 
between transferred and reserved services.  His best estimate was about one third 
imperial for the work of the surveyors, the engineers could be taken as wholly Irish as 
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were the land loans staff, but the drainage engineers were wholly imperial.  The 
puzzle was how it could be possible to transfer services without transferring staff?22  
Nathan expected the heads of the departments to co-operate in the transfer of 
authority and reshaping the administration.  He asked the heads to supply him with 
confidential memorandum on what adaptations would be required in their departments 
in order to bring into line with a more streamlined administrative system of seven 
departments under an Irish prime minister sharing responsibility with the London 
administration.23  The CDB refused to co-operate, taking the high view that it had 
nothing to do with Dublin Castle and should answer only to the Imperial parliament.24   
At these confidential meetings Redmond and Dillon brought no ideas of their 
own, they simply reacted to those of Nathan.  In some respects this was the usual 
relationship between a political head and his senior civil servant.  Redmond, it could 
be said, had signalled for years that he wanted cheaper and more efficient 
administration and an end to the ‘ridiculously extravagant’ Castle system.25  Nathan 
as a senior civil servant was bringing forward ideas to accomplish that objective, but 
Redmond and Dillon had the final determination.  However the suspicion that 
Nathan’s advice may have been shaped by British rather than Irish interests did not 
seem to have crossed the mind of Redmond or Dillon.  The emphasis of Nathan’s 
advice was always on avoiding conflict between the Irish and the British governments 
and little thought was given to the relationship between the new home rule executive 
and the existing civil service.  Even in the case of the completely new finance 
department Redmond and Dillon were oddly passive, Dillon merely enthusing that 
they regarded the British system of Treasury control as the ‘best in the world’. Nathan 
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advised that the new department be staffed on ‘necessarily economical lines rather 
than on the past extravagances of the Irish administration’.  In this he was merely 
echoing nationalist rhetoric.  The only intervention was when Dillon disagreed on the 
appropriate salary scales for the departmental heads.  Dillon interpreted Nathan’s 
suggestion of a rate below that of London as a slight on the status of the Irish 
government and insisted on London rates of £2000 for the secretary of the department 
of finance and £1,500 for all other departmental heads.26  Nathan strongly urged 
Redmond, who did not demur, not to appoint ‘civil service types’ to represent Irish 
interests on the joint British-Irish Treasury board, on which they would have two 
members, but apart from the permanent head of the Irish treasury to ‘go for someone 
to speak with authority for the industrial and manufacturing section of the 
community’.27  These qualifications and the phrase “section of the community” would 
have been taken as spelling out a Protestant Unionist.   
Nathan also got Redmond to agree that the Irish government would continue 
to use the British civil service commissioners for recruiting and examining candidates 
for employment in the Irish civil service.28  This would mean perpetuating the 
stranglehold of the Oxbridge colleges on the elite administrative division and higher 
posts in the civil service.  That Redmond did not demur signals his utter fixation on 
the representative aspects of home rule along with a disregard for the reality of 
executive authority.  The main argument in favour of home rule advanced since the 
days of Isaac Butt and repeated by Redmond himself when he described the Castle 
administration as a school of experimentation for English “shake-beggars”, was that 
Ireland was grossly misgoverned by the very system that he now blithely agreed to 
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perpetuate.29  This was precisely the response of Maurice Headlam who was hugely 
amused at being asked by Nathan to suggest suitable staff for an Irish department of 
finance; ‘one of the chief arguments for home rule has always been the necessity for 
governing Ireland according to “Irish” ideas.  The Treasury is regarded here as the 
embodiment of “English” ideas.  Hence it is not without humour that you should ask a 
Treasury official for guidance for an Irish Treasury and that the politicians should be 
unable, or unwilling, or forbidden by the government which has encouraged the “Irish 
ideas” theory to evolve any scheme of their own’.30    
In fact Nathan was deeply pessimistic as to the viability of an Irish Treasury.  
The insurmountable problem for an Irish department of finance was the elaborate 
safeguards of the home rule act securing the status of the Irish civil servants.  The 
finances of the home rule scheme were premised on reducing the size and cost of the 
administration of Ireland, yet if the Irish government was to observe the safeguards 
attached to the civil service it would be fatal to economies.  But if the Irish 
government, in pursuit of economy, violated the conditions of service of the civil 
servants it would entitle the officers to the ‘most liberal compensation payable’.31  
Before it even came into existence the Irish government had lost the battle to 
economise because the Irish civil service had already won it.  If the 1914 Act had in 
fact been put into force the British exchequer would have had to come to the 
immediate rescue of the Irish treasury.        
In November 1915, following the establishment of a similar committee in 
Britain, an Irish retrenchment committee was established.  The function of the 
committee was to generate savings in the government of Ireland, savings that would 
                                                
29 Redmond, Ireland’s Financial Relations, p5. 
30 NLI ms 26,175, Joseph Brennan papers, ‘memo prepared by Maurice Headlam 1 April 1915’.  
31 Ibid., ‘memorandum on the irish dept of finance’. 
 71 
go to the war effort.32  This committee soon proved as much a failure as previous 
attempts to cut Irish expenditure.  When the Irish party realised that the savings in the 
Irish administration were not going to be applied in Ireland but were to be transferred 
to Britain they boycotted the committee.  Redmond was also afraid that allowing 
Whitehall complete freedom of action in Dublin Castle might create difficulties for a 
future home rule administration.  The retrenchment committee retreated behind the 
hope that Dublin Castle would ‘carry still further the scrutiny of expenditure which 
has already taken place’.33 
By mid-1915 the early enthusiasm for volunteering was tailing off whilst the 
heavy losses on the western front were leading to a crisis of military manpower.  
Allegations that sections of British manhood were shirking their duty led to calls for 
enforced conscription, a course which had been resisted by the Liberal party.  The 
“Derby Scheme” whereby men could attest to their willingness to serve if eventually 
called upon was an attempt to stave off compulsion.  Men who attested their 
willingness to serve were given a half-crown and an armband signalling their new 
status.  The scheme ran from October to December 1915.  The failure of the scheme 
to make up the required numbers cleared the way for conscription in January 1916.34  
However conscription was more a mechanism for enforcing fairness than a 
militarisation of British society.  In Britain the unflagging level of mass participation 
and assent to ‘total war’ contrasts with the detached, and in some cases outright 
hostility, of most Irish opinion.   
The British civil service had, like the rest of British society, been swept up in 
the initial enthusiasm for the war.  Departmental heads, fearful of the disruption that 
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would follow a mass exodus of staff into the ranks for a war that ‘would be over by 
Christmas’, simply refused permission to enlist on the grounds that the staff member 
was essential to the war effort.  But the failure to win by Christmas and the pressure 
on recruitment mean that the civil service had to be seen to carrying its share of the 
burden.  In June 1915 the War Office called on civil servants to enlist, promising they 
would continue to receive the same salary and that they would not lose out in 
seniority or years of service.  This call was taken up by the heads of the government 
departments in Dublin Castle who circulated every man of military age on their staff, 
urging them to join up.35  The Irish civil service proved reluctant recruits, particularly 
when compared to the English and Scottish officers.  A return of the Irish civil 
service, prepared but never published, shows that of the 3,004 civil servants of 
military age in the Irish civil departments at the outbreak of war, excluding the postal 
and revenue departments, only 823 had enlisted by April 1916.  That is about twenty-
seven per cent.  In comparison fifty-four per cent of the English and sixty-two per 
cent of the Scottish civil servants had joined up.36  The only department of the Irish 
government to show any degree of enthusiasm was the lord lieutenant’s household, 
made up of military men for the most part.37   
The Northcliffe newspapers led the campaign on the recruiting question and 
the alleged cowardice of the civil service.  These featured farcical accounts of 
unlimited numbers of ‘young shirkers’ hiding in government departments, labelled 
‘funkholes’.  These were to be ‘rounded-up’ and ‘combed out’.38  Civil servants who 
had applied to join up in 1914 but were refused permission as ‘indispensable’ were 
increasingly resentful at the press campaign, the attitude of the War Office and the 
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failure of their departmental heads to defend them.  Denied the privilege of 
volunteering when they had a choice of units and having endured the white feathers of 
‘patriotic young misses’, they now faced compulsory conscription into the infantry 
and the certainty of being pushed up to the trenches and the front-line.39   
Nathan was a keen supporter of the drive to recruit civil servants of military 
age in Ireland.  He dismissed their work as essentially elementary for the most part 
and said that they would be of better service defending the empire.40  In Dublin Castle 
Nathan put pressure on the temporary second division clerks to enlist by threatening 
them with discharge at the end of their period of employment.  It was implied that 
should they be lucky enough to survive the trenches they would be certain of a 
permanent position after the war.  Dillon was unhappy at Nathan’s bullying offer of 
enlistment or dismissal, especially as the Castle had not established equivalents to the 
British military tribunals empowered to determine exemptions to military service.41  
That Nathan was issuing the threat suggests both that the second division men were 
refusing to enlist and also that he regarded that refusal as unacceptable in any servant 
of the crown, even a temporary one.  Most significantly, it signals the extent to which 
many of the lower-ranking Irish civil servants regarded the British state as simply 
their employer and to whom they owed no more than the contractual loyalty due to 
any employer.42  Most civil servants were of the opinion that the war in France was 
‘not our war’, and, with home rule imminent, ‘the better part of valour was to stay at 
home and await developments’.43     
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However, amongst the Irish civil service there was a minority for whom 
opposition to enlistment was an expression of deep-seated hostility to the British state.  
As well as bearing the usual metropolitan scorn for the Dublin Castle administration, 
Nathan quickly became deeply suspicious of the loyalty of the Irish civil service.44  
Shortly after his arrival he reported that there were 'a good number of the lower 
officials in this undesirable organisation Sinn Féin...and we shall have to put a strong 
check on their increased activity'.45  Nathan’s category “Sinn Féin” covered all anti-
recruitment and nationalist organisations.  Nathan tried to use conscription to get rid 
of some of the more prominent ‘Sinn Féin’ officials.  Under pressure to reduce the 
staff of the ILC he allowed seven of the staff to enlist, despite the disruption that their 
loss entailed, and proposed to transfer the ‘prominent Sinn Féiners’ Rooney, Sheehan 
and O’Hehir to London, thus creating a paper reduction in staff of ten men.46  
During the Hardinge commission hearings into the Rising Nathan suggested 
that many in the Irish civil service had a ‘pious dislike’ of England arising from the 
opinion that England had treated Ireland badly.47  The move from a dislike of 
government to actively participating in a revolutionary attempt to overthrow that 
government does require explanation.  Civil servants acquired a deep identification 
with the state as part of their training and sometimes came to regard themselves as a 
better guardian of the public interest than their political masters. The motivation of 
those civil servants who joined a revolutionary movement actively working against 
the state therefore goes against the grain.  For many civil servants their introduction to 
separatism was initially cultural rather than political.  The progress of a section of the 
civil service from the cultural organisations like the Gaelic League and GAA, to the 
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political organisations like Sinn Féin, the IRB and finally the Irish Volunteers is a 
barometer of the growing alienation of these Irish civil servants from the British state.  
The Gaelic League was formed at a meeting held in Martin Kelly’s Civil Service 
grind school at 9 Lower Sackville Street and civil servants dominated the first 
executive.  Eoin MacNeill, founder of both the Gaelic League and the Irish 
Volunteers, was a clerk in the Accountant-General’s office at the Four Courts, the 
only Catholic on the permanent staff of the office.48  The membership of the Keating 
branch of the Gaelic League, presided over by Father Dineen, was mostly civil 
servants and teachers.  The Gaelic League and the GAA were typical of the sort of 
self-improvement society that always proved attractive to the middle class ethos of the 
civil service.  However membership of cultural nationalist movements initially did not 
mean an automatic sympathy with political nationalism.  James Kavanagh, a clerk in 
the Board of Works in Dublin Castle, 1916 volunteer and later secretary of the Dáil 
Éireann department of local government, reckoned that many of the teachers and civil 
service members of the Keating branch of the Gaelic league were antagonistic to his 
separatist politics.  He recalled that on one occasion the Keating branch was riven by 
a dispute when a woman member insisted on playing ‘God Save the King’ on the 
piano as the king being above politics, it could not be a “political” song.49  But for 
many civil servants these cultural movements were the initial introduction to “Irish-
Ireland” ideas that then led to the more advanced separatist politics of the Irish 
Volunteers, the IRB and Sinn Féin.50  Take out the civil servants (nearly all lower 
ranking grades) and the separatist movement looks a lot less formidable; Michael 
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Collins, Richard Mulcahy, Ernest Blythe, Liam Archer, Eamon Broy, Alf Cotton, Con 
Collins (who was arrested in Tralee trying to make contact with Casement), Patrick J. 
Daly (who rose to become assistant secretary department of local government), Hugo 
Flinn, Diarmuid Lynch, Dr Conn Murphy, Joe O’Reilly (one of the Squad) and 
Diarmuid O’Hegarty.  The civil service, by separating them from home and 
community, gave them independence and a cosmopolitan and critical outlook on Irish 
life.51  What it did not do was create any identification with the state.  However if the 
‘exile’ from Irish life was too extended it diminished rather than increased the 
radicalism of the young civil servant.  Michael Gallagher felt that he was well on the 
way to being ‘poured into the mould of an ordinary Englishman’ during his service in 
London, had he not secured a transfer to Dublin.52   Michael, John and Maurice 
Moynihan were the sons of a prominent IRB man in Tralee.  Michael was successful 
in the civil service exams in 1910 and joined the Inland Revenue in London.  His 
correspondence with his brother John shows a gradual decline in radicalism and an 
absorption into the ethos of the British civil service.  He eventually joined the Civil 
Service Rifles and then the King’s Liverpool regiment and was killed in June 1918 at 
the front.  His brothers John and Maurice, both republicans, had equally distinguished 
service in the civil service of the independent Irish state.  What made the difference 
between Michael and his brothers was the years of independent living in London.53      
The Irish Volunteer Convention of October 1914, whilst rejecting Redmond’s 
call for the Volunteers to enlist in the British army, also adopted an openly 
revolutionary policy that included ‘the abolition of the system of governing Ireland 
through Dublin Castle and the British military power and the establishment of a 
                                                
51 Tom Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (1981) pp 100-02. 
52 Gallagher, memoirs of a civil servant, p6. 
53 Deirdre MacMahon (ed and intro), The Moynihan Brothers in Peace and War 1909-1918, Their New 
Ireland (2004).  
 77 
National Government in its place’.54  Nathan used this declaration to forbid members 
of the government service ‘to belong to an organisation of which the avowed object 
was to thwart and injure that government’.55  He prepared a circular to be sent to any 
civil servant suspected of associating with the Irish Volunteers but there is no 
evidence that the carefully drafted memorandum was ever actually distributed.56  
Joseph Devlin, MP for West Belfast, cautioned Nathan against suppressing the anti-
war press but was prepared to support action against civil servants taking part in ‘pro-
German’ meetings, by which he meant anti-enlistment activity.57  As late as February 
1916 Nathan was assuring Lords Midleton and Barrymore that he was taking action 
against civil servants who were taking part in ‘Sinn Féin’ activities.58    
Dismissals occurred in the Inland Revenue, Ordnance Survey and the Post 
Office.   Many of those dismissed were to prove significant revolutionary figures, a 
confirmation of Nathan’s assessment.  They included Austin Stack and Robert 
Monteith.  Stack, who played a key role in the IRA, IRB and in the Dáil was 
dismissed from the Inland Revenue.  Monteith, dismissed from the Ordnance Stores, 
went to America and from there to Germany where he met with Casement and 
returned with him to Banna strand.  Dismissal was one response to civil service 
disaffection, but deportation under the guise of redeployment was more frequent. 
Ernest Blythe, a clerk in the DATI, and Liam Mellows, a Post Office engineer, were 
both deported to England.  P.S. O’Hegarty, the Postmaster of Queenstown, was 
deported to Welshpool in Wales.59  John Cox, an excise-man in the port of Dublin, 
and P.F. Burke, excise-man in the Monaghan-Louth area and an IRB man, both of 
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whom were to be arrested after the 1916 Rising, were identified as ‘active Sinn 
Féiners’ and were pensioned off in order to be rid of them.60  Other dismissals were 
petty.  The postmistress of Dalkey was deprived of the post because her daughter was 
active in Cumann na mBan.61   
In the aftermath of 1916 Nathan, however, could recollect only eight or nine 
men being actually dismissed because most civil servants when asked whether they 
were members of the Volunteers would say ‘we do not deny it’, which was not quite 
an affirmation of membership.  The Volunteers remained a legal organisation and 
therefore civil servants who were members were not breaking the law, only 
regulations.  To enforce discipline would require either specific evidence of 
membership or an admission, and in many cases Nathan had neither.  It was believed 
by Nathan that the Volunteers took especial care to safeguard civil servants from 
observation by the police while on route marches.62  Hugh Hehir, a civil servant in the 
ILC and later registrar of the Dáil Éireann courts in Co Clare, who had progressed 
through the usual cultural initiations of the GAA and the Gaelic League to the 
political circles of Sinn Féin, the IRB and the Volunteers, was ordered by Sean 
MacDermott to publicly sever connections with the movement after he had been 
identified by the secretary of the ILC as active in the Irish Volunteers.63  Mortimer 
O’Connell, an excise officer and IRB man, was another civil servant directed to 
withdraw from Volunteer parades.  O’Connell believed that Sean MacDermott had 
several IRB informants amongst the Castle departments besides O’Connell himself, 
that kept him informed on government policy changes.64  Eugene Smith, a Volunteer 
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and civil servant who escaped detection, claimed to have passed many sensitive 
documents over the years to the Volunteer executive, including plans for conscription, 
arms raids and the German Plot arrests.65   
Dublin Corporation was another centre of disaffection identified by Nathan.  
Henry Campbell, the Dublin City Town Clerk, gave Nathan a list of persons whom he 
thought a danger to the ‘safety of the realm’ and who would cause embarrassment by 
calling strikes or worse in any moment of crisis.  The list included John McBride ‘a 
dangerous rogue’, James Connolly, William Partridge, Edmund Kent (Eamonn 
Ceannt), John Fitzgibbon and Fred Allen.66  The only senior civil servant prepared to 
speak in defence of the lower ranks was A.H. Norway, secretary of the Post Office, 
Ireland.  Norway had been alert to the growth of separatist movements within the civil 
service, but he had been shrugged off by the Castle.67  Vexed at the prominence given 
to allegations that the Irish Post Office was a hotbed of Sinn Féin agitation, Norway 
used the Hardinge commission to detail the steps that he had taken after the 
government forbad civil servants to join or remain in the Volunteers, in contrast with 
Nathan’s passivity.  In the period leading up to the 1916 Rising, as Irish Volunteer 
activity grew more intense he issued the following letter to every member of the 
postal staff alleged to be a member of the Irish Volunteers; 
Sir, 
The attention of the Postmaster General has recently been called to 
the fact that you are a member of the Irish Volunteers under the leadership 
of a committee presided over by Mr John McNeill.  The Postmaster General 
has also been apprised of the open hostility of this organisation to 
recruitment in the Forces of the Crown and generally, to the Government 
under which you are serving.  Of this, the public utterances of the leaders of 
the organisation and matter contained in the newspaper which purports to be 
its official organ are sufficient evidence.  While it appears to the Postmaster 
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General that an openly hostile attitude towards the Government, such as is 
indicated by membership of the body referred to, by taking part in its 
exercises and by association with its leaders in its business would at any 
time be improper in a member of the Civil Service, such an attitude in the 
time of war on the part of persons entrusted with business of the State is 
fraught with risk to the country which no Government is justified in 
incurring.  In those circumstances I am directed to call on you to cease all 
connection with the Irish Volunteers or any similar organisation or face 
dismissal.68 
   
In the aftermath of the 1916 Rising the loyalty of the Irish civil service to the 
state whilst it was at war could not be taken for granted.  But what can be done with a 
disloyal civil servant?  At one extreme it could be argued that disloyalty in a servant 
of the crown was equivalent to treason, and the penalty for treason is death.  In fact 
disloyalty in the civil service in Ireland was treated with considerable leniency. Every 
opportunity to retreat from separatist actions was offered.  The incorrigible were 
simply dismissed, facing no other charge.   
Within a week of the ending of the Rising the Ulster Unionist Craig was 
questioning the prime minister on the number of government officials arrested in the 
rebellion and what steps he proposed ‘to clear out members of the Sinn Féin society 
from the postal service, land commission and other government departments’.  
Asquith’s vague reply that ‘steps were being initiated to ascertain which of the 
government officials were in anyway implicated in the recent disturbances’ infuriated 
Craig who demanded a complete purge of any sympathisers from the government 
service.69  The precision of Craig’s focus on the Post Office and ILC was well 
informed as it was the officials of these departments were those most engaged in the 
Rising.  The clerks of the ILC were well represented in the list of those deported; 
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eleven in all.70  Nathan called for a full statement from civil servants of their 
movements from noon on Saturday 22 April to noon on Monday 1 May, including 
where they stayed each night.  This may appear particularly pointless as those civil 
servants who were active in the rebellion were by then in British gaols and the rest 
had been confined to their homes, but the statements were intended for future use to 
weed out those that had escaped detection and also the passive sympathisers.  Each 
head of department was directed to ensure that all staff supplied a statement.  These 
were then forwarded to the CSO.  Officers missing or failing to provide a detailed 
statement were pursued.  When the two clerks Francis Shouldice and Thomas Cotter 
of the NHIC, men already suspected of involvement in the Volunteers, failed to return 
to work after the Rising two senior clerks called to their homes where they were 
fobbed off with vague answers to their queries.71  DMP detectives came to the offices 
of the ILC looking for Hugh Hehir.  Hehir who had avoided public associations with 
the Volunteers after March 1915, remained a member of C Company under Thomas 
McDonagh.  He also successfully resisted efforts to transfer him to London where he 
would face conscription.  Ironically Hehir was in the dark about the Rising and spent 
Easter 1916 on holiday in Co Clare.  Nevertheless he was arrested on his return and 
sent to Frongoch.72  The statements of the staff were corroborated by checking details 
with the DMP or the military.73  Of course there were also the usual anonymous 
letters informing the Castle about the suspicious behaviour of certain civil servants; ‘I 
beg to inform you that a young man named John Roche of Seville Place employed in 
                                                
70 NAI CSORP 1916/11,502 Irish Land Commission absent members deported. 
71 ibid., 1916/11,492 ‘staff statements NHIC 10 May 1916’. 
72 NAI bureau of military history w.s.683; CSORP 1916/11,501 Irish land Commission return of staff.. 
73 NAI, CSORP 1916/7703 ‘general prisons board; /7709 ‘RIC office staff’; /7720 ‘Customs and 
Excise Dublin’; /11,391 ‘DATI staff’; /11,416 ‘Land Registry staff’; 11,495 ‘National Education Office 
staff’; /11,499 ‘DMP office staff’. 
 82 
the Land Commission Office is a Sinn Fein Volunteer and was with them during the 
week of Rising in Dublin but escaped and got home...’74   
A committee was appointed under Mr Justice Sankey to investigate individual 
cases of the over one thousand persons detained in the post-rebellion attempt to crush 
Irish separatist organisations.75  About ninety civil servants were investigated, half of 
them in the Post Office.76  There were immediate protests, especially from Pease in 
the Irish Post Office, at the deportation on the flimsiest evidence of many postal 
staff.77  In some civil service cases it is clear that Sankey’s inquiries were very brief.  
James Kenny, a civil servant and member of the 4th battalion of the Volunteers active 
in the GPO garrison was simply asked if he had any knowledge beforehand of the 
Rising and, on denying any such knowledge, was released.78  Internees who expressed 
defiance or refused to co-operate were simply continued in detention.79  Thus, except 
where there was evidence that the civil servant was in a leadership position, or was 
defiant, they were soon released.  Naturally enough they then returned to their 
government offices, citing their release as evidence of their innocence of any 
wrongdoing.  T.W. Russell accepted that Sankey’s release of John Daly, an assistant 
agricultural overseer in DATI, exonerated him.  He was reinstated in his post and paid 
the back money due since his arrest.  Home Secretary Samuels immediately ordered 
his suspension dryly noting that ‘it does not necessarily follow that because this man 
was released from internment in England he is a fit person to be employed by the 
Crown’.80  The re-employment of these ex-internees, naturally enough, provoked the 
Irish Unionist MPs.  In July Major Walter Guinness asked the prime minister about 
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the clerks Patrick Kelly, Patrick Sheehan and Robert Rooney of the ILC, who had 
fought in the rebellion, had been released by Sankey and returned to the land 
commission, where they were cheered as returning heroes, and were once again put in 
receipt of government pay.  However the growing sympathy for the rebels was 
already affecting the interpretation of the Rising and Lundon, the MP for East 
Limerick, immediately accused Unionists like Major Guinness of using the rebellion 
to ‘drive Catholics out of every government post in Dublin’.81   
The cases of Sheehan, Kelly and Rooney illustrate the confusion that began to 
surround the question of disloyalty in the civil service.  Patrick Sheehan had been 
arrested at his home in the immediate aftermath of the Rising by the military that 
found ammunition and a uniform at his home.  The G Division detectives in the DMP 
in fact considered Sheehan a member of the Redmondite National Volunteers.  This 
difference was too subtle for the military authorities and he was sent to Knutsford 
prison even though he had not participated in the Rising.  Patrick Kelly was also 
unknown to the police but had been arrested as part of the Jacob’s factory garrison.  
He maintained that he had simply gone to Jacob’s factory out of curiosity and had 
been ordered inside at gunpoint by the rebels.  Rooney had been arrested by the 
military at his office but he was unknown to the police and no evidence of any 
wrongdoing had been found.  It is possible that he was the victim of a malicious 
informer.82  Sheehan became something of a cause celébre.  After Major Guinness’s 
parliamentary question he was suspended from his department.  Lundon used his case 
to make the general point that Sinn Féin sympathy was growing in the Irish civil 
service because they saw ‘day after day Protestants and Freemasons being appointed 
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over their heads to the positions which Catholics should enjoy’.83  Sheehan, he and the 
other Irish MPs suggested, was ‘fingered’ by lower division clerks anxious to fill his 
position.  Sheehan was finally dismissed but found immediate employment as 
permanent secretary of Sinn Féin.  There is no doubt that Sheehan was in fact an 
active Irish Volunteer.84  He however clearly felt that, although he was sympathetic to 
its aims, as he was not active in the Rising he was entitled to retain his post.  He was 
exactly the sort of civil servant that Guinness wanted purged because in his view the 
security of the state depended on having confidence in the unswerving loyalty of its 
civil service.85  To Irish nationalist opinion Guinness was simply trying to start a 
witch-hunt against Catholics in the civil service and was being egged-on by malicious 
informants.  This, in their view, had nothing to do with state security and everything 
to do with sectarian ambitions.  By July Laurence Ginnell was asking the Prime 
Minister for the names of each civil servant in Ireland dismissed, threatened with 
dismissal, reduced in rank, denied normal promotion or transferred, due to connection 
with Irish Volunteers from July 1914 to April 1916 when the Volunteers were not an 
illegal organisation.86        
Sankey’s inquiry was in fact of the most cursory kind.  He did a quick trawl to 
sort out the 1,841 cases of internees and, having identified the 569 dangerous cases to 
be kept in internment, allowed the release of the others.  He did not in fact attempt to 
determine guilt or innocence, simply the degree of danger presented to the state.87  
The government therefore established an internal and confidential inquiry to deal with 
the problem of the civil servants who had been released by Sankey, but now remained 
suspended.  In July Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson and Sir William Byrne, an English 
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Catholic recently appointed as assistant under secretary, began a discreet investigation 
to ‘consider the cases of Irish Civil Servants who have been suspended from their 
duties owing to their suspected complicity with the recent Rebellion and to advice 
how they should be dealt with’.88  These were not only those released by Sankey and 
suspended but also those civil servants who had escaped detention but were suspected 
by the departmental heads of Sinn Féin sympathies.  Civil servants still in detention 
were taken to have been proved guilty and not considered. In the growing reaction 
against the Castle regime and the prevailing spirit of reconciliation, Wilson and Byrne 
deliberately avoided associating their investigation with the Castle.  They dealt 
directly with the departmental heads, private rooms were secured in Hume Street and 
secretarial and clerical assistance dispensed with.  Working from lists of suspects 
forwarded by the heads of departments along with departmental, military and police 
records, and after interviewing fourteen of those heads, the investigation looked at the 
cases of forty-two men, mostly of the lower ranks.  The accused were encouraged to 
make the best possible case for themselves and were assured that both Wilson and 
Byrne, as civil servants themselves, would find it ‘a genuine pleasure’ to recommend 
reinstatement.89  The reaction of the accused however dismayed their interrogators; 
We had greatly hoped that no cases, or only isolated instances of 
evident disloyalty would come before us, but we regret to have to state 
that in a good many cases we have felt it our duty to recommend 
removal from the service.  The confession of faith of the suspect was 
often tendered freely, frankly and unblushingly.  Briefly it amounted 
in many cases to a declaration that so long as the individual in question 
discharged his official duties satisfactorily during office hours, he was 
fully entitled to do as he pleased out of office hours, even if it involved 
violence which might lead to the killing of troops or police officers.  
This view was expressed not by the lowest ranks only.  In more than 
one instance the allegation that a man engaged in military operations 
had not actually fired at a soldier was advanced as sufficient 
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justification for re-instatement.  We have been struck by the readiness 
with which a considerable number of those inculpated air views quite 
incompatible, in our view, with their position as public servants.  In no 
instance were we altogether satisfied that such Civil Servants as 
actually took active part in the rebellion, under alleged compulsion, 
could not have withdrawn at an early stage of it……Owing to the 
peculiar political situation in Ireland, we did not, broadly speaking, 
judge men only from the standpoint of their continued connection with 
the Sinn Fein movement.  We were guided by their activities, their 
explanations thereof, by their mental attitude towards the rebellion, 
and by their expressed intention in the future to subordinate or 
otherwise, their loyalty as public servants, to their political creed.90 
 
The most senior civil servant dismissed was J.J. McElligott, whose plea that he had 
been forced at gunpoint into participation in the Rising did not save him, although 
participation, albeit reluctant, did help to further his later successful career in the Irish 
Free State civil service.91  Of the forty-two cases dealt with twenty-three were 
dismissed, one pensioned, and eighteen reinstated.  No notes were kept and there is no 
evident rationale in the decisions which probably reflected the demeanour of the 
accused.  It is said that it is easier to sack the Pope than a civil servant, but by any 
reckoning Wilson and Byrne may be considered very generous in their treatment.  
However it was very deliberately noted by them that their investigation found no 
evidence whatsoever for Nathan’s assertion that civil servants had been circularised to 
withdraw from the Irish Volunteers, nor could any of those interviewed recollect any 
such circular.  Such a circular had indeed been drafted and filed, but apparently never 
actually issued.  Arguably therefore simple membership of the Volunteers without 
active participation in the rebellion was, in their view, excusable.92   
At a more general level Wilson and Byrne were clearly worried by the evident 
lack of identification with the state amongst Irish civil servants and the gulf between 
the senior and junior ranks.  Their report recommended that ‘Advantage should be 
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taken of the present situation, by serious and combined effort on the part of all 
concerned, to instil a higher tone in the ranks of the Irish Civil Service and to require 
a more distinct recognition of the obligation which properly attach to Public Service.  
We believe that much good would result if increased interest were shown in, and if 
friendly advice were more freely tendered to, young Civil Servants by their 
Chiefs…93 
One idea that Wilson and Byrne advanced as a way to remind civil servants of 
a sense of duty was that all civil servants throughout the United Kingdom ought to be 
required to take an Oath of Allegiance to the crown such as was required of the armed 
forces.  This proposal reappeared much later, in 1918, though now with no reference 
to Ireland. Some members of parliament managed to become convinced that British 
failures on the western front were due to pro-German elements in the civil service 
either leaking secrets to the German military command or deliberately sabotaging the 
British war machine.  The solution was an Oath of Allegiance, which apparently, 
would reveal the traitors.  In Ireland this demand for an oath was seen as an attempted 
‘combing out’ of nationalists. The oath was avoided where possible, taken with bad 
grace in most cases, and in a few cases refused outright.94  Those who refused were 
F.X.Thunder, David O’Donoghue and E. Cleary in the ILC, Diarmuid O’Hegarty and 
Michael McDunphy, both Second Division clerks in the DATI, Tom McArdle, a 
Second Division clerk in the LGB, and P. Cremins and Eamon Duggan in the Post 
Office.  A protest meeting of the ‘recusants’ was organised but they all remained 
dismissed.95  The newly-organised Assistant Clerks Association (ACA) took up the 
case of the oath, which they regarded as an encroachment on their civil rights, but 
failed to organise any significant opposition to it.  The ACA continued to financially 
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support dismissed members until they found employment.96  Dismissal for refusing to 
take the Oath of Allegiance was one of the criteria accepted by the committee for the 
re-instatement of civil servants, set up by the Free State government under the 
chairmanship of P.S. O’Hegarty.  In all fifty-three cases were considered of civil 
servants who could establish that they had been dismissed for sympathy with or 
participation in the 1916 rebellion; or for refusing the Oath of Allegiance, or for 
refusing to join the British armed forces.97  We shall return to this file later, but it is to 
be noted that none of those actually dismissed in 1918 for refusing to take the oath 
were amongst those who made an application to the 1923 P.S. O’Hegarty committee. 
As the administration in Dublin Castle returned to what passed for normal the 
civil servants noted the few vacant places, none of them a surprise.98  For the mass of 
the Irish civil service, the foot soldiers in the state apparatus, the Rising had been a 
brief burst of excitement but apart from the dismissal of a few colleagues one that 
brought no significant changes.  One cynic described the Rising as ‘the most exciting 
event in the Irish government since a senior clerk was promoted, probably 
mistakenly’.99  The Irish National Aid Association, formed by Collins to assist the 
survivors of the Rising and to re-mobilise the revolutionary movement, which we 
might assume had the most complete list of those affected, assisted some seventy-two 
dismissed civil servants.100  However, as the government investigation into the Rising 
deepened, its conclusions indicated that the problem was more than a few disaffected 
civil servants in the minor grades.  Lloyd George reported to the House of Commons 
in the immediate aftermath of the Rising that the existing system of government in 
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Ireland had broken down.101  The royal commission of inquiry into the Rising, chaired 
by Lord Hardinge, utterly damned the entire Dublin Castle administration as 
‘anomalous in quiet times, and almost unworkable in times of crisis’.102   The most 
dramatic impact of the Rising was therefore on the top ranks of the Irish state 
apparatus.  
Birrell and Nathan, the heads of the Irish administration, resigned and a 
military regime was instituted under General Maxwell.  Meanwhile Lloyd George 
tried to inveigle the Irish Nationalists and Unionists to accept an immediate 
implementation of home rule for the twenty-six counties by promising the 
Nationalists that partition was temporary whilst assuring the Unionists it was 
permanent.  Having failed in that, the Irish Convention was convened in the hope that 
some solution would emerge.  Meanwhile the opportunity to reform the 
administration, which all admitted was an urgent task, slipped away.     
In the absence of any initiative the old administrative system reasserted itself 
as H.E. Duke (a sixty-one year old English barrister and Unionist MP with no 
ministerial experience) was appointed chief secretary with Robert Chalmers, famous 
for being the rudest man in Whitehall whose ‘pomposity and cynicism concealed his 
many benefactions’, as under secretary.103   Chalmers was one of the most brilliant 
and ruthless officials in the Treasury.  A liberal in his politics he played a key role 
during the 1909 “People’s Budget” struggle.  Falling out of favour with Lloyd George 
he was exiled to Ceylon in 1913.  His return to Dublin Castle signalled perhaps a step 
toward full rehabilitation and a return to Whitehall. Dukes was lauded by Asquith as 
bringing to the position a judicial mind, a firm hand, administrative capacity, 
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sympathy with the Irish people and a strong desire to promote an Irish settlement.  His 
first task, according to Asquith, was to undertake a careful survey of the whole 
administrative situation with all its possibilities.104  There is no evidence that any such 
survey was undertaken.     
Both Chalmers and Duke made it clear to the staff in the Castle that they had 
reluctantly agreed to come to Dublin and expected to be bothered as little as 
possible.105  Chalmers was not going to waste his time and expertise on reform of the 
Irish administration and by October was gone back to Whitehall.  Castle government 
returned to Ireland, advised and assisted by a civil service that only some weeks 
previously had been condemned as useless.  In October, after the departure of 
Chalmers, A.P.Magill replied to Duke’s complaint that he, Duke, was having to run 
the office on his own, with a description of the cuts that the war had wrought on the 
staff.  In 1913 the Irish Office in London consisted of a private secretary, a 
parliamentary private secretary, an assistant private secretary, one chief clerk, one 
second division clerk and two typists.  It now consisted of Magill himself and two 
typists, one of whom was about to be called up by the military.  Since the outbreak of 
the war Magill had had one weeks leave, had worked on Sundays and holidays and 
had to constantly divide his time between London and Dublin.  Clearly Magill was 
feeling little sympathy for his chief secretary.  The only solution he could suggest was 
that Duke should try and get Duggan and Hamilton, who had gone to the Admiralty, 
to return. But the derisory salaries offered by the CSO would have to be improved to 
attract them back.  Magill once again struck what was now a familiar note when he 
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underlined the urgency of an inquiry into the staffing of the CSO and the Irish 
Office.106       
The overwhelming needs of the war were not only cutting a swathe through 
the staff in Dublin Castle, they were also constraining the ability of Duke to pursue an 
imaginative Irish policy.  The summer of 1916 saw the disaster of the Somme 
campaign, the failure of the British navy to win the Battle of Jutland and the death of 
Kitchener, the symbol of the British war spirit.  In comparison Ireland was parochial.  
Also, as Duke was reporting to a coalition cabinet divided only by Ireland, it would be 
foolhardy to invite dissensions.  Walter Long revived once again the old idea of 
abolishing the Viceroyalty and strengthening the office of the chief secretary to that of 
a full secretary of state, but Wimborne was determined to be important.107  The 
reforms that were introduced were primarily personnel rather than structural.  In a 
process of “Greening” the administration John J. Taylor was passed over for the post 
of under secretary for William Byrne, a Catholic (though English) and joint 
investigator of the civil service participants in the 1916 Rising.  The new head of the 
RIC was also Catholic, General Sir Joseph Byrne; as was the new Attorney General, 
James O’Connor.108  At a private lunch Duggan told Magill that he was not ‘too eager 
to return to the intricacies of Irish policy and the work of Dublin Castle’.109  Despite 
losing out on the under-secretaryship Power secured his position in the Irish offices 
by manoeuvring himself into the position of private secretary to Lord Wimborne.  
Wimborne, in seeking approval from the treasury for this post, indicated that he 
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108 O’Halpin, Decline of the Union, pp118-34; McBride, Greening of Dublin Castle, pp214-9. 
109 NAI, “early E files” E1/8, ‘Duggan to Edward O’Farrell, 27 Oct. 1916’ 
 92 
would be relying on Power to guide him through the intricacies of the Irish 
departments.110   
By year’s end it was being complained that the Irish offices were 
undermanned to the point of crisis and economy was being applied beyond the bounds 
of common sense, yet the Treasury remained inflexible.  The needs of the war 
demanded that no new posts should be created, no promotions made and shortfalls 
would have to be made good by loans of staff from other departments.111   The DATI 
was subject to an investigation by Maurice Headlam and Sir John Irwin.  Irwin, a 
minor figure in Dublin Unionist politics, was a paper merchant who appeared 
regularly in Stubb’s Gazette as a defaulter. Their investigation showed a complete 
inability to understand the organisation or function of the DATI and was utterly 
worthless.112  The failure to restructure the Castle, along the failure to rethink Irish 
policy, was the end of any realistic attempt to engage with settling the Irish question.  
The Irish Convention, which met from July 1917 to April 1918, was an 
attempt by Lloyd George to rush an Irish settlement, partly in answer to American 
critics and partly to rescue the home rule party which was clearly losing ground to 
Sinn Féin.  However, even though it was apparent that the home rule bill would be 
amended, the general expectation was still that in the end Ireland would be governed 
by some form of home rule with the supremacy of Westminster intact.  Overall, 
government policy remained one of home rule with provision for Ulster exclusion.   
As it became clear that home rule was once again subject to amendment the 
GCICS seized the opportunity to present a position paper to the Irish Convention, 
requesting that any future proposals for an Irish government emanating from the 
Convention would address deficiencies in the clauses dealing with civil servants in the 
                                                
110 Ibid., ‘Lord Lieutenant to the treasury, 5 Oct. 1916’. 
111 Ibid., ‘memorandum to the chief Secretary, 2 Jan. 1917’; ‘treasury memorandum, 24 Jan. 1917’. 
112 HLRO, Lloyd George papers, F/74/19/1-2. 
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1914 Act.113  Under the operation of patronage by the Birrell regime in particular and 
with the advance of competitive entry in general, the lower ranks of the civil service 
in Ireland, in what has been called the ‘Greening of Dublin Castle’, by 1917 was 
becoming a more Catholic and nationalist apparatus.114  The membership of the 1917 
GCICS, and the demands put forward in the Statement, attest the dominance in Irish 
civil service organisation that had been achieved by the lower (and therefore Catholic) 
grades of the second division and clerical staffs since the formation of the original 
1911 committee; (Appendix. Table 4: General Committee of Irish Civil Servants. 
1917).  The continued expansion of the state in Ireland is also reflected in the increase 
in the number of government departments represented on the committee; thirty-four 
as opposed to the twenty-nine of 1911.  The new departments were the NHIC, the 
Department of National Service, the Ministry of Munitions, the Wages Board and the 
Ministry of Labour.  All of the new departments were Irish branches of British 
departments.  The 1917 committee also had delegates from twenty-one civil service 
organisations.  The 1911 representative scheme of delegates from the professional, 
higher, second division and clerical grades had not been sustained.  Instead, the 1917 
GCICS was composed of quasi-trade union associations representing the clerkdom of 
the lower grades only, along with representatives of departments.  Separate delegates 
from the administrative and technical departments now represented the GPO.  The 
Customs and Excise Federation (CEF) had withdrawn, presumably to pursue their 
own interests as a reserved service.  Of the 114 delegates on the general committee, 
forty were from civil service associations, many of which were Irish branches of 
British organisations.  The 1917 committee did represent a balanced mix of the new 
                                                
113NLI mss Ir.32341, 'statement of the general committee of Irish civil servants as to their position in 
view of further legislation affecting the government of Ireland'.  There is a copy of the statement in the 
Long papers, Wilts. & Swindon record office 947/147, with correspondence between Barlas and Long. 
114 Lawrence McBride, The Greening of Dublin, pp187-92. 
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and old.  Of the sixty-eight members of the 1911 general committee twenty-seven 
continued into the 1917 committee.  But of the twenty-two members of the 1917 
executive committee, six only had been a member of the original 1911 executive.  
Barlas, the veteran of the 1893 and 1911 executives was still chairman, likewise 
Healy the treasurer and McCarthy the secretary.  Sam Sloan, of the second division 
officers, was now vice-chairman.  The other long serving members were Dixon and 
Drennan, higher officers in the land commission.  The sixteen other members of the 
executive were new.   
Few of the 1917 departmental representatives on the general committee were 
higher grade or professional men.  Messrs Vereker, Sheridan and Glass represented 
the CDB.  Vereker was a civil engineer and chief land inspector of the CDB; Sheridan 
was a barrister-at-law and secretary to the board whilst Glass was legal assistant.  
These professional men were on the committee to represent the CDB staff as a whole, 
rather than any of the many professional officers of the board.  However the clerks of 
the same board choose to organise as a separate class and were represented by their 
own CDB Clerks’ Association.  In contrast to the general committee, which was still 
dominated by departmental delegates, association delegates dominated the executive 
committee; ten departmental to twelve association delegates on the twenty-two 
member executive.  In fact the executive committee of the GCICS was dominated by 
the clerical grades to the extent that whilst none of the professional officers of the 
CDB made it onto the executive, O’Loghlin of the clerical staff was there.   
Not only did the clerical grades dominate the representation on the general 
committee they also dominated its proposals, and the demands of the professional and 
higher grade officers were attached on almost as an after-thought.  The demands of 
the civil servants for a better retirement and severance deal would imply either an 
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expectation or intent of leaving the service of a home rule executive.  Such were the 
demands of the GCICS since the first home rule proposal.  The 1917 committee 
however, whilst addressing issues of a better severance deal, was primarily focussed 
on security for promotion.  This implies an expectation and commitment of 
continuous service to a home rule administration.  The former demand for a severance 
deal is implicitly unionist, the latter demand for security for promotion is implicitly 
nationalist.  By 1917 the civil service committee, as it became dominated by the lower 
grades and temporary clerks, had become implicitly nationalist.  This also reflected a 
generational difference.  Older men were most concerned that the terms for voluntary 
or compulsory retirement would be sufficient to secure them continuity in the lifestyle 
to which they had become accustomed.  The 1917 committee wanted even better 
money terms for those compelled to retire (and there was an even greater expectation 
of compulsion after 1916) as well as better security for those who opted to retire.  
With the experience of wartime inflation the statement also wanted a provision that 
pensions should match salary increases in the relevant grade for a period of years.115 
  But, as the statement pointed out ‘the securing of mere continuity of service, 
though important, does not itself constitute a sufficiently satisfactory safeguard to the 
position of the Service as a whole’.116  Loyal to the huge numbers of temporary fellow 
civil servants the statement demanded recognition of temporary whole-time officers 
as permanent civil servants, recognition of temporary years for reckoning pension 
entitlements, and an entitlement to added years in calculating pensions for those 
officers with professional qualification in recognition of their years of study.  But the 
key new demand put forward by the 1917 committee was not for better retirement 
conditions but rather for guarantees for promotional opportunities for the lower 
                                                
115 'statement of the general committee of Irish civil servants as to their position in view of further 
legislation affecting the government of Ireland', pp6-7. 
116 Ibid., p3. 
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grades.117  The great fear within the civil service was that with the complete 
disruption of structures and departments imposed by the war, and with the local 
uncertainties of post-1916 Ireland, the civil service would be used to award the friends 
of those in power. The immediate demand of the civil servants committee was for 
additional security regarding promotion within the Irish service ‘a question which is 
regarded by all ranks as a vital one’.  They asked for a provision in the bill to prevent 
the appointment of “outsiders” to posts that could be filled by fully qualified officers 
already in the service.  The committee in their statement did acknowledge that there 
might be some appointments to posts ‘for which certain special technical or 
professional qualifications are essential’ but did anticipate that such cases would be 
comparatively rare. 118  Clearly the GCICS was very sceptical about the claims of 
expertise made for the great majority of professional, technical and higher-grade posts 
and saw these as sinecures and patronage appointments blocking the usual avenues of 
promotion.119  The fear was that the civil service higher posts would become filled by 
a recrudescence of patronage under a future home rule government. 
Recognising that the Irish civil service would in all probability be a much 
smaller service, with limited promotional opportunities, the 1917 statement wanted 
legislation to allow for transfers and exchanges between the British and Irish services, 
and for Irish civil servants to be allowed to continue to compete for promotional posts 
within the British service.  The British service had supplied nearly ninety per cent of 
the promotional opportunities for Irish civil servants.  The loss of that opportunity 
opened up a depressing prospect of a lifetime of assistant clerkship.   
In general the statement made it clear that it was expected that what it 
described as a “the natural channels” of promotion from within the ranks would be 
                                                
117ibid., p7. 
118Ibid., p3. 
119Gallagher, 'Memoirs of a civil servant', p40 
 97 
clearly laid down in any amended legislation, and followed.  The statement also 
strongly expressed the preference within the Irish civil service for the extension of 
entry exclusively by open competitive examination.  Where a vacancy occurred for a 
post that required specialist qualifications the vacancy should be publicly advertised 
with particulars of the qualifications required.  These posts could also be filled 
through promotion from within the service by a limited competition or a qualifying 
examination.  The 1917 committee identified the Civil Service Committee established 
by the 1914 Act to deal with questions affecting the rights of existing officers as an 
important strategic advantage, one that diluted Treasury power, and asked for 
increased representation on, and increased powers for, that committee.  They asked 
that the committee to be increased to five members with two members elected by the 
Irish civil service, and that the quorum of the committee should be three.  They also 
wanted the Civil Service Committee to be empowered to act as a court of appeal for 
any civil servant unhappy with his retirement terms.120  
Attitudes toward the civil service were generally less sympathetic with 
allegations of shirking war service being bandied about.  Also the 1916 Rising had 
revealed that the Irish civil service had within its ranks a lower standard of loyalty 
than was expected.  The report of the Convention contented itself with pious 
generalities rather than specific measures. The report suggested that an Irish civil 
service commission, following as closely as possible English practices and with 
Unionist representation, be established to regulate competitive examinations for 
admission to the public services, to determine salaries appropriate to Ireland, to decide 
on promotions and to exercise the patronage of higher appointments.121   
                                                
120 'statement of the general committee of Irish civil servants as to their position in view of further 
legislation affecting the government of Ireland', p5. 
121 Report of the proceedings of the Irish Convention Parl. Papers 1918, X [9019] 697. pp16-17. 
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 To understand why, despite the number of politically well-connected 
professional and higher division officers, the clerical grades had come to dominate 
civil service organisation in Ireland we need to understand the impact of the world 
war on the state apparatus.  By the summer of 1914, as home rule moved towards the 
statute books, it was clear that the Irish civil service was facing into a major 
reorganisation, with many departments facing either their demise or reduction.  But 
from early August all questions relating to home rule or administrative reform were 
shelved “for the duration” as the state mobilised all its resources for war with 
Germany.  Though home rule remained on the statute books it gradually receded into 
some future long-off day and it was the demands of the war effort rather than home 
rule that now inexorably revolutionised the Irish civil service organisations.  Amongst 
the Irish civil servants the question of salaries, rent and the price of bread proved an 




       
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CIVIL SERVICE ORGANISATION, 1918-1920. 
 
 
The wartime expansion of government in Britain and the enormous rise in the 
recruitment of civil servants created both alarm at the growing cost of administration 
and a consciousness of the defects of the administrative machine.1   The entire British 
civil service that had been 73,000 in 1914 had grown to 193,000 by 1919.  Of this 
increase of 120,000 about 72,000 could be laid at the new wartime departments and 
48,000 at the older departments.  A consensus began to emerge in the Whitehall 
political establishment on the need to reduce the size and cost of government whilst 
improving the civil service.2  Newspaper campaigns encouraged the illusion that 
waste, not policies, was the source of excessive expenditure, but that was not the view 
in the Treasury.  The leisurely pace of inquiry into the civil service, every ten years or 
so between the Northcote-Trevelyan and the MacDonnell inquiries, became a sprint.  
Between 1915 and 1919 a series of government reports into the organisation of the 
civil service rationalised and restructured the entire administrative machine and 
transformed the collection of loosely connected departments into a highly centralized 
bureaucratic apparatus.  The single most important administrative change to emerge 
out of these inquiries was the formal strengthening of Treasury control of the civil 
service.3   
                                                
1 Kathleen Burk (ed) War and the State the Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919 (1982). 
2O'Halpin, Sir Warren Fisher,pp24-5, 55-7. 
3 Report of the committee of the ministry of reconstruction on the relations of employers and employed 
on Joint Standing Industrial Councils [Whitley] Parl Papers 1918, X [cd.9002] 659; Report of the 
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As the state transformed its own administrative structures that transformation 
in turn necessitated a change in the way the civil service organised to deal with the 
state, its employer.  These years comprise a period of the most rapid organisation in 
the history of civil service associations.4  By 1920 civil servants were organised in de 
facto trade unions that were using vigorous united action, demanding collective 
negotiation and affiliating with the broader trade union movement.  The inhibiting 
effect of hierarchical structures, status and competitive promotions evaporated under 
the pressure of inflation.  This wave of civil service organisation can also be seen as 
part of the unprecedented level of white-collar militancy in state and commercial 
employments that characterised the post-war period in industrial relations.5  The main 
objective of all civil service associations was to end Treasury dominance and win 
some control over their conditions, preferably through a permanent parliamentary 
committee or arbitration system.6   
In Ireland the civil service joined this mobilisation.  Despite the fact that the 
wartime experience of the two services was so radically different, most civil service 
organisations in Ireland were offshoots of British organisations.  Whereas the British 
service experienced a huge expansion the Irish service largely atrophied, as Ireland 
was in many respects marginal to the war effort.  Some few departments experienced 
a small growth in the number of temporaries, but these hardly matched the loss of 
                                                
machinery of government committee of the ministry of reconstruction [Haldane] Parl. Papers 1918, XII 
[cd.9230]; Report on the application of the Whitley report to the administrative departments of the civil 
service [Heath] Parl. Papers 1919, XI [cd.9], 227; Report of the national provisional joint committee on 
the application of the Whitley report to the administrative departments of the civil service [Ramsay & 
Stuart-Bunning] Parl. papers 1919, XI [cd 198], 239;Report of the committee appointed by the lords 
commissioners of HM Treasury to consider and make recommendations upon certain questions with 
regard to recruitment for the civil service after the war [Gladstone] Parl. Papers 1919, XI [cd. 34], 
171;Report of the committee appointed to inquire into the organisation and staffing of government 
offices [Bradbury] Parl. Papers 1919, XI [Cd 61], 207. 
4 Humphries, Clerical Unions, p128. 
5 Gordon McMullan,’The Irish bank “strike”, 1919’ in Saothar,5 (1979) pp39-49; Maguire, Servants to 
the Public, pp36-7. 
6 Eric Wigham, From Humble Petition to Militant Action a history of the Civil and Public Services 
Association 1903-1978 (1980) London.pp35-41. 
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permanent officers on military service.  Apart from some few shell factories the 
Ministry of Munitions, the engine of civil service growth in Britain did not organise in 
Ireland.  The other ‘mushroom’ ministry, the Ministry of Food, was irrelevant in 
Ireland where food production and not rationing was the priority.7  For the Irish civil 
service there was also the added and very local issues of home rule, partition and the 
challenge of the counter-state posed by Dáil Éireann, all problems of which the 
British service had no concern.  But as a result of the war the concerns and interests of 
civil servants in Ireland on pay and conditions matched those of the British service 
and, based on that shared concern, the wave of organisation in Britain reached and 
transformed the Irish service.  They shared the view that the main problem facing the 
civil service was the Treasury with its apparent contempt for all other departments of 
the state.   
The civil service associations and alliances, formed under the pressure of war 
and post-war conditions, were emphatically fighting organisations.  Irish organisation 
began as local branches of British associations, reflecting not only a general trend in 
trade union organisation but also the development of general all-service classes across 
the United Kingdom since the Ridley report.8  A new civil service leadership emerged 
from this period of organisation.  The surge of organisation and the new leadership 
that emerged reflects the fact that there was a great deal of discontent in the Irish civil 
service that had nothing to do with home rule.  In fact amongst many of the lower 
grade Irish civil servants there was an expectation that a home rule administration 
would provide both better opportunities and better redress for their grievances than 
the British Treasury.9    
                                                
7 McDowell,’ administration and the public service’, pp595-600. 
8 Gallagher, memoirs of a civil servant, p40. 
9 ibid., p7. 
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The first and foremost issue driving organisation in both Britain and Ireland 
was pay.  The wartime erosion of the value of salaries led to the award of a cross-
grade percentage increase, the “bonus”, which was a variable top-up to basic salaries.  
As the bonus was initially small and inflation continued all civil servants therefore 
had a common and immediate grievance in the decline in real salaries.  Added to pay 
were issues of grading structures and promotional opportunities.  The expansion of 
administration that had begun under the Liberal government and mushroomed in the 
war had not led to an expansion of opportunity.  Many of the senior posts in the new 
departments were filled by nomination rather than by promotion with patronage 
taking on new forms.10   
As Ireland was still in constitutional terms a part of the United Kingdom, the 
Irish civil service was swept along in these great changes.  Irish civil servants 
participated in the wave of organisation, sent delegates to meetings, joined in 
demonstrations and negotiated alongside their British colleagues.  At the same time 
the last attempt to answer the Irish question by home rule, the 1920 Government of 
Ireland Act, was being framed and enacted.  That the Castle administration in Ireland 
was a failure was axiomatic for Irish nationalists.  In the time between the assembling 
of the first Dáil Éireann and the Treaty this also became the view of a significant 
section of the British administrative and political elite.  This realisation was born not 
only from the defects of the Castle apparatus but also of the more penetrating scrutiny 
of the whole civil service as a result of the war.  The reopening of the home rule 
question led to a revival of the GCICS.  There was, as we shall see, a complex 
interaction between the Committee and the civil service associations.  The civil 
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service associations introduced a new core of activists on the Committee, though the 
objectives and mode of agitation were very different to that of the associations. 
During World War 1 prices rose rapidly, leading to a general agitation 
amongst workers for pay increases.  In 1915 two million working days were lost in 
strikes in Britain.  Within the civil service the strict Treasury rule that pay claims 
could only be considered at departmental level was overwhelmed by the rapid 
inflation.  After the Treasury rejected a pay claim by the postal workers the 
government, fearing a strike, referred the claim to an arbitrator.  The reward of the 
‘war bonus’ by the arbitrator Sir James Woodhouse, announced in July 1915, marks 
not only the first increase awarded to civil servants in compensation for the increased 
cost of living, it also marks the war-time marginalisation of the Treasury in these 
matters.  The increase was extended later in 1915 to all civil servants whose basic 
salary did not exceed fifty shillings (£2.50) per week.  The continued rise in prices led 
to further applications for increases. The increased pressure of applications led to the 
establishment of the civil service conciliation and arbitration board early in 1917, thus 
taking pay determination entirely out of the hands of the Treasury.  McDonnell had 
recommended some system of arbitration in the report of the royal commission on the 
civil service, but now the war forced the pace of change.  The conciliation and 
arbitration board issued thirteen awards in the period 1917-19, all of which took the 
form of percentage additions (called war bonuses) to basic salaries in compensation 
for the rise in the cost of living.11    
The establishment of the arbitration board was a tremendous incentive to 
organisation as it was only through associations or trade unions that representations 
could be effectively made.  With inflation continuing the associations had to return 
                                                
11NAI, Dept. of Finance, establishment division, E121/12/33,'memo by civil service organisations'; 
Parris, Staff Relations, p23; Humphries, Clerical Unions, pp80-9. 
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again and again to the arbitrator, using arbitration to perfect organisation.  The CDB 
Clerks Association won a claim for increased pay and promotion by presenting a 
sophisticated claim to the arbitrator backed up with well-documented precedents.12  
The Treasury began to respond with offers to Irish departmental claims.  These offers 
were calculated to avoid the necessity of an arbitration hearing and perhaps also to 
avoid revealing the incoherence of the Castle administration.13  This in turn 
encouraged organisation.  As the arbitration system became established and as 
inflation surged ahead the number of civil service associations more than doubled 
from 80 in 1913 to 194 at the war’s end.14  After the war the fight for the war bonus 
became a movement for improved conditions that led to the establishment of Whitley 
Councils in the civil service. 
As early as 1916, though victory was still far from certain, The British 
government, realising that the war had changed everything, began to look to a future 
after the war and to plan for reconstruction.  Recognising the changes that the war had 
brought about in British industry, and fearful of the growing militancy of shop 
stewards, the government accepted that unions and collective bargaining had become 
a normal feature of the workplace and looked to foster more co-operative industrial 
relations in the post-war world.  A committee of officials from employer bodies and 
trade unions was appointed, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Speaker of the 
House of Commons J.H. Whitley, to make proposals for ‘securing a permanent 
improvement in relations between employers and workmen and to recommend ways 
of systematically reviewing industrial relations in the future’.15  The Whitley report, 
as it became known, recommended the creation of joint worker-employer industrial 
                                                
12 NAUK, T1/123337 ‘civil service arbitration board, CDB clerks association claim 4 June 1919’. 
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‘assoc of second division clerks memorial, April-March 1918’. 
14Sweeney, In Public Service, p17. 
15Quoted in W. Hamish Fraser, A History of British Trade Unionism 1700-1998 (1999), pp 141-2. 
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councils.  Whitleyism was not intended to extend beyond industrial employment but 
the civil service associations argued that the government ought to set an example by 
instituting a Whitley council for its own employees, the civil service.16  Sir Thomas 
Heath was appointed to chair a sub-committee to draw up a scheme of Whitleyism for 
administrative staffs.  The staff associations were invited to make submissions but as 
Heath made clear these submissions were accepted as information only.  The Heath 
committee offered crumbs to the civil service associations; consultation and a promise 
of a ‘greater share in and responsibility for the determination and observance’ of their 
conditions of work.  But it restated the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which 
meant that Whitley Councils could not diminish the right of a minister (read Treasury) 
to accept or reject the conclusions of any joint council.  These councils as envisaged 
by Heath could never be more than advisory and consultative.17  More than anything 
the threatened recrudescence of unfettered Treasury control, personified by Heath, 
galvanised the civil service associations.  At a packed Caxton Hall meeting with 
Chancellor Austen Chamberlain, who was flanked by the Treasury top brass, a 
meeting attended by several Irish representatives, the civil service showed a 
remarkable discipline.  Led by the postal workers representative Stuart-Bunning, the 
meeting unanimously rejected Chamberlains plea to ‘give it a go’ and demanded that 
a provisional national joint committee of staff and official sides should be directed to 
draw up a detailed scheme for a Whitley Council in the civil service.   The Heath 
report was consigned to the dustbin and in 3 July 1919, a mass meeting approved the 
resolutions of the joint conference of official and staff representatives, jointly chaired 
by Stuart-Bunning and Malcolm Ramsay (first controller of establishments at the 
Treasury), proposing a two-tier National Whitley Council for the civil service with 
                                                
16 Committee of the ministry of reconstruction on relations of employers and employees [Whitley] p6. 
17 Heath Report; Humphries, Clerical Unions, pp109-12. 
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Departmental Councils of departmental heads (not politicians as the civil service 
wanted) representing the official side and representatives of the civil service 
associations representing the staff side, and with an over-arching National Council 
representing the government and the staff associations.18  Notwithstanding its many 
limitations the National Whitley Council was a great advance for civil servants.  For 
the first time the civil service associations now had a determining rather than a mere 
consultative role in their own work conditions. 
The Irish civil servants had asked that the Ramsay and Stuart-Bunning 
committee establish a separate national council for Ireland.  However the committee 
concluded that it was not competent to make any definite recommendation and merely 
expressed an opinion that ‘questions exclusively affecting the conditions of service of 
Irish civil servants must be dealt with by joint bodies on which Irish civil servants 
have full and direct representation’.19  The Irish civil service delegates evidently had 
considerable sympathy amongst their British colleagues.  The only amendment to the 
report of the provisional committee presented to the mass meeting of civil servants 
was that moved by the Irish delegates and fully supported by the rest of the service.  
The amendment asked for a concurrent meeting of Irish staff and official sides to 
frame proposals for the setting up of separate machinery to safeguard Irish interests.  
The chancellor, recognising that some arrangement would be necessary to meet the 
situation in Ireland, where devolved government was imminent, accepted the Irish 
amendment.20  Two weeks later a meeting of the Irish Provisional Joint Council was 
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held in the Privy Council chamber at Dublin Castle.21  The provisional committee was 
to ‘frame proposals for the setting up of machinery to safeguard Irish interests’.22  The 
official side was headed up by the Under-Secretary James MacMahon and included 
most heads of departments.  The staff side represented the civil service grade 
associations rather than, as was the case with the GCICS, the departmental 
associations, though some of the same individuals appear as delegates to the 1917 
general committee.  (Appendix. Table 5: The Irish Provisional Joint Committee, July 
1919).  Most importantly, the Whitley council staff side was made up of the elected 
delegates of the associations.  Therefore, because the Irish civil service had few in the 
executive grades, the staff side of the Irish Civil Service Joint Committee was 
dominated by the clerical grades.  James MacMahon was appointed chairman with 
Gerald Mulvin of the Irish Civil Service Alliance as vice-chairman.  Patrick Ryan 
acted as official side secretary and Michael Gallagher as staff side.23  James 
MacMahon, because he was an Irishman who had risen through the ranks from the 
second division, and also perhaps because he was Catholic and sympathetic to 
nationalist aspirations for self-rule, was well regarded by the staff side even though he 
was a wily negotiator who knew every ploy available to the ranks out of which he had 
risen.24    
A dispute arose immediately as to the power of the Irish Joint Committee.  
The Chancellor, Austen Chamberlain, had ruled that the subjects that were proper for 
discussion by the Irish council were those which, after reference to the National 
Council, are agreed by that body [my italics] to be either (a) exclusively Irish 
questions, or (b) exclusively Irish aspects of general questions.  The staff side 
                                                
21quoted in Gallagher, 'memoirs of a civil servant', appendix chapter seven. 
22 Red Tape, no 95, vol VIII, (Aug 1919). 
23Gallagher, 'memoirs of a civil servant', pp48-55; Red Tape, no 95, vol VIII (Aug 1919). 
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immediately objected to the phrase in italics that gave the London-based National 
Council prior authority to determine the issues that would be considered by the Irish 
committee, thus making the Irish a sub-committee of the British body.25  The London 
officials of the associations at the National Council gave full support to the Irish 
demand for an autonomous Irish Whitley council, attending meetings alongside 
Michael Gallagher, Gerald Mulvin and Thomas Murphy and reinforcing their 
arguments.26  After several meetings through the autumn and winter, when it seemed 
at times that the Irish committee would never come into real existence, Chamberlain 
finally agreed to the deletion of the requirement for a prior reference to the National 
Council.  In March 1920 the National Council delegated power to the Irish Joint Civil 
Service Committee to itself determine what were “exclusively” Irish questions or 
aspects of Irish questions, granting de facto autonomy to the Irish body.27  
The success of the staff side in securing autonomy for the Irish led to problems 
for the official side.  In the confusion of authority that characterised the Irish 
administration it was very difficult to determine which were the Irish departments and 
therefore the appropriate departmental council to which grievances should be brought.  
Staff members of the Inland Revenue belonged to an “imperial” department.  Should 
the officers of that department, who happened to be stationed in Dublin, participate in 
an Irish committee concerned ‘exclusively’ with Irish affairs?  Should the staff of an 
imperial department be allowed to bring ‘exclusively Irish’ problems to the Irish 
committee or should they be brought to the departmental council in London?  Giving 
the London-based National Council the power to determine what were “exclusively 
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Irish” issues would have secured the necessary control.  Now that the Irish committee 
had thrown over that control there was a real danger that civil servants in the Irish 
departments would be able to secure double representation on the Whitley Councils of 
Ireland and of Great Britain and use one to secure gains that had been denied in the 
other.   MacMahon’s advice to the official side to use the proviso “exclusively Irish” 
to intervene if it was felt that the Irish committee was straying into the territory of the 
National Council was hardly adequate and clearly this was an area ripe for 
confusion.28   The Irish staff of the branch departments, conscious of the distance 
from Whitehall and the peculiarities of the Irish situation, were themselves pressing 
for local departmental councils.29 
The Irish civil servants now had two effective organisations for the service as 
a whole, the ad hoc GCICS that had been around since 1893 representing the entire 
Irish civil service, well connected politically and accepted as competent to negotiate 
with the government on the conditions attached to home rule; and a representative and 
formal Irish Whitley Committee made of nominated representatives of the different 
grades and classes and regarded with suspicion by the Treasury, to negotiate on 
general service conditions.  The Whitley committee was the Irish expression of a 
British original, dominated like the British organisation by the representatives of the 
civil service associations.   
The relationship between the Irish and British organisations was complex.  
The Irish associations had considerable autonomy and took an independent line on 
Irish issues. The Irish civil service was more militant than the British; its demands for 
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salary increases were usually set higher and conference speeches more pugnacious.30  
The April 1920 strike in support of the political prisoners, which was supported by the 
Irish associations, was regarded with some awe by the British civil service as was the 
decision by the Irish CSA to establish a strike fund.  British civil servants hesitated to 
even contemplate using the strike weapon.31  However the Irish organisations tended 
to look to London for leadership and direction and were quick to criticise that 
leadership for any tardiness in responding to Irish issues.  Even as late as October 
1921 the executive officers of the CDB looked to the London leadership to help their 
claim for reorganisation.32  On the other hand the London leadership were wary that 
too much attention to Irish issues would raise the danger of fragmentation of the 
associations into geographic units with the Scottish members taking their lead from 
Dublin.33 
The emphasis on class and grade organisation of the British associations was a 
break with Irish organisational traditions, which were emphatically departmental and 
‘all-Irish’.  Because the Irish departments had in effect a single political head, the 
Irish chief secretary, the permanent heads had little interference in how they ran their 
departments and so every civil servant’s career depended to an uncomfortable degree 
on their head of department.  Also, there was little movement of civil servants 
between the Irish departments.  The Irish clerical grades generally held the official 
Treasury representative in the Castle, Maurice Headlam, in contempt.34   
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The movement toward large grade-based organisations was not welcome to 
one small group, the professional civil servants.  These, despite their title, were the 
only civil servants not trained as civil servants.  Rather, they were professionally 
qualified auditors, surveyors and engineers who happened to work for the state.  
Discontented with the dominance achieved by the clerical grades, in February 1920, a 
group of professional civil servants met in Dublin and formed the Institution of 
Professional Civil Servants (Ireland) (IPCS).35  As professional civil servants, too 
reliant perhaps on that professional status, they had been left behind in the rapid 
evolution of civil service organisation that was now being driven by the executive and 
clerical grades, marginalizing the professional and technical staffs.  None of the 
founding members of the IPCS had previous experience of organisation or agitation 
and they came from across the whole range of government departments; McDonnell 
and Querkett ( who later went to Northern Ireland) from the LGB; Stevenson and 
O'Farrell of the CDB; Major Brunicardi (a Boer war veteran) and McAuley of the 
General Valuation Office Surveyors; Banton and Patey of the ILC; Allberry and 
Chaloner-Smith of the Board of Works; Power-Steele of the General Valuation 
Office; Yates of the NEB Senior Inspectors and Palmer of the Land Registry Mapping 
Section.36  Many years later, during the 1932 Brennan Commission hearings into the 
civil service, Major Brunicardi described the IPCS as a 'relic of the Whitley system'.37  
Clearly, were it not for the establishment of the Whitley councils, it is unlikely the 
professional and technical civil servants would have managed to organise themselves.  
Michael Gallagher of the ACA and also staff side secretary to the Irish Whitley 
Council, may well have prompted the founding of the IPCS.  At its first meeting the 
IPCS council referred to correspondence from Gallagher and sent Messrs Power-
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Steele, Allberry, Banton and Yates along to observe the conference which had been 
called to establish the Irish Civil Service Joint Whitley Committee.   
As the significance of the Whitley committee began to dawn on the Institute a 
more urgent note crept in.  By March 1920, one month after its foundation, the IPCS 
council was insisting on having its own representative of the professional civil 
service, Mr Allberry, on the Irish Whitley Committee.  By the end of March, as the 
Irish Whitley Council held its initial meetings, the IPCS had been recognised and 
accepted as the organisation of the professional civil servants in Ireland, though as yet 
it actually represented very few of them.  The IPCS was now provided with the forum 
within which it could raise the problems of the membership.38 
 It would have been more precise for the IPCS council to call their organisation 
a federation of professional and technical associations as all those on the founding 
council attended as honorary secretaries representing their various departmental 
professional associations.  The creation of the IPCS and the constitution it adopted 
closely followed on the foundation of a similar Institution of Professional Civil 
Servants in England in January 1919.  Just like the English institution the IPCS was 
essentially an alliance of the associations of the professional and technical civil 
servants in the various government departments.  Again, just like the English 
institution, there was great anxiety to ensure that only professionally qualified civil 
servants would be admitted to membership.39  The first council was made up of 
representatives of 'associations whose constitutions have been found by the drafting 
committee to contain a qualifying clause in accordance with the Constitution of the 
Institution of Professional Civil Servants'' and that 'the honorary secretaries of 
associations send in individual applications for members of their associations together 
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with qualifications of applicant'.40  The constitution formalised the rules for admission 
to membership of the IPCS through a 'properly constituted association of professional 
civil servants' who might nominate any of its members to the Institute.  The council 
was required to satisfy itself firstly, that the membership of the nominating 
association was confined to professionals and secondly, that the individual proposed 
had recognisable professional or technical qualifications and duties as a civil 
servant.41  During the summer of 1920 the council canvassed the possibility of 
affiliating the IPCS with the English institution, but as the English institution was less 
than enthusiastic and as the constitutional situation in Ireland became more uncertain 
the proposal was allowed to lapse.42  By May the constitution was agreed and, by the 
time of the annual general meeting of March 1921, the first annual report of the IPCS 
could record eleven constituent associations, 367 full members and 71 associate 
members. 
The Association of Staff Clerks and Other Civil Servants (ASCOCS) was 
formed in 1916 to organise a ‘war bonus’ claim for civil servants with salaries 
exceeding £300 per annum. The Dublin branch of ASCOCS (organising the senior 
grades on salaries over £400 per annum) was an affiliate of the British organisation 
along with Malta and West Africa.43  The Dublin branch was organised by J.E. 
Highton who also acted as the staff clerks’ delegate on the 1917 Civil Service 
Committee on the home rule bill.  He represented Irish staff clerks at a ‘war bonus’ 
appeal in November 1917, but the London organisation seem generally to have had 
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little contact with the Dublin members.44  By early 1919 the Dublin branch was 
demanding separate representation at the general meeting of all civil service 
associations at Caxton Hall, called to co-ordinate a response to the Heath committee 
report.45  ASCOCS remained aloof from the movement for cross-service unity.  An 
invitation from the CSA to join in a campaign for the abolition of Treasury control 
and security for promotion, an invitation supported by the Irish staff clerks, was 
rejected on the grounds that the clerical grades alliance had a membership ‘of an 
essentially different character from that of the Staff Clerks’, an example of the 
inhibiting effect of grade snobbery on civil service organisation.46  ASCOCS instead 
joined with the Society of Civil Servants (SCS), which was more a club than a 
fighting organisation.  The Irish membership expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
SCS, criticised the failure of the London executive to keep the Irish members 
informed on issues and, in 1920, demanded and got a seat on the executive 
committee.47  The Irish chairman was Thomas A. Murphy, the secretary was Mr J. 
McInerney.  The tendency through 1920 was for the Irish branch, under the leadership 
of Dr. Cornelius (Conn) Murphy, Michael Smithwick, Thomas Murphy and 
McInerney, to take an independent and more militant line on reorganisation and re-
grading. The Irish members seem to have been regarded as a welcome ginger group 
by the London executive and the Irish membership at 490 was not insignificant in 
comparison to the British figure of 1,249.48  With the fragmentation of the grade 
under reorganisation (all staff clerks above £450 were automatically re-graded as 
higher executive, those in the range £200-400 were to be graded individually) it was 
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decided to amalgamate with the Association of Executive Officers (AEO) and to leave 
the SCS and join with the CSA.  This represents a more militant attitude born of the 
failure of the association to win better terms in the civil service reorganisation.  It was 
a course fully supported by the Irish members.49 
The most shadowy group in the civil service were the temporary clerks.  
Departments could employ temporary clerks to meet pressure of work without 
bringing it to the notice of the Treasury.  Once in a department they tended to become 
fixtures and, if efficient, ended up doing higher work than they had been originally 
recruited to do.  The first organisation of temporary clerks was in Ireland in 1912 
where, in response to home rule, a Temporary Clerks Association was formed.  In 
1918 the Unestablished Civil Servants Association in Dublin applied for annual leave 
and overtime pay.  Headlam noted that the assistant clerks are extremely jealous of 
the temporary clerks, whom they regarded as a class that undermined the conditions 
of their grade and damaged their prospects.50 
The most numerous civil service class was the assistant clerk, a Treasury 
grade devised to fill the gap between the Ridley First and Second Divisions and one 
that constituted a low-paid ‘submerged class’ of the service.51  The ACA began in 
1901 as the Senior Assistant Clerks Committee, formed to press claims for higher 
increments and full pension credit for un-established service.  In 1902 the assistant 
clerks in six of the government departments in Dublin combined to present a united 
demand for improved pay directly to the Treasury, bypassing their departmental 
heads.  The example of the Dublin clerks in organising across the departments was 
followed in Edinburgh and London and led to the founding of the ACA in 1904, under 
the leadership of W.J. Brown, the most militant of all civil service organisers, along 
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with David Milne.52  The aim of the ACA was to recruit all clerical grade staff in the 
civil service and to win the right to deal directly with the Treasury.  The ACA 
campaigned for a ‘living wage’ and better promotional prospects.  From 1911 it 
published the journal Red Tape.  Dublin assistant clerks joined the ACA from its 
beginning but through their departmental organisations rather than as specifically Irish 
clerks.53  In 1904 the Dublin departments with members in the ACA were the GPO, 
the ILC and the LGB.  Each year a few of the other departments joined in; the Inland 
revenue, DATI, the Board of Works and so on.  The growth in membership may well 
have reflected the slow movement of individual assistant clerks through the 
departments bringing with them the habit of organisation.54  In 1920 the ACA merged 
with the Post Office Engineering Clerical Assistants to form the Clerical Officers 
Association (COA).  In 1921 the COA merged in turn with the lower section of the re-
graded ASCOCS members to become the Civil Service Clerical Association 
(CSCA).55   
One of the key figures in the expansion of clerical organisation in Ireland was 
Michael J. Gallagher.  Gallagher entered the civil service through the competitive 
examinations and worked in London in the GPO engineering section.  Through 
contacts in the Irish parliamentary party, the sort of backstairs influence that (rightly) 
he was later to condemn, he secured a transfer back to the Dublin NHIC office.56  His 
London experience, brief though it was, made him more self-conscious of his status as 
Irish, Catholic and as a ‘black-coated worker’. From London he also brought back a 
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conviction of the need for civil service organisation.  The fight for a war bonus was 
the campaign that marked him out as a natural organiser.   
Tom Barrington of the DATI statistics section, who later was to exert a 
profound influence on Irish administrative thought, wrote an analysis of wartime 
rising prices and their impact on civil service salaries for the Irish CSA.57  This short 
pamphlet had a revolutionary impact on civil service thinking on salary claims and led 
directly to the indexing of the war bonus.  Barrington, using the rather homely 
metaphor of the dairy farmer diluting milk, proved that the government had been 
‘adulterating’ the value of money by ‘watering it down’ through issuing paper pounds 
that were not backed up by gold reserves.  In effect this was a dilution of the 
purchasing power of the pound sterling.  What civil servants and other workers were 
demanding therefore was not an increase in salaries but restitution by the government 
for the adulteration in the value of money.  Barrington had in fact produced a short 
and brilliant analysis of inflation, a phenomenon unfamiliar to a generation used to 
stable prices.  Gallagher was able to use the civil servant’s habits of record keeping to 
substantiate Barrington’s argument. By collecting and analysing the grocery bills of 
many civil servants, which tended to be usually the same items over years, he could 
show that the pound now bought far fewer items than it had in 1914.  The cost of 
maintaining the same standard of living had increased and therefore the onus lay with 
the government to either restore the value of the pound or offer a compensatory 
increase.  Civil servants could no longer be apologetic in demanding pay increases, 
rather the government should be apologetic for causing the need for them.58   
Whereas the Irish delegates of the other civil service associations seem to have 
been relatively unknown in the London offices, Gallagher was close to W.J. Brown.  
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Gallagher brought Brown to Dublin to ginger up the organisation and assist in a 
recruitment drive. He attended the annual general meeting of the ACA in London and 
on one occasion was chosen to second a militant motion brought forward by Brown to 
the annual conference.59  Gallagher imbibed some of the ideas of the guild socialists 
whilst in London and advocated the ‘control of the civil service by civil servants and 
the abolition of grades’.60   He affiliated the 450-member CSCA into the Irish Labour 
Party and Trade Union Congress (ILPTUC) in 1920, the only civil service 
organisation outside the post office to do so.61  He was described as the ‘Irish WJB’ 
with the appearance of a ‘mild-mannered pedagogue’ but ‘pugnacious if opposed’, 
whose aggression frequently made enemies but who was also a ‘tireless worker for 
the interests of his class’.62      
The forerunner to the Second Division Association, the rather longwinded 
“Association of Clerks of the Second Division appointed under the Order-in-Council 
of 21st March, 1890” (usually known as the Ridley clerks) had Irish members shortly 
after its revival in 1905.63  The Second Division Association became the Association 
of Executive Officers (AEO) following re-grading and the affiliation of the ASCOCS 
higher-grade members.  In 1919 the executives of the Irish and British associations 
met, implying their essentially separate existence, and promised a more sympathetic 
relationship in which the London executive would do all that was necessary to defend 
the interests of the Irish membership under any home rule parliament.64  The AEO 
was relatively active in pursuing the case of Irish members during the 1920-1 
reorganisation of the Irish departments under A.J.P. Waterfield and Treasury Ireland, 
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the subject of chapter five.65  There was a suggestion that the Irish AEO was not 
paying its fair share of the overheads of the association, but the resolution of that issue 
involved an even closer affiliation between the Irish and British organisations.  This 
does suggest that home rule was not regarded as a barrier to continuing trade union 
organisation within the civil service executive grades of a self-governing Ireland.66  
The Irish organisers of the AEO were Mr R.Clarke, Mr Attride and Michael 
Smithwick (formerly of ASCOCS), after his transfer out of the Staff Clerk grade.  The 
key figure was however Sam Sloan of DATI, regarded already as a legend in civil 
service organisation.67  Sloan was described as a ‘typical Ulsterman’; aggressive and 
blunt in negotiation.  He was exceptionally well-versed in the minutiae of regulations 
and unequalled in his recall of commission and inquiry reports.68  He later transferred 
to Belfast and ended up as establishment officer in the Northern Ireland department of 
finance, a case of poacher turning gamekeeper.   
Sloan, along with Gallagher of the assistant clerks, W.G. Mulvin, Michael 
Smithwick, Conn Murphy, Thomas Murphy, and Ronald.J.P. Mortished formed the 
backbone of Irish civil service organisation.  What united all these across their several 
classes and departments was a shared conviction that grade exclusiveness was the 
weakness of the Irish service.  They all voiced at some stage their support for the 
syndicalist concept of the “One Big Union” (OBU) for the entire administrative, 
executive and clerical grades.  Within the broader movement of civil service 
organisation the AEO and the clerical associations were to the forefront of the 
movement toward a general organisation of civil servants.69     
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The civil service, whilst generating grade organisations, was also forming 
federal organisations.  In 1909 the Civil Service Federation (CSF) was formed as a 
cross-grade movement.70  It was originally intended that it would act as an all-service 
organisation to agitate for a standing committee of the House of Commons to form a 
committee of appeals on civil service grievances.  As membership took off this very 
specific purpose was lost in a more nebulous objective to ‘watch over and advance’ 
the interests of civil servants.  Under the influence of the postal unions, always the 
most radical, the purpose of the CSF then became explicitly political, demanding the 
right for civil servants to contest elections.  This turn from a campaign on pay and 
conditions to one on politics, allied with the tendency of the postal unions to go it 
alone in fighting pay claims, led to the disaffiliation of the clerical and second 
division associations.71     
In 1916, building on the success of a joint campaign on hours of work, the 
ACA, the Second Division Association, the Federation of Women Civil Servants and 
the Civil Service Typists Association combined in the Civil Service Alliance (CSA) 
with the objective of promoting the efficiency of the civil service and providing the 
‘conditions of a good life’ for civil servants.72  As the CSA grew it restricted 
membership to organisations representing civil servants of clerical associations with 
similar conditions (and therefore grievances), thus lessening the possibility of the sort 
of rifts that had weakened the Federation.  The CSA represented 15,000 civil servants 
in the clerical grades of the United Kingdom.  In 1921 the CSA and the CSF merged 
to form the Civil Service Confederation (CSC).   
As the larger federal structures emerged the Irish followed the lead of the 
British movement forming Irish federations with affiliate or branch status to the 
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British organisations.  The Irish CSA of thirteen associations included several Irish 
departmental associations but the largest membership came from the Irish members of 
associations such as the AEO, the Association of Assistant and Supervising Assistant 
Clerks, the Federation of Women Civil Servants, the Civil Service Typists 
Association, and the Association of Tax Clerks.  The Irish CSA membership totalled 
1,500 in comparison to over 24,000 in the British Alliance.73   The Irish CSA, along 
with the Irish Association of Post Office Clerks (IAPOC), organised the largest mass 
protest ever by the Irish civil service in November 1919.  The meeting was called to 
protest at the recent ten per cent offer made by the arbitration board.  The meeting 
approved resolutions calling for closer and more effective organisation and greater 
union with outside workers, along with a readiness to use the strike weapon.  Only 
thus, it was said, could the civil service hope to win justice.74  
Amongst the Irish civil service activists there were two distinct groups, 
reflecting two different analyses of the situation they faced.  Many of the civil service 
leadership, such as Gallagher, saw the function of the Irish organisations as being no 
more than maximising membership in support of the London leadership.  They saw 
home rule as no more and no less an alteration in the conditions of service than 
reorganisation of departments or recasting grades.75  Priority had to be given to the 
struggle for pay and re-grading, a struggle that was shared with the British civil 
service.  Along with Gallagher we could list Sam Sloan of the executive officers, 
Thomas A Murphy of the staff clerks, William F. Nally of the postal workers and 
W.G. Mulvin of the Irish CSA.  However amongst the activists there were some who 
pressed for what they saw as the necessity for a consciously nationalist outlook within 
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civil service associations in Ireland.  This group would include Ronald J.P. Mortished, 
Michael Smithwick and Dr Conn Murphy. 
Mortished, whilst remaining a member of the AEO, was a founder of the Irish 
Civil Service Union (ICSU), a federal organisation ‘open to all civil servants, working 
to promote complete unity of organisation in the service in Ireland’.  He was also 
editor of its journal The Irish Civil Servant.76  The origins of the ICSU lay in the order 
in council of 1918 demanding that civil servants take an oath of allegiance to the 
crown.  As has been noted this arose from a political and newspaper campaign 
alleging that disloyal civil servants were sabotaging the war effort.  The oath was not 
regarded as controversial amongst British civil servants but in Ireland it was seen as a 
manoeuvre by the loyalists in Dublin Castle to get at nationalist-minded civil servants. 
Mortished was one of those at a meeting in the Forester’s Hall, along with Diarmaid 
O’Hegarty, to establish a Society for the Protection of the Rights of Civil Servants 
‘open to established, unestablished and disestablished civil servants’ out of which the 
Civil Service Union was formed.  Mortished had already a reputation within the 
Treasury and the service for radical labour views.  Born in London of Irish parents, he 
was a graduate of the London School of Economics where he was actively involved in 
socialist politics and joined the Independent Labour Party.  In 1909 he entered the 
civil service and was sent to Dublin to the Registry of Deeds.  He joined the Socialist 
Party of Ireland and was close to Larkin and Connolly at a time of spectacular growth 
for the syndicalist ITGWU.77  In 1914 he had been disciplined and forfeited two 
increments in pay for writing articles in the Workers’ Republic critical of the war.  He 
was again disciplined during the dock strike of 1916 after a speech to a Liberty Hall 
meeting condemning the clerical staff of the Dublin Steampacket Company as 
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‘blacklegs’ for continuing to work.  Mortished as president of the National Union of 
Clerks, Dublin branch, made the speech.  The National Union of Clerks was a large 
and growing British white-collar union.   He narrowly missed dismissal but did lose 
another increment in salary.  The speech was made in early April but the reaction 
came in the aftermath to the Easter Rising.  The site and the tenor of the speech 
signalled sympathy, or even prior knowledge, of the Rising.  Mortished was 
eventually able to use his position as vice-chairman of the departmental Whitley 
council to win a restoration of his lost increments.78   
Mortished used his editorship of The Irish Civil Servant to criticise the Irish 
associations for merely imitating the British organisations.  Whilst ready to 
acknowledge the achievements of Gallagher, Sloan, Thomas Murphy and Mulvin he 
maintained that as much could have been achieved through the British associations, 
implying the redundancy of the Irish organisations.  He urged the fusion of all Irish 
organisations into a single national union, livelier and more aggressive than the 
British, imbued with class-consciousness rather than grade exclusiveness, and ready 
to use the strike weapon.79   In his writings he returned again and again to the theme 
that the Irish organisations were being smothered by the ‘English’; and that an 
explicitly separatist agenda was needed.  By the summer of 1921 as ‘Carsonia’ was 
being established, he was writing that it was positively dangerous for the Irish 
associations to give the British organisations the right to act on behalf of the Irish civil 
servants.80   
Mortished was unusual in that it was his labour activism that brought him into 
civil service organisation.  Other leaders emerged out of the cultural movements.  
Michael Smithwick’s area of activism was the Irish language movement.  Both he and 
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Conn Murphy were founder-members of the Gaelic League.  Smithwick (who 
gaelicised his name to Smidic) was close to Douglas Hyde.  Conn Murphy was a link 
with the revolutionary movement.  He was the first to be awarded a Ph.D. from the 
Royal University.  He gave lectures on logic to civil servants, not to introduce them to 
the beauty of philosophy but to prepare them for negotiation, analysing arguments and 
spotting flawed logic.  A founder-member of the Gaelic League he was active in Sinn 
Féin politics.  As we shall see, he later took an anti-Treaty position and was dismissed 
from the service by the provisional government.  Both he and his son were imprisoned 
during the civil war.81   
The importance to the civil service of achieving autonomous organisations and 
an Irish Whitley Committee arose from the imminence of home rule.  The unification 
of the Irish AEO with the COA in June 1921, led by Mortished and Gallagher, was 
driven by the implementation of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act.82  Home rule 
promised to allow the Irish civil service to carry into any new government ‘existing 
conditions of service’.  If the civil service could carry powerful organisations and a 
joint committee with negotiating machinery in good working order, recognised by 
both staff and official sides, it would be of considerable advantage.   
The outbreak of war had prevented movement on the MacDonnell commission 
recommendations on civil service reform.  MacDonnell, with a vision of the civil 
service as a single unit, had found a needless complexity and lack of uniformity in 
departments of state and in the grading of staff across the whole civil service.  His 
recommendation for a complete re-grading of the entire civil service into 
administrative, executive and clerical classes had been shelved.  However the rapid 
and haphazard growth of the wartime civil service further revealed the administrative 
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defects of the state apparatus.  The task of the inquiry by Haldane was to ‘enquire into 
the responsibilities of the various departments of the central executive Government, 
and to advise in what manner the exercise and distribution by the Government of its 
functions should be improved’.83  Haldane’s first finding suggested that Whitehall, 
supposedly the paragon of efficiency, was almost as chaotic as Dublin castle with 
overlapping, obscure and confused departments of government.  Haldane attempted to 
not only apply the recommendations of the pre-war MacDonnell report on grading but 
also to come to terms with the changes of the war.  Treasury dominance over 
personnel across the entire civil service was re-established by the creation of the 
Establishment Division. The cabinet’s status as the mainspring of the government 
machine was reinforced. The civil service was to acquire an expertise as providers of 
‘investigation and thought as the preliminary to action’ with the recommendation that 
each department should have an intelligence and research branch.  The committee 
also recommended an extension in the range and variety of the duties entrusted to 
women through the entire civil service, transforming an entirely male environment.84  
Haldane offered an exalted vision of the civil service with the value of efficient 
administration recognised and rewarded in both Great Britain and Ireland.85  Few of 
his recommendations were realised and although Haldane seemed to offer better 
status for the civil service in fact all that was achieved in concrete terms was greater 
Treasury control.  However for the associations a significant victory was that the 
reorganisation of the civil service into the new grades was to be undertaken by the 
service itself through the Whitley Councils.  Whitley Councils of all the various 
government departments were instructed to work out a departmental reorganisation 
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into the new and universal structure of administrative, executive and clerical classes 
to be then submitted to the Treasury Establishment Division for final approval.   
Reorganisation necessarily opened the further question of assimilating civil 
servants to new grades.  The associations wanted ‘weight for age’ to apply; that is any 
individual would be assimilated at the point of the new scale that he would have 
achieved at his present age.  The Treasury would only accept assimilation at the same 
actual monetary point on the scale; that is a civil servant would enjoy at best a modest 
rise in salary on assimilation even if the point of assimilation represented far fewer 
years of service than actually served.  A related issue was that of inflation continuing 
to erode wages at a steady rate.  The ‘cost-of-living committee’ established the 1914 
cost-of-living as a baseline and awarded periodic percentage increases to compensate 
for the rise in the cost of living over that figure since 1914.  In 1920 this stood at 130.  
The war bonus was then calculated at 130 per cent over 1914 salary levels and was to 
be periodically adjusted by the fall and rise of the prices index.  This, it was hoped, 
would end the perpetual battles with the Treasury followed by rounds of conciliation 
and arbitration.86   
Haldane made a brief visit to Ireland in April 1919 where the viceroy Lord 
French and the chief secretary Edward Shortt, both at utter loggerheads, acquainted 
him with the chaos that passed for an administration in Ireland.  The Irish civil service 
was studded with many different classes and grades, which had now to be somehow 
fitted into the three main classes and subsidiary grades with fixed duties and universal 
salary scales. There was also growing pressure from Whitehall for Dublin to absorb 
the huge number of demobilised soldiers, which was countered by equal pressure 
from the Treasury to cut civil service numbers and to come to severance terms with 
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the thousands of temporary staff recruited during the war.  Haldane made contact with 
Sinn Féin in the hope that the party would co-operate with a committee set up like the 
‘Machinery of Government Committee’ in Great Britain, to be chaired by Haldane, 
which would work out some scheme of urgently needed administrative reform for 
Ireland but would not preclude future home rule.  Haldane was of the opinion that the 
‘reform and organisation of the machinery of Irish government may be only the 
beginning of wisdom, but I am strongly convinced that it is the indispensable first step 
towards it’.87  Haldane’s suggestion was for dominion status for all Ireland to be 
preceded by a re-organisation of the Irish administration along with a general scheme 
of reconstruction guided by representatives of Irish opinion that would include an 
Ulsterman and de Valera.    Haldane seems to have got a positive response from both 
Sinn Féin and the Ulster Unionists but the idea was scotched by Walter Long, the 
cabinet’s Irish “expert” who told him to ‘go to hell’.88     
Long was at that time working at what emerged as the last of the home rule 
proposals for Ireland, the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, which proposed to 
partition the country and create two limited home rule assemblies, one based in 
Belfast for Ulster and one based in Dublin for the other three provinces, with an over-
arching Council of Ireland, whilst reserving some services in Whitehall.89  This would 
necessitate even further administrative confusion with the partition of parts of the civil 
service between north and south whilst retaining an imperial service. 
The GCICS was reactivated.  Though it was at the initiative of the CSCA that 
the GCICS was re-organised in 1917 to accommodate grade associations along with 
the departmental representatives, the Dublin council of the CSCA now regarded the 
Whitley committee as the better vehicle for defending the interests of the 
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membership, referring to the GCICS as being no more than ‘useful’.  It was decided 
to continue representation on the committee but there is no record of any active 
engagement.90  The committee, based on years of experience, used very different 
methods to those of the associations to put forward and win its demands.  While the 
associations were energetically using the Whitley Councils to win the best deal on 
reorganisation and re-grading (see the next chapter) the home rule committee, or more 
accurately an inner coterie, was busy building up a network of influence in the cabinet 
and the Treasury. 
The key figure on the 1919 GCICS was its chairman, Barlas of the LGB, a 
veteran of every civil servant home rule committee since 1893 and a diligent worker 
in the corridors of political power.  Edward Saunderson, second son of Colonel 
Saunderson the first leader of the Ulster Unionist party, was his access to the cabinet 
through his close relationship with Walter Long.  Long had been instrumental in 
getting Saunderson a permanent post at the LGB (hence his contact with Barlas) and 
then promotion to the coveted and influential post of private secretary to French in 
April 1918.  The LGB under Sir Henry Robinson seems to have been a fertile source 
for civil servants of impeccable ‘die-hard’ unionist opinion.  Sam Watt of the LGB 
was parachuted into position as private secretary to Ian Macpherson in early 1919, 
over the heads of two better-qualified Catholic candidates.  Saunderson remained 
Long’s creature and as a Unionist ‘die-hard’ he exercised a malign influence on Lord 
French.91  Whilst Barlas was diligently manipulating his political contacts on behalf 
of his fellow Irish civil servants he was not above feathering his own nest at the same 
time.  In November 1919 the LGB, via John Taylor in the under-secretary’s office, 
submitted a proposal for reorganisation to the Treasury.  In the reorganisation Barlas 
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was to be elevated to a new post of secretary to the Board at £1,000 per annum.  If 
granted this would allow Barlas to retire on a pension higher than the salary he was 
then receiving.  The reorganisation was in fact rejected by the Treasury, sceptical that 
the candidates for promotion were of first class calibre though ‘it was suggested they 
should get Class 1 salaries’.92  
On 9 April 1918 Lloyd George announced that Ireland was to have both 
conscription and a new measure of self-government.  Walter Long was persuaded to 
act as chairman of the drafting committee on the new home rule bill.93  There was 
little prospect of a home rule measure being actually passed by parliament but any bill 
that was produced would help set out the terms under which any future Irish 
settlement would be made.94  It was in that spirit that Barlas immediately wrote a 
private letter to Saunderson, before a meeting of the home rule committee.  What 
Barlas asked was that Saunderson should contact Long ‘who has always been 
sympathetic to the Irish civil servants’ and pass on to him a copy of the 1917 
statement with an offer to meet and convey the fears of the civil service and the hope 
that he might address these in the bill.95   
Long immediately replied to Barlas and, in an exchange of letters, Barlas 
outlined the principles that ought to guide the civil service clauses.  Barlas 
complained that the 1917 Convention had ‘contented themselves with a pious 
expression of opinion that the rights of existing officers should be preserved’.  The 
only practical suggestion that had been made was the establishment of an Irish civil 
service commission.  The position of the Irish civil service would be anything but 
secure under any Irish government likely to be elected in the circumstances of anti-
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conscription agitation.  Barlas was himself quite fearful, more so probably than the 
majority of the lower ranks of the service.  ‘The feeling in the greater part of the 
country is notoriously anti-British’ he told Long, and ‘civil servants transferred will 
be in a much more precarious position now than they would have been in had the 
1914 act come into operation 3 or 4 years ago’.  It was his position that the GCICS 
statement of 1917 was no longer sufficient to protect the interests of the civil service.  
Whilst mindful of the importance of the difficult question of loss of prospects and 
security regarding promotion (at the core of the 1917 statement and mainly affecting 
civil servants determined to stay on) Barlas was of the opinion that ‘the whole thing 
narrows itself down to the financial penalties to be imposed on any new government 
for removing civil servants without just cause or for alteration of their present rates of 
remuneration and status’.96   He wanted the British government to legislate so that any 
future home rule governments would find it not only administratively difficult but 
also financially crippling to impose cuts on the civil service.  Long then forwarded to 
Sir Robert Chalmers at the Treasury an edited version of Barlas’ letter, containing the 
requested legislative changes, along with a copy of the 1917 statement.   
The 1918 home rule proposal petered out, but Long was now entrenched as the 
cabinet liaison with the Irish government and the primary influence on Irish 
legislation.  In October 1919 he was asked to chair the cabinet committee on Ireland 
and to return to preparing a new home rule bill for Ireland.  Barlas was again 
immediately in contact and supplied him with a copy of the ‘Supplementary Statement 
by the General Committee of Irish Civil Servants as to their position in view of further 
legislation affecting the government of Ireland’.97  The victory of Sinn Féin in the 
1918 general election made Barlas even more pessimistic than before, and even a little 
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wistful for the comforts of the lost 1914 Act.  It was incontrovertible, he wrote, that 
‘the position of Irish civil servants, especially those of fairly long service, will be 
immeasurably more insecure now, having regard to recent developments, than it 
would have been if the Government of Ireland Act of 1914 had come into operation in 
that year.  Civil servants not in sympathy with the views of any new government in 
this country will, almost certainly, have to vacate their positions and the terms of 
compensation on retirement (either voluntary or compulsory) provided by the Act of 
1914 should, therefore, be substantially improved’.  He also feared that the power in 
the 1914 Act of the government to retain civil servants who might wish to retire, for 
up to five years, would expose them to intolerable pressures.98   
Cabinet committee records and the relevant clauses of the 1920 Government 
of Ireland Act indicate that Barlas and the civil service committee, exploiting the 
political access and status provided by the patronage of Long, succeeded to a large 
degree in influencing and shaping the clauses on the civil service.99  The 1919 
statement asked that the concessions requested in 1917 should be granted along with 
additional concessions to meet the changed circumstances.  The 1917 statement had 
concentrated on security for promotion for civil servants continuing in the service of 
the new government.  It had only incidentally asked for improved terms for civil 
servants retiring either voluntarily or under compulsion.100  The 1919 supplementary 
statement was much more focused on the terms of retirement, the special classes of 
civil servant on the Irish boards and the consequences of partition.  Barlas wanted 
additional representation for civil servants on the Civil Service Committee established 
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by the 1914 Act, which had the authority to permit retirements and award pensions, 
from one to three.  He asked that the availability of the special terms of retirement 
should be extended from seven to ten years after the appointed day.  The voluntary 
retirement terms had been limited in the 1914 Act to officers under sixty years of age.  
He wanted the age limit extended to sixty-five, reflecting the large cohort of senior 
officers approaching retirement age.  The Civil Service Committee had the power to 
postpone voluntary retirement indefinitely under the 1914 Act. Barlas wanted this 
limited to two years.   
Ian Macpherson adopted the cause of the GCICS and supplied the cabinet 
committee with a brief in which he endorsed Barlas’ pessimism.  He wrote, ‘It is 
contended with some reason that safeguards as to security of tenure, promotion, 
prospects and transfers, are likely to prove of little practical value in the case at least 
of the South of Ireland Government, and this consideration strengthens the claim for 
improvement of the terms of retirement, whether voluntary, compulsory, or 
“permissive”.  This is the most important question that arises’.101  Macpherson was in 
favour of adding to the power of the Civil Service Committee and of increasing the 
civil service representation on it.  He was at the same time mindful of the danger of 
offering terms for retirement so generous they would strip the new governments of 
their entire civil service.   
Worthington-Evans, minister for pensions, was willing to extend the civil 
servants representation on the Civil Service Committee, though to two only and not to 
the three asked by Barlas.  On limiting the stay on voluntary retirement to two years, 
he agreed.  He also supported extending the upper age limit for the special terms to 
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sixty-five but did not support the extension of the option to retire under special terms 
to ten years after the appointed day.102          
 The cabinet memoranda plainly stated that ‘in deference to representations 
from the Committee of Irish Civil Servants’ the terms of compensation for officers 
who retired were now more generous than those in the 1914 Act.103  Hitherto a ‘civil 
servant’ had been a person paid out of a fund voted by parliament.  The committee 
proposed to define an ‘Irish officer’ in terms so broad it included all and every person 
whether permanent or temporary, in departments of state or autonomous boards, paid 
by vote, fees or allowances.  Pension rights were also to be extended to categories 
that, up to then, had none, such as the CDB officers, provided the Treasury processed 
the necessary regulations before the appointed day.  It would not do if home rule 
legislation imposed on the Irish governments concessions that had been refused by the 
British government.  Compensation for retirement was however the nub of the issue 
so far as Barlas and the committee were concerned.  Here the cabinet committee were 
prepared to meet the civil service without reservation.  ‘In deference to the 
representations of the Committee of Irish Civil Servants’ the transitional period, it 
was proposed, would be extended from five to seven years.  This was not as generous 
as Barlas’ ten years, but it still extended beyond the retiring age of a great number of 
the senior civil servants.  The terms of permissive retirement were equally generous.  
Under the 1914 Act the Civil Service Committee permitted retirement if a civil 
servant could show that his position had been altered to his detriment.  Under the 
1920 bill it was only required that the position had been materially altered.  Also, 
under the 1914 Act the question of permitting retirement only arose after the 
transitional period of five years.  After all, an officer, if he did not like the new 
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conditions but was not compelled to retire, could simply opt for voluntary retirement 
during the five years.  The difficulty for such an officer however, was that the terms 
of voluntary retirement were much less generous than those for permissive retirement.  
The intent of the 1914 Act was to encourage civil servants to stay on for at least five 
years by offering security that conditions would not get worse and might even get 
better after the transition.  The 1920 bill, in response to Barlas and the civil service 
representations, abolished that distinction.  An officer retiring without permission 
could expect the same terms as an officer retiring with permission.  By agreeing to 
extend the normal retirement age from sixty to sixty-five, and by extending the 
transition period to seven years, the actual sums of compensation (which were based 
on years to retirement and transitional years) were greatly increased.  The 
compensation scale of the 1914 Act became the minimum of the new scale, with a 
maximum of two-thirds of retiring salary.  The cabinet committee also proposed to 
allow the civil servants two, rather than one, representative on the Civil Service 
Committee.  The two representatives would be drawn from north and south and the 
committee was extended to seven.104 
Clauses 54-59 with the eighth schedule of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act 
were the achievement of the GCICS.  This achievement was the result of a long 
campaign that began with the 1911 overtures to the home rule bill of 1912, but whose 
origins lay in the 1893 committee.  The achievement was, for a while, overshadowed 
by the revolutionary changes that swept the state they served into the dustbin of 
history.  However those achievements were vital in allowing the civil service to 
negotiate the shifting direction and speed of reform as the Irish administration, now in 
the hands of an English “junta” of elite civil servants, turned to face the challenge of 
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partition and a revolutionary state claiming true legitimacy.  Since 1911 the 
Committee had succeeded in forging a combination that crossed classes, grades, 
departments and the political allegiance of nationalist and unionist civil servants.  
Sharing many of the same activists as the associations and the departmental Whitley 
Councils it relied exclusively on personal and private contacts and not at all on mass 
mobilisation or the fraternal support of fellow officials.  By persistent but discreet 
lobbying within the corridors of power it succeeded in shaping and amending 
legislation so as to win better terms and security for the status, pay and promotions 
and pensions of the Irish civil service.  Most significantly of all it succeeded in 
winning what was in effect a “written constitution”.  By 1920 the vested interests of 
Irish civil servants, who previously were employed “at pleasure”, had been 
transformed into rights that were legal and parliamentary, and therefore defensible at 
law. 
 
             
  







TREASURY (IRELAND) 1920-21. 
 
Early in 1920 Maurice Headlam was visited by Sir Warren Fisher, secretary to the 
Treasury and head of the civil service, accompanied by Sir John Anderson, from the 
Inland Revenue board.  Headlam was rattled to be treated with something very like 
contempt, after expressing strong suspicions about some Catholic official to his 
visitors.1 Headlam was also puzzled as to the purpose of the visit but, as all heads of 
departments ought to know well, visitations by the Treasury were always the prelude 
to great changes.  Since the failure of the Convention the Castle administration had 
not come up with any politically creative ideas.  In fact the last significant political 
initiative to emanate from the Castle had been MacDonnell’s 1906 Irish Council Bill.2    
The attempt to link home rule and conscription in 1918 had proved a disaster and had 
boosted Sinn Féin.  The post-war general election results demonstrated that Sinn Féin 
now represented the majority view of the Irish electorate.  Concluding that no political 
solution was possible Dublin Castle turned to imposing coercion, a policy that led 
increasingly to a militarisation of the administration.3  As H.A.L. Fisher pointed out to 
Lloyd George, the strategy being pursued by the Irish government would mean that 
Irish home rule, which was on the statute books, would be accompanied by military 
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law.4  A Castle clique of the new Chief Secretary Ian Macpherson, the Viceroy Lord 
French, and the senior civil servants Sir John Taylor (former member of the 1911 civil 
service committee), W.P.J. Connolly, Edward Saunderson and Samuel Watt supposed 
that everyone except “Ulster”, and all opinion that was not “loyal”, was to be subject 
to indiscriminate coercion.  Taylor, identified as the dominant personality in this 
centre of reaction, was unable to see that Dáil Éireann’s claim to be the legitimate 
state presented a wholly different challenge than the rick-burning and cattle drives of 
earlier agitation.5  Under them the RIC was further militarised and Sinn Féin, the 
political representatives of the majority of the Irish people, was suppressed and its 
supporters punished.  As the failure of militarising the administration to deliver social 
order became evident, the fault was laid at the door of the civil service administrators 
and not the policy.  The problem, it was alleged was the unreliability or even 
incompetence of elements within the civil service.  Lord French blamed the failure of 
his repression on the ‘weakness and inefficiency of some officials’ and moved to 
purge the civil service of any officials with Sinn Féin sympathies, which meant all 
Catholics in the administration came under suspicion.6  MacMahon, the Catholic 
under-secretary, was marginalized as the ultra-loyalist Sir John Taylor was appointed 
assistant under-secretary, vaulting over the highly able Joseph Brennan, a Catholic.  
Headlam was so determined to defend the status quo that he secretly kept Unionist 
critics informed on the Irish policy of the government, which is the most serious 
possible breach of civil service ethics.7  The civil servants in the Castle split into two 
camps, those who backed MacMahon and those who backed Taylor.  The deepening 
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politicisation of the bureaucracy of Dublin Castle fatally weakened the state as a 
culture of militarism expelled anyone counselling dialogue with nationalism.8  The 
key role of the modern civil servant, to inform, to advice and to warn, was a nullity.  
A culture of militaristic machismo, revealed by the frequent accusation of “cold feet” 
being hurled against any who counselled caution, prevailed.9  Duggan remembered 
this time as the ‘unhappiest twelve months of my civil service career’.10  General Sir 
Joseph Byrne, the Catholic head of the RIC was pushed out of office because, Lord 
French alleged ‘he had lost his nerve’ and was too soft on Sinn Féin.11  Far from 
losing his nerve however he was in fighting form and complained to the cabinet that 
the problem was the Castle government was out of touch with all opinion save its 
own.12    
As the challenge of the republican forces grew the British government further 
militarised the administration.  Hamar Greenwood, who had no knowledge of Ireland 
and no cabinet experience, replaced Macpherson, now in turn accused by Edward 
Saunderson of showing ‘cold feet’.13  Sir Neville Macready was appointed General 
Officer Commanding.  Meanwhile Walter Long’s Government of Ireland bill, which 
would establish a Council of Ireland with two local parliaments in Belfast and Dublin, 
began to make its passage through parliament.  If, as appeared likely, it was accepted 
by the Ulster Unionists but rejected by Sinn Féin then the government would partition 
the country and rule the south by military government.14  A new dual policy emerged 
of smashing Sinn Féin whilst proffering the Government of Ireland bill as a final 
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settlement.  Greenwood’s Restoration of Order (Ireland) Act imposed imprisonment 
without trial and courts-martial in designated areas.  The “Black and Tans” and the 
Auxiliaries bolstered the crumbling RIC as county after county was put under martial 
law.  It was also clear that the police and soldiers enjoyed considerable freedom in 
interpreting the law.  Reprisals were sanctioned and became official policy, 
destroying any legitimacy that the state might have retained in British and 
international eyes.  The only political policy was the mechanical progress of the 1920 
bill through parliament and the partition of the administration.   
The soldiers appointed to govern Ireland in early 1920; Colonel Ormond 
Winter, chief of intelligence; General Tudor, head of the RIC; General Macready, 
Commander in Chief of the army; General Boyd, head of the DMP and Brigadier 
Crozier, head of the Auxiliaries; all sent to Ireland to defeat Sinn Féin by military 
repression, found themselves filling an administrative vacuum. Macready confessed 
himself ‘fairly astonished’ at the chaos and incompetence that prevailed in the Irish 
administration.15  Sir Hamar Greenwood, the new chief secretary, reported to cabinet 
in May 1920 that his real difficulty was ‘the inadequacy and sloppiness of the 
instruments of government.16  After a blistering attack on the incompetence of the 
castle apparatus by Macready an investigation of the Irish administration took place in 
May 1920 under Warren Fisher, permanent secretary of the Treasury and head of the 
British civil service.  Fisher did not share in the Castle paranoia of Irish Catholics.  A 
supporter of home rule for Ireland, he liked the country and the people, besides which 
his wife was half-Irish and a Catholic.17 
The British government insisted that Fisher’s investigation into Dublin Castle 
was merely to prepare the ground for implementing in Ireland the recently approved 
                                                
15General Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of an Active Life, (2 vols, 1925). ii p448-9. 
16Jones, Whitehall Diary, pp16-8. 
17Eunan O’Halpin, Sir Warren Fisher, p84. 
 140 
recommendation of the National Whitley Council on reorganisation.18  However the 
signals that something more thorough was being planned were, by early April, 
sufficiently strong to thoroughly alarm Robert Lynn the Belfast unionist MP for 
Woodvale constituency.  Writing to Bonar Law he implored him to ‘refuse to allow 
the betrayal of the faithful servants by an act of government treachery’, or at least, if 
they were to be ‘thrown to the wolves’ to ensure that they received adequate 
pensions.19  The Fisher report on the Irish administration was unequivocal in its direct 
and plain-speaking condemnation;  
The castle administration does not administer.  On the mechanical side 
it can never have been good and is now quite obsolete; in the infinitely 
more important sphere (a) of informing and advising the Irish 
government in relation to policy and (b) of practical capacity in the 
application of policy it simply has no existence…The prevailing 
conception of the post of under secretary - who should be the principal 
permanent adviser to the Irish government in civil affairs - appears to 
be that he is a routine clerk...The position at the present moment is 
seemingly that no one in the Chief Secretary’s Office, from the Under 
Secretary downwards, regards himself as responsible even for 
decisions on departmental papers, let alone for a share in the solution 
of difficulties in the realm either of policy or of execution.  The Chief 
Secretary, for his part, appears to be under the illusion that a Civil 
Servant - even though he has the position and emoluments of 
permanent head of the Irish administration - is entirely unconcerned 
with the exploration or settlement of the problems which the Irish 
administration exists to solve.20   
 
 Warren Fisher’s view was that Macready, appointed as GOC, had in fact been 
playing the role of under secretary and had therefore hidden the fundamental 
weakness of the administration.  He recommended that MacMahon, though 
inadequate, should be left in the post of under secretary not least because he ‘holds 
views more in keeping with 20th century sentiment than those expressed by the 
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ascendancy party and the supporters of indiscriminate coercion’.21  But Taylor had to 
be got rid off and a new team of senior civil servants sent in to thoroughly recast the 
administration.  
In a supplement to the report Warren Fisher concluded that the government of 
Ireland was ‘woodenly stupid’ and that the problems in the Castle administration were 
not simply administrative but were political.  The continuance of government by 
‘folly and brute force’ would lead to no alternative but military rule in Ireland.  Fisher 
recommended that any solution would need to be one that showed the government 
seizing the initiative and was imaginative, offering the maximum of both political and 
administrative reform.  These would include the abolition of the lord lieutenancy ‘a 
pinchbeck royalty’, the abandonment of Walter Long’s home rule bill, which had no 
friends in Ireland, and an offer of dominion home rule with safeguards for defence 
and Ulster.22  The cabinet rejected out of hand his recommendations on political 
reform but his recommendations on administrative reform were accepted and a team 
of civil servants were sent to sort out Dublin castle.23  
Fisher executed a coup of the Irish administration.  Taylor was ditched.  His 
claim for £11,070 compensation, pursued relentlessly with Walter Long and Austen 
Chamberlain, was dismissed by Malcolm Ramsay who noted that nobody but Sir John 
Taylor could suppose he was that valuable, and by Warren Fisher who informed Long 
that Taylor had enjoyed advancement far beyond anything that a modestly efficient 
English department would have given a man of similar calibre.  Eventually he settled 
gratefully for £3,000.24  Connolly, who had moved into the Castle after the killing of 
Alan Bell and ran up a considerable bill at the officer’s mess, was moved to 
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Bournemouth.25  Headlam was moved back to an obscure department in the Treasury 
in London to serve out his years to retirement.26  Interestingly, no other senior civil 
servants were moved, not even Micks the head of the notoriously difficult CDB.  
Clearly was at issue was not efficiency but an over-zealous and uncritical 
identification with reactionary policies which blinded Taylor and his like-minded 
coterie to the collapse of the state civil machine.  
The moment in May 1920 when the reins of the Castle administration passed 
into the hands of a team of English civil servants is recognised as crucial to the history 
of the Irish administration in the period of revolution.  It is generally argued that this 
team of non-political experts transformed a demoralised and outmoded administrative 
machine into an efficient and modernised civil service, just in time for the Treaty 
settlement.27  This would be a remarkable achievement and deserves further 
examination into precisely who they were and what they did to the Irish civil service.  
It would also bring the civil service and the state to the centre of the revolutionary 
struggle.  
The team of English civil servants sent to Dublin were led by John Anderson, 
forming a “junta” in the words of George Chester Duggan, the superintending clerk in 
the chief Secretary’s Office at the time.28  John Anderson was Chairman of the Board 
of Inland Revenue.  During the war he had served as secretary of the Ministry of 
Shipping.  In Dublin Anderson was appointed joint under secretary with the powers of 
a permanent head of the Treasury and given a free hand; ‘no civil servant has ever 
wielded, or is ever likely to wield, such power as he did during his twenty-one months 
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of tenure of office as Under-Secretary.’29  Accompanying Anderson were A.W. 
[Andy] Cope, a customs detective who was to play the decisive role in negotiating the 
Truce; Mark Sturgis, Chairman of the Treasury Selection Board, who left a racy diary 
of those years; Basil Clarke, former war correspondent of the Daily Mail, Director of 
Public Information in the newly created Ministry of Health and seconded to Dublin as 
Head of Publicity, at which he was a failure; Geoffrey Whiskard, of principal officer 
rank, a crime specialist to co-ordinate civil and military forces; L.N. Blake-Odgers, 
seconded from the Home Office; William Thomas Matthews and Bernard Gilbert, 
both Treasury principal officers appointed assistants to Waterfield; T.D. Fairgrieve, 
seconded from the Scottish Office; Norman Gerald Loughnane, a Treasury principal 
officer; and Alexander Percival Waterfield who was made Treasury Remembrancer 
with the power of assistant under secretary.30  W.E. Wylie, the legal advisor to the 
government, was deeply impressed by the group and, as his own analysis and 
prescription so closely mirrored that of Anderson, he was absorbed into the team.31  
The Anderson team constituted, from the day of their arrival until the creation of the 
provisional government under the Treaty, a “super bureaucracy” of competent and 
trustworthy civil servants in Ireland.32  Their status within the service was signalled 
by Treasury circulars from Warren Fisher and from Johnson the establishment officer, 
directing that all papers ‘dealing with, bearing on, or arising out of the present 
abnormal Irish conditions’ were to be treated with the ‘utmost despatch at every 
stage’.33 Anderson brought one immediate advantage to the Irish administration; there 
were to be no more humiliations at the hands of the Public Accounts Committee for 
the heads of the Irish civil service.  In 1920 MacMahon’s mild suggestion that many 
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departments made expenditures in anticipation of Treasury sanction flung Henry 
Craik of the PAC into a righteous rage.  Anderson had no such trouble as extra 
allowances were nodded through for his English officials living in the Marine Hotel in 
Kingstown, travelling first class and enjoying special allowances.34  As Duggan puts 
it, Anderson arrived ‘drawing forth a well-filled purse’.35  As the “economy” frenzy 
swept through Whitehall, Fairgrieve dismissed a Treasury demand for reductions in 
staff, writing that ‘ordinary conditions applicable to Great Britain are not possible as 
regards Ireland just yet’.36  These ‘suave and sophisticated Englishmen’, with neither 
careers nor commitments in Ireland, cosseted and believed to be receiving huge 
salaries, aroused deep resentment in the old Unionist ‘die-hards’ of the Castle 
establishment.37  The nationalist press, in the hope that it signalled the abolition of the 
hated Dublin Castle, cheered their arrival.38   
It is clear that both Warren Fisher and Anderson also interpreted the new 
regime as signalling a new policy for Ireland.  They were also clear what this policy 
was to be; an immediate offer of dominion home rule for Ireland, with protection for 
Ulster and British defence interests, allied with unflinching coercion.  This was the 
policy that Macready, Warren Fisher, Anderson and Wylie agreed and brought to the 
cabinet in July 1920.39  This was the policy that Wylie reported to Anderson had 
brought the southern unionists, churchmen and “political” Sinn Féin ‘in with us’.40  
However, despite the arguments of the Irish specialists the cabinet was not convinced 
and Churchill with Tudor won support for more coercion.  Walter Long rejected the 
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Fisher report and insisted that home rule would be accepted and that all that was 
required was for the government to ‘stand up to the Irishman’ and assured Lloyd 
George that ‘it is dogged does it’.41  However the Anderson team acted as if the 
cabinet decision not to offer dominion home rule was a delay, rather than a rejection 
of the policy.  Cope continued to develop his own contacts with Sinn Féin, despite the 
cabinet decision that no authority existed for any person serving the Irish government 
to contact Sinn Féin except to convey government policy.42   
As well as referring to the failure of administration Warren Fisher also wrote 
to Lloyd George on the failure of statecraft in Ireland; and on the absence of an 
understanding of the role of a modern civil servant; ‘to inform to advise and to warn’.  
A civil servant is not a soldier, he may disagree and he should certainly speak with 
complete frankness.  In Dublin Castle none of the civil servants were prepared to do 
that and all avoided responsibility.  Irish government was in danger of being 
overwhelmed by those who thought that all that there was nothing more to be done 
than to defeat the gunmen.   The ascendancy party in Dublin Castle were actually 
quite content with the status quo accompanied by additional coercion.  The Anderson 
team were sent to Dublin to deal with a technical problem of administration, but also 
to provide the statecraft that was lacking.  The danger was that the Irish government 
was abdicating to the military and quite unwittingly was creating the conditions in 
which the state in Ireland would come under a military executive. The mission of the 
Anderson team was to prevent the eclipse of civil government and to ensure that when 
the cabinet finally arrived at the correct decision it would be possible to enact it.  
They understood the enormous difference between civil government and military 
government and the difficulty of going back to civil government.  As Macready put it, 
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enforcing relative peace by military rule was not difficult; it was what was done after 
that was difficult.43  What this group also saw clearly was that the actions of Dáil 
Éireann and Sinn Féin in establishing the counter-state indicated a desire to maintain 
social order and the rule of law and a wise government would have encouraged this 
desire. 
Warren Fisher and Anderson presented the cabinet with a clear choice; to 
govern Ireland by a civil or a military government.  In presenting this clear choice 
they were not only arguing against the cabinet decision but also displaying a deeper 
loyalty to the state.  As Warren Fisher reminded Lloyd George ‘there is all the 
difference in the world between a military machine and a civil machine in 
circumstances such as now obtain in Ireland’.44  A military government has the means 
to enforce its decisions because it is not dependent on civil society to execute its 
orders.  Civil government requires the consent of society because agents who are also 
part of the civil population execute its orders.  A further difference that Warren Fisher 
did not draw out was that whereas a soldier obeys an order, a civil servant responds to 
an order, sometimes critically.  That Ireland would eventually have to be given self-
government was evident to all except the most hard-bitten, diehard unionist.  The 
form of the state in Ireland after attaining self-government would be continuous with 
that of the last British regime, either civil or military.  For Warren Fisher in particular 
failure to ensure continuity of civil government of the state would be devastating.  
Hence his veiled threat to withdraw the Anderson team if the policy of coercion was 
pursued to its logical ends.          
In Whitehall the recent retirement of many senior civil servants created an 
opportunity to re-organise the Treasury and impose the control of the civil service that 
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had eluded reformers since it was first suggested by the MacDonnell royal 
commission.  Between September 1919 and March 1920 a series of Treasury circulars 
reorganised the Treasury into three divisions of finance, supply and establishment.  
The status of the permanent secretary to the Treasury as head of the civil service was 
confirmed, as was the power of the Treasury to regulate and control the departments 
of government.45  Throughout the 1919-22 period, when the state in Ireland teetered 
on the edge of collapse Warren Fisher was deeply engaged in the most far-reaching 
reforms of the British civil service.46  The entire civil service in Britain, from the 
senior to the most junior ranks, through the departmental Whitley Councils, was now 
engaged in thinking about the problems of reorganisation and reform as part of post-
war reconstruction.  It was inevitable that such thinking would influence policy on 
Ireland.   
Warren Fisher could clearly see the connection between civil service reform, 
the crisis in Ireland and a threatened failure of the state.  Although expressed in purely 
administrative language, the role of the Anderson team was clearly political in the 
sense that they responded to the crumbling of British political supremacy in Ireland.  
As Wylie pointed out, the people were either hostile or neutral ‘because they no 
longer looked upon the government as the government’.47  Sturgis put the same 
conclusion more colourfully; ‘the Irish may not be fit to govern themselves, but 
neither were the English, nor the Welsh’.48  The over-riding objective of the Anderson 
team was first, to ensure that the civil government of Ireland would not be swept aside 
by military government, and second that the civil government would provide 
continuity into a new government in Ireland.  In pursuing these goals they acted 
                                                
45 Kathleen Burk, ‘the Treasury: from impotence to power’ in Burk (ed) War and the State, pp84-107. 
46 O’Halpin, Warren Fisher, pp46-65. 
47 NAUK, CO/904/188/463, Anderson Papers, ‘Wylie to Anderson 3 Aug. 1920’. 
48 Sturgis, Last Days, p17. 
 148 
outside the tradition of the civil service, but confident that their political masters 
simply needed time to agree with the superior insight of their civil servants.  Despite 
the posturing of Greenwood and the generals the civil service were agreed that it was 
Anderson who was the ‘most powerful force in the British administration in 
Ireland’.49  The condition of Ireland and the infestation of the state apparatus by the 
military justified the exercise of executive power by an objective civil service in order 
to ensure the survival of the state itself.   
The group was selected not alone on ability but also because they largely 
agreed with Warren Fisher on Ireland.  Before transfer to Ireland Sturgis’ briefing at 
Treasury was a process of acquiring Warren Fisher’s views on the failures of the old 
‘Castle Gang’.50  Cope, the central figure in the secret contacts and negotiations that 
led to the truce and treaty, was an anti-militarist and a democrat.51  As civil servants 
they recognised that there was a lot more to do in Ireland than simply beating an 
enemy.52  It was lucky for Dáil Éireann that the cabinet resisted for so long.  
Revolutions in the twentieth-century, to be successful, depended more on the failure 
of the state than on the actions of the revolutionaries.53  The IRA guerrilla campaign 
could ensure its own survival, but it could not topple a state.  It was the failure of the 
British state in Ireland created the conditions in which what might have been a comic 
operetta of Dáil Éireann succeeded in taking state power.   
Andy Cope, highly strung with a nervous energy, was then and is now 
recognised as the key figure in securing the truce and treaty.  In the political history of 
the revolutionary period he is, on the British side, the central force.  For the mass of 
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the Irish civil servants Waterfield was the key figure, one very much less significant 
in the bigger picture and not mentioned at all by Sturgis.  But, if the view that an 
administrative apparatus on the verge of collapse was thoroughly modernised within 
eighteen months is to be accepted, then his achievement deserves recognition.   
The creation of Treasury Ireland on 16 June 1920, with responsibility for ‘all 
expenditure of all Irish departments, universities and colleges, including all questions 
of supply and establishment’ with the authority to ‘advise and make observations’ on 
the Irish branches of the ‘English’ departments such as the Admiralty, Air Force, 
Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Pensions and Revenue Departments; achieved in an 
instant the centralised control of the Irish departments that had often been proposed 
but never achieved.54  However that control now lay with a civil servant, not a 
politician.  John Anderson went to London looking for clarity in the relationship 
between the establishment division of the Treasury in London and Treasury Ireland, 
in regard to reorganisation in Ireland.  He was assured that Waterfield, assistant 
secretary at Treasury (Ireland), was regarded as the head of the Irish civil service 
under the direction of Anderson.55    
Some of the pressing administrative problems that Waterfield had to deal with 
had nothing to do with the political crisis and were common to both Britain and 
Ireland.  Most immediate were the demands of the demobilised soldiers and sailors.  
Across Europe embittered demobilised soldiers, organised in groups such as the 
German Freikorps and the Italian Arditi, were becoming a dangerous and destabilising 
force in society.  In the immediate aftermath of the Armistice there was a general 
expectation of improvements in the British economy.  The release of pent-up savings 
and the backlog of unsatisfied demands, allied with the end to the slaughter of war, 
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created a public euphoria encouraged by a government declaration promising a "land 
fit for heroes".  It was anticipated that the post-war economy would easily cope with 
the discharged soldiers, and that the government would do its bit by giving them jobs.  
A committee of inquiry into the employment of ex-servicemen in the civil service, 
headed by Lord Lytton, put a lot of pressure on the government departments to 
employ these men, especially the disabled.  Apart from the few with recognised 
qualifications most of the ex-soldiers were virtually illiterate and, by repeatedly 
failing the qualifying examinations, had proved incapable of achieving a basic 
acceptable standard.  It became necessary to simply ignore their failings and admit 
them on the recommendation of the departmental heads.  In Ireland these men were 
often rapidly promoted into permanent posts, by-passing other temporary men who 
were better qualified but regarded as less loyal.56  The particular animus of these 
veterans was the number of women employed in civil service posts.  The veteran 
associations were feared and hated by the established civil servants   When the 
veteran associations amalgamated to form the British Legion and began recruiting ex-
servicemen within the civil service W.J. Brown of the CSCA attacked them as a 
union-breaking force and as a sinister movement close in spirit to the fascisti of 
Italy.57   
In Dublin the 4,600 ex-soldiers of the ‘Irish Federation of Discharged or 
Demobilised Sailors’ and ‘Comrades of the Great War’ were well organised, bitter, 
and vocal.58  The Federation had boycotted the official Peace Day celebrations of July 
1919 in protest at the government’s lack of action on their behalf.59   The ‘Association 
of Ex-Service Civil Servants’ alleged victimisation at the hands of the Irish 
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departments who, they claimed, were ignoring the claims of those who had risked life 
and limb.  They wanted new posts and promotions reserved for ex-servicemen.60  
They minutely scrutinised the departments for the lists of women employees and 
bombarded the heads of those departments with demands for their replacement by 
veterans.61  General Macready was generally sympathetic and a willing conduit to 
Anderson for their grievances about the Irish departments.62  John Anderson was 
anxious that the claims of the veterans living in the midst of a hostile population 
‘whose value to the cause of settled government at the present time is very great’ 
should be have as many positions as possible opened to them.63  The DATI was 
particularly anxious to please and Gill assured Anderson that 'where possible all 
professional and technical staff are ex-servicemen'.64  The Whitley reorganisation of 
the civil service seemed to provide these veterans with the ideal opportunity to press 
their claims.  The Irish Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and 
Soldiers demanded representation on the departmental Whitley Councils of the Irish 
government.  Waterfield was nervous of this group and wanted them excluded despite 
Anderson’s support for them, but he left it to the civil service unions to keep them 
out.65  On the other hand Waterfield was quite prepared to put pressure on the heads 
of departments to dismiss women in temporary posts and employ the ex-servicemen 
in their place.66 
  The other main task that Waterfield faced was the application of the Ramsay 
and Stuart-Bunning Whitley Joint Sub-Committee on Reorganisation report.  The sub-
                                                
60 NAI, AG1/G3543/19 ‘memorandum from association of Irish civil servants…9 Apr. 1919. 
61 NAUK, T158/6 ‘assoc of ex-service civil servants to Waterfield’, 6 Dec 1921. 
62 NAUK CO/904/188/595, ‘Macready to Anderson 27 Sept. 1920’. 
63 NAI, CSORP 1921-2, 22192/20 ‘employment of ex-servicemen’ 22 June 1920.. 
64NAI, AG1/G4034/21 "statement showing what has been done by department for ex-servicemen since 
Armistice". 
65 NAUK, T158/3 ‘Waterfield to Phillips’ 7 May 1921. 
66 NAUK, T158/5, ‘Waterfield to Patterson’ & Waterfield to Cope’ 8 Nov. 1921; T158/6 ‘Waterfield to 
Minnis’ 20 Dec. 1921. 
 152 
committee, formed entirely of former and serving civil servants, including Sir John 
Anderson, reported in February 1920.  The report recommended that the entire civil 
service; consisting of twelve classes, should be re-graded into just four classes; 
writing assistants, clerical, executive and administrative; with higher and lower grades 
where appropriate. 
So far as the civil service associations were concerned the gains offered by the 
reorganisation report were an end to the university monopoly on the administrative 
posts, a clear pyramid of promotion from the clerical to the administrative class, the 
retention of the seven-hour day and the improved scales of pay which offered a 
‘marrying’ wage at age of twenty-five.  The disadvantages were the creation of the 
new writing assistant class and the formalising of discrimination against women who 
were doing the same work at the same grade as men but for a lower pay.67  In Ireland 
the reorganisation report had been condemned by the ILC assistant clerks because of 
the discrimination against women and the perpetuation of a dead-end in the writing 
assistant grade.  However the rest of the service accepted the report by an 
overwhelming majority.68    
The civil service associations assumed that assimilation would be a straight-
forward process whereby the assistant clerks would become clerical officers and the 
second division clerks would become executive officers.  It was also assumed that the 
transfer would be ‘weighted for age’, that is to say that a civil servant would enter the 
new class at an increment corresponding to his age.  Instead the Treasury offered 
transfer at an increment equivalent to a slight increase on the salary actually enjoyed 
at the moment of transfer.  In real terms what that meant was that an assistant clerk of 
forty years, with twenty-two years service, might expect to arrive at a salary for a 
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clerical officer with the same twenty-two years of service.  Instead the Treasury might 
offer a salary equivalent to only ten years of clerical officer service.  Leading the 
reaction to reject these terms were the Dublin civil servants.  Furious at the chronic 
delay that accompanied the whole reorganisation process and disillusioned with 
Whitleyism, large numbers of the Dublin civil servants were prepared to abandon 
Whitleyism, establish a strike fund and revive the demand for an arbitration board 
under parliamentary control.69  The Treasury, by offering a guarantee for a substantial 
increase in actual salary for all assimilated officers did secure agreement, but at the 
cost of a great deal of suspicion and bad feeling.   
As Waterfield established himself in Dublin Castle as ‘Treasury Ireland’ he 
faced the task of reorganising departments and assimilating a disgruntled and 
suspicious Irish civil service to their new classes and grades.  The procedure, ideally, 
was that departmental Whitley councils would draw up a proposed reorganisation 
scheme for submission to Waterfield, allocating the work of the department to a 
number of administrative, executive and clerical officers.  He would then evaluate 
and, if he thought it necessary, modify the scheme, usually by reducing the proposed 
number of administrative and executive posts.  The departmental council could then 
reconsider the modified scheme, but as was made clear the ‘fundamental principle of 
Whitleyism is that the Whitley Council in no way detracts from the supreme authority 
of the head of department and the Treasury and no proposal can be acted on without 
the approval of the Treasury’.70  What this meant in reality was that the only real 
reorganisation was the Treasury offer, which the staff was free to accept or reject.  
The next stage was assimilation.  Each individual civil servant’s immediate superior 
would certify that he was fit for allocation to a certain class and grade; higher clerical 
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or lower executive for instance.71  On a date to be decided by Whitehall the 
reorganisation would take effect and the entire service would transfer to the new 
classes.   
In doing this Waterfield at all times tried to act according to the principles that 
were being followed in Whitehall and so had to constantly refer to the Treasury.  
Waterfield soon found that, not surprisingly, the heads and staff of the Irish 
departments saw him as an English interloper and tended to combine against him.  At 
the same time the civil service associations remained active on behalf of individual 
civil servants and certain classes.  As a background to all these was the problem posed 
for civil service organisation by the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 
and the establishment of three or four executive powers of Southern Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, Council of Ireland and the United Kingdom parliament. 
In early October 1920 Waterfield met the heads of the Irish departments to 
discuss the difficulties that the Whitley reorganisation posed and to set out some 
general principles.  It was an opportunity for the departmental heads to put to him 
some of the difficulties they had encountered.  A Treasury directive had instructed all 
departments to appoint an Establishments officer to deal with all staff matters.  These 
establishment officers formed the official side of the departmental councils.  
Waterfield, however, dealt with the departmental heads only.  This protected him 
from the rough and tumble of negotiation but ensured control of the process.72   
At this point Waterfield was attempting to board a moving train as several of 
the departments had already begun negotiations with Whitehall.  The staff side on the 
Whitley councils interpreted the reorganisation report as setting out a proportion of 
higher and lower classes and grades in each department such as would offer a 
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reasonable prospect of promotion.  This proportion was 1:6 for higher to lower 
clerical and the number of lower executive to equal the number of higher and other 
executive posts above that rank.  This was not an unreasonable interpretation, but the 
Whitehall view was that such a proportion represented an ideal, rather than a hard and 
fast rule.  It did not follow for instance that all departments would have an 
administrative class; they might have to be satisfied with an executive class as the 
highest the department could aspire to.  This immediately created the suspicion that 
the only department that would actually have an administrative class would be the 
Treasury.  The question also arose whether an exceptional civil servant of a clerical 
class might be promoted to a higher executive class in another department, or were 
these reserved to the clerical officers of that department.73   
On all these and other questions Waterfield looked to his colleagues in 
Whitehall for authoritative guidance before approving Irish reorganisation schemes.74   
Some of the cases were utterly inconsequential and must have tried the patience of the 
London Treasury.  A second division clerk in the DATI was clearly shell-shocked in 
the war and now was ‘un-nerved by the sight of figures’.  Yet Gill, the head of DATI 
wanted to promote him to the lower executive class.  What Gill most likely had in 
mind was providing that the unfortunate clerk would be able to retire under the 1920 
Act on a significantly improved pension, albeit at the expense of the Irish taxpayer.  
Waterfield looked to London to see whether there had been a similar case in 
England.75  At the same time Waterfield was under pressure not to concede to the 
Irish service anything that could be cited by the British service as a precedent in their 
reorganisation.  He was also under pressure from London to do no more or less than 
ensure that each department was ready for handing over to the new governments ‘in 
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good working order with neither unfilled obligations nor arrears of maintenance’.76  
Waterfield enjoyed considerable autonomy in Treasury Ireland so long as he was not 
creating precedents nor encouraging civil service expansion, but his constant 
reference to the Treasury for guidance and the often brusque responses he got suggest 
that Waterfield felt himself to be on a tight leash held by Whitehall.  
In the New Year, confident that he was not deviating from the approved 
Treasury norms and armed with the Government of Ireland act, Waterfield grew more 
assertive in his dealings with the Irish departmental reorganisation committees and the 
pace of change accelerated.  The reorganisation process began with the departments 
themselves come up with a proposal.  Waterfield would then review and revise the 
proposal and send it back to the department for agreement.77  Waterfield’s method of 
officious and minute investigation of departments alienated the departmental heads.  
Refusing to accept the view of either the establishment officer or the departmental 
head, Waterfield swept through each department ‘looking at the work as it is 
performed’ asking ‘how we should grade the department entirely afresh’.78 It is 
probable that Waterfield was following through a personal directive from Anderson to 
use reorganisation as an opportunity to simplify and reduce the cost of the Irish 
administrative machine, the same task that Warren Fisher was pursuing in 
Whitehall.79  It was generally expected that the Irish administration would lose a lot of 
its civil service after home rule through voluntary and compulsory retirement.  The 
last salary scales before retirement would determine pensions, whether they had been 
enjoyed for one week or one year.  A high burden of pensions would allow the Irish 
governments to negotiate a cut in the £18 million contribution to the British war debt.  
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It was therefore in the interests of the Treasury to ensure that the salary levels in 
Dublin were as compressed as possible.    
It was possible for a department to refuse to play along and attempt to shorten 
the process by asking Waterfield to come with a reorganisation scheme, as happened 
with the always difficult CDB.  But Waterfield resolutely refused, insisting that his 
job was to review, not initiate, schemes.  Eventually, as Micks dug in his heels, it fell 
to the staff associations in the CDB to force a reorganisation scheme through the 
departmental Whitley council.80  Sometimes the staff and official side on a 
departmental committee would combine against Waterfield.  The staff side would put 
a proposal on the agenda for an increase in salaries for certain classes and send a copy 
to Waterfield inviting him to the next meeting.  At the next meeting, with no objection 
noted from Treasury Ireland, agreement by the official and staff sides would be noted 
and forwarded to Waterfield, who would promptly reject it.  The staff side would then 
refuse to attend any further meetings until the Treasury made a prior undertaking to 
accept any agreements reached by departmental Whitley councils.  A ‘preposterous 
manner’ of settling reorganisation according to Waterfield.81  The least troublesome 
reorganisation was effected where the head of department sounded Waterfield out 
first, as did Stevenson of the Board of Works.  Waterfield soothed Stevenson with 
assurances that these discussions were not a matter of bargaining but rather of ‘each 
doing what is best for the public service as a whole’.82   
The area of disagreement was always in the proportion of administrative, 
executive and clerical posts in the department.  Most heads of departments, for 
reasons of status, wanted the greatest number of higher posts possible.  Generally, but 
                                                
80 NAUK, T158/5 ‘Waterfield to Micks, CDB, 11 Oct. 1921; Warwick University MRC, AEO 
reorganisation committee minutes, 14 Oct. 1921. 
81 NAUK, T158/2 ‘Waterfield to Heseltine, 10 Mar. 1921’. 
82 Ibid., T158/1 ‘Watefield to Stevenson, Nov 1920; T158/2 ‘Waterfield to Stevenson, 28 Feb 1921’. 
 158 
not always, this was supported by the staff side.  Waterfield on the other hand, looked 
to reduce the cost of each department by classifying its work as suitable for the lower 
class. Where a departmental head proved obdurate Waterfield was unsparing in his 
contempt.  Dilworth of the NEB was told that his superintendents did no actual work, 
that much of the work of his office could be handled by writing assistants, that the 
examiners had no ‘professional’ qualifications and their position ought to opened up 
to the clerical officers as a promotional post.83  Butler of the Intermediate Education 
Office was told that the work of his office was inferior and quasi-routine, suitable for 
writing assistants rather than clerical grades, with overly-generous salary scales.84   
Generally speaking the heads of the Irish departments found reorganisation to 
be a humiliating experience. Required to act as the bearer of Waterfield’s bad tidings 
they either adopted his schemes as their own, or were exposed to the staff side on 
their departmental councils as powerless. Captain Atkinson of the Commissioners of 
Charitable Donations found all his executive posts re-graded as clerical and, 
correcting the belief that ‘a high degree of qualifications in accountancy was 
necessary for the proper performance of his duties’, Waterfield re-graded the 
accountant as a clerk and a clerk he remained, despite the best efforts of Atkinson and 
the AEO.85  In the General Valuation Office Beckett, in an attempt perhaps to save 
face, showed the staff side of his departmental council his correspondence with 
Waterfield, drawing down the full wrath and majesty of Treasury Ireland;  
It is an essential part of the civil service constitution that where the 
head of a department has done his best to get the Treasury to agree to a 
proposal, and has failed, he must accept the Treasury decision loyally 
and do his best to carry it out.  Whitleyism does not in any way affect 
this fundamental principle; indeed it is obvious that discipline would 
be reduced to a farce if it were to do so…I should perhaps add that the 
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Treasury do not anticipate or regard it as necessary that there should be 
agreement between the official and staff sides in proposals of this kind.  
They would of course prefer it, but they cannot undertake to make 
concessions, of the necessity of which they are not convinced, merely 
in order to secure formal agreement.86 
 
Even Sir Henry Robinson, possessed of a monumental sense of his own 
importance, was brought to heel.  Robinson presented the reorganisation scheme to 
the departmental Whitley council as being a ‘Treasury’ scheme, which he himself had 
neither accepted nor rejected.  Waterfield upbraided him for revealing his 
disagreement with the Treasury which ‘it is of course desirable to conceal as far as 
possible’ from the staff side.  The issue on which they disagreed was the fundamental 
one of whether the LGB department should be re-graded as administrative or 
executive.  This would determine whether it would recruit at a clerical level or at the 
highest administrative level.  Robinson, who was notorious for nepotism, wanted to 
grade his department as administrative, but Waterfield refused.  In this case the staff 
side generally supported Waterfield rather than Robinson because his scheme offered 
the best prospects for promotion in the longer term.  If Robinson had his way he 
would simply promote his favourites to the plum posts.  In fact he still managed to 
slip a couple under the nose of Waterfield, promoting a Captain Harris to the post of 
secretary of the Irish Public Health Council and a second division clerk to the post of 
deputy legal assistant on £500 per annum.  Robinson eventually handed over the 
reorganisation to Barlas who enjoyed a better relationship with Waterfield.  In his 
letter authorising Barlas’ scheme Waterfield revealed his own attitude to the staff side 
and the Whitley councils.  Noting that the LGB process had been irregular and that 
the staff side would reject the proposed reorganisation, with which they were already 
familiar, as inadequate Waterfield suggested that Barlas ‘call a special meeting, lay 
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the scheme before them as an official scheme, give them an hour or two to talk, then 
apply the closure and ask whether you are to record the matter as formally agreed, or 
not, making it clear on the assumption that nothing new emerges that the scheme will 
not be modified further whichever line they take’.87   
 Sometimes, however, Waterfield got it wrong.  In the land registry the clerical 
officers regarded the assistant inspectorate as highly desirable promotional posts.  
Waterfield encouraged this expectation in his reorganisation of the department.  The 
head of the land registry preferred to follow a different Treasury policy of reserving 
these posts for ex-service temporary officers.  With the only avenue of promotion 
choked off the clerical staff furiously accused the departmental head of a breach of 
faith.  He in turn accused Waterfield of making him look ridiculous in front of his 
staff.88  Some departmental heads simply threw in the towel and left it to the staff 
associations to fight it out themselves with Waterfield.89  The only departments where 
reorganisation was uncontroversial were the Castle departments under Andy Cope and 
the land courts under Wylie.90  In the reorganisation of the CSO Cope assimilated 
almost the entire former clerical class into the new executive class.91 
Waterfield also looked to London for guidance on dealing with the civil 
service organisations.  1920 was the most difficult year for the Irish civil service 
associations.  The increasing violence of the IRA, a curfew, and the activities of the 
Black and Tans curtailed meetings.  The debate on the Government of Ireland bill 
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generated uncertainty as to their future.92  In the midst of these difficulties the Irish 
Whitley Committee seemed to secure some measure of control over their destiny.  
The civil service had already gathered that Warren Fisher was not an enthusiast for 
the Whitley councils and Waterfield, in first meeting with the staff associations, was 
so frankly dismissive of Whitleyism that the staff associations were taken aback.93   
Determined that the reorganisation would not become a competition between the 
executive and clerical grades the Irish staff associations agreed that the departmental 
staff side committees would exchange information on the progress of each scheme. 
The COA and the AEO, on a joint motion of Mortished and Smithwick, agreed to co-
operate on reorganisation schemes.94 The CSA suggested to Waterfield that they 
might be brought into negotiations in cases where the departmental Whitley Council 
would not accept the Treasury reorganisation scheme.  The CSA representatives, 
Duff, Sloan and Mulvin, suggested that they might be able to induce the staff side to 
accept the Treasury decision.  Waterfield was wary of a transparent attempt by the 
CSA to get involved directly in departmental negotiations but was prepared to be 
guided by Treasury opinion.  He also revealed his impressions of the Irish organisers; 
Sloan he did not like as too obstinate and a troublemaker, but he thought Mulvin more 
diplomatic and tactful and willing to see the point of view of the Treasury.95  The 
offer was of course refused.  Otherwise every department would want to appeal to the 
CSA.96  Interestingly, one of those that he consulted in Whitehall was H.P. Boland 
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who was within a few years to become the establishment officer in the department of 
finance of the Irish Free State.97    
In dealing with the civil service associations Waterfield resorted to the threat 
of imminent partition under the 1920 act to force through agreement.  Writing to 
Mulvin (his more favoured association delegate) he noted that ‘the passing of the 
Government of Ireland Act makes it urgent that schemes should be settled as soon as 
possible.  Staff will have sufficient time to consider the official scheme but we cannot 
be held responsible for the consequences of delay’.98  The choice offered to the staff 
associations was to either accept Waterfield’s proposals or be handed over to the 
‘tender mercies of the new governments’ without reorganisation.99  With the 
‘appointed day’ for the transfer to the new governments postponed and with the 
signing of the truce this threat lost its potential to frighten.  The staff associations had 
no inducement to reach agreement.  The associations argued that until the very day of 
transfer they remained civil servants of the United Kingdom and therefore entitled to 
all the benefits and advantages gained by the rest of the service.  They argued that 
there was every possibility that a new government might take a less oppositional line 
to the Whitley councils and the staff generally than was being shown by Treasury 
Ireland.  Furthermore, they had secured a commitment from Waterfield that 
reorganisation would be completed before partition and transfer of the departments.  
Therefore the staff side had nothing to lose (as they would transfer with existing rights 
protected) and the possibility of something to gain by refusing to accept the Treasury 
schemes, or at least leaving agreement to the last minute.  Waterfield could have 
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allowed it to drift but as he admitted ‘such a failure is a confession of weakness of 
administration on our part which we ought to endeavour to overcome if we can’.100        
For the professional civil servants organised in the IPCS, reorganisation was 
less about grades than about the salary scales attached to professional and technical 
posts. It was recognised that the salaries attached to professional posts in the civil 
service had fallen behind those paid in private employment.  Failing to go through the 
process of reassessing the professional or technical responsibilities attached to a post 
meant failure to re-grade, and thus failure to win better salary scales.  Clearly the 
constituent associations were lax at keeping the Institute informed of progress and in 
replying to correspondence, despite the evident progress of the clerical and 
administrative re-grading.  Thus it was difficult for the council of the Institute to keep 
track of the emerging trends in re-grading the professionals across many various 
departments.  Making the situation even more complex was the passing of the 
Government of Ireland Act, which received the Royal Assent on 23 December 1920.  
There was a real danger that neglect or delay in pushing ahead with re-grading would 
fatally prejudice the bargaining position of the professional and technical officers, as 
all recognised that after partition of the service between London, Dublin and Belfast 
the prospects for improvements were remote.101  
   By January 1921 the IPCS council was urging the constituent associations to 
use their departmental Whitley councils to press the 'necessity of at once preparing 
and getting through reorganisation schemes for professional and technical staffs'.102  
As the IPCS council monitored the progress of re-grading it also worked on 
anticipating the possible dangers to the members of partitioning the service and the 
best method of guarding their interests.  Members were warned against volunteering 
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for transfer to the North before the completion of re-grading and before removal 
expenses had been agreed.103  It also supported the veterinary association of the DATI 
in a successful claim to be considered a reserved service and therefore to remain 
under Whitehall control.104      
 Initially the IPCS looked to London to advance its position on the re-grading 
issue.  Contact was maintained with the British Institute of Professional Civil Servants 
who agreed to co-operate on matters affecting the technical and professional 
divisions.  A delegation of the Irish institute attended the Whitehall meeting of the 
professional re-grading committee of the National Whitley Council in March 1921.  
Though the British institute promised to continue to co-operate with the IPCS it was 
made clear that the creation of Treasury Ireland and the imminence of partition, meant 
that the best course of action for professional civil servants was to apply pressure in 
Dublin.105   
 In January 1921 a deputation of the IPCS council met with Waterfield to urge 
that the professional and technical grades be included in the departmental schemes.  
Waterfield made it clear to the IPCS that the professional and technical grades were 
not included in the general reorganisation scheme of the Whitley council but that any 
departmental scheme submitted would be considered on its merits.106  As the meeting 
reviewed the progress made in re-grading the professional classes, department by 
department, it became apparent that though many could in fact report great progress 
implementation was delayed as departmental heads awaited Waterfield’s approval.  
The only department that had managed to see through a complete reorganisation of its 
professional staff was the Board of Works, however Waterfield had withheld sanction 
                                                
103Ibid., council minutes 18 Feb. 1921. 
104Ibid., council minutes, 26 Jan.; 2 Feb. 1921. 
105IPCS (Ireland) First annual report of council 1920-21,pp6-7. 
106 NAUK T158/2 ‘Waterfield to IPCS’ 25 Jan. 1921’. 
 165 
pending proposals for the re-grading of comparable professional staffs in the English 
departments.107  By September Waterfield was sufficiently confident of his own 
position to tell the Treasury in London that either they give specific instructions on 
the professional grades or he would assume the responsibility himself of settling these 
grades in Ireland.108 
    Generally it proved to be the case that it was to the advantage of the 
departments if they could secure an agreed reorganisation sooner rather than later.  
The NHIC moved very quickly on reorganisation.  The staff side, led by Gallagher 
and Duff, watched the English claim closely and simply demanded the same.  They 
were not able to secure the number of higher posts that they wanted but were relieved 
to agree to a complete re-grading of the 198 staff by early 1921.109  This need for 
haste had little to do with Treasury Ireland but arose from the British newspaper 
campaign demanding economy in the civil service that led to the ‘Geddes Axe’ and a 
series of wage cuts beginning in August 1921. As the post-war improvement in the 
economy petered out, and the scale of the inherited wartime debt became apparent, a 
relentless pressure from the Treasury for savings soon overrode all other 
considerations.  The suspicion grew that Waterfield was using the departmental 
reorganisation schemes submitted for approval as a device to secure reductions in 
staffing and grades.110  In March 1921 Waterfield instructed that reorganisation 
schemes should provide for 'no addition to the established staff of Irish departments 
except from the ranks of ex-servicemen' and that new grades must be 'on a scale 
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which is lower by not more than ten per cent than the London scale'.111  The Irish 
associations complained of the manner in which the duties of the Irish departments 
were being compressed to the clerical class and of the rapidly growing number of the 
writing assistant class, which was being imposed in every department.112  By August a 
new demand for economy flatly instructed that no vacancies and no promotions were 
to be filled.113  It was now clear to the staff associations that the primary purpose of 
re-grading was not to promote efficiency but to make it easier to control, and 
therefore reduce, the level of salaries.  However the post-truce negotiations with the 
Dáil delegation had begun, with no certainty as to what would emerge, except that it 
would be more than home rule offered.  It was now in the interests of the civil service 
to secure the assurance of an agreement on salaries, even if the agreement was one 
that would ordinarily be rejected. 
By November Waterfield could report that almost all of the Irish departments 
were organised and either in operation or awaiting enforcement.  To complete 
reorganisation all that was required therefore was that the Irish branches of the British 
departments should roll out their schemes.  However the Treasury in Whitehall, under 
pressure to retrench, had abandoned reorganisation though without saying as much.114  
Waterfield therefore secured permission to go ahead himself with the reorganisation 
of the Irish branches.  He was able then to report on the 2 December, four days before 
the Treaty was signed, that all the Irish departments and the Irish branches of the 
British departments were ready to go with reorganisation.115 
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Waterfield was of the ‘candle-ends’ school of administration.  His instincts 
were to see the interests of the state as embodied in the interests of the taxpayer.  In 
his analysis no matter what settlement emerged in Anglo-Irish relations, the interests 
of the Irish taxpayer and the British Treasury were at one.116  No expenditure was too 
insignificant, nor distasteful, for his attention.  After the hanging on 14 March 1921 in 
Dublin of six republican prisoners Waterfield bargained for a cut in the executioners 
fee.  The executioner demanded the usual fee, multiplied by six, for himself and his 
assistant.  Waterfield, noting that the executions had been on the same day, imposed 
what was in effect a group discount; sanctioning £15 for the first and £5 for each 
subsequent hanging for the executioner, with £5 and £2.10s. 0d. for his assistant.117   
The Irish civil service saw Waterfield as a zealous and ruthless guardian of the 
Treasury interest, fair in so far as his downgrading of departments was seen to be 
utterly even-handed.118  So far as the associations were concerned, he was certainly an 
improvement on Headlam.119  His instincts in dealing with the Irish civil service were 
essentially decent.  He pushed very hard to ensure that the many temporary civil 
servants, who would no doubt in time become established, received their certificates 
before the appointed day under the 1920 act, just in case the new government might 
take a different view.120  On the other hand he was not going to allow the interests of 
any future Irish state to be compromised.  He was committed to handing over the Irish 
departments in good working order, by which he meant as close to the Treasury norm 
as possible.  In many of the departments, by coincidence, the heads were all due for 
retirement.  The demand to keep the departments in good working order would 
ordinarily have meant making a new appointment.  This would have led to intense 
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lobbying and political pressures from the eligible officials, with the danger that the 
successful candidates would then promptly retire on a substantial pension having 
served perhaps only a few weeks.  In order to avoid having to make a new 
appointment Waterfield ‘in the public interest’, refused to allow these men retire 
leaving the incoming government free to make whatever appointments it saw fit.121   
Civil service associations were there to voice grievances and it would never do 
to say there was no grievance.  Bu the reorganisation did, with few exceptions, mean 
that the Irish civil servant received something like a promotion when assimilated to 
the new grades and certainly an increase in salary.  An assistant clerk on a maximum 
of £200 became a clerical officer on a maximum of £250; Second division clerks on a 
maximum of £300 became lower executive officers on a maximum of £400.  With 
clear cross-service structures the possibility of promotion to the heights of the 
administrative class, hitherto closed to all without the right political connections, now 
opened up. With hindsight Michael Gallagher acknowledged that the reorganisation 
and assimilation of the Irish civil service to the new classes was an enormous 
achievement in which Waterfield succeeded in turning the labyrinthine multiple 
departmental grades into a coherent service-wide structure.  However Waterfield was 
pedestrian in his vision of the state and his work as Treasury Ireland was simply the 
financial conclusion of a policy decided elsewhere, it was not a policy in itself.  He 
was often paralysed by the fear of creating a precedent and ultimately was guided by 
fear of losing contact or influence in Whitehall, his natural home.122  Reorganisation 
has never produced economies in administration; it can only produce better 
management. The Irish civil service in any case had not experienced the phenomenal 
growth of the British service during the war years.  In July 1914 the Irish service was 
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25,192.  In July 1921, at the truce, it was still only 27,671.123  That the cost had risen 
was not due to any increase in numbers but to the war-induced inflation.  Only 
changes in policy can result in reductions in expenditure.  Treasury Ireland could with 
more accuracy be described as Establishments Ireland.  Nor by any stretch of the 
imagination could Waterfield’s reorganisation of classes and grades be described as 
the transformation of a decrepit administration into the efficient apparatus of an 
independent state.  The possibility that the Irish civil service was in fact relatively 
efficient and well-organised for the task of governing Ireland was not considered.  
The chorus of derision that met the Castle from all sides lacked perspective.  The 
problem in Castle government was its nepotism and uncritical identification of the 
state with unionist opinion.  However the civil service had successfully delivered all 
that was demanded of it in land reform, regional development in the impoverished 
west, local government and public health reform, education and all the other tasks set 
by an interventionist state.  What it failed to do, because it was an impossible task, 
was make the British state popular in Ireland.  The Irish civil service also suffered 
from the assumption that the Whitehall system was administrative perfection and the 
Irish system with its autonomous boards and lack of clear political control was 
deficient.  The state in Ireland was a political and not an administrative failure.   
   
        
  
 
                                                







THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE, 1919-1922. 
 
 
On 16 January 1922 a Dáil Éireann delegation led by Michael Collins swept into the 
upper Castle yard and ‘accepted the surrender of Dublin Castle’ from Viceroy Lord 
Fitzalan.1  That gesture brought to a victorious conclusion the revolution that began 
on 21 January 1919, precisely three years earlier, when Dáil Éireann assembled and 
declared itself to be the lawful government of the independent Irish state. In the 
December 1918 general election Britain had voted ‘khaki’ and for Lloyd George, but 
Ireland voted Sinn Féin and for secession from the United Kingdom.  Historians have 
been reluctant to describe events in Ireland between the assembly of the first Dáil 
Éireann and the takeover of the Castle as ‘revolution’.  Euphemisms such as 
‘violence’ ‘struggle’ ‘troubles’ ‘takeover’ ‘rebellion’ and ‘war’ have been used in 
order, it would seem, to avoid revolution.2  Amongst the recently written histories 
Kostick and Fitzpatrick explicitly describe the period as revolutionary.3  The historian 
of the Dáil administration also recognises the revolutionary nature of the assembly.4  
However, if we recognise that revolution in the twentieth century was a state-centred 
event; the violent seizure of state power with the intent to then use state power to 
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transform society; putting the state rather than society at the centre of revolutionary 
developments, then there is no doubt that the takeover of Dublin Castle was as 
revolutionary an event as the storming of the Winter Palace.5   
Explaining the Irish revolution in terms of the failure of the British state in 
Ireland, rather than in terms of the actions and intents of the revolutionaries, would 
suggest that the surrender of the Castle administration to the revolutionaries was not 
simply a consequence of the IRA military campaign.  The crisis of the Castle 
administration was deeply rooted in the failure of the British state to meet the 
aspirations of the Irish people (unionist as well as nationalist) since the emergence of 
the home rule issue.  This crisis came to a final stage in the period 1919-1922.  
However, the failure of the British state was not simply the failure of legitimacy 
brought about by the increasingly militarised response to Irish opinion.  It was also a 
failure in effectiveness as the state apparatus became so saturated with politics it 
ceased to work and ground to a halt.  The failure of the state created a vacuum of both 
legitimacy and effectiveness in which the revolutionary challenge of Dáil Éireann, 
that might have been a comic farce, emerged as a triumphant success.   
Sinn Féin was the first Irish party to explicitly give a state form to the historic 
demands of Irish nationalism for separation.  Sinn Féin’s strategy was not aimed at 
simply destroying British state power but rather at its displacement by a national state 
power.  As a strategy it did not emerge from the traditional engine of revolutionary 
nationalism, agrarian discontent.  Previous Irish social movements had sometimes 
developed beyond the agrarian issues that had given rise to them and had taken on 
functions that could be described as state-like.  The Land League that began as a 
tenant agitation began to behave as a proto-state and assume judicial, welfare and 
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educational functions.6  But, though the Land league and later the United Irish League 
both had the capacity to create a proto-state, neither progressed beyond local agrarian 
issues.7  As revolutionary movements they remained limited to expressing traditional 
tenant demands.  The ability of the British state to respond to those demands had led 
to the assimilation and blunting of their revolutionary potential.  The Ulster Unionist 
Council had threatened to form a provisional government for Ulster in the event of a 
home rule government being installed in 1914.  The outbreak of world war meant that 
the Ulster Unionist counter-state strategy was never activated.  
As a revolutionary strategy, conceived by an intellectual elite within Irish 
nationalism, essentially urban and middle-class in its membership and ideology, Sinn 
Féin succeeded in creating the broadest alliance against the British state.  Rather than 
aiming at the destruction of the state it aimed to construct a more legitimate and 
politically popular form of the state.  In the minds of the revolutionaries taking over 
the Castle administration the transfer of state power was simply the first stage of a 
state-led transference of society from a British to a Gaelic way of life.  Much has been 
written on the cultural aspects of Sinn Féin strategy.8  Today there is a general 
tendency to treat this cultural aspect of the movement in an ironic discourse, noting 
the enormous degree of abstraction and delusion it entailed about the Irish language, 
the working class, Irish women, unionism and rural Ireland.9  Whilst much of this 
criticism is accurate it misses that Sinn Féin, despite the rhetoric of cultural nativism, 
was thoroughly modern in situating nationalism within an Étatisme that gave priority 
to the state, not the nation, in achieving progress and social justice.  Sinn Féin was 
effective because it succeeded in using the cultural rhetoric of tradition as a form of 
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broad mobilisation across Irish society and as a strategy to state power.  Of all the 
forces that were engaged in the revolutionary struggle, the IRB, the IRA, Sinn Féin 
and Dáil Éireann; it was the Dáil that came out on top.  This is because it used the 
revolution as a state-building opportunity.  It undermined the claim of the British state 
in Ireland to legitimacy by portraying the British state as alien, oppressive and 
exploitative and by successfully countering its status as a progressive and enlightened 
force in Irish society and the wider Empire.  By the time of the ‘surrender’ Dublin 
Castle was stained with ‘Black and Tanism’ and viewed with contempt whilst Dáil 
Éireann basked in the glow of the Dáil courts and police, a local government 
department that was pushing through reforms, the appearance of an energetic 
programme of industrial development; all presented to the world by a thoroughly 
modern and effective propaganda department. The decision of the successful Sinn 
Féin candidates in the December 1918 general election to assemble in Dublin’s 
Mansion House and to declare themselves, as Dáil Éireann, the legitimate government 
in Ireland was therefore in itself a revolutionary action.  Resistance to the British state 
was to be expressed through a rival state.10   
The emphasis on a state-centred revolutionary struggle necessarily focuses on 
the role of the civil service, the objective of the revolutionary forces, in both the 
British state and in the revolutionary counter-state.  The situation in which the Castle 
civil service found itself in at the end of 1921 was one that was inconceivable at the 
passing the of the home rule act in 1914. We now turn to the experience of those men 
and women who made the Dáil function as a government from the assembly of the 
first Dáil to the surrender of the Castle (Appendix. Table 6: Dáil Éireann civil service, 
Jan.1919-Jan.1922). 
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The constitution of Dáil Éireann, adopted provisionally at the opening session 
of 21 January, was the organisational basis of the Dáil government.  Modified at the 
sessions of April 1919 it was composed of an inner circle of the prime minister 
(príomh aire) and four ministers of finance, home affairs, foreign affairs and national 
defence with an outer circle of variously termed ministers and directors.  On de 
Valera’s departure Griffith, as acting prime minister, set out the realisation of the 
domestic and constructive side of the Sinn Féin programme as the work for the 
departments and directories of the Dáil.11  Whilst implying that the foreign relations 
of the republic were a matter for the prime minister it also suggests that the Dáil 
ministry was determined to give real effect to its claim to be a government of an Irish 
state.   
A government to function required a civil service.  The Dáil had in the 
writings of Griffith some guidance on how a revolutionary counter-state should 
organise its civil service.  Arthur Griffith, in his The Resurrection of Hungary: A 
Parallel for Ireland, proposed that the four to six thousand officials of the local 
government bodies would form the basis of a national civil service.12  This was 
further developed in the pages of the Sinn Féin Weekly where he detailed how, once 
stripped of nepotistic and corrupt recruitment practices, a national civil service would 
have a profound impact on Irish education and would offer an attractive alternative to 
the British and Imperial services for young Irish men.13  Under this scheme of a single 
unified service embracing local and central government a clerk on Ballina UDC could 
aspire to the secretaryship of a department of state.  Griffith’s concept of the national 
civil service implied that much of the work of the local and central government was of 
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the same nature and mainly clerical.  The programme of the re-organised Sinn Féin 
party of 1917 adopted the Griffithite policy in Article (F) ‘the creation of a National 
Civil Service embracing all the employees of County Councils, Rural Councils, Poor 
Law Boards, Harbour Boards and other bodies responsible to the Irish people, by the 
institution of a common national qualifying examination and a local competitive 
examination (the latter at the discretion of the local bodies).14   
In the session of 18 June 1919 the Dáil decreed  ‘the establishment of a 
National Civil Service embracing the employees of all public elective bodies, and that 
a sum of £500 be appropriated for the purpose of the Scheme’.  A short debate, of 
which no record was kept, ensued.  Griffith, in reply to the debate, said that ‘the 
Ministry were not wedded to any particular scheme and that a consultative committee 
would be selected to go into the whole matter’.15  In the session of 19 August 
Griffith’s statement that the committee had not completed its deliberations but ‘that it 
was for the Dáil or the Ministry to propose a scheme, or for the committee to proceed 
with the completion of a scheme’ suggested that the question of who exactly 
controlled the recruitment and role of the civil service in the revolutionary state was 
not clarified.  It might also suggest that not a lot of thought was being put into the 
question.  At the session of 27 October the final report of the committee implied that 
the National Civil Service would in fact apply to local authorities only and not to the 
Dáil administration, though again the lack of a full debate report leaves the question 
open.16   
 The question as to whether the civil service of the state would be controlled 
by the Dáil or by the ministry arose in June 1919, when the appointment of Gavan 
Duffy as secretary to the ministry led to a debate on whether the government ought to 
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be allowed to make appointments without the sanction of the Dáil.  Thomas Kelly TD 
pointed to the real question at issue, expressing a fear of the government appointing 
members of the Dáil to paid positions, presenting an opportunity for corruption and 
cronyism, the very vice of which the Castle was so often guilty.  It was agreed that in 
future all appointments of members of the Dáil to paid positions would be sent to the 
Dáil for ratification.17  However, the only civil service appointment that was in fact 
brought to the Dáil for sanction was that of Accountant-General, a post that went to 
George McGrath.18  For this post Collins sought permission for the appointment of a 
professional auditor and accountant at £500 per annum to co-ordinate the system of 
accounting in the various departments, except defence, and to keep track of day-to-
day spending.19  McGrath visited the various departments and helped to set up proper 
accounting systems.  He also carried out occasional internal audits, very much like a 
one-man committee of public accounts.20  Though it was clearly felt desirable that the 
Dáil should have control of the developing civil service, the suppression of the Dáil 
made it impracticable.  In practice the various ministers had the freedom to recruit 
their own staff as required.  The only control was that exercised by Collins in finance 
who had to be notified of appointments and who provided the cash to pay their 
salaries, thus replicating the British system of treasury control of staff.21  Ministers 
notified Collins of the duties and salaries of the new appointees.  These were then 
registered in the departmental schedules held by finance.  Presumably Collins could 
also use his central control to ensure that all those employed were trustworthy.  Dáil 
departments were instructed not to pay staff themselves.  Staff was paid directly by 
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Seán McGrath, the department of finance’s ‘walking bank’, who sometimes carried 
thousands of pounds on his person as he walked with the weekly wages around the 
streets of Dublin.22  It proved an efficient system of controlling payments and insuring 
a central control of numbers whilst also ensuring that staff was paid regularly.23  
The recruitment of a civil service for the counter-state raised questions around 
issues of cost, control of recruitment and, linked to that question, proficiency in the 
Irish language.  Initially, as most of the departments remained largely nominal, the 
civil service remained relatively small so the question of where control of the civil 
service lay was of little practical importance.  In June 1919, the Dáil paid only seven 
officials on a total monthly salary of £24/2/4; O’Hegarty, Clerk of the Dáil; Lynch, 
the official translator; O’Siochain, a private secretary to Austin Stack; O’Donoghue, 
an accountant; Murphy, a clerical assistant; Miss Mason a typist and Conlon, a 
messenger.24  The department of agriculture sought permission to empower the 
National Land Commission decreed by the Dáil to appoint a registrar, secretary, 
assessors, valuers and ‘such officers, clerks or employees as it deems necessary’.  The 
Dáil agreed but, cautious of the political capital that the ability to make grants of land 
commanded, also decreed that no official of the proposed land commission could be 
elected to, or be a member of, the Dáil.25 
However successful departments inevitably expanded and this was especially 
the case with local government.26  As the department sought to take over the role of 
the LGB and the ‘clean-break’ decree was promulgated, Cosgrave sought sanction 
from the Dáil for a dramatic expansion of staff; four inspectors, ten clerks and 
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nineteen auditors at an annual cost of £23,000.  Collins immediately refused, saying 
that the money was not available.  Collins was not going to diminish the priority of 
the IRA in the competition for finances.  MacEntee suggested that the local authorities 
should be made finance the cost of the department by a levy but this was rejected by 
both Cosgrave and Collins as undermining the dominance of the Dáil department.  No 
department that supervised local authorities should depend on those authorities for 
finance.  Collins finally agreed to find £5,000 to cover the expenses of the department 
to the end of 1920.27  By the time of the Treaty the Dáil department of local 
government had seventy-nine office staff, inspectors, auditors and stocktakers.  
Interestingly, in view of the later Free State attitude to female civil servants, the Dáil 
departments in general, and local government in particular, were good employers of 
women.  Women were rarely detained or searched and so could be safely entrusted 
with the most sensitive documents.28  Of the thirty-six office staff of the department 
of local government, sixteen were women.  In the more demanding and dangerous 
work of the inspectors and auditors there were seven women among the staff of forty-
one.29   
Cosgrave was a stickler for correct procedures and so far as possible he 
wanted recruitment by examination only to apply.  For the recruitment of auditors this 
required an elaborate charade.  Advertisements were placed in the newspapers 
inviting applications for the posts, detailing the requirements but without disclosing 
the name of the employer.  Michael De Lacy, the officer of the department in charge 
of the outdoor staff, set and conducted an examination for the qualified candidates in 
the offices of Dublin Corporation.  The exact nature of the work and the employer 
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were revealed only to the successful candidates.  Frank Barnard, who was delighted to 
be told he had got first place, initially refused the post when its full nature was 
revealed to him.30  James Kavanagh ran into trouble with Cosgrave on the issue of 
staff recruitment in the local government department.  When Cosgrave was under 
arrest in early 1920 Kavanagh, in need of extra staff, recruited Tom McArdle, a 
former civil servant.  Cosgrave on his release refused to sanction the appointment.  It 
took a great deal of pressure from Kavanagh to force Cosgrave’s reluctant 
agreement.31  McArdle went on later to become the first secretary of the Department 
of Health.32  Cosgrave could not maintain such Spartan recruitment procedures and 
personal recommendation by the trusted was resorted to.  Michael De Lacy personally 
recruited Nicholas O’Dwyer as an inspector.  O’Dwyer in turn recruited James 
McLysaght.  O’Dwyer had no recollection of there ever being an interview, the jobs 
were offered and accepted in personal conversations.33 
However imperfectly it managed to recruit its own staff by open competition, 
one of the key functions of the Dáil department of local government was to enforce 
fair and open competition in local posts.  Whatever compromises were necessary to 
run the Dáil departments they would not, in the longer term, be as significant as local 
appointments because it was intended that the post-revolutionary state would be 
staffed by a ‘National Civil Service’ recruited and trained locally and advancing by 
ability alone. The department closely watched the employment practices of the local 
authorities and refused to sanction any appointment of elected persons to paid posts.  
In Baltinglass in Co. Wicklow sanction was refused when the chairman of the local 
RDC successfully applied for the post of clerk to the council.  The appointment of an 
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elected member of the Waterford Corporation as town clerk was raised in the Dáil as 
an example of the bad practices that a native government ought to eradicate.34  In 
August 1920 the Dáil department of labour circularised local authorities with a 
scheme of arbitration for settling salaries of employees and officials, implying a 
centralising of authority over local government by the Dáil.35  This was strongly 
welcomed by the trade union of the local officers the Irish Local Government 
Officers’ Trade Union (ILGOU), if not by the local authorities. 
The ILGOU had its roots in the Dublin Municipal Officers’ Association 
(DMOA).  The DMOA was founded in 1901 to defend the Dublin municipal officers 
against a wage-cutting corporation.  The DMOA was from the beginning sympathetic 
to the Sinn Féin ideal of a national civil service with open competitive entry and 
promotion in the whole of the local and state civil service.  Henry Mangan, chairman 
of the DMOA in 1910, gave a critical but positive response to Griffith’s original 
proposals for a single national civil service.36  Mangan was later an advisor to Collins 
in the negotiations on the financial provisions of the Treaty.  Amongst those executed 
in 1916 Eamonn Ceannt and John McBride were both members of the DMOA. 
Ceannt served on the executive between 1907 and 1913.  The founding energy of the 
ILGOU came from a group of DMOA members, many of them IRB, who had 
participated in the 1916 rising or were strongly sympathetic.   
Thomas Gay, a corporation librarian, who was close to Collins and allowed 
him the use of the Capel street library as a meeting place, was a prominent figure in 
the ILGOU.  The driving force was Harry Nicholls, an engineer in the corporation, 
unusual in his militant republicanism in that he was a Protestant.  He was an officer in 
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the fourth battalion Volunteers, the same battalion as Patrick Pearse, W.T. Cosgrave 
and Eamonn Ceannt.  Arrested as a member of the St Stephen’s Green garrison he 
was interned in Frongoch until his release in December 1916.  He immediately began 
organising the ILGOU as a national union for all local government officers.  There is 
every likelihood that the ILGOU was conceived in Frongoch as an arm of the coming 
struggle.37  The union employed Michael Price as its first general secretary, providing 
a useful front for his work as Director of Organisation of the IRA.   
The ILGOU announced itself as a militant white-collar organisation by staging 
in Dublin in June 1920 the first ever strike by public servants in either Britain or 
Ireland.38   At its first annual general meeting Nicholls committed the ILGOU to 
supporting the Dáil department in its struggle against the LGB.  The ILGOU refused 
to represent officials, such as Henry Campbell and John Flood, dismissed for 
maintaining contact with the LGB despite the resolution of Dublin Corporation.  
Instead the union gave full support to local authorities that threw in their lot with the 
Dáil department.  The reason that the local officers were ready to support the 
revolutionary assembly was the promise of better pay and conditions through the 
creation of a national standard salary scale, better promotional opportunities and an 
end to corruption in local appointments.39            
Another issue that intruded into recruitment of the Dáil civil service was that 
of competence in the Irish language.  The general feeling was that, all else being 
equal, the candidate with Irish was to be given preference over the one without Irish.  
Collins as Minister for Finance had to abandon his search for Irish-proficient clerks 
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and accept monolingual but efficient candidates.40  The preference for Irish speakers 
was justified not on terms of efficiency, none of Collin’s departmental business was 
conducted in Irish, but as a cultural measure that would counteract the view of the 
language as a mark of ignorance and poverty and enhance its status.  This was seen as 
especially vital in the Irish-speaking areas where English was the passport to 
employment.  If Irish could be seen as securing well-paid and high status employment 
it would be a significant cultural shift.  However there was defensiveness in the 
debate and a repeated insistence that Irish competence was to be final criterion and 
not the first.41  This was an issue that was to return again and again in the Free State.       
 However the reality for the departments of the Dáil government was that it 
was more important that staff be discreet, loyal and willing.  The departments could 
not too fussy about procedures of recruitment and officials were recruited by any and 
every means.  J.D.O’Connell, a solicitor in Tralee, came under considerable pressure 
to ‘lend’ his typist Mary Hogan to the Dáil secretariat.  His response lacked the zeal 
of revolutionary commitment; ‘I trust she will be well looked after in Dublin.  She has 
not been out of home before and she is rather quiet in her disposition…She is only 
lent to you temporarily, as soon as she can be spared I would like to have her back 
again…Her people are quite elderly…if she does not like the city she must be allowed 
back again’.42  Evidently the city suited Mary Hogan very well as she settled into her 
job at £3 per week.  Seán McCluskey, caretaker of the Dáil offices at 76 Harcourt 
Street, and therefore privy to every secret of the counter-state, was recruited by 
Kathleen Brennan, a member of Cumann na nBan and sister-in-law of Eamonn 
Ceannt.  After a hurried interview by Michael Collins (one of the few instances of 
anything like an interview for applicants) he was given the job and moved into the 
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basement flat of the Dáil premises.43  The couriers who carried the correspondence 
between the Dáil departments and their covering addresses were all recruited from the 
Dublin brigade IRA and from the IRB.44 
The Sinn Féin party was an obvious source for staff but one with 
constitutional difficulties.  The 1917 party executive included several civil servants.45  
Collins and de Valera, who were to come to such fundamental disagreement, were at 
one on the necessity of separating the party from the state apparatus.  Not only was it 
undemocratic to merge party and state, it was also recognised that the fundamental 
weakness of the Castle administration was its saturation in party politics.  Collins 
objected to two of the staff of the local government department being elected to the 
second Dáil in May 1921.  De Valera from the earliest days of Dáil Éireann worked to 
exclude members of the party from positions within the state apparatus.46   
It was however impossible to ignore the potential offered by the party, though 
it would be truer to say that the state exploited the party rather than the party the state. 
In fact many of the Sinn Féin officials who migrated into the Dáil civil service 
assumed that the work of the party and the state were interchangeable.  Seán Nunan 
who was appointed the first clerk of the Dáil, was recruited from the Sinn Féin party, 
though he was also known both as a Volunteer and as an IRB man.  He was then 
withdrawn from the Dáil to act as de Valera’s secretary in the USA.47   Much of the 
maintenance of the ledger records of the Dáil Éireann loan was done by Sinn Féin 
staff at the Sinn Féin offices or at home.48  It was the Sinn Féin cumainn and 
organisers did the hard graft of organising and running church-gate meetings to 
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persuade the subscribers to the anti-conscription fund to allow the money be diverted 
to the use of Dáil Éireann.49  When James Kavanagh, who was an accountant in Sinn 
Féin, was invited by Kevin O’Higgins to take up the secretaryship of the department 
of local government, Padraig O’Keeffe, secretary of the party, strongly objected to the 
Dáil departments raiding his staff resources.  However Kavanagh was in no doubt that 
the work of the Dáil ‘was of greater importance than that of a political organisation’.50  
Cathleen Napoli-McKenna thought that the Dáil department of propaganda and the 
production of the Irish Bulletin had always been run by Sinn Féin rather than the 
state.51  Vera McDonnell who was employed as a stenographer in Sinn Féin working 
under Fr Flanagan, also did typing of ministerial memoranda for Michael Collins and 
W.T. Cosgrave as well encoding cablegrams on the Dáil Éireann loans for 
transmission to the USA.52  She transferred to the republican side in the civil war and, 
at the request of de Valera, worked to keep the Sinn Féin office functioning.  For her 
the party, the counter-state, and the anti-state republicans were a seamless 
organisation.  After the November 1919 arrests, the gaps in the administration of local 
government were filled by transferring Frank Kelly (one of the London Irish who 
came over for 1916) and Miss Enie O’Hegarty (sister of Diarmuid) from Sinn Féin to 
the Dáil department.53            
In choosing its civil service one further source available to the Dáil ministry 
were the dismissed and former civil servants of the British government. Both Richard 
Mulcahy and Michael Collins, the two dominant figures of the revolution, were 
former civil servants as were Diarmuid O’Hegarty, the clerk of the Dáil and Ernest 
Blythe, Director of Trade and Commerce.  Former civil servants would be already 
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well-versed in the intricacies of record-keeping and bureaucratic procedures.  A 
properly indexed and ordered record system would be well able to bear the brunt of 
loss of officials through arrest and imprisonment.  Former civil servants of the British 
regime who worked in the counter-state were F.X. Thunder, David O’Donoghue, 
Edward Cleary and Hugh Hehir from the Land Commission; Diarmuid O’Hegarty and 
Michael McDunphy from the DATI; Tom McArdle from the LGB; and Paddy 
Cremins with Eamon Duggan from the Post Office.  Most of these had been dismissed 
for participating in the 1916 rising or for refusing to take the oath of allegiance in 
1918.54  Of all the Dáil officials it was these former civil servants who were to prove 
the most successful in developing a career in the free State bureaucracy, with some 
rising to the highest posts in the civil service of the independent state.   
Procedures in the Dáil departments were, of necessity, informal and non-
hierarchical.  The only officers with clearly defined positions were the typists, 
couriers, George McGrath the accountant-general and James Kavanagh who described 
himself as secretary and accounting officer in the Dáil department of local 
government.  There was no apparent division of work into administrative and 
executive grade, nor was there clear grading of salaries or promotional posts.55  
Salaries were determined in an ad hoc manner by the cabinet and, if we take salary as 
reflecting grade and status, were not any higher than that of the clerical grades in the 
British civil service. The lowest paid were the couriers, despite the danger of their 
work, next the typists, above them the equivalent of the clerical assistants.56 Ministers 
themselves acted as an administrative or first division rank.  Just as in the castle civil 
service, the Dáil civil service soon found that inflation was rapidly eroding the value 
of their salaries and a co-ordinated request for a general salary increase was met by 
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the cabinet in June 1920.57  Coordinating demands for salary increases has always 
proved a most potent source of organisation, however the civil service of the Dáil did 
not last long enough to develop its own corp d’esprit.  Any sense of comradeship was 
provided in the main by prior membership of Sinn Féin, the IRB, the Volunteers or 
Cumann na mBan.  If there was one single organisation binding the Dáil civil service 
together it was the IRB.   
Tom McArdle describes the department of local government as working with 
a ‘generous spirit’ with no distinctions of ranks and with ministers doing the work of 
drafting and typing that ordinarily would be done by officials and staff.58  Informality 
can however also be a sign of incoherence and lack of direction.  Where there was no 
clear division of responsibility and no presiding minister with energy and vision a 
department might never progress beyond a paper existence. 
The truce brought an opportunity to evaluate the performance of the Dáil 
departments and to address the question as to what extent the apparatus of the 
counter-state was capable of undertaking the task of replacing the existing Castle 
apparatus.  The truce gave equality to the counter-state and, in contrast to the fear and 
confusion that permeated the Castle apparatus, the counter-state was animated by a 
keen anticipation of power.59  The counter-state was now to be led by a president of 
the republic, de Valera, who also retained the post of prime minister.  The executive 
was reorganised with six inner cabinet and seven minor non-cabinet ministries.  The 
Dáil agreed on the devolution of its authority in administration to county authorities in 
the event of a resumption of hostilities.  This concentration of authority in the 
president and dispersal of power in regional assemblies worried many deputies but as 
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the constitution remained provisional and the changes were designed to allow the 
continuance of the government in the event of a resumption of war it was let pass.60   
Liam de Róiste closely questioned Collins on the numbers and salaries of the 
officials employed by the Dáil departments but Collins told that the information was 
in the registers and could be got ‘on application’ to the department of finance.61  In 
fact the cabinet had already recognised that the informality in grading and recruitment 
of the underground administration was not sustainable in the circumstances of the 
truce.  The proposal to create a committee on the civil service that been first mooted 
early in 1919 was resurrected as a ‘salaries board’.  This board, acting in either an 
advisory or supervisory capacity to the cabinet, would grade and determine salary 
levels across the administration, ensuring uniformity and equality of the different 
departments.  In some ways this would cut across the work of the finance 
department’s accountant-general appointed by Collins who had in fact evolved into an 
‘establishments officer’.  The names suggested for the salaries board were John 
Murphy of O’Loughlin, Boland and Murphy accountants; Richard Foley of the 
Underwood Typewriting Company, who had provided office space for Collins; Henry 
Dixon, the solicitor and Sinn Féin founder-member; Daithi O’Donoghue of the Dáil 
department of finance and Pádraig O’Keeffe the Sinn Féin secretary.62  Such a board 
would have been dominated by those with business and commercial traditions, rather 
than with the traditions of the public service.   
There is no evidence that the proposed board was ever formed and recruitment 
continued on an ad hoc basis.  The Dáil department of local government was, again, 
the most energetic.  Of the seventy-nine staff in the department at the time of the 
                                                
60 Ibid., p303. 
61Dáil Éireann debates, vol.4, 25 August 1921. 
62 NAI, DE2/491, ‘Dáil Éireann secretariat, E.Price, 17 Oct 1921. 
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Treaty almost half, thirty-eight, were recruited in the months after the truce.63   
Cosgrave was still intent on enforcing local government competitive recruitment and 
approached Professor Hayes of the NUI about setting up an external examination 
board for local government appointments.64  Austin Stack fretted about the lack of 
supervision over the Dáil staff, suggesting that general regulations be enforced with 
office hours for all government departments from 9.30 to 5.30 with an hour for lunch 
and a half-day Saturday.65     
During the Treaty debate much was made on the pro-Treaty side of the fact 
that the IRA had reached the limits of its operational capacity.  However, prior to the 
truce in early June, Collins was considering a shift in the fighting strategy, which 
suggests that the revolutionary counter-state had not run out of options.  Collins 
proposal was to shift the target of the struggle from the police and army towards the 
civil service of the crown in Ireland.  Citing as a precedent Benjamin Franklin’s 
proclamation of October 1778 against loyalists in the United States, Collins wanted 
the Dáil to pass an act declaring as illegal and a usurpation of lawful authority all 
practices that assisted the British government; 
My chief desire is not to single out any particular institution but to 
get at them all.  No English connection should be tolerated, except a 
connection we could not get rid of, or that we would be unwilling to 
get rid of, for instance the P.O. is not doing us any particular harm 
might be allowed operate, or the Board of Education in certain ways 
at any rate, might be allowed to operate.  This is a matter that has 
been weighing heavily on me and I have been anxious to see you 
about it.  To my mind we must widen the attack at the present 
moment.  We are attacking with our weakest arm and are attacking 
their strongest arm. 66    
 
                                                
63 NAI, bureau military history witness statement 501, T.J.McArdle. 
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Collins was once again stressing the advantages that disorder and chaos in the British 
administration would bring to the revolutionary forces.  Stack drafted a memorandum 
for the cabinet detailing the new offensive against the Castle administration.  The 
memorandum listed nine categories of officials of the British state in Ireland; 
1. Dublin Castle officials including the Chief Secretary, the Under 
Secretary, the Attorney General and Solicitor General, Chief 
Crown Solicitor and their many subordinates. 
2. The members of the Privy Council. 
3. The Lord Chancellor and other judges of the “Supreme Court 
of Judiciature in Ireland”. 
4. The officials of the “Four Courts”. 
5. Recorders and County Court Judges. 
6. Clerks of the Crown and Peace, Crown Prosecutors, Crown 
Solicitors. 
7. Sheriffs and Under Sheriffs, Baliffs and Process Servers. 
8. Civil servants engaged in the imposition and collection of 
taxes, custom duties and the like. 
9. Other civil servants. 
Categories one to three were clearly directing and assisting in the application of 
marital law in Ireland and in the activities of the Auxiliaries and Black and Tans and 
therefore ‘made themselves enemies of the Republic in time of war and are...called 
upon the leave their present offices; otherwise they themselves will be responsible for 
the consequences’.  Civil servants in the categories four to seven, were essential to the 
administration of British law.  If they could be compelled to resign it would make it 
impossible for the writ of British law to run in any practical sense.  Categories eight 
and nine, ‘whilst not actually harmful in themselves’, did form part of the enemy 
administration.  If they also could be compelled to resign then British government in 
Ireland would be ‘seriously handicapped if not entirely impotent’.  Their fate, the 
memorandum concluded, could be left over for later decision.67   
This new aggressive strategy against the state was overtaken by the truce but 
was unveiled to the post-truce Dáil as a ‘decree as to purported exercise of public 
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functions’ at the 26 August private session.  The decree asked that the Minister may 
‘impose penalties by fine, imprisonment, banishment from a particular area or 
otherwise’ (my italics) on persons ‘purporting to exercise judicial, administrative and 
legislative functions without the authority of the Republic’.68  Launching an attack on 
the civil service was now being offered as a strategy held in reserve in the event of the 
truce breaking down and war being resumed.  Gavan Duffy entered an objection to 
the “or otherwise” which, as Austin Stack made clear, meant execution.  Gavan Duffy 
was not squeamish about the death penalty as such.  In fact he suggested that 
barristers ought to be included on the list.  But if the Dáil was to impose the death 
penalty then it should say so in plain and simple language and it should be imposed by 
judges and not by politicians.  This view gained strong support from amongst the 
TDs, including later die-hard anti-Treatyites such as MacEntee.  With Stack in danger 
of allowing the debate be smothered in details on the right of appeal Collins 
intervened to bring the argument back to the central issue saying, ‘it was not a 
question of preventing those officials from functioning, but a question of not allowing 
the British government to carry on any functions at all in this state’.69  From his 
sources Collins was aware of the panic that swept through Dublin Castle in the wake 
of the killing in March 1920 of Alan Bell, an ex-RM who had been investigating the 
hiding places of the Dáil finances.  The killing of a civil servant clearly had much 
greater impact on the administrative machine than that of a policeman or a soldier.  
Perhaps it was just as well that the Castle civil servants themselves had no inkling of 
their probable fate in the event of a resumption of hostilities, and it is to those civil 
servants that we now must turn. 
 
                                                







PARTITION AND THE CIVIL SERVICE 
 
Waterfield, in reorganising the Irish civil service, was simply applying with local 
variations a policy that was also being applied in Great Britain.  He could check with 
Whitehall at every stage and ensure that that his schemes were in line with Treasury 
policy generally.  Partition of the civil service was however uniquely Irish in its 
application and was also an unprecedented administrative act.  Earlier home rule 
proposals provided that some of the Irish civil servants would be transferred to an 
Irish parliament and that some would remain under the control of the London 
government.  The 1920 Government of Ireland Act, as shaped by the Irish cabinet 
committee under Walter Long, went through increasingly complicated variations of 
devolution that provided for governments of Southern and Northern Ireland, an Irish 
Council and a hypothetical future Irish parliament whilst retaining Westminster 
sovereignty.  Its main virtue was that, as it partitioned Ireland, it held the coalition 
government together.   
The 1920 Act divided the Irish administration in ways never previously 
proposed.1  Originally the legislation proposed that the Irish departments would be 
divided north and south with sections that could not be partitioned allocated to the 
Council of Ireland, thus being shared between north and south.  By the final stages of 
the bill, under pressure from the Ulster Unionists, a ‘clean-cut’ between north and 
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south was envisaged with the Council of Ireland acting as a potential vehicle for 
future unity.2  Through the various drafts Westminster continued to retain most of the 
financial, revenue and customs departments.  Of all these state and quasi-state 
administrations only two actually existed in reality, Dublin and London.  Belfast had 
only a paper and the Council of Ireland a purely conceptual existence.  Therefore the 
new civil service of north and south in Ireland would have to be carved out of the 
existing Irish administration through partition.   
On the “appointed day” for the operation of the new governments, the 
functions of existing departments would be transferred simultaneously to the Southern 
and Northern Ireland governments and with them their civil servants who were also 
transferred en bloc. For the purpose of partition the 1920 act created two categories of 
Irish civil servant.  Those civil servants who ‘on the appointed day were concerned 
solely with the administration of public services’ in Southern or Northern Ireland 
automatically became officers of that government.  For all other civil servants the 
Civil Service Committee established by the act, and on which the civil servants 
themselves had two representatives, would determine their allocation north or south.  
This was a further development of the Civil Service Committee established by the 
1914 Act.  The original committee had the power to determine the status and 
entitlements of Irish civil servants who opted to retire.  Under the 1920 Act this 
committee was further empowered to determine the allocation of the civil service to 
north and south and, in doing so, was instructed to defer to the wishes of the 
individual officer so far as possible.3  The success of the GCICS in getting 
representation on this committee was crucial to securing the confidence of the civil 
servants themselves in the new governments.  Sam Sloan of the AEO and Michael 
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Gallagher of the CSCA, the two most active representatives of the membership, were 
elected on the 29 July to the committee.4       
Another class of civil servant whose welfare was being secured by Waterfield 
were Englishmen who happened to be posted in Ireland and who faced being 
allocated to either of the Irish governments on the appointed day.  There was also 
evidence that some Irish civil servants in Britain were looking for transfer to Ireland 
in anticipation of native government.  Waterfield established an informal transfer 
between the British and the Irish departments for those officers.  His objective was to 
ensure so far as possible that the Irish governments would take over a civil service 
staffed by men who wished to serve in Ireland.5  To his surprise the number of Irish 
officers wishing to transfer out of Britain to Ireland far out-numbered British officers 
wishing to transfer the other way.  Generally civil servants of the higher executive 
grades wished to transfer out of Ireland, those of the lower clerical grades into Ireland.  
This reflects the anticipation of where the better future opportunities lay for the 
respective classes.6   
However the main preoccupation of the civil service associations, as we have 
seen, were reorganisation and re-grading.  The threat, or promise, of home rule had 
been part of Irish administration for the lifetime of many of the Irish civil service and 
most had grown used to the waxing and waning of the issue and even regarded it with 
some indifference.7  The GCICS, as we have seen, was diligent in protecting the 
interests of the service and used each revision of home rule to extend previously won 
concessions.  The mood within the Irish committee of the cabinet was abjectly 
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conciliatory to the Irish civil service.  The amendments cub-committee on the 
Government of Ireland bill recommended that the Treasury should go out of its way to 
meet the inevitable ‘hard cases’ that partition of the civil service would throw up, 
meaning most probably those that neither north nor south wanted.8 
As partition emerged as cabinet policy Anderson instructed the Irish 
departments to draw up a paper allocation of their work and a ‘provisional list of 
officers available for transfer to the governments of Northern and Southern Ireland, or 
the Council of Ireland’.9  However, the 1920 Act was so convoluted that it was 
confidently felt that partition would never actually happen and the whole work of 
preparing the Irish departments for the appointed day had an air of unreality to it.10  
“Irish services” were described by the Act as ‘all public services in connection with 
the administration of civil government…except the administration of matters with 
respect to which the [northern and southern parliaments] have under the provisions 
hereinbefore contained no power to make laws, including in this exception all public 
services in connection with the administration of matters by this Act declared to be 
reserved matters so long as they continue to be reserved…’11  For the civil service 
itself ‘the nightmare of transfer to Belfast’ as it was described in the civil service 
journal seemed remote.12  Such was the conviction within the civil service 
associations that partition would not happen or, if it did, would not work, that they 
several times repeated their determination that they would remain as all-Ireland 
associations.13 
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 Of the political forces then shaping Ireland the only one that saw virtue 
in the 1920 Act were the Ulster Unionists.  The key figures in turning the 1920 Act to 
successful regime-building were James Craig and Ernest Clark.  However it is 
important to appreciate that Craig saw little virtue in the 1920 Act as such and simply 
used it as the means to the end of Ulster Unionist autonomy in a six-county Northern 
Ireland.14  Craig was amongst the more ‘state-minded’ Irish politicians of his times.  
He succeeded in creating out of the UVF what was in effect an armed force of the 
state, the Special Constabulary, to guarantee the security of Northern Ireland before 
the state itself came into existence.  A skilled administrator and negotiator rather than 
an original thinker, the record shows that he had a keen insight into the importance of 
securing early control of administrative machinery.  Even though he had no actual 
position in the Irish government it was assumed that Craig, as leader of the Ulster 
Unionist Council, was the future prime minister of Northern Ireland and he was 
consulted as such.   
Sir Ernest Clark, like Anderson a civil servant from the Treasury departments, 
was appointed in September 1920 as assistant under secretary in the Irish Office with 
responsibility for the six counties that were to form Northern Ireland.  The 
appointment of Clark prompted Wylie to draw up a memorandum on the Irish 
situation in which he described the appointment as a ‘blunder leading to permanent 
partition’.15  A former evangelical preacher, Clark retained through out his life a sense 
of mission but was clearly overwhelmed by James Craig’s towering presence and 
adroit flattery.16  Although he was supposed to report to Anderson in Dublin Castle 
and remained a civil servant of the crown, Clark was soon acting at the behest of 
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Craig.  The civil service staff representatives found him capable but ruthless in 
pursuing his ends.  On his trips to Dublin to meet with the civil service representatives 
he mentioned more than once that he had ‘set-up’ the South African government 
equipped with no more than an Act of Parliament, a table and a chair in an empty 
room and that he would do the same in Northern Ireland.17   
Long before the elections for a Northern Ireland government and the selection 
of an executive, Craig and Clark worked together to create an administrative 
apparatus that would have written across it, as Craig urged Clark to write across his 
own chest, ULSTER!  In an echo of the strategy of Sinn Féin they created an 
administration from the top down; first a framework for a cabinet of ministries was 
elaborated, then the existing departments were allocated to these ministries and finally 
a civil service to run these ministries was assembled.  The shape of the cabinet was 
developed in discussion between Clark, Craig and Adam Duffin of the Belfast 
Chamber of Commerce between February and April 1921.  Clark’s suggestion for a 
cabinet of five ministries was countered by Duffin’s suggestion of eight.  Despite 
Clark’s warning that, for a party that would have between thirty-two and forty seats in 
the northern parliament, to have one-quarter or one-fifth of them in cabinet would 
make a nonsense of parliamentary government, Craig plumped for seven ministries; 
six plus the prime minister.18  Craig seems to have already sounded out his Ulster 
Unionist colleagues as to prospective ministerial posts.  The task then was to start 
staffing the ministries with a civil service.  It was here that the Ulster Unionists ran 
into trouble with the Anderson team in Dublin Castle and with the civil service staff 
associations.  
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Relations between Craig and Clark and the Anderson team were fraught as 
Belfast became suspicious that Dublin was being obstructive and was preventing the 
smooth working of the Belfast administration.  Most informed opinion was well 
aware that the Anderson team were sceptical of the 1920 Act and were working for a 
dominion home rule settlement.  Cope and Sturgis were hostile and Anderson became 
even more stiffly formal.19  Anderson’s position on home rule and partition has been 
described as ‘enigmatic’.20  The creation of a Belfast under secretary seems to have 
been his idea, yet his was less than enthusiastic about its operation.  If we assume that 
Anderson’s main objective was to ensure continuity and integrity in administration, 
then his actions appear more consistent.  By insisting that the Belfast administration 
would not have a free hand in recruiting its civil servants he hoped to ensure that the 
state apparatus would not be tainted by the sort of politicisation that had brought the 
Castle regime into disrepute.  Anderson reminded Clark that the assignment of the 
civil service was entirely in the hands of the Civil Service Committee, which could 
not come into existence until both the northern and the southern governments had 
been elected.  The sequence therefore should be that the civil service heads of the 
Irish departments would make a putative division of the work of the department 
between northern and southern business.  Staff would be discreetly sounded out as to 
their preference for future service, north or south.  The heads of the departments 
would then, so far as possible, ensure that individual civil servants were assigned to 
the jurisdiction they preferred in advance of partition.  In order to make partition of 
the staff as un-contentious as possible Anderson suggested that departmental Whitley 
Councils of staff and official sides could determine the preferences of each civil 
servant and prepare provisional allocations.  On partition the Civil Service Committee 
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would then find it simplest to assign the staff on the lines already worked out 
provisionally by the departmental Whitley Councils.  The governments of north and 
south would then have to either accept or pension the staff assigned to them.21  
Anderson’s confidence lay in the civil service loyalty to the state and to its esprit de 
corps, rather than to the putative governing parties, to ensure that there would be an 
essential continuity.  The determination of Craig and Clark to push ahead with 
staffing the Belfast departments in advance of elections and the creation of the Civil 
Service Committee fatally undermined Anderson’s strategy.  In this determination 
Craig and Clark had the support of the cabinet.   
In March Clark wrote to Sturgis asking for the list of the civil servants who 
had opted to go north, as per the circular of 20 January.  Clark was suspicious that the 
departments in Dublin Castle were dividing up the staff in such a way as to transfer 
the ‘duds’ of the service to the north.  Cope in his reply, denying that there was any 
such intent, told Clark that there was an equally strong suspicion on the staff side in 
Dublin Castle that the few plum jobs in the new administration were being earmarked 
for English civil servants.22  Clark, who anticipated that the southern government 
would retain most of the experienced men, was actually looking to recruit pensioned 
civil servants as temporaries to set up the departments.23  Anderson offered Clark 
further assurance that nothing was being withheld from him and the problem was that 
the men were unwilling to commit themselves either way in advance of the actual date 
of transfer.  In fact as we have seen the civil service associations were fully occupied 
with reorganisation and re-grading.  Also, with the future so uncertain, a sensible civil 
servant might reasonably fear that too enthusiastic a display of support for either 
government might jeopardise future prospects if he had the misfortune to end up 
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under the other.  Anderson suggested that the best course of action for Clark would be 
to pick men for the principal posts in the departments and let them work out schemes 
of organisation and staffing for their departments.24  Anderson assumed that Clark 
would recruit the heads of the departments from the Irish service, as these were the 
men who best knew the requirements of the work and the calibre of the officers 
available.  He also assumed that this would be a purely paper exercise until the Civil 
Service Committee could function and make allocations.  In fact Craig and Clark were 
already filling the key posts with Ulstermen such as Sam Watt with his well-known 
anti-Catholic views, Gordon of the DATI, Dale and Litchfield, both from the British 
service, A.P. Magill and G.C. Duggan also from Dublin and W.D. Scott from the 
Treasury.25  In order to make Belfast an attractive posting Clark recommended that 
the staff scheme should have a ‘liberal number of higher posts’.26  He also offered 
considerably higher salaries to English officers as an inducement to transfer.  
Waterfield, conscious of the resentment this injustice would cause amongst the 
officers transferred from Dublin, later insisted on Treasury salary scales being applied 
evenly.27  There was also an attempt to prevent the reorganisation grades being 
applied so far as the northern jurisdiction was concerned, leaving the Northern Ireland 
government free to offer better terms if necessary to attract the right men.28  Clark 
staffed his own office first, recruiting officers from London such as Scott from the 
Treasury, but also choosing men of Ulster Protestant background like Captain 
Petherick, a war veteran who had served in the Iniskilling Fusiliers.29       
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Relations with the Irish civil service, where there were growing suspicions 
about the recruitment of staff to the northern government, were also poor.  Mortished, 
in his Irish Civil Servant journal, noted as early as April 1921 that allegations of 
patronage appointments within what he termed “Carsonia” were circulating within the 
Irish service.30 In May, before the elections under the 1920 Act, the AEO published 
its correspondence with Craig as the ‘prospective head of government of Northern 
Ireland’.  The AEO had written to Craig in April 1921 asking him to express support 
for recruitment by open competitive examination and for the principle of promotion 
by merit alone.  Specifically the AEO asked him for assurances that appointments to 
the Northern Irish civil service would be made through the Civil Service Committee 
established by the 1920 Act.  On neither count would Craig offer any substantial 
assurance.31  The creation of two governments and the partition of departments 
necessarily reduced the work and opportunities that each government offered as 
compared to an all-Ireland service.  In much reduced administrations, which 
coincided with a large number of retirements, the competition for the few top posts 
would be even keener.32      
The May elections and the establishment of the Northern Ireland government 
in June added another force to the partition of the civil service, the Belfast cabinet.  
The 1920 Act stated quite unambiguously that the allocation of staff north and south 
was exclusively a function of the Civil Service Committee.  That could not happen 
until both governments were established and both could nominate their 
representatives to the committee.  However, as Craig indicated to his cabinet the 
northern government did not want to recruit the whole of its civil service from Dublin.  
He regarded the Dublin civil servants as undesirable and, in particular, was unhappy 
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that the allocation of staff was under the control of the Whitley Councils of each 
department.  This, the northern cabinet agreed, was in itself prejudicial to Northern 
Irish interests.  Hamar Greenwood suggested to Craig that the problem could be 
addressed by the loan of temporary staff from Dublin.  This, he assured the cabinet, 
would not lead to the northern administration acquiring too many civil servants, and 
therefore a demand for extensive pensioning of redundant staff, as Greenwood had 
also offered assurances that any surplus would be re-absorbed.  Anderson does not 
seem to have been informed by Greenwood of these assurances.33  Fortified by these 
assurances the northern government began recruiting a civil service by personal 
contact with individuals in the Dublin administration and by public advertisement 
inviting applications to a selection board.  The mysterious migration northwards of 
certain officials was noted and condemned as ‘wire-pulling’ by the civil service 
associations.  The Irish CSA sent a delegation on the issue to the new Minister for 
Finance Pollock, the first Irish minister they had met.  Pollock referred to the problem 
of finding housing or lodging for transferred officers from Dublin, but refused to 
accede to the delegations demand that the handpicking of men should stop and that 
transfers could only take place as the Civil Service Committee directed.  It was clear 
to the civil service associations that with the northern government now a reality, and 
the truce adding to uncertainty as to the future of Dublin government, a scramble for 
posts was going on behind the scenes and fatally undermining the safeguards that had 
been won.  Those without influence in Belfast would end up with little choice.34   
In fact the employment of Catholics was already exciting debate within the 
Northern Ireland cabinet.  Complaints about the employment of Catholics in the civil 
service were being forwarded by the Orange Order and by Ulster Ex-Service 
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34 The Irish Civil Servant, Vol.1 No.9 (July-Aug. 1921); Gallagher, Memoirs of a civil servant, p67-8. 
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Association and were being treated with utmost seriousness by the cabinet.  Clark 
might have dismissed as ‘pure imagination’ allegations of anti-Catholic bias but the 
Freeman’s Journal was completely accurate in its reporting of a furore in cabinet 
around the employment of Coyle in the Ministry of Agriculture.  Coyle was a 
Catholic transferred from the DATI who was an early target of Orange Order 
complaint.35  The cabinet members regarded the selection board as the vehicle for 
their personal patronage and there was stout resistance to Clark’s suggestion that 
recruitment would be entirely in the hands of the Ministry of Finance.  Cabinet 
ministers arranged it so that the crucial selection board would in fact be simply a 
‘rubber stamp’ on the employment of the individuals they recommended.36  The 
pattern of Ulster Unionist Party and civil service relations were established in the 
short period of 1920-21 as intensely parochial, nepotistic and anti-Catholic.37 
Mention of a selection board alarmed Dublin.  Fairgrieves wrote to Clark 
reminding him that the only body competent to assign staff to the northern 
government was the Civil Service Committee mentioned in the 1920 Act and that a 
selection board was ‘not on’.  Clark assured him that the board was for purely 
temporary posts to ensure the operation of the administration and that as soon as the 
officers were assigned to the northern government they could be dispensed with.  A 
public notice was drafted and then redrafted to exclude references to an interview 
panel and preference being given to men of an “Ulster” background.38  By now 
allegations were flying around Dublin Castle of the northern government refusing to 
entertain any applications for transfer from Dublin by Catholics.39   
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     The truce of 11 July and the search for a basis for negotiation gave the 
priority to conciliation with Sinn Féin rather than to establishing the Northern 
administration.  The transfer of authority that was meant to follow the elections under 
the 1920 Act was delayed.  The threat to impose crown colony government in the area 
of southern Ireland was not followed through.  In the aftermath of the truce the 
establishment of the Civil Service Committee and the partition of the civil service 
became in effect a ‘slow bicycle’ race with all the contestants determined to go as 
slow as possible.  The winner, it was felt, would be whoever was last in.  For Sinn 
Féin it was vital in the period between the truce and whatever agreement would 
emerge that the government of Southern Ireland should not be established.   
Whilst Craig was desperately anxious for the transfer of functions he was 
confident that between local recruits and voluntary transfers from Dublin he had in 
fact a functioning civil service and did not particularly want or need an allocation of 
the existing civil service.40  Yet he could not say this. The non-functioning of the 
administration disguised the degree of ‘stateness’ it had already acquired through its 
security apparatus, the Special Constabulary.  Therefore Pollock and Clark, who was 
now head of the Northern Ireland civil service, began to delay the question of 
transfers.  Pollock asked for an inquiry by the Civil Service Committee, prior to 
allocation, into the staffing of the existing Irish departments, alleging that there was 
evidence that the staff levels were excessive.  He argued that it was responsibility of 
the British government to either absorb or pension excess staff and not place this 
burden on the Irish governments.  Waterfield quietly squashed that line, insisting that 
his own reorganisation had dealt with the issue and there was no excess in the Irish 
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service.41  The long delay between the truce and the actual start of negotiations on 11 
October allowed the Northern government further time to consolidate its security and 
administrative apparatus. 
On 9th of November, soon after the Treaty negotiations had started, the British 
government announced suddenly the transfer of services to Northern Ireland.42  Over 
the next few days, in a rush of Orders-in-Council, the Dublin Castle departments were 
commanded to assign officers for temporary transfer to the north, even though the 
Civil Service Committee, which had the statutory function of distributing staff, had 
not yet formally met.  Lord Chancellor Birkenhead and Lloyd George had been 
considering how it would be possible to transfer power to Northern Ireland without 
setting up crown colony government in Southern Ireland.  The difficulty was that the 
1920 Act could not be put into operation without the Joint Exchequer Board and the 
Civil Service Committee, on which there would be a southern representative.  
Birkenhead suggested that the 1920 Act could be stretched to authorise the lord 
lieutenant to appoint the southern representatives without having to dissolve the 
Southern Ireland parliament and declare crown colony government.43  The place of 
the government of Southern Ireland on the Civil Service Committee, which remained 
unfilled, was allocated to MacMahon by order of the Lord Lieutenant.44  At the same 
time the ‘appointed day’ for transfer of the departments of government were set out as 
22 November, 1 December, 1 January and 1 February.45   
Whilst Craig sat on his rock of ‘Ulster’ the civil service sat on the rock of 
section 59 of the 1920 Act that established the Civil Service Committee.  The 
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associations were confident in their understanding that partition of the civil service 
could only be done by that committee and therefore, in the absence of a representative 
of the southern government, it could not be established.  The civil service associations 
were confident that whatever would emerge from the London negotiations would be 
at least as good as existing terms and might be even better.  The civil service had 
always done well in setting the terms in the discussions on home rule.  In those 
circumstances it was better to wait.  As the Treaty negotiations made progress Conn 
Murphy and Ronald Mortished of the CSA maintained contact with Sinn Féin and the 
Dáil and received assurances that the protection granted in the 1920 Act to civil 
servants would be continued into any new agreement.46                
 Every home rule proposal, from1886 to 1920, had all been based on 
some form of division of the departments of state and therefore of the civil service.  
For instance customs and trade had been excluded in each and every home rule 
proposals thus implying that the civil service of the Revenue and Custom and Excise 
would remain as they were.  The Post Office was also excluded, which was by far the 
largest of all government departments, and the Ordnance Survey, which had its own 
service traditions that owed more to its military origins than to the wider civil service.   
This would in part explain the detached complacency with which many Irish civil 
servants regarded the home rule debate, confident as they were that they at least 
would not be affected.  The Treaty, to the amazement of the Irish civil servants, 
transferred all twenty thousand of them without exception to the new Saorstát 
Éireann.   Even the postal service which had been reserved to the imperial parliament 
in all the home rule bills, and which represented the vast majority of the Irish civil 
service, was to be transferred in its entirety to the Irish government.  It was even 
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possible that the Treaty could be interpreted as transferring authority over the 
Northern Ireland government to Saorstát Éireann. 
There was considerable disagreement within the civil service associations as to 
the correct response in the aftermath of the Treaty.47   Despite his later avowal of 
republicanism, which cost him his civil service job, Con Murphy was initially an 
ardent supporter.  On its announcement he addressed an impromptu audience from the 
steps of his departmental offices on Merrion Square on the momentous achievement.48  
Murphy as chairman of the CSA took the view that the 1920 Act, and all associated 
with it, had been swept away by the Treaty and that the civil service should throw in 
its lot with the elected government of the Irish people, Dáil Éireann.  They should do 
nothing that would validate partition and in particular should not participate in the 
Civil Service Committee now summoned to meet.  Gallagher and Sloan were loath to 
simply refuse to attend, not least because the committee could function without them.  
It was eventually decided that the CSA would enter a legal challenge to the validity of 
MacMahon’s appointment in an effort to stop the committee in its tracks.  Legal 
advice was sought from Hugh Kennedy, later advisor to the provisional government. 
The Civil Service Committee first met on 8 December, two days after the 
treaty had been signed and after the first two of the appointed days for transfer of 
services had actually passed.49  The committee consisted of Sir Courtauld Thomson, 
Chairman; A.P. Waterfield, Treasury Ireland; R.A. Johnson, Treasury London; James 
MacMahon, the southern government; R.D. Megan, replaced by Ernest Craig, the 
northern government; and Sam Sloan and Michael Gallagher, the representatives of 
the existing Irish officers.  Sloan and Gallagher immediately challenged the 
appointment of MacMahon as not in accordance with the 1920 Act, and protested 
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against the ‘Civil Service Committee undertaking any functions or carrying out any 
duties until it has been duly constituted in accordance with provisions of the Act’.  
Having entered their protest Sloan and Gallagher then agreed that the committee 
could continue so long as the proceedings remained provisional and transfers were 
confined to volunteers.  A paper allocation would be made and civil servants were to 
be asked did they (a) wish to be allocated to the Northern government (b) were they 
willing to be allocated and (c) did they object to being allocated?  All transfers were 
to be at existing ranks but promotions were the sole concern of the government 
employing the officers. 50   
At the second meeting Sloan and Gallagher returned to question once again 
the appointment of MacMahon.  A letter from Anderson was read stating that the 
order-in-council was valid but, if it proved necessary, steps would be taken to put it 
beyond doubt by effective legislation.  Sloan and Gallagher then withdrew from the 
meeting to consult with the CSA.  The rest of the committee may not have accepted 
the position of Sloan and Gallagher but they were certainly willing to play for time 
and delay matters.  When Ernest Clark, who had replaced Megan as the northern 
representative, began to name individual officers as having indicated a willingness to 
transfer north the committee determined that it would be necessary to have the 
personal signature of each officer consenting to transfer.  Clark interpreted this as 
pure obstruction, but in fact the rest of the committee was more likely to have been 
afraid of the growing reaction within the civil service to the work of the committee.51 
A mass meeting of the Dublin civil service on the 12 December resolved that 
‘no civil servant, whatever his personal opinion may be, should answer the 
questionnaire or any other document issued by the Civil Service Committee as at 
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present constituted, but that in each Department the representative of each Association 
or the Chairman of the Staff Side of the Whitley Council or Committee should collect 
the blank forms issued and return them to the head of the department accompanied by 
copies of this resolution in explanation of the refusal of each officer to reply to the 
questions’.52  
As 17 December meeting of the Civil Service Committee was drawing to a 
close a messenger arrived with a notice of proceedings by Conn Murphy acting on 
behalf of existing Irish officers seeking an injunction against those ‘purporting to act 
as the Civil Service Committee’ thus effectively ending the work of the committee.53  
The proceedings were heard by the Master of Rolls on 21 December, as the Treaty 
debate continued in the Dáil.  Not surprisingly the courts rejected the case put by the 
CSA, however it had served its main function of further delaying the process of 
partition until the provisional government took power.54  The committee was finally 
halted by the decree of the provisional government of 16 January forbidding all 
movements of civil servants without the permission of the government.   On the 
following day when Clark asked that the committee should immediately allocate those 
civil servants who had declared a willingness to move north but had not yet done so, 
he found no support.  Instead the committee, whether from fear of the provisional 
government or exasperation at Clark, adjourned indefinitely.55    
The committee meetings worked by allocating staff for the departments and 
then trying to find sufficient volunteers to fill them.  This involved a notional 
allocation of proportions of the work of the department as to north and south.  When it 
came to actually filling the positions it was clear that though there were volunteers to 
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go north, there were not enough of them.  Service in Northern Ireland was not 
attractive to the majority of the civil service, especially as the prospects now looked 
more promising in the Free State.  In Waterfield’s own Treasury (Ireland) not one 
man volunteered to go north to the new Ministry of Finance.  Besides, allocation north 
or south was a function of the Civil Service Committee not the Treasury, so there 
could be no question of compulsion.56  The Civil Service Committee for its part, 
insisted that each civil servant allocated north indicate in writing that he was indeed a 
volunteer.  In order to make up the numbers the committee decided to move outside 
the strict letter of the 1920 Act and invite applications from any civil servant serving 
in Ireland, whether in an Irish or an imperial department.   
The number of staff actually allocated by the short-lived committee was two 
hundred and thirty-five.57  It was calculated that the new northern administration 
required between six and seven hundred staff but by May 1922 only two hundred and 
eighty were actually transferred officers from Dublin and London.58   The only 
comprehensive list of transferred civil servants is that compiled from memory in 1978 
by Frederick Falkiner of the Board of Works.  He lists one hundred and eighty-five 
transfers from Dublin.59  Had the Civil Service Committee actually operated then 
about six out of ten civil servants in Northern Ireland would have been allocated by 
compulsion.  Though Clark recorded a great deal of indignation at the obstruction he 
encountered from the committee, he was in fact probably happy enough with the 
result.  Along with the London transfers, officers who supported the Unionist regime 
formed a core staff of the civil service of Northern Ireland.  The vacancies could be 
used to sate the feeding frenzy of applications that formed around every northern 
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minister.  The Selection Board filled two hundred and forty-five posts in the first five 
months of 1922.  As early as March 1922 concerns were being expressed by senior 
Whitehall civil servants as the narrow sectarian bias of the emerging northern 
government.60 On the other hand the Free State acquired an un-partitioned and 
functioning civil service.  As for the civil servants themselves they had prevented 
compulsory allocation to the north whilst preserving all the safeguards that had been 
won in the 1920 Act.  All in all everybody could feel satisfied. 
The hope of the civil service unions to maintain all-Ireland structures was not 
sustained in the reality of the new state authorities.  The postal workers provide an 
example of the difficulties that any civil service association faced in the new 
circumstances.  The Post Office had always been regarded as a United Kingdom 
service and therefore unaffected by the various home rule proposals.  In Ireland the 
postal workers were organised in the Irish Postal Union (IPU).  With the creation of 
the Irish Free State the British Postmaster General withdrew recognition from the 
union, although it was still organising the clerical grades in Northern Ireland. The 
only union recognised by the Postmaster General was the British-based Union of Post 
Office Workers (UPW), which organised the non-clerical grades.  The Northern Irish 
postal workers refused to join the UPW insisting that a London-based union could not 
adequately represent Irish interests.  The solution arrived at was the creation and 
financing by the IPU of POCA; the Post Office Clerks’ Association (Northern 
Ireland); out of its northern branches.  Because the post office remained an imperial 
service the northern postal workers could keep the Unionist government at some 
distance.  It was generally nationalist in its utterances, describing partition as ‘a 
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political division of Ireland not of our choosing’.61  The postal clerks had always been 
a lively and combative union and the postal services had always been at the forefront 
of civil service organisation, but POCA could not survive the re-grading of the postal 
services undertaken in the 1930s and 1940s and the subsequent erosion of the clerical 
classes.  Contacts with independent Ireland dwindled, where the postal services had 
merged in the single POWU in 1923, and membership was lost to the UPW.  Finding 
it impossible to survive in the small pond of Northern Ireland in the absence of state 
patronage it finally ceased to exist in 1954, having had a purely paper existence for 
many years.62   
The clerical and executive civil service also found it impossible to maintain 
the all-Ireland structure in the face of Unionist government hostility.  Where the state 
was the employer civil servants ultimately had no choice but accept the rules as 
determined by that state.  The British AEO asked Sam Sloan, who had been such a 
formidable organiser in Dublin but had moved north, to form a branch of the 
association in Belfast, but little seems to have come of it.63  An Association of 
Established Civil Servants (Northern Ireland), affiliated to the British Civil Service 
Confederation, attempted to organise the clerical and executive grades.  Fraternal 
contacts were maintained with the Free State, frequent mention is made in the journal 
of events south of the border, and the association invited O’Shea of the Civil Service 
Federation of the Irish Free State to its conferences.64 Another time W.J. Brown of the 
CSCA was invited to drum up support, but a mere twelve civil servants turned up to 
the meeting where he spoke.65 
                                                
61 The Gazette: the official organ of the Northern Ireland PO Clerks’ Association, vol.1, August 1923; 
vol.4, Nov. 1923; vol. 5 Dec. 1923. 
62 Marsh & Ryan, Historical Directory of trade Unions, vol.1, pp 176-7. 
63 Warwick University MRC, mss.232/ AEO executive committee minutes, 27 Oct. 1922. 
64 Civil Service News, vol.1, no.3, Feb 1928, association of executive officers agm. 
65 Ibid., vol.2, no.4, Mar. 1929. 
 212 
The association campaigned for parity with London in pay and conditions.  
Specifically it wanted restoration of Whitley Councils, a demand of the southern civil 
servants also.66  It also wanted an end to the Selection Board, which had extended its 
writ to cover not only recruitment but also promotion.  The association recommended 
that any civil servant going before the Board should be ‘fair-haired, have a stock of 
jokes, and be prepared to talk about where you go for your holidays’.67  The 
implication was clear, the candidate to fill the post was already selected and the 
interview was just for show.  Rather being than an expression of bias within the 
service itself, discrimination in the Northern Ireland civil service against Catholics 
was imposed by the Ulster Unionist party.68  Stormont was, so far as the clerical 
grades were concerned, a recrudescence of the old Dublin Castle problem of nepotism 
and favouritism in promotions.  In such a system active trade unionism was a 
disadvantage.  If prospects depended entirely on the view that the head of a 
department took of you, then it was safer to curry favour than demand fairness.69  A 
far more powerful organisation was the Ex-Servicemen’s Association, which was 
wreaking havoc amongst the English associations with its campaign for establishment 
and promotions exclusively for ex-soldiers, and managed to secure one half of the 
posts created between 1922 and 1928 in the Northern Ireland civil service for its 
members.70 
Pollock took an autocratic view of the powers of the Ministry of Finance and 
treated the Association of Established Civil Servants (Northern Ireland) with 
contempt.  This association was formed in 1922 and represented half of all civil 
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servants, yet its letters to the minister were simply ignored.71  There was also a great 
deal of suspicion attached to the transferred officers amongst the political classes in 
Stormont.  An oath of loyalty to the crown and of service to the state of Northern 
Ireland was imposed on the transferred officers in 1923.72  In 1927 the Trade Disputes 
Act explicitly excluded the possibility of Whitley Councils and narrowly 
circumscribed the ability of civil servants to organise.73     
In 1928 Pollock allowed the formation of a civil service representative 
council.  But the council was based on departments, not associations, and so a cross-
service agitation could not gather pace.  It was also exclusively a staff side council 
with no official side.  The opinion of the council could be conveyed directly to the 
minister, who could do as he wished with it.74  Eventually the staff representatives 
decided to withdraw because, as they said, the council was not representative, it had 
no influence on the decisions made, and was used simply to impart the semblance of 
agreement to the decisions of the minister.75  
 The Northern Ireland civil service was limited not only by the attitude of the 
minister, the sectarianism of the state in which it colluded, but also by its own 
inhibiting exclusiveness.  By clinging to the class and grade structure of the state 
departments it had fragmented its own membership.  It was only when the Association 
of established Civil Servants was dissolved and a new Association of Civil Servants 
in the Government of Northern Ireland was founded in1934, which organised every 
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THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. 
 
The stability of Irish democracy in the aftermath of revolution and civil war is 
sometimes explained by the underlying continuity in the state apparatus.  The 
continuity in the civil service inherited from the former regime into the Irish Free 
State in particular is cited.  It is argued that because of its innate conservatism and its 
distance from the revolutionary state-building process the former civil service ensured 
stability and continuity.1  This argument, that what happened the Irish state could be 
characterised as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, was articulated as early as 
1936 by the Brennan Commission.  Brennan concluded that ‘the passing of the State 
services into the control of a native Government, however revolutionary it may have 
been as a step in the political development of the nation, entailed, broadly speaking, 
no immediate disturbance of any fundamental kind in the daily work of the average 
Civil Servant.  Under changed masters the main tasks of administration continued to 
be performed by the same staffs on the same general lines of organisation and 
procedure’.2   
The question arises as to whether the provisional government did simply 
continue with the same civil service, given that every other institution of the British 
state in Ireland was changed; parliament, executive, judiciary, police and military; and 
replaced by native institutions.  In the midst of so much change why retain the same 
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civil service, especially as the revolutionary regime had built up a civil service of its 
own?  If continuity was the case then the question arises as to why did the provisional 
government accept what was described as an anti-Irish, extravagant, corrupt and run-
down apparatus?  The accepted view is that the Irish civil service, notoriously 
inefficient, had been thoroughly overhauled and successfully rebuilt into a modern 
and efficient machine by Waterfield in the previous year and a half.3  That 
transformation, were it true, would in itself be remarkable, though as we have seen, it 
had not in fact occurred.  The emphasis on continuity also begs the question as to the 
fate of the civil service of Dáil Éireann.  Did the men and women recruited to serve 
the revolution allow themselves to be meekly absorbed into the inherited apparatus of 
the state they had fought to destroy?  
The process by which the provisional government constructed the civil service 
of the Irish Free State was in fact one of immense complexity to which the anodyne 
assurance of continuity does not apply.  To paraphrase Brennan it is argued here that, 
under new masters, new staffs, on new lines of organisation and procedure, performed 
new tasks.  We now turn to examine in turn the constitutional path that was laid down 
for that process and the deviations from that path that the emergence of anti-Treaty 
sentiment necessitated; the reactions of the civil service itself in the Castle 
administration as well as in the administration of Dáil Éireann to the formation of the 
new state and their ability to shape it; the emergence of the marginal pressure groups 
such as those civil servants who for whatever reason felt left out by the 
transformations in the state; and finally the practical problems of merging the civil 
services of the Castle administration and that of the revolutionary Dáil.  
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 The Treaty proposed a constitutional relationship between Britain and Ireland 
far in advance of any previous home rule proposals, including the 1920 Act, a tribute 
to the negotiating skills of Griffith and Collins.  Unlike all previous home rule bills, 
which limited the range of executive responsibilities of an Irish government, Article 1 
of the Treaty stated that the Irish executive would be responsible only to the Irish 
parliament with no reference to any authority being retained in Westminster.  The 
civil service was not to be divided between an imperial and an Irish service; the 
authority of the Irish parliament over the entire state apparatus was absolute.  Also, 
looking no further than the title; 'Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great 
Britain and Ireland-December 6, 1921', it brought into question the very existence of 
Northern Ireland.  Articles 11-15, which dealt with Northern Ireland, could be 
interpreted as implying that the Treaty had superseded the Government of Ireland Act 
of 1920 and that partition would be a purely temporary arrangement.  Even if the 
Northern Ireland parliament were to continue it might well be as a subordinate 
authority to the Irish Free State.4  Therefore, it would seem, the Civil Service 
Committee created by the 1920 Act and charged with partitioning the civil service 
was redundant.  Yet Dublin Castle and Belfast continued to demand that civil servants 
immediately choose between north and south.  Amongst the clerical grades, mostly 
nationalist in sentiment, there was a very public display of resistance to transfer at a 
mass meeting where the continuing efforts to partition the service in the immediate 
aftermath of the Treaty agreement were condemned as a 'political manoeuvre'.5  As 
we have seen, the Civil Service Alliance, advised by Hugh Kennedy, used the courts 
to challenge the appointment of James MacMahon as representing the southern 
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parliament to the Civil Service Committee and succeeded in delaying the allocation of 
civil servants to the north.6   
Article 17 of the Treaty provided a mechanism for transferring the 
administration of Ireland from British to Irish control via an interim provisional 
government.  Precisely how this would work was however still unclear and the Treaty 
was marked not only by political but also institutional confusion.7  For instance it was 
not at all clear at what point the Treaty could be said to have taken effect; was it when 
it was agreed by the Dáil cabinet or by the British cabinet, or by Dáil Éireann or by 
Westminster?8  
The British government deliberately excluded the Dáil from the transitional 
arrangements.  This was agreeable to Collins and Griffith because they planned to use 
the Dáil as institutional cover for the transition from British to native rule.9  On both 
sides therefore, as the Treaty was being considered by parliament and Dáil, there was 
considerable thought being given to the practicalities of transferring authority over the 
state.10  The only certainty was that the ratification of the Treaty by the Dáil would be 
immediately followed by the withdrawal of the ‘military and auxiliary Forces of the 
Crown in Southern Ireland’.11   
In the week after the signing of the Treaty a memorandum for the British 
cabinet’s Irish committee on Article 17 detailed the administrative problems that the 
Treaty created.  The memorandum reflected the collective thought of Lionel Curtis, 
Francis Liddell, Francis Greer, John Anderson and Niemeyer of the Treasury, all 
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hand over its administration to the control of the provisional government.  
10 Oxford, Bodleian library, Curtis papers, ms.89, f.67-70. 
11 NAI, department of the taoiseach, S.21, ‘Lloyd George to Arthur Griffith’ 13 Dec. 1921. 
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senior civil servants rather than politicians.  Curtis’s own analysis was heavily 
influenced by his South African experience and his contempt for the ‘American 
democratic ideas’ that had ‘infected’ Irish political thought.12  Article 17 had been 
based on the original clause of the 1920 Act, but that Act had anticipated only a few 
of the departments being transferred to a new constitutionally elected administration.  
Its main objective was to transfer responsibility for the preservation of order as soon 
as possible to the Irish leaders.  Few could have anticipated that the task of preserving 
order and good government would be handed over to a committee of rebels.  The 
memorandum foresaw great difficulty in transferring at a stroke all the departments of 
the state into the hands of former rebels who would have access to all sorts of 
sensitive papers.  Anderson was particularly afraid that local government, the courts 
and the police service would be subject to greater pressure than they could bear and 
he accelerated the disposal of sensitive police documents.13  Local government and 
the courts were the success story of the Dáil administration and the departments that 
the provisional government would be most anxious should maintain their position.14    
The memorandum anticipated, correctly as it turned out, that the provisional 
government would require the full year provided in the Treaty to draw up and enact a 
constitution for the Irish Free State.  That would mean the provisional government 
would have a whole year in which it would act as an executive authority free of any 
legislative element to which it would have to answer.  Extended periods of arbitrary 
government could undermine public support for the provisional government, and by 
extension the Treaty.  The best Curtis could suggest was that the provisional 
government could be invited to form an assembly of the representatives returned to 
                                                
12 NAUK, CAB 43/2, conference on Ireland, memorandum on article 17 of the Treaty, 10 Dec 1921’. 
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the southern constituencies in the elections under the 1920 Act, which would include 
the supposedly wiser and more experienced Unionist members.  That the second Dáil 
was precisely such an assembly did not escape Curtis but he had no faith that, given 
the political complexion of the Dáil and the tenor of the debate on the Treaty, it could 
not provide this vital constitutional brake on the provisional government. 15   
The British government envisaged the autonomy of the Irish Free State 
coming about in three stages;  
(1) Immediately on approval of the Treaty there would be in existence 
for Southern Ireland a body called the Temporary Provisional 
Government. 
(2)  When the necessary legislation had been passed by parliament 
this body would be clothed with legal powers and become the 
Provisional Government of Southern Ireland as contemplated by 
Article 17. 
(3) Lastly the Government of the Irish Free State would come into 
existence when the Constitution had been formally enacted.16 
 
However, whilst the British government were determined to ‘preserve unbroken the 
line of British statutory authority’ and had allotted no role to the Dáil in establishing 
the provisional government, Collins and Griffith were equally determined to preserve 
the authority of the Dáil.17  Throughout the Treaty debate Collins and Griffith 
suggested proposals that were constitutionally ambiguous but were designed to 
prevent a resurgence of the British state in Ireland and to bring partition of the civil 
service to a halt.18  In a memorandum drafted on Christmas Day 1921 Griffith 
outlined a strategy whereby the Dáil Éireann administration would continue to 
function during the interregnum and then, after the passing of the constitution, merge 
with the Free State; 'the provisional government would do nothing to consolidate the 
                                                
15NAUK, CAB 43/2, Curtis memorandum. 
16 NAI, department of the taoiseach, S.11 ‘Anglo-Irish Treaty: conference with the British government 
Jan-Apr 1922’ copy of cabinet paper prepared by P.G.1.18. 
17 Mansergh, The Unresolved Question, p194. 
18 Hopkinson, Green against Green, pp 34-40. 
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Castle system of administration by filling vacancies etc., but would on the contrary let 
that system wither and die and allow the Dáil system to grow and strengthen…by the 
time the new constitution was in operation the Irish system of administration would 
have superseded the Castle system.'19  The provisional government, which would take 
control of the existing civil service, would take over and isolate the inherited 
administrative machine in Dublin Castle. All business would be directed to the civil 
service under the control of the Dáil Éireann ministries.  Tightening the grip of the 
Dáil on the departments would also make further partition difficult.  The Dáil 
departments would continue to meet as a government under President de Valera 
whilst only the members of the Provisional government would be required to declare 
allegiance to the Treaty.20  Collins and Griffith envisioned the provisional government 
acting as a “committee of public safety” under a united Dáil.  The Dáil would 
continue in being ready to re-assume full authority on completion of British 
withdrawal.21  With both the provisional government and the Dáil functioning there 
would be in effect a dual government. It would be possible, whatever the British 
might legislate, to maintain that the provisional government was a creation of the Dáil 
as much as it was a creation of the British government.  No Irish politician was going 
to repeat the mistake of the pre-Union parliament that voted itself out of existence.   
However this was too subtle for those opposed to the Treaty, and even for 
some of those who supported it.  As Collins said ‘hardly anyone, even those who 
support it, really understand it’.22  The debate failed to get to grips with the mechanics 
of taking over the state and never got beyond an argument between those who saw the 
Dáil government in symbolic terms and those who saw in functional terms.  Those 
                                                
19NAI, Dept of the Taoiseach, S.26. 
20 Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (1988) Dublin, pp 55-6. 
21 Dáil Éireann Debates, vol.3, col.32, 19 Dec. 1921. 
22 Ibid. 
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opposed to the Treaty insisted that the provisional government was as much a 
usurpation of the Dáil as of the Castle government that it replaced.  Seán T. O’Kelly 
described it as the ‘partitionist, provincial, provisional’ government.23 Piaras Béaslaí 
countered by insisting that the Treaty was popularly accepted and that ‘the state is the 
people organised in a coherent from, and no matter whatever you call it a Republic or 
a Free State, my allegiance is to the people of Ireland and to the state which represents 
the national will.  If we do not represent the national will, we [The Dáil] are a 
usurpation’.24   
Document Number Two made unnecessarily explicit what was implicit in the 
Treaty on the transfer of state power, but missed the key element of preserving the 
Dáil as a continuing and separate authority.  The provisional government of the Treaty 
became the ‘transitional government to which the British Government and Dáil 
Éireann shall transfer the authority, powers and machinery requisite for the discharge 
of its duties’.  The clear difference with the Treaty was that de Valera’s transitional 
government derived its authority from the members of Dáil Éireann, not the members 
of the Southern Ireland constituencies and replaced instead of acting as a sub-
committee to the Dáil.25  Document Number Two also reproduced precisely Article 
10 of the Treaty on compensation for dismissed judges and civil servants.   
De Valera’s tactics during the Treaty debate suggest that initially he 
anticipated that the Dáil would reject it, but that Collins, through his IRB centres, 
would ensure that the IRA accepted it.  His emotional outburst at the vote in favour of 
the Treaty also suggests this remained his hope up to the last moment and that he had 
no second line to retreat to.  His resignation and offer of re-election were a desperate 
attempt to retrieve his position by continuing the Dáil as suggested by Collins, but 
                                                
23 Ibid., vol.3, col.136, 22 Dec. 1921. 
24 Ibid., vol.3, cols 179-80, 3 Jan. 1922. 
25 Dorothy McArdle, The Irish Republic (1937, 1999 facsimile edition), pp959-61. 
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now as an opposition to the provisional government.  Even at this stage Collins was 
prepared to postpone the vote on the Treaty and offer once again the idea of a 
“committee of public safety” to take over the Castle, to ‘do all the dirty work’ as 
Collins termed it, whilst preserving the Dáil as a united and separate authority.26  
But the rancorous tone of de Valera’s opposition and the transparency of his 
intent to use Collin’s constitutionally ambiguous dual authority to undermine the 
provisional government at every turn meant that the offer was no longer on the 
table.27  Liam de Roiste, in rejecting de Valera’s offer, put it plainly when he said that 
the provisional government was simply the mechanism whereby the British could 
hand control of the ‘abomination’ of Dublin Castle administration over to the Irish.  In 
the absence of the provisional government that abomination is retained.28  Blythe also 
recognised that what de Valera was proposing differed significantly from the offer 
originally made by Collins.  Under the original idea the provisional government, 
either informally or formally, would derive its authority from the Dáil.  What de 
Valera proposed was two distinct and rival governments.29   The reality was that de 
Valera had little experience of statecraft.  He had not participated, except for a brief 
period, in the Dáil between his arrest in March 1918 and his return from America in 
December 1920.  Choosing to exercise his authority at the heady level of international 
diplomacy he had no experience of cabinet decision-making or the reality of running 
departments of state.         
The strategy of constitutional ambiguity began to unravel with the resignation 
of de Valera and the election of Griffith as president of the Dáil.  A new executive 
was elected with Collins as Minister for Finance, Gavan Duffy in Foreign Affairs, 
                                                
26 Dáil Éireann debates, vol.3, col 349, 9 Jan 1922. 
27 Ibid., vol.3, cols352-3, 9 Jan. 1922. 
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Eamonn Duggan in Home Affairs, William Cosgrave in Local Government, Kevin 
O’Higgins in Economic Affairs and Richard Mulcahy in Defence.  The Ministers for 
Finance, Home Affairs, Local Government and Economic Affairs were also members 
of the provisional government, along with Patrick Hogan, Fionan Lynch, Joe McGrath 
and Eoin MacNeill.  The shared membership of the provisional and Dáil governments 
was an attempt to reconstruct a creative ambiguity around the authority of the state.  
Collins acted as chairman of the provisional government whilst retaining his post as 
Minister for Finance in the Dáil Éireann executive.  Arthur Griffith’s decision not to 
join the provisional government provided constitutional cover for the same persons in 
the same posts acting as distinctly different executives; that of the provisional 
government and that of the Dáil.  When Collins was in the chair it was the provisional 
government, when it was Griffith it was the Dáil ministry.    In the end the steady 
undermining of the authority of the Dáil executive by the anti-Treaty deputies and its 
the outright rejection by the anti-Treaty IRA undermined the structural ambiguity and 
exposed it to ridicule. The Dáil ministry was silently merged into the provisional 
government and by the end of April has ceased to exist as a separate body.30   
Whether dual government could be effective government was never actually tested, 
but the strategy of constitutional ambiguity did mean that during the crucial months of 
state-building the anti-Treaty forces were confined to an armed strategy and no 
attempt was made to establish a rival republican Dáil until October, by which time it 
was too late.31   
Article 17 of the Treaty required ratification by the House of Commons of 
Southern Ireland, elected in June 1921 but never convened.32  It was agreed by the 
British and the provisional government in January 1922 that the establishment of the 
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Free State would immediately follow the provisional government and that there was 
to be no intervening stage of a regularised “Provisional Government and 
Parliament”.33  Collins anticipated that as soon as the British government ratified the 
Treaty, probably in the last week of February, the Dáil would dissolve immediately 
and there would be elections to a new Dáil.  If possible the dissolution of the Dáil 
would be paralleled by the dissolution of the Northern parliament.  In early April the 
newly elected Dáil would elect a new provisional government.  The framing and 
passing of the constitution by the Irish parliament would be finished by I May with 
the registration of the constitution completed in early June by the British parliament.  
The “Ulster month” was to run from that date and if, as seemed likely, the north 
seceded then the Boundary commission was begin its work immediately.  In a 
simplified and shortened process the provisional government would continue to run 
the administration whilst framing the constitution, which would be passed by the new 
Dáil in June and thus immediately inaugurate the Irish Free State.  The Boundary 
Commission would then begin its work of dismantling, as he saw it, the Northern 
state.34   
The weakness of the strategy of constitutional ambiguity lay in its slowness in 
asserting the “stateness” of the provisional government by confronting the anti-Treaty 
forces and in the slow response of the British government that allowed the northern 
government time to consolidate its control.  The British government interpreted the 
December vote in Westminster as merely approving and not ratifying the Treaty.  
Ratification could only occur later with the simultaneous ratification of the 
constitution of the Irish Free State, which would take some months.   It was not until 
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13 March that the British Parliament passed its own measure to enact the Treaty.35  
This delay created a three-month ‘moment of ambiguity’ in which the British source 
for the authority of the provisional government was missing.36  Had the Dáil remained 
united this period of ambiguity would have been to its advantage and could have 
reinforced the Irish source for the authority of the provisional government.   
Collins had expected that the Ulster month would follow immediately on the 
approval of the Treaty.  The three-month delay was vital to the Belfast government.37  
On 1 April 1922, by Order-In-Council in Dublin and by enactment in London, the 
existing government departments and officers were transferred to the provisional 
government.38  But the order also transferred responsibility for services reserved to 
the Council of Ireland to the Northern Ireland parliament, which would act as agent 
for the British government.  This enabled the Northern government to “dig in” on the 
high ground of state power.  The provisional government would answer to a 
constituent “provisional parliament” elected exclusively to debate and pass the 
constitution of the Irish Free State.  This body was eventually elected as the Third 
Dáil in June 1922.   
On the British side it was generally expected that the takeover of the Castle 
departments would be a gradual process, with the inexperienced new government 
proceeding one department at a time. But the provisional government in fact moved 
with great speed and decisiveness to assume full control of the state.  The takeover of 
Dublin castle was a revolutionary event, but it was not a spectacle.  At that time there 
was no precedent for British withdrawal from her colonies so there was none of the 
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elaborate ceremonial to which a later generation became accustomed, with flags 
coming down and flags running up, accompanied by gun-salutes.  Instead, in the Privy 
Council chamber, Collins handed Lord Fitzalan a copy of the Treaty signed by the 
members of the provisional government.  Fitzalan then congratulated the provisional 
government and, wishing them the best of luck, left.39  The provisional government 
was then introduced to the few senior civil servants rounded up for the occasion, at 
least some of whom enjoyed the irony that the men, who just a few months before had 
a price on their heads or languished in Mountjoy Prison, were now being introduced 
as the new government.  For others there was a deep sense of betrayal and disgust at 
being invited to ‘grasp hands red with the blood of government servants’.40  
The provisional government then returned to the Mansion House and issued a 
press statement that ‘the members of Rialtas Sealadach Na hEireann received the 
surrender of Dublin Castle at 1:45 p.m. today.  It is now in the hands of the Irish 
nation....’.  The reference to “surrender” disgusted Sturgis, who hoped that Lloyd 
George would use the Honours List to signal some recognition of the achievement of 
the Anderson team.41  Honours were indeed distributed but, apart from Anderson 
himself, their work in extricating Britain from Ireland was not the launch of a brilliant 
career for these civil servants and the members of Anderson’s “Junta” faded into 
obscurity.  A new cohort of civil servants was assembled to assist in the construction 
of the civil service of the Irish Free State, most notably William O’Brien from Inland 
Revenue, Joseph Brennan and Walter Doolin from the CSO, along with T.K. Bewley 
and C.J. Gregg on loan from Whitehall.42    
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The revolution that opened with the rhetoric of the Declaration of 
Independence, the Appeal to the Free Nations of the World and the Democratic 
Programme, announced its victory with its first directive; 
WE do hereby direct that all Law Courts, Corporations, 
Councils, Departments of State, Boards, Judges, Civil Servants, Officers of 
the Peace, and all Public Servants and functionaries hitherto under the 
authority of the British Government shall continue to carry out their 
functions unless and until otherwise ordered by us, pending the 
constitution of the Parliament and Government of Saorstát na hÉireann, 
and without prejudice to the full and free exercise by that Parliament and 
Government, when constituted, of all and every its powers and authorities 
in regard to them or any of them............Published at Dublin this 16th day 
of January, 1922.43 
 
The Provisional government also prohibited any action 'altering the status, 
rights, perquisites or stipends or the transfer, or dismissal of any officer, servant, 
employee or functionary of the state' or the removal of any records, documents or 
correspondence.44  Whilst these directives lack the rhetorical flourish that began the 
revolution they display a sober understanding of what revolution entails; the seizing 
of state power; and they are directed precisely at the apparatus of the state, the civil 
service.  Though the country had been partitioned, due to the action of the civil 
servants themselves the entire civil service remained united, available and now firmly 
under the control of the provisional government.   
Although the power of the provisional government was purely administrative 
and not legislative, and in that respect seemed limited, to the civil service that was the 
power that mattered.45  The constitutional and parliamentary form in which it 
happened concealed the extent to which, by seizing control of the civil service, the 
entire existing machinery of the state was now under the control of the provisional 
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government.  The new government shunned the Castle, establishing itself in the City 
Hall.  As the British soldiers, Auxiliaries, Black and Tans, and RIC all departed the 
Castle fell silent.  It was even suggested that the entire Castle complex should be 
demolished in order to symbolise the reality of the change from a British to a national 
administration.46   
In preparation for the transfer of power Michael Collins, Eamonn Duggan and 
Kevin O’Higgins travelled to London on Tuesday 17 January, the day after the 
takeover of Dublin Castle.  Patrick McGilligan travelled as secretary, Kevin O’Shiel 
acted as liaison with the Dublin Castle departments.47  As the provisional government 
began to implement the Treaty it was pressed by the British government to use the 
mechanisms created by the 1920 Act to facilitate the partition of the civil service.  In 
particular the British government wanted to see the Joint Exchequer Board and the 
Civil Service Committee established by the 1920 Act constituted as part of the 
transfer of authority.48  Waterfield administered a mild fright to the provisional 
government by reminding O’Brien that the Irish government would have to either 
employ or pension all the civil servants it would acquire on the setting up of the Free 
State and that it might be in its own interest to agree to some sort of civil service 
committee to facilitate transfers north immediately.49  Waterfield reckoned that he 
could immediately identify about thirty officers still in Dublin, willing to transfer 
north, costing about £10,000 in salaries.  He suggested that the provisional 
government could agree to allow, whilst refusing to compel, transfers north.50   
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Instead of facilitating partition however the provisional government ordered 
the Civil Service Committee, which had begun to allocate officers to Belfast, to 
cease.51  Collins intended to use the control exercised by the provisional government 
over the civil service to prevent the Northern government establishing itself.  In a 
characteristically succinct note to Kennedy he asked for instructions as to ‘what we 
are entitled to do and what we entitled to prevent the north-east government from 
doing’.52  In February the provisional government instructed departments to accord no 
facilities for allocating staff to Northern Ireland.53  At a London conference in late 
March Collins refused to hand over state documents until the boundary was settled.54  
This refusal to send staff north suited the heads and staff of the departments in Dublin 
because it is part of the culture of bureaucracy that size is equivalent to status and no 
head of a department will reduce staff unless compelled to do so.  However, perhaps 
as part of the rapprochement leading to the second Craig-Collins pact, the provisional 
government did allow the voluntary transfer north of thirty officers; seven from the 
ILC; three from the NEB; nine from the NHIC, nine from the DATI and two from the 
Ministry of Labour.55   
In early February Anderson in a memorandum on the power of the provisional 
government attempted to create an administrative cordon sanitaire around the six 
counties, saying that the terms of the Treaty established that the British government 
could not transfer, and the provisional government could not exercise, ‘any powers 
within or in respect of that area’.  The administration of Northern Ireland would 
continue as if the provisional government had never been established.  Following this 
Treasury (Ireland) circulated the departments instructing that all payments of salaries 
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to officers serving in Northern Ireland would cease as from 1 April and would become 
the responsibility of the government of Northern Ireland.56  Kevin O’Sheil dismissed 
this as a far-fetched interpretation.  In his view, which we may assume was also that 
of Collins, the only limitations on the provisional government’s power were two-fold; 
that all the members of it should have signed the Treaty and that it should cease to 
exist after twelve months.  O’Sheil summarised his interpretation as ‘briefly we are 
not obliged by the Treaty to assist the Belfast Parliament in any way’.57   
Though the threat of immediate and compulsory transfer to the north had 
receded, the civil service would have been apprehensive had they known that even as 
the provisional government was taking over the Castle apparatus it was already 
discussing its replacement.  At the meetings with the British government on 
establishing the provisional government and transferring responsibility for the 
administration, the Irish delegation had originally wanted the entire Irish civil service 
transferred on loan rather than permanently.  This would have allowed the Free State 
to pick and choose, leaving the British government to deal with the rest.  Not 
surprisingly the British rejected this suggestion.58  Nevertheless there was an intense 
debate going on within the provisional government as to the future of the civil service.  
This debate was characterised by outright hostility to the Castle apparatus and a 
determination to replace it, reflecting the strategy outlined in Griffith’s Christmas 
memorandum.  Collins indicated that he looked forward to replacing the 'alien and 
cumbersome administration', scrapping the inherited civil servants and replacing them 
with fresh 'Gaelic' ones.59  The leading Sinn Féin ideologue Aodh De Blacam called 
for the imposition of an ‘iron Bismarckian phase’ as a step on the road to the creation 
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of a model corporate Catholic state and society.60  J.J. (Ginger) O’Connell, Assistant 
Chief of Staff in the IRA at the time of the Treaty and a supporter of Collins, 
proposing a virtually militarised civil service, urged a purge of those civil servants 
‘with the wrong outlook’, an immediate imposition of salary ceilings, big cuts in 
staffs and a government directive to ‘bring all public servants under thorough 
discipline and prohibit and make criminal strikes by government employees’.61  
Meanwhile the IRB was being courted to support the Treaty with promises of civil 
service jobs.62  
The most detailed, and realistic, analysis of the relationship between the 
provisional government and the Castle civil service is contained in a ten-page 
memorandum on provisional government policy toward the civil service.63  Eoin 
MacNeill sent the memorandum to Collins outlining a proposal to ‘make the fact of 
the change of government penetrate every cell and fibre of the old governmental 
system’.  At the heart of his scheme was a supervisory commission of a small number 
of the best men in the civil service, qualified by their ‘sound national outlook’, to act 
as a kind of watchdog over the senior civil servants.64  The memorandum outlined a 
vital role for the civil service in consolidating provisional government control of the 
state.  Dividing up the Dublin Castle offices into Finance and Establishment, (the 
Treasury) and Home Affairs (the Chief Secretary’s Office) it suggested that the 
provisional government select ‘three or four existing Irish civil servants from each of 
these offices of sound national outlook’ to act as the eyes and ears of the Minister for 
Finance, Collins, and the Minister for Home Affairs, Duggan.  In particular these civil 
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servants, with their understanding of the state apparatus, would have vital role in 
preventing the Northern government consolidating itself.  These civil servants were to 
be joined by the best of the Dáil Éireann staff from the local government and 
secretariat departments.  The next suggested step in taking control of the state was the 
appointment of an officer equivalent to Anderson in the Treasury and Clark in Belfast, 
a civil servant expert in Treasury matters to take control of staff and financial matters. 
From the point of view of the civil service the most interesting proposal was 
one to establish an advisory committee of civil servants ‘to take an immediate survey 
of the machinery required for finance and civil administration and to report to a small 
cabinet committee’.  The memorandum stressed that ‘it is of the highest importance 
for the provisional government to get in touch with and take the fullest advantage of 
the experience of the Irish civil service generally’.  This advisory committee would 
assist in preparing a budget, keeping an eye on transfers of revenue from Whitehall 
and in reshaping the departments of government and staffing in preparation of the 
assumption of power by a native government.  It would also be vital in directing 
departments ‘away from British and toward Irish considerations’ and would have 
blanket powers of access to all departments and records.  
The MacNeill memorandum also suggested that a cabinet secretariat could be 
drawn from the loyal elements of the existing civil service to ‘give effect to cabinet 
decisions’.  It also suggested a civil service commission to replace the Civil Service 
Committee established by the 1920 Act.  This would consist of two members elected 
by the staff and two appointed by the provisional government, with an agreed Dáil 
Éireann (judge?) acting as chairman.  This committee would therefore have no 
representative from either the British Treasury or the Belfast government.  This 
commission would deal with all questions of ‘retirement and discharge of civil 
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servants owing to the recent change of government’, transfers of civil servants 
between Britain and Ireland, consider all applications for new appointments and make 
recommendations on ‘Principles of Promotion’.  The memorandum also strongly 
recommended that the provisional government should publicly adopt a ‘self-denying 
ordinance’ to give no undertakings and make no promises as to jobs or promotions.  
Finally, a full list of forty-six ‘reliable and efficient’ civil servants whom the 
provisional government could consult with confidence on the work of the departments 
was attached.  The ‘reliable civil servants’ included eight organisational activists; E. 
Fahy, Conn Murphy, P.J. Troddyn, H. Bell, E.P. O’Toole, Thomas A. Murphy and 
Michael Smithwick.   
In some of its suggestions the MacNeill memorandum reflects the position of 
the civil servants themselves, as is shown by an equally detailed memorandum 
presented by them to the provisional government.  In fact it is possible that the 
MacNeill memorandum may have been partly written by Conn Murphy, who had 
several unofficial meetings with Collins, Griffith, and MacNeill.65  As soon as the 
Treaty was approved Conn Murphy and Michael Gallagher wrote to the secretary of 
Dáil Éireann, Diarmaid O'Hegarty, introducing themselves as the staff side of the 
Irish civil service Joint Whitley Committee but now representing the new “Executive 
Committee of the Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants”, with whom 
‘any future Irish government may conduct such negotiations as may be deemed 
necessary’. They also forwarded a detailed fifteen-page memorandum on the current 
situation of the Irish civil service and its relationship with the Castle government, the 
Belfast regime and the provisional government.66  Murphy knew O’Hegarty 
personally from the 1918 fight against the oath of allegiance and addressed him on 
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first name terms.  The civil servants’ memorandum was entirely positive and 
optimistic about the situation of the civil service.  The memorandum initially 
explained that the staff side of the Whitley Committee represented the entire fifty-six 
organisations of the civil service.  With the formation of the provisional government 
the official side of the council, appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had 
lapsed.  The staff side now looked to the provisional government to form 
‘consultation and conciliation machinery of a kind more suitable to Irish conditions’, 
which implied that they were not entirely happy with the Whitley scheme and were 
anxious for an opportunity to put their views on an alternative.   
Although the civil servants’ memorandum did not detail what they thought 
was ‘more suitable’ the expectation was that the machinery would be more than a 
mechanism for conveying Treasury decisions and would offer the civil service more 
real control over their conditions.  It had been the experience of the civil service 
organisations that substantial gains had always been negotiated with politicians.  For 
instance, all the safeguards and guarantees in the home rule proposals had been 
secured through dealing with the government.  In contrast the experience of dealing 
with the Treasury in the Whitley Committee, or with Treasury (Ireland) and 
Waterfield, had produced not negotiation but mere consultation.  However the 
memorandum did recognise that the Treaty imposed no obligation on the new 
government beyond that of compensation to discharged or dismissed civil servants 
and that the provisional government was free to deal with the existing civil service as 
it thought fit.    
The memorandum shows that the civil service was dominated by fear of the 
imposition of partition and responded to the provisional government’s resistance to 
partition with encouragement and support.  It also shows that the civil service hoped 
 236 
to use the transition to the provisional government to end the dominance of the 
Treasury and the senior ranks of the service on civil service negotiation.  On partition 
the memorandum not only underlined the resistance of the civil service and but also 
directed attention to the danger posed to the authority of the new government if the 
changes in train were allowed to continue unchecked.   
On the transferred services such as education the memorandum warned that 
though these were not to be transferred until the Council of Ireland had been set up, a 
number of services had already been transferred with consequent division of staffs, 
with more transfers due for the 1st of February and of March.  The Northern 
government was pushing for these transfers to be dated from the 16 January, the day 
the provisional government took power.  This was clearly a challenge to the authority 
of the government.  The memorandum urged that the government consider the 
validity of the transfers already made and whether it was prepared to agree to further 
transfers.   
On the reserved services, such as the post office and police, the civil service 
view was that the Treaty clearly handed these over the provisional government for the 
area of “Southern Ireland” but equally clearly did not give the Northern government 
any additional power over them.  The question for the civil service, and for the 
provisional government, was whether these services and their staffs in the northern 
area would pass to the control of the provisional government or remain under the 
control of the British government.  This was also the case with the excluded services, 
such as customs and excise and revenue, where the legislation was quite clear that the 
northern government had no authority whatsoever.  Yet the actions of the northern 
authorities indicated that it wanted to partition all the government departments in 
advance of the establishment of the Free State. 
 237 
The memorandum also emphasised the hostility of the civil service to the Civil 
Service Committee created by the 1920 Act and the ‘repugnance with which they, as a 
whole, viewed the liability of transfer to Belfast’.  They asked that the provisional 
government support their resistance to compulsory transfer, even if it led to surplus 
staff in Dublin and suggested that the government form a new Civil Service 
Committee composed of three staff side representatives, three Irish government 
representatives and a Dáil Éireann judge to act as chairman, precisely replicating 
MacNeill’s scheme.  The significant point was the exclusion of an official side made 
up of senior or finance civil servants from this committee.  The staff side would sit 
opposite a politician, not a higher-ranking fellow civil servant.  The committee would 
deal with all questions arising from retirements and discharges, make 
recommendations on inter-departmental transfers and new appointments; set up an 
open competitive recruitment scheme and act as a conciliation and arbitration board 
on salaries, hours, terms of service and conditions of employment, and finally the 
committee would also prepare a superannuation scheme.67   
The civil service memorandum also warned the provisional government that 
there were strong grounds for objecting to a continuing role for Waterfield and 
warned that, if he was retained, ‘means should be devised to ensure that the policy of 
the provisional government shall be observed…and that his work…should properly be 
directed from Dublin and not from London’.68  The memorandum reinforced the 
distaste that the civil service felt for higher officials in its recommendation that the 
provisional government immediately appoint a minister corresponding to a secretary 
to the Treasury with whom the civil service could make representations.  Although the 
memorandum complained of the distaste the civil service felt at making 
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representations to the British Treasury now that there was a native government, the 
real difficulty lay with the higher officials.   
The memorandum also conveyed the view of the civil service that it had ample 
talent to staff the new departments which the provisional government would have to 
create and asked that ‘in no circumstances should English civil servants or outsiders 
be imported for these purposes’.  Other issues of lesser importance, but still of some 
importance, were the reorganisation of the existing departments, the imminent cut in 
the cost of living bonus, transfers of civil servants between Great Britain and Ireland, 
the liability for pensions and the principle of open competition.  In order to address 
these issues Murphy pressed O’Hegarty for an immediate meeting.69   
Murphy and Gallagher were essentially offering to throw the full weight of 
civil service organisations behind the provisional government and any changes they 
might wish to make, so long as they could be assured that there would be no 
worsening of conditions and changes would be negotiated through the staff side, now 
known as the executive committee to the associations.70   
A delegation of the Irish branch of the CEF (who had always expected to be 
retained as an imperial service) also met with the government to seek reassurances 
whilst also indicating a general enthusiasm for serving the new government.  The 
draft rules of the new association included as its objects that of encouraging 
‘educational and social development among the members along Irish lines and in 
harmony with Irish interests’.71  Even the professional civil servants, who were now 
in a grading limbo, could summon up some degree of enthusiasm.  The initial 
response of the IPCS to the establishing of the provisional government was one of a 
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guarded optimism.  At the annual general meeting in March 1922 the IPCS President 
spoke warmly about the ‘new vistas of usefulness that was gradually opening before 
the Institution’.72   
There was, however, no reason to suppose that the Castle civil servants were 
irreplaceable.  Almost all of them were lower level clerical grades with few in the 
higher policy-developing levels.  The signing of the Treaty unleashed a flood of job 
applications to the Dáil, most of them accompanied by a recommendation from a 
parish priest, a TD and the local IRA commander, with some of the applications 
coming in fact from the local IRA men themselves.73  It ought to be noted that the 
provisional government decided that there would no toleration for canvassing by 
politicians or by ministers on behalf of any applicant for employment or promotion, a 
decision that was, with a few exceptions, rigidly obeyed.74  There was also, to the 
surprise of Waterfield, a considerable number of applications by civil servants in 
Britain to transfer to the provisional government.75   
The Dáil also would have at its disposal the officials of the local government 
system.  Arthur Griffith had good contacts with the local government officers of 
Dublin Corporation, organised in the ILGOU.  Mangan, the ILGOU president, 
worked for Collins on the finance sub-committee during the Treaty negotiations.76  
The ILGOU, Sinn Féin policy, and the proposed National Civil Service all envisioned 
a single public service based on the six thousand local officials, central government 
officials, as well as the officers of the customs and excise.  Thus the exclusivity and 
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rigid departmental and grade structure of the existing civil service would be breached 
and it would be possible, in theory, for a gifted clerk in a local council to rise by merit 
alone to the level of a departmental secretary.77   
The provisional government drew its staff from the Sinn Féin party, Dublin 
Castle and the Dáil departments, whilst maintaining strict separation between the Dáil 
Éireann accounts and those of the provisional government.78  Between January and 
April, that is between setting up the provisional government and the actual transfer of 
authority, the departments had a free hand in recruiting staff on a quasi-permanent, 
temporary or even casual basis.79  Staff was recruited from the existing civil service in 
the Castle departments, from the civil service of the Dáil departments and from civil 
servants who had been dismissed since 1916 for disloyalty.  The intent here was 
clearly to draw from all the potential officials to forge a completely new civil service.  
The provisional government took immediate steps to disperse the Castle civil service 
by re-assigning men to new departments of the provisional government in local 
government, the post office, home affairs, education, and finance.  The CSO staff was 
dispersed to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs with other 
individual civil servants sent to various separate departments.80  The core provisional 
government Ministry of Finance was made up civil servants recruited from the 
Treasury in London, the CSO, the NHIC, customs and excise, the LGB and the Dáil 
local government department; along with Collin’s personal secretariat made almost 
entirely of the staff of the Dáil department of finance along with Joe O’Reilly of the 
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“Squad” who acted as Collins personal bodyguard.81  The CDB, which had played 
such a key role in making the state a positive force in transforming western Ireland, 
found itself dispersed amongst the departments of agriculture, fisheries and the land 
commission.82    
However pouring the new wine of native government into the old skin of the 
Castle departments proved more difficult that had been anticipated.  The clash of 
authority between Dáil and Castle civil servants was causing problems in the 
department of local government.  The Dáil department of local government was one 
of the successes of the revolutionary administration and by the time of the Treaty had 
already effected radical changes in the local administration of the country.  Between 
the truce and the Treaty the department had continued recruitment and maintained its 
authority as the de facto local government department.  With the passing of the Treaty 
the old Custom House officials, transferred to Jury’s Hotel after the burning of their 
departmental headquarters by the Dublin IRA, immediately began to undo the work of 
the Dáil department.  Lorcan Robbins of the Dáil local government department 
demanded that the provisional government pension off the LGB immediately and put 
the Board under the control of sympathetic men or, if that was not possible, close it 
down.  However it should be noted that the professional staff of the LGB were still 
agitating for guarantees on conditions and status and were in no mood to co-operate 
with anybody, British or Irish.83   
Acquiring the records and staff of the Registry of Deeds was vital to the 
successful functioning of the Belfast administration.  Despite the fact that they were 
still employed by the British government, which acted as an agent of the Irish 
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government, the staff simply refused to go north.84  In Belfast Clark was more anxious 
to get control of the records and documents that related to the northern area than he 
was to acquire the staff.  In March he wrote to O’Brien suggesting that he himself, 
along with O’Brien and Waterfield and the heads of the departments, should form an 
unofficial “civil service committee” and simply confirm the voluntary transfers that 
had happened.  Clark was emphatic that Belfast did not want men who did not want to 
go north and was happy to recruit most of the civil service locally.  What he wanted 
really was for the issue to be driven to a conclusion before the constitution was 
enacted and the ‘Ulster month’ began.85   
The particular ground on which the provisional government chose to confront 
the partition of the civil service was the administration of the “control of contagious 
diseases in cattle” function of the DATI.86  This was reserved to the Council of 
Ireland under the 1920 Act.  By the order-in-council of 1 April, article 2, the British 
government had in effect partitioned the department of agriculture, despite the fact 
that the Treaty envisaged the control of animal diseases as being administered by 
either the Irish Free State or the Council of Ireland.  There was no provision for its 
administration by the government of Northern Ireland.  Apart from the constitutional 
mechanisms the administration of these services required the co-operation of 
professional civil servants, most especially veterinary inspectors in the cattle trading 
ports.  All of these officers made it absolutely clear to Waterfield, who conveyed it to 
Clark, that they had no wish to go north.87 
Hogan continued to instruct the veterinary inspectors in the northern area and 
to make appointments after the 1 April.  Collins also instructed his department to 
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continue paying the salaries of the inspectors in the northeastern counties.  Ernest 
Clark was excluded from the negotiations which ensued between Collins, Churchill, 
Greenwood and Hogan.  The British government eventually agreed that these 
important functions would be returned, in the six-county area, to the chief secretary, 
who assumed responsibility for the staff but would not agree to station the chief 
veterinary officer in Dublin.  The officials were now paid by the chief secretary and 
receive their instructions from him, but in close consultation with the provisional 
government and to the exclusion of the Belfast government.88   
As the IRA split and opposition to the Treaty became militarised the pretence 
of a dual power was dropped and the Dáil ceased to meet from mid-April.  A shift in 
tactics toward the civil service is indicated by the decision of the provisional 
government to invite civil servants, including both Castle and Dáil civil servants, to 
offer their names for inclusion in a pool of candidates for a selection board to the 
higher clerical and junior executive grades.89  In May, before the general election, 
Collins circulated a request to the members of the provisional government to provide 
a summary of the work of their departments with an outline of reforms, economies 
and improvements.  Collins indicated that ‘it was essential that each department 
should become thoroughly Irish, and that forms and circulars associated with the old 
administration should be altered to suit the new condition’.90  The outbreak of civil 
war in June prevented the sweeping changes that clearly were being planned for the 
Irish administration.  From that point on the provisional government had to assert 
control not only over the Castle administration but also the remnants of the Dáil 
departments.   
The split in the republican movement also affected the Dáil Éireann civil 
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service.  The Dáil Éireann district court clerks had been replacing the dismissed petty 
session clerks, but as some took an anti-Treaty position and loyalties became 
uncertain the Dáil clerks found themselves put on probation, a status they still held ten 
years later.91  The Dáil ministry was initially minded to facilitate the retirement of any 
of its civil servants who had a genuine objection to the Treaty and there was some 
discussion of compensation on resignation.  Attitudes hardened as the rhetoric of the 
anti-Treaty forces became more extreme and militaristic.  The Belfast Boycott staff, 
which initially had been offered compensation for loss of office, was threatened with 
summary dismissal.  They forwarded a memorandum, signed by thirteen staff, to the 
Dáil cabinet comparing their treatment as civil servants of the Dáil with that accorded 
by the Treaty to the ‘British officials who worked against the Republic’.92  The more 
political Cosgrave convinced his Dáil cabinet colleagues to offer three months wages 
to buy off the boycott staff.93  Insubordination was noted in which some messengers 
refused to carry out orders, alleging that the authority of the provisional government 
officials was not valid.94   Absences in either the Dáil or provisional government 
departments were noted and, in an echo of the response of the British government to 
suspected involvement in the Easter 1916 Rising, civil servants were compelled to 
give an account of their movements on the days after 27 June.95  It was instructed that 
women staff suspected of irregular sympathies were to be imprisoned if caught in the 
act of spying.96  If a minister was not satisfied with the attitude of any member of staff 
toward the provisional government then the officer was to be suspended and 
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prevented entering government buildings.97  Bolstered by the results of the June 
general election the provisional government now treated both the Dáil and the Castle 
civil service as equally under the control of the provisional government, not Dáil 
Éireann.98  
An oath of fidelity to the provisional government was imposed on both the 
civil service of Dáil Éireann and the Castle departments.  The government originally 
intended to search out dissent by a series of probing questions but, advised by Gregg, 
settled for a simple oath of fidelity.99  Each civil servant of the Dáil and the 
provisional government was required to sign an undertaking stating that, ‘I have not 
taken part with, or aided or abetted in any way whatsoever the forces in revolt against 
the Irish Provisional Government and I promise to be faithful to that government and 
to give no aid or support of any kind to those who are engaged in conflict against the 
authority of that government’.100  A note from Collins accompanied each copy of the 
declaration emphasising that the irregulars were in opposition to the elected 
government of the people and denying that the declaration sought to prescribe the 
political opinions of civil servants.  Rather than being directed against opinions it was 
directed against activities incompatible with public service, an echo of Nathan’s 
attitude to civil service engagement with the Irish Volunteers.101   
The land judge Conor Maguire, it soon emerged, was actively working to draw 
the staff of the Land Settlement Commission away from the provisional government.  
He was immediately suspended.102  Conn Murphy was another victim.  Despite his 
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earlier enthusiasm for the Treaty by the outbreak of the civil war he had changed 
sides.  In September 1922, after writing to the newspapers complaining of the heavy-
handed raids by the military on his home, he was immediately dismissed though he 
had not actually taken any active part in hostilities, but merely signalled his 
opposition by his letter to the newspaper.  His son Fearghus, who was an active anti-
Treatyite, was interned in the Curragh.  In December 1922 he, along with Cáit 
O’Kelly, Count Plunkett and professor Arthur Clery of UCD, acting as a “Committee 
of Irish Catholics”, drafted an eighty-seven page memorandum on the republican 
interpretation of the status of the provisional government and Treaty.  The 
memorandum made much of the oath of allegiance that all the Dáil deputies had made 
to the republic.  Clery and Murphy travelled to Rome to deliver the memorandum 
personally to the Pope.  On his return Murphy was arrested, not because of his trip to 
Rome but because it was alleged he was allowing his home to be used for republican 
despatches.  Conn himself went on a hunger-strike in protest at his treatment.103  
Murphy became something of a cause celébre when he obtained an Apostolic 
Blessing from the Pope during his hunger-strike.104  Perhaps because of the high 
profile enjoyed by Murphy as an organiser within the civil service trade union 
movement and his status on the national Whitley Committee and despite the key role 
he had played in preventing the partition of the civil service, the provisional and Free 
State governments took a particularly hard line with him.  He did not help his own 
case by writing a personal letter to Blythe reporting how his family had been 
terrorised by ‘an organised murder gang, the members of which are at present 
employed and paid by the provisional government’.105  He was refused permission to 
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retire under the Treaty provisions as he had been dismissed already and was also 
denied his accumulated pension as a signal of government disapproval, despite the 
pleas of Áine Ceannt, the widow of the 1916 leader, on his behalf.106  Dismissed in 
October 1922 he was briefly reinstated in December 1927 to be formally discharged 
as redundant and awarded an inadequate pension.107   
Plans to construct a completely new apparatus were abandoned and the civil 
service of the Dáil was assimilated into the old Castle administration.  The terms of 
the Treaty and the need for a speedy transfer of authority did not encourage any 
radical re-structuring of the civil service.  In the absence of such radical restructuring 
for each department the process of assimilating the staff of the Dáil ministries to the 
Castle administration was simply a matter of assigning each member of the staff to a 
grade, based on an inspection of the work done.  Curiously enough this was exactly 
the process that Waterfield had been laboriously doing in each department of the 
Castle administration.  However although the Castle civil service was reassigned and 
dispersed in the new departments, the Dáil civil service tended to move en bloc into 
the parallel department of the provisional government.  It was decided that as a 
fundamental principle of assimilation the truce would be the deciding line for 
allocating the staff of the Dáil ministry to permanent or temporary positions.  This 
was in recognition of the special claim to permanent pensionable posts of the staff that 
had borne the risks of the pre-truce service whilst, at the same time, being fair to the 
existing staff with years of efficient service.  In effect this isolated the civil service of 
the pre-truce Dáil as a special case.  The staff of the Dáil civil service recruited after 
the truce became temporary civil servants and would have to compete along with the 
rest of the civil service for any permanent posts that might become available.  They 
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were however assimilated at the same salary they had enjoyed under the Dáil 
departments, even though it was generally higher than a temporary civil servant 
usually enjoyed, subject to that salary being liable to any subsequent reductions due to 
the fall in the cost of living bonus.   
Both the LGB and the Dáil department of local government were in disarray.  
Though it would have been preferable to decide on the future shape of the department 
and fit the two organisations into that model, it had proved impractical as a way of 
progressing.108  The LGB was still in disarray due to the standoff between Robinson 
and Waterfield on reorganisation.  A further difficulty was that the provisional 
government had brought into its ministry of local government departments other than 
the LGB.  It was anticipated that these would become sections in a rationalised 
ministry run by a single minister rather than a collective board, with a consequent 
reallocation of staff, but that was yet to be arranged.109  On the Dáil department side 
there was the difficulty that the Treaty split was undermining control over dissident 
local authorities and testing departmental staff loyalties.  The appointment of 
McCarron, a former auditor in the LGB, as acting departmental secretary tested the 
loyalty of the Dáil staff, with rumours that some were threatening mass resignations.  
The assimilation and grading of the Dáil staff was done by McCarron and De Lacey 
of the Dáil department and sanctioned by Gregg in finance.  Loyalties were further 
tested when the staff that had been given permanent status discovered that in many 
cases the scale of pay in the provisional government was lower than that of the Dáil 
ministry.  There is however no evidence in the records for Blythe’s claim that he had 
averted the threatened mutiny by random increases and decreases of salaries, thus 
fostering distrust in the ranks of the mutineers.  The salary levels on assimilation were 
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in every case those appropriate to the LGB staff on the same grade and were set by 
Gregg in finance.  Gregg in fact resisted Blythe’s suggestion that some staff should 
enter their scales at a higher level.  The provisional government seems to have 
determined that service in Dáil Éireann would neither help nor hinder any member of 
staff.  All staff were assimilated at the bottom of the scale, with, in the cases of some 
younger officers, the direction that they should “mark-time” until they had attained 
the age usually appropriate for their point on the scale.110  Dáil officials recruited after 
the truce were assimilated as temporary civil servants.  Because the salaries they had 
been paid by the Dáil departments in many cases exceeded the usual rates for 
temporary clerks it was agreed that they would continue on the same salary but now 
subject to the variation in the cost of living bonus.  
In agriculture assimilation was complicated by the ILC status as a reserved 
service.  The staff of the ILC, like other reserved services, remained the employees of 
the British government, which acted as agent for the provisional government.  The 
Dáil department of agriculture staff were the members of the Land Resettlement 
Commission, established to quell the rising unrest over land, and so therefore engaged 
in much the same sort of work of inspection and adjudication as the ILC.111  From the 
point of view of assimilation however, this made the task a straightforward one.  
Following a practice that was being elevated to a principle it was decided that the staff 
of the Dáil land commission would be assimilated to similar grades and scales as the 
ILC staff. 
Civil servants who had served the Dáil felt badly treated by the favour, as they 
saw it, with which the old regime’s civil service were treated. Years later, in evidence 
to the Brennan Commission, the Association of Dáil Civil Servants and Dismissed 
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British Civil Servants’ claimed to represent one hundred and twenty members.  Most 
were clerical officers, with some from higher posts.  Their main complaint was that on 
assimilation ‘due regard was not paid to the nature of the duties on which they had 
been engaged previously’.  It was their contention that the duties on which a Dáil 
Éireann officer had been engaged ought to have determined their grade and not the 
duties to which they were assigned in the provisional and Free State governments.  
The informal and unstructured Dáil departments had, rightly or wrongly, given them a 
greater sense of status than that attached to their new provisional government grades.  
The implication clearly was that they felt that ‘people who had suffered in support of 
the national cause’ had undergone loss of status.  It was also their view that the civil 
servants who had been dismissed under the British regime had suffered loss of 
promotion and that ‘it is a distinct loss to have been patriotic in the civil service’.112 
That was not true for at least some of the Dáil civil servants.  One group of 
Dáil civil servants that did do well in the change of government were drawn from 
those dismissed by the British for disloyalty.  Alexander J. Connolly, interned in 
Frongoch after 1916, was reinstated in the Department of Industry and Commerce and 
ended his civil service career as private secretary to Lemass.  Michael Cremen, 
another 1916 veteran, became private secretary to Patrick Little in Posts and 
Telegraph and Gerald Boland in Justice as well as secretary to the Military Pensions 
Board.  Patrick J. Daly emerged from the Dáil Éireann local government department 
to finish as assistant secretary to the Department of Local Government.  Michael De 
Lacey was another civil servant interned after 1916 who entered the Dáil Éireann 
local government department.  He ended his career as assistant secretary in local 
government.  Michael Heavey transferred from the Land Settlement Commission to 
                                                
112 NAI, Brennan Commission evidence, BC/3, 22 Feb. 1934. 
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the Irish Land Commission as senior commissioner.  Thomas McArdle, who had 
served in the Dáil Éireann local government department, went on to become the first 
secretary of the Department of Health.  James J. McElligott, interned after 1916, 
returned to become the dominant figure in the Department of Finance.  His case 
underlines the fact that participation in revolution does not preclude an intense 
conservatism.  George McGrath transferred to the Free State as auditor-general from 
the same post in Dáil Éireann.  Michael McDunphy, dismissed by the British 
government for refusing to take an oath, ended his career as secretary to the President 
of Ireland.  Maurice O’Connor, dismissed during the War of Independence, was 
reinstated and retired as assistant principal in the Department of Education.  Henry 
O’Friel, another civil servant dismissed for refusing to take the oath in 1918, ended 
his career as secretary of the Department of Justice.  P.S. O’Hegarty, dismissed for 
refusing the oath in 1918, was a long serving secretary to the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs.  Diarmaid O’Hegarty, dismissed in 1918, served the Dáil cabinet and the 
provisional government as secretary, ending his career as Chairman of the OPW.113      
However these cases perhaps served to underline the poor treatment meted out 
to others who felt themselves as well qualified on grounds of commitment to the 
national cause and ability.  Diarmaid Fawcett had served Sinn Féin and the Dáil as a 
member of Cork Industrial Development Association, as Consul-General in the USA 
and as technical advisor to both the Dáil and the provisional government on economic 
affairs.  Then in September he was told that he was to act as assistant to the secretary 
of the Department of Industry and Commerce the Right Honourable Mr Gordon 
Campbell, but without a right of access to the minister.  In a bitter letter of complaint 
at this demotion he detailed the service he had freely given ‘when to serve Dáil 
                                                
113 All details from the DIB database, Earlsfort Terrace Dublin 2.. 
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Éireann was not the secure and pleasant office that comparatively speaking it is today.  
Moreover I rendered this service at a time when those many others who professed to 
be possessed of technical and administrative knowledge elected to serve under an 
entrenched despotic alien government than under a popularly-elected national 
administration in the adolescent stage’.114  Joe O’Reilly found the transition from 
gunman to civil servant particularly difficult.  When he remarked that it was his 
opinion that there would be ‘more than a few irregulars to be cleared out’ in the 
government departments, he was sharply reminded by O’Brien that ‘whatever his 
qualities as a soldier he had better understand his position as a clerk’.115 
T.H. Nally and Léon Ó Broin, who had resisted Conor Maguire’s attempts to 
alienate their loyalty to the provisional government, were shocked to discover that 
they would have to suffer a reduction of salary on assimilation.  Nally took the high 
view that his salary had been negotiated with the minister personally and was 
therefore not subject to finance controls.  Neither got very far in their challenge to the 
emerging power of the Department of Finance.116 
In the Ministry of Home Affairs P.J. Crump got a particularly raw deal.  As 
the Treaty split began to undermine the Dáil departments Crump was appointed to the 
legal staff in February 1922 to replace an official who was taking an increasingly anti-
Treaty line.  Crump abandoned a good post in a solicitor’s practice on the assurance 
that he would get a permanent post and also because he was pressed by Eamonn 
Duggan to do his duty by the country.  However because he was recruited after the 
truce the Department of Finance refused to make his post permanent, despite the pleas 
of Duggan and the protests of Crump that he had been duped.  Regardless of the 
difficulties that it might cause for ministers, finance was demonstrating its 
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unwavering determination to achieve sole control of establishments.  Although this 
can be seen as an early expression of the dominance of the finance mandarins, it was 
in fact as much a reflection of the mind of Collins as the official mind of finance.  Of 
all the ministers of the provisional government Collins best understood that though 
control of the IRA was vital, no less vital to the success of the provisional government 
was control of the civil service of both the Dáil and the Castle.117    
Whether because of the speed of their assimilation, or the short period in 
which they had functioned as a corps, the civil service of the former Dáil did not 
manage to form any organisation to fight their interests.118  Where the Dáil staff did 
manage to combine to make a protest about reduced salaries, as happened in the 
department of local government in November 1922, they succeeded in winning some 
concessions but Gregg in finance refused to allow Blythe make any offer that would 
be ‘embarrassing for us vis a vis the civil service generally’.  The provisional 
government was learning to think of itself as a cohesive if isolated collective that had 
to stand united against all claimants, even those of loyal supporters.119  The only 
organised pressure group to emerge was the ‘Irish Republican Soldiers 1916-1921 and 
Prisoners of War Association’ that acted as a not very effective conduit for pleas for 
employment for the ex-IRA men and the relatives of the fallen.120  The final “clean-
break” with the Dáil came on 14 December 1922 when a directive ordered McGrath 
to cease making payment from the Dáil funds and to transfer all the staff and 
payments to the provisional government.121  All those employed by the Dáil and 
transferring to the provisional government were required to sign the declaration of 
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fidelity to the government.122  
In most countries that have emerged from colonial rule into independence 
through a revolutionary struggle, the army of liberation has served as the main 
stabilising force.  But in Ireland as the IRA split on the issue of the Treaty, the 
liberation army became in fact the main source of instability.  As the Dáil, Sinn Féin 
and the IRA all split, some of the staff of the old Dáil departments, many of them also 
members of Sinn Féin and of the IRA, were seen as no longer reliable.  The 
legitimacy of the provisional government was challenged and there were instances of 
insubordination and refusals to obey instructions.  In contrast, whatever the private 
sentiments of individual civil servants, the entire Castle apparatus without exception 
accepted the legitimacy of the provisional government as the state authority. Oaths of 
loyalty to the provisional government were demanded of civil servants, failure to 
account for movements led to dismissal.  The provisional government became isolated 
from its roots in the Sinn Féin party and in the Dáil, and soon lost contact with any 
popular base.  In O’Higgins memorable if overwrought peroration they were ‘eight 
young men standing amidst the ruins of one administration with the foundations of 
another not yet laid, and with wild men screaming through the keyhole’.123  The 
Castle bureaucracy on the other hand had long learned to remain aloof from the 
political struggles in civil society and demonstrate its readiness to work with whatever 
authority it found.  A besieged provisional government soon shared the barely 
concealed contempt with which many in the Irish civil service had long regarded the 
political classes.124  It was these circumstances of civil war that enabled the Castle 
civil service to get a foot in the door of the independent state and establish itself as a 
stabilising force.  However, the view that some senior civil servants later encouraged, 
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that in the absence of political interference they quickly dominated their departments 
and were able to construct the state administrative machine without the politicians, is 
to taken with a grain of salt.125  To return to O’Higgins’s cry, not only were there the 
foundations of the old administration in ruins, the foundations of the new were still to 
be laid.   
Finally, the most important reason that the provisional government abandoned 
plans to create a completely new national civil service was that the immediate task 
facing the fledgling state was waging war, the most state-defining activity of all.  
With the death of Griffith and of Collins the provisional government lost its 
visionaries. Thoughts of building a completely new and national civil service were 
quietly abandoned. As the provisional government concentrated on the growing 
military threat of the anti-Treaty IRA its control of civil government weakened.  
Collins, McGrath, O’Higgins, O’Hegarty and Lynch were transferred from civil 
government to the army and the provisional government seemed to exist only as a 
facade for the War Council.  The survival of the new state depended on the army, not 
civil government.  Gavan Duffy emphasised to Mulcahy the danger that lay in 
creating the impression that the ‘men who matter have gone to Portobello leaving 
only a feeble residue in Merrion Street’.126  In an uncanny echo of the fears expressed 
by Wylie, Cope and Anderson in 1920, there was a real danger that the military alone 
would become the expression of state authority in the Free State.127  The Dáil civil 
service was further weakened by the formation of a Volunteer Reserve of the National 
Army from the civil service.  A great many of the former Dáil civil servants enlisted, 
whether in the hope of bettering their status or to simply escape the tedium of 
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administration.128   
In October 1922 the anti-Treaty IRA, belatedly recognising the need to cloak 
their anti-Treaty war with a state-form, nominated a government of the Republic.  De 
Valera issued a circular directed to all state employees asking that they sever their 
connection with the provisional government and recognise the government of the 
republicans.129  The logical decision, which flowed from the formation of a republican 
government, was to target members of the “illegal” Dáil that sanctioned the military 
tribunals ordering the execution of republicans since September.  The IRA murder of 
the TD Sean Hales on 7 December 1922 led in turn to the wholly unlawful executions 
of McKelvey, Barrett, Mellows and O’Connor at dawn on the following day.  No 
challenge to the authority of the state was tolerated.  Even the September withdrawal 
of labour by the post office workers in a strike against wage cuts was treated as 
subversion and ruthlessly crushed.  This strike led the government to outline a view of 
an almost authoritarian relationship between the state and the civil service that was far 
removed from the informality and casualness of the old regime (see next chapter).  
 1922 was a deeply hazardous rite of passage for Irish democracy.130  
Much of the anarchy of the year of provisional government could be put down to the 
weakness of the state itself, a legacy of inherited neglect, failed reform and the Anglo-
Irish war.  For two years, at least, civil government had been overshadowed by 
military rule, either by republicans or by crown forces.  The ruthless and often illegal 
suppression of the anti-Treaty forces did ensure that the elected representatives and 
civil service of the new state could do their work and build the civil administration of 
the state in safety.  Winning the civil war was not the result of a more coherent 
ideology but rather of a greater determination to use the conflict to consolidate control 
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of the state.   However, filled perhaps with an awful consciousness of the 
consequences of failure, the provisional government in its determination to win 
became filled with a high-handed arrogance.  The civil service was, initially, fired 
with a sense of mission and a determination to serve the new nation fully and 
faithfully.  Though there were instances of sympathy to the anti-Treaty irregulars the 
mood was one of enthusiasm, in which change would have been possible and perhaps 
even welcomed.  The first issue of IRIS, the Journal of the Civil Service Federation, 
noted that at the time of the Treaty the civil service had been enthused at the opening 
up of brighter prospects of an efficient service and had hoped that the camaraderie 
which had infused the Gaelic League in the old days would infuse the nation and its 
civil service once again.  Most civil servants anticipated that national independence 
would mean a civil service in which patronage and nepotism would be a thing of the 
past, entrance would be by a ‘ruthlessly just’ competitive system and industry, 
integrity and intelligence in the service of the state would prove the only passports to 
promotion.  However, one year later the mood was one of foreboding.  National 
freedom meant an attack on workers, on trade unions and on the civil service.131  The 
opportunity had passed.  The provisional government squandered the goodwill of its 
civil service and as 1923 dawned and the Irish Free State came into office the attitude 
of the civil service was one of suspicion and defensiveness.  For many civil servants 
the state was failing to embody the bright ideals and generous ambitions of the 
national struggle.  As will be seen, the assimilation of the Dáil staff into the Castle 
civil service led to the unexpected consequence that it was discontent on salary levels 
and the imposition of pay cuts rather than nationalist sentiment or patriotic ambitions 
that formed the basis for unity in the combined civil service.   
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The task of maintaining a separate administration for the Dáil, untainted by 
contact with the Castle, would in any case have been enormously difficult.  The 
transfer of the existing Castle apparatus was effected through the provisional 
government, not the revolutionary Dáil administration.  Also the strategy of the 
revolution, of creating a parallel state, had the effect of creating a duplicate state.  It 
would have seemed like administrative good sense to simply merge the duplicate 
departments.  Finally, Article 10 of the Treaty (and Article 77 of the constitution of 
the Free State) gave a constitutional standing to the vested interests of the former 
apparatus, guaranteeing their status, tenure, salaries and conditions.  On the other 
hand the staff of the Dáil Éireann departments were not offered any constitutional or 
indeed any legal status at all.   
But the establishing of the new state was not an uninterrupted continuity with 
the old.  Rather than being smooth transfer of a functioning apparatus the provisional 
government operated in a country where the existence of any central government as a 
reality could be questioned.132  The civil service that the provisional government took 
over remained in a state of organisational confusion.  It is as well to remind ourselves 
that Waterfield’s ‘reorganisation’ was in fact a re-grading and entailed no more than 
assigning so many administrative, executive or clerical posts to each department and 
slotting the existing civil servants into these new grades.  Although it was treated by 
Brennan, and by later historians, as having been delivered from a burning bush it was 
in fact purely imaginary in some departments and never existed in most.133  
Waterfield had taken the model as agreed by the British National Whitley Council as 
a norm and attempted to apply it to the Irish departments, disregarding the very 
different function, structure and relative autonomy of the state in Ireland.  
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Reorganisation did not begin with an analysis of the objective of each department 
followed by an assessment of its success or failure to achieve that objective.  
Assuming that Whitehall was best he stubbornly forced the Irish bureaucratic horse 
between the shafts of a London cart.   In departments where there was an allocation of 
significant numbers of higher posts, individual clerical and executive officers could 
anticipate promotion, but the Irish administration as a whole retained what was 
regarded as its notorious fragmentation and incoherence.  This fragmentation was in 
fact simply the structures that had evolved through metropolitan intervention in the 
society of Ireland.134   
The Dáil civil service was purged by demands of loyalty to the provisional 
government.  But the old administration was also purged, not by the usual firing 
squads of revolutionary regimes, but through the operation of the Wylie committee on 
Article 10 of the Treaty and it is to this process that the next chapter will turn.   
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CUMANN NA NGAEDHEAL AND THE CIVIL SERVICE 
 
 
Given the initially co-operative attitude shown by the civil service toward the 
provisional government the question arises as to why that relationship declined and 
became, as we shall see, antagonistic under Cumann na nGaedheal.  In the cabinet the 
correspondence from the civil service associations welcoming the provisional 
government and asking for a meeting was noted but ignored.  Conn Murphy had some 
unofficial meetings with Collins, Griffith, and MacNéill, but nothing concrete 
emerged from these meetings.1   
Although the official break with Whitleyism was not announced until 
December 1924, and although departmental councils continued to meet, the decision 
to do away with it was in fact made early in the term of the provisional government.2  
Discussing a memorandum on the Whitley Councils prepared by James MacMahon, 
which included Conn Murphy’s observations, the provisional government decided 
that they posed an unacceptable limitation to the power of the executive, were un-
Irish, and ordered that they should immediately cease working.3  As the Treaty split 
began to edge toward crisis Collins agreed to meet a deputation of civil service 
representatives from the civil service associations.  The CSF had submitted a 
memorandum on 22 April detailing the points that the civil service wanted to discuss 
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which included the status and continuity of service and salaries, the establishment of a 
new Civil Service Committee, the setting up of a new Irish Civil Service National 
Council and retirements and pensions.4 
On the first point the deputation was assured that the government, while not 
being in a position to give a guarantee (as they could not bind their successors) had no 
desire to interfere with the existing rights and privileges of civil servants.  The 
specific assurance offered was that the government ‘would try to ensure that future 
conditions will be no worse than hitherto and had no intention to deprive civil 
servants of any rights held under the former government’.  The question of a Civil 
Service Committee was being addressed by what emerged as the Wylie committee.  
On the question of retirements and pensions Collins directed the deputation to the 
legislation.  On the request for an Irish Civil Service National Council Collins was 
wary and it was clear to the deputation that the provisional government was opposed 
to the idea.  Instead it offered a special commission to find out ‘whether the object of 
an Irish National Council could not be effected in a different manner’.  Until the 
question was decided a temporary consultative committee was offered.5 
As the Dáil debated the Treaty, Waterfield’s main concern was those 
departments that he had never re-graded, such as the Post Office, on the assumption 
that they would remain part of the reserved civil service.  The Treaty now proposed to 
transfer the entire state apparatus to the new Free State.  Waterfield spent Christmas 
and New Year hurrying through a series of notional reorganisations with immediate 
effect that left many questions unanswered on promotional vacancies, professional 
grades and temporary posts whilst moving a few key men from Dublin Castle to 
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Whitehall.6  The proclamation of 16 January put an immediate stop to all changes.  To 
those civil servants who disagreed with their new grading Waterfield could only offer 
the view that they were lucky to have been re-graded at all.  To the civil servants still 
waiting a new grading he could only offer the advice to wait until the new provisional 
government had found its feet before opening the question.7   
For many of the professional and technical civil servants the proclamation by 
the provisional government, which banned any interference with their status, also 
prevented any alteration to their grades and pay.  The often promised re-grading was 
still incomplete, and it seemed would remain so despite the many pledges received.8  
As the Treaty discussions entered their final days desperate pleadings of their case 
were sent to Waterfield, to the British Chancellor Woods, and to Gallagher on the 
staff side of the Irish Civil Service Joint Whitley Committee, though none were sent 
to the Dáil.9  Waterfield’s failure to complete the re-grading meant that those 
professional civil servants who opted to retire, or were compelled to retire, would 
receive pensions calculated on pre-reorganisation grading or, if their status as civil 
servants was not confirmed, perhaps no pension at all. 10       
It was made clear to Waterfield that the Treasury in Whitehall would be co-
operating with the provisional government in giving effect to the proclamation.  
Cope’s assurance that the proclamation was for appearance only and that the 
prohibitions might not be applied as rigidly as might appear at first sight did not 
reassure Waterfield.  He feared that a close scrutiny of the re-gradings that he had 
already completed might lead in some cases to their rejection by the provisional 
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government.11  There is no doubt that Waterfield was pessimistic as to the future 
prospects of the civil service in the Irish Free State and was burdened by a deep sense 
of obligation to those civil servants left out of his re-grading.  On 23 January he sent a 
detailed memorandum to the provisional government on the outstanding problems in 
reorganisation that had been brought to a halt by the proclamation.  These included 
cases where the Treasury had sanctioned appointments but the formalities had not 
been completed before the proclamation; cases where individuals had passed the civil 
service examinations but had not been actually appointed; and cases where persons 
had not qualified for permanent appointment but were eligible to compete in the civil 
service examinations for pending permanent appointments.  Waterfield pressed all of 
these cases as ones requiring decisions one way or the other.  A month later he was 
still waiting a reply.12   All through January and February he attempted to secure a 
personal interview with the provisional government whilst assuring the civil service 
associations that outstanding re-gradings might yet go through.13  Waterfield’s own 
feeling was that the provisional government was convinced that the Castle was over-
staffed and in need of severe cutbacks.  Besides, they would want to keep any 
vacancies to satisfy the demands of their own supporters.14  What finally enabled 
Waterfield to get his foot in the door was the question of salary cuts.    
In order to compensate for wartime inflation the government had introduced 
the ‘bonus’ as a multiplier on basic salary.  This multiplier was based on a cost of 
living index figure calculated every six months.  It was expressly declared that the 
bonus would be temporary.  With post-war deflation this figure began to fall.  Civil 
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servants, having got used to thinking of their combined basic and ‘bonus’ as their real 
salaries, now faced what was in effect a cut in pay.  As the provisional government 
came into office the British government had already made a decision that the civil 
service would face a significant reduction in pay.  The post-war euphoria had 
evaporated in Britain.  The conservative newspapers, the Morning Post and the Daily 
Mail, ran a populist campaign against the expanded civil service.  The root of the 
emerging economic problems they confidently asserted lay in “squandermania” and 
those mythical civil servants “Dilly and Dally”.   
In reaction to this campaign the government instituted the Geddes 
investigation into the cost of the civil service.  Geddes, one of the allegedly efficient 
businessmen brought into the war cabinet by Lloyd George, had been personally 
responsible for the creation of the enormous Department of Transport.  In February 
1922, following the recommendations of his investigation, the British government 
imposed the “Geddes Supercut” of between ten and fifty per cent on civil service 
salaries along with an overall maximum total remuneration of £2000.15  Waterfield 
wrote to O’Hegarty to ask whether the provisional government ‘concurred’ in the 
cut.16  At this stage the authority of the provisional government was being eroded by 
anti-Treatyite propaganda and it seemed that actual state authority lay in Portobello 
barracks rather than in Merrion Street.  In Cork the civil servants in the Ministry of 
Labour went on a three-day strike when the reduction was first announced.  It seemed 
probable that strikes would spread when the cut was actually imposed.  Waterfield 
would actually have been happier of the government had postponed consideration, or 
ignored his letter as they had ignored earlier ones.  Once the transfer date of 1 April 
was reached responsibility would pass from his hands and it would be up to the 
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provisional government and not Treasury (Ireland) to impose economies.  However 
his acute sense of professional propriety and responsibility to both staff and 
provisional government would not allow him to delay the question.17    
Waterfield was called immediately to meet with the provisional government 
where he could elaborate his concerns on reorganisation, as well as on the cuts.  
Within a few weeks he felt sufficiently confident of his position to offer a mild 
reprimand for excessive government expenditure; asking whether the provisional 
government could not have secured less expensive accommodation for the 
constitution committee than the Shelbourne hotel and refusing to sanction the 
purchase of calculating machines for the Department of Finance.18  Waterfield 
established a good working relationship with Cosgrave, similar to that of any 
Treasury official and a politician, and together they ironed out some of the difficulties 
that pressed on Waterfield.  It ought to be noted that compared to the problems facing 
the provisional government, Waterfield’s anxieties about the accounting officers of 
the LGB or temporary ex-servicemen would have seemed absurdly trivial.19   In fact 
whilst Waterfield’s concerns for the rank and file of the Irish service shows a 
commendable decency, it was Cope who managed the delicate task of discretely 
moving staff out from the Castle into the departments of the provisional government 
and ensuring that those formerly engaged in security work found safe niches.  For 
instance, it was Cope who secured a comfortable and undemanding lower clerical 
position for a Mr Butler who was ‘suffering considerably from shell shock resulting 
from the Great War and is not fit for duties requiring strain and pressure.’20    
In contrast to the British post office, which was profitable, the Irish post office 
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ran at a massive loss due to the density of its service in a thinly populated country.  
When the provisional government decided to impose the cut only the postal workers 
signalled resistance.  The postal workers had not won any revision of their grades or 
scales since 1870.  Great hopes had been placed in the Whitley reorganisation but in 
Ireland Waterfield had ignored the postal grades, expecting they would be included in 
the general British re-organisation.  When the Treaty clarified that the entire postal 
staff would in fact be transferred Waterfield worked up a hasty reorganisation in some 
of the managerial sections that was only completed the day before the transfer of the 
administration.  It was in any case rejected by them as an ‘utterly worthless 
proposal’.21    The provisional government decided that the best policy was to follow 
the line that it took over the departments as they found them and that the reductions 
would be allowed take effect.22  The postal workers, organised in three unions; the 
Irish Postal Union (IPU), the Irish Postal Workers’ Union (IPWU) and the Irish Post 
Office Engineers’ Union (IPOEU); threatened to go on a co-ordinated strike if the 
cuts were imposed.  A request by Walsh to the British Postmaster General to provide 
strike-breakers got a positive response.  The British government was anxious about 
the impact on their own civil service of any successful agitation in Ireland against cuts 
at a time when the two civil services were still closely linked.23  The British civil 
service unions were in fact following the course of this first confrontation between the 
new government and its civil service with great interest.24  But the Dáil and Collins 
repudiated this ‘scab’ tactic.25   
Collins was in fact very worried by the complications that labour troubles 
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would add to the developing Treaty split and wanted a settlement.  He asked James 
Douglas to chair a commission to consider wages, salaries, organisation of work and 
conditions generally in the post office.  Apart from Douglas as chairman the 
commission consisted of Grattan Esmonde TD and Henry Friel of the Department of 
Finance as the provisional government nominees with T.J. O’Connell of the Teachers 
Union and L.J. Duffy of the Distributive Workers Union as Labour party nominees.26  
The Department of Finance was hesitant about this, the first commission of inquiry 
within the early weeks of native government in Ireland, which in their view set an 
unhealthy precedent.  Gregg wanted to establish as a governing principle of civil 
service pay that no higher basic wage would be paid in the Free State than was paid 
by the British government to similar grades.  Walsh argued that that such a principle 
was wrong in itself as, firstly, wages should be determined solely by local conditions, 
and secondly, because it implied that not paying more also meant not paying less.27   
Douglas settled the threatened strike by securing a temporary rise in the basic 
salary, rather than a reduction in bonus, and promising to effect a reorganisation of the 
post office.  It was also agreed that the government would calculate an Irish cost of 
living figure rather than rely on the British figure.28  Part of the opposition to the cut 
had been that the cost of living in Ireland was higher than in Britain and that in justice 
the British figure could not be used to cut wages.  The Ministry of Economics Affairs 
of Dáil Éireann was given the task of calculating an Irish figure based on the cost of 
rent and basic foodstuffs.  The secretary to the committee was Michael Gallagher of 
the COA.29  Five thousand forms were sent to national schoolteachers in every school 
in the country asking for details of local rents and prices.  Three hundred and eight 
                                                
26 NAI, G1/1, provisional government minutes, 22 mar 1922; J. Anthony Gaughan (ed) Memoirs of 
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were returned, from one hundred and twelve towns.30   The dramatic gains that had 
been won by the threat of strike did not go unnoticed by other civil service 
associations.  When Walsh refused to meet the AEO branch in the PO accountant-
general’s office, they pointed out that staff had always been consulted on 
reorganisation and expressed the hope that his decision to meet the humble postmen, 
which contrasted with his refusal to meet the accountancy staff, was not because of 
their threat to strike.31  
 In September the next cost of living calculation, based on the new Irish 
figure, was due.  In Britain the figure was calculated at 85, that is the cost of living 
was 85 per cent above that of August 1914.  In Ireland, based on the local cost of 
living figure, it was 90.  This meant that the civil service faced a cut in salaries, 
though not as severe as in Great Britain.  The reduction amounted to 3/26ths, or 
between eleven and twelve per cent, on the bonus element of salary.  Departments 
were instructed to apply the reduction from 1 September.32  P.S. O’Hegarty was 
sanguine, predicting that the postal workers would contest the cuts but would use the 
Labour party in the Dáil to make complaints rather than take direct action.  The 
government offered to phase in the reductions, so long as the principle of reductions 
was accepted.  The postal unions shifted position by arguing that basic wages were 
too low to bear any cuts in the bonus and asked that the cuts be withdrawn and their 
claim for an increase in basic pay be submitted to arbitration.  Negotiations broke 
down and a strike was declared.33   
By now the civil war was entering its darkest phase in the weeks after the 
killing of Michael Collins.  Faced with a strike by the post office workers the 
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government responded as if the strike was inspired by ‘Irregulars’ rather than by 
discontent on pay.  The provisional government recruited pensioners and unemployed 
to act as strike breakers and issued a statement that ‘the government does not 
recognise the right of Civil Servants to strike.  In the event of a cessation of work by 
any section of the Postal Service picketing such as is permitted in connection with 
industrial disputes will not be allowed’.34  Few civil servants would have conceived of 
ever going on strike, but to be told that the right to strike was expressly denied them 
by their employer was a shock, especially since that same government had left the 
Whitley Councils in suspension, the only institutional forum for addressing 
grievances in the civil service.  Nor had it been forgotten that the same politicians had 
applauded strikes by civil servants in support of political prisoners in April 1920.   
In the Dáil the strikers, it was implied, were motivated by hostility to the 
government and sympathy for the irregulars and that they were out to subvert the 
government.  It was also alleged that a clique of Dublin postmen, who used 
intimidation to enforce their will, drove the strike.35  The army broke up the attempted 
pickets of the Crown Alley exchange by firing follies over their heads.  Pickets in 
Dundalk were arrested by military patrols.  Eventually the defeated postal workers 
returned to work, their return negotiated by Thomas Johnson of the ILPTUC.  They 
accepted the government’s offer to impose the cuts in phased reductions over three 
months, an offer that had been made before the strike but rejected.36  As Hogan, one 
of the strike leaders, told the IPU conference ‘the power of the government was 
derived from the circumstances of the time, and because of civil war.  The 
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government did not care at any time if the whole place fell down about them’.37  The 
other civil service organisations, which had accepted the cuts, remained aloof from 
the strike but the assertion that they had no right to strike made a deep impression and 
was often referred to as an example of the autocratic attitude of the government. 
The near hysterical atmosphere in the provisional government, which treated 
any opposition as treason, can be sensed in the memoirs of the then secretary to the 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs, P.S. O’Hegarty.38  O’Hegarty was in fact urging 
the government to break the unions completely by adopting an aggressively 
intransigent attitude.  O’Hegarty, it ought to be noted, was just as aggressive as any 
trade unionist in preventing a reduction in his own salary as secretary to the Post 
Office.39   It was only fear of a general strike, as the railway men began to threaten 
sympathetic action, which persuaded the government to resubmit the original offer.40   
The only member of the government who objected to Walsh’s handling of the strike 
was Joe McGrath, an IRB man and Director of Intelligence in the Army, but even he 
toed the line.  The application of the Irish cost of living figure did create an interesting 
and embarrassing anomaly for the British government.  There were still in the Irish 
administration civil servants on loan to the provisional government along with the 
staff of the British government services still in Ireland, in the Ministry of Pensions 
and the Haulbowline Dockyard staffs.  The civil servants on loan won the higher 
bonus that applied to the Irish service, but those in the British government services 
suffered the extra cuts imposed by the British government.41  
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 The postal workers’ September strike coincided with the first meeting of the 
Third Dáil, elected in June 1922.  This Dáil was also the constituent ‘provisional 
parliament’ provided for in the Irish Free State (Agreement) Act of March, elected to 
debate and pass the constitution of the Irish Free State and so allow the Irish Free 
State come into official existence on December 6, the anniversary of the Treaty.  The 
Dáil simply set the same date for the election of the third Dáil.42  The debate on the 
status of the transferred civil servants was brief and uncontroversial.43  All of the 
21,035 officials transferred had, under the Treaty, a right to compensation if they 
resigned as a consequence of the transfer of government or were dismissed.  In fact 
however the majority of this apparently vast bureaucracy was the now thoroughly 
humiliated postal staff.  The civil service proper of administrative, executive, clerical 
and professional grades was 6,403.44  Articles 77 and 78 of the constitution provided 
that  
‘every existing officer of the Provisional Government at the date of the coming 
into operation of this Constitution (not being an officer whose services have 
been lent by the British Government to the Provisional Government) shall on 
that date be transferred to and become an officer of the Irish Free State (Saorstát 
Éireann), and shall hold office by a tenure corresponding to his previous tenure.  
Every such existing officer who was transferred from the British Government by 
virtue of any transfer of services to the Provisional Government shall be entitled 
to the benefit of Article 10 of the Scheduled Treaty’. 
 
Article 10 of the Treaty stated that 'the government of the Irish Free State agrees to 
pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 
1920 to judges, officials, members of police forces and other public servants who are 
discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of government'.  The 
inclusion of this assurance in the Treaty, in effect a constitutional guarantee of their 
status, seemed to assure a fair deal in future negotiations and was initially of great 
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relief to the civil service.45   The 1920 Act, in the eighth schedule, set out in 
considerable detail the compensation and pension entitlements of civil servants 
dismissed, permitted to retire, or who chose to retire.  However the Treaty article 10 
differed in significant ways to the guarantees contained in the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920.  The IPCS immediately noted that though article 10 offered guarantees to 
those civil servants who were dismissed or chose to retire, it offered no guarantees in 
terms of status or conditions to those who chose to remain in the service of the Irish 
Free State.46     
It was also noted that under the 1920 Act the British government had the 
security of the Irish share of reserved taxes to ensure compensation was paid to any 
discharged or retired civil servant.  If necessary the British government could make 
the payment and recover it by deduction from the reserved funds.  Under the Treaty 
all payment would be made by the Irish Free State and if that government decided 
that, for whatever reason, the compensation was unreasonable or excessive and would 
not be paid, then there was nothing the British government could do about it.  The 
retired civil servant would go penniless.47   
Also, under the 1920 Act transferred “Irish officers” were only those civil 
servants working in the transferred government departments.  A great number of civil 
servants would have remained servants of the crown and part of the British service 
though serving in Ireland.  Under the Treaty all civil servants serving in Ireland were 
transferred, even those in the War Office who were busy evacuating the British 
military from Ireland!48  From the point of view of the staff of those departments 
reserved under the 1920 Act such as the Land Commission, Registry of Deeds or the 
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Post Office, the treaty offered them positive guarantees as to status and pension that 
they would forgo if they opted to serve in the north, where these departments 
remained reserved.49  Articles 77 and 78 of the Constitution seemed to address the 
fears of those civil servants who expected to continue in the service of the Free State 
by offering some guarantees of no worsening of conditions. 
In contrast to Cope, who continued to enjoy a close relationship with Collins, 
and Anderson, who was a member of the British cabinet committee on Ireland, 
Waterfield found himself increasingly marginalized during the administration of the 
provisional government.  It was only after Waterfield repeatedly pressed O’Brien for 
a decision that the provisional government decided to retain Treasury (Ireland) staff 
on loan for a further six months after the 1 April handover of responsibility.  
Waterfield was under some pressure from Whitehall to return, or at least to allow 
some of his principal officers to return.  For his part he was anxious that the 
provisional government and the civil service should both feel that he had not allowed 
either to be badly treated.  His main anxiety was the double role he had to play as a 
representative of the imperial government running the few remaining all-Ireland 
departments and defending the interests of the Whitehall Treasury, whilst also 
advising the provisional government on Treasury matters.  In fact however the 
provisional government never sought his advice and he was allowed a free hand to run 
down the British administration.   Acting as O’Brien’s subordinate Waterfield was 
primarily engaged in a “sunset” department, tidying up the withdrawal of British 
government from the Castle.50   
The LGB was the department that continued to cause Waterfield most 
difficulty.  Despite Waterfield pointing out that his department had done well on 
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reorganisation, Robinson continued to demand more higher-grade posts for his 
department right up to the 1 April.  For Waterfield the difficulty was that he was 
aware that though the provisional government had ambitious plans for local 
government, it had a department of its own.  The combined staff, in his view, was too 
big and therefore the LGB, the only one for which he was responsible, had to be 
reduced.51  Waterfield was acutely embarrassed to discover after the 1 April, when the 
departmental records were handed over, that Robinson had been using the soldiers 
and sailors housing scheme in Killester in north Dublin as a sort of works scheme for 
ex-servicemen with over-employment, high specification and slow completion.  The 
finance allocation was almost all spent but the scheme remained unfinished.  He had 
also run up enormous legal bills of over thirteen thousand pounds in two years with a 
single senior counsel, presumably a friend of his, in pursuit of mandamus claims by 
staff against local authorities.52 
Waterfield was also deeply involved in arranging for the transfer of staff 
between Ireland and Britain.53  The scheme that was agreed with Gregg and Cosgrave 
provided for a head for head transfer between the British and the Irish administrations 
of officers at the same class and grade, with the agreement of the heads of the 
departments concerned.54  Each government agreed to accept full liability for the 
pensions of the officers that they received.   What this meant was that transfers could 
in reality only occur where there were officers closely matched in terms of years of 
service, class and grade, and were thus actually very few.55  Some heads of 
departments were not satisfied that the officer being transferred to Dublin was of the 
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same calibre as the officer transferred to London and as a result refused permission.  
A further inhibition on transfers was the requirement that the officer transferring into 
Ireland sign an undertaking that he was not covered by article 10 of the Treaty.  When 
the scheme was finally wound up in July 1931 two hundred and seventy one civil 
servants had transferred into the Free State and eighty-eight had transferred out.  Of 
those transferred only one hundred and thirty-nine were on a head for head basis.56 
One task that Waterfield was happy to hand over the provisional government was that 
of meeting delegations of the staff associations anxious as to their position.  
Waterfield refused to meet Michael Smithwick of the AEO, redirecting him to 
O’Brien.57  
The main task that occupied Waterfield in the last days of Castle rule was the 
establishment of a committee to deal with those civil servants who would be 
discharged, or who would resign, as a consequence of the change of government.58  
The Civil Service Committee set up by the 1920 Act, which was seen by the 
provisional government and the civil service alike as a partition committee, had of 
course stopped functioning by order of the provisional government.  But, under the 
1920 Act, this committee also had the task of determining the status and the 
compensation of discharged and retiring civil servants.  The provisional government 
was not going to operate any committee established by the 1920 Act, which it 
regarded as superseded by the Treaty.  In the absence of the committee established by 
the legislation it was clear that some equally acceptable forum had to be established to 
deal with the task of retirements and compensation.   
The Order-in-Council of 1 April was framed to bridge the constitutional gap 
between the 1920 Act and the Treaty. Section 7 of that Order dealt with the civil 
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service.  Section 7 (i) provided that  
All officers who are on the day of transfer engaged or employed in 
the discharge of functions transferred to and become officers of the 
Provisional Government; provided that (a) where any such officer, being 
officers employed on services which in Northern Ireland are within the 
jurisdiction of the Government of Northern Ireland, or it is agreed between 
the Provisional Government and the Government of Northern Ireland that 
they shall be so allocated, or if any such officers have signified their wish 
to be transferred to the government of Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Northern Ireland consents to such transfer they shall not be 
transferred to or become the officers of the Provisional Government, (b) 
where any such officers are officers employed on services which in 
Northern Ireland are not within the jurisdiction of the government of 
Northern Ireland, or are officers who, though engaged in such services, 
form an integral part of a staff not solely engaged on Irish services, the 
existing departments under which they are employed shall prepare a 
scheme for determining which of the members of their staff are to be 
transferred to the Provisional Government, and such scheme, when 
approved by the British government and the Provisional Government shall 
determine which of those officers are to be treated as transferred to the 
Provisional Government under this article.   
Section 7 (ii) provided that  
Where an officer is transferred to the provisional government under 
this order, he shall hold office by a tenure corresponding to his previous 
tenure and if he is discharged by the provisional government, or if he 
retires in consequence of the change of government, he shall be entitled to 
receive compensation from the provisional government on terms no less 
favourable than provided by the 1920 Act.59   
 
The order-in-council deliberately omitted any reference to a civil service committee, 
thus putting the onus on the provisional government to either use the 1920 committee 
or to set up by its own authority a committee to fulfil the same functions.60  The 
original committee had the widest discretion to determine the question of status and 
the terms of compensation free of either Treasury or political influence.  Now, with 
that committee defunct, if any officer protested that the terms of compensation offered 
by the provisional government were less favourable than those offered in the 1920 
Act it would be impossible to determine what the committee might have decided.  As 
we shall see when in dealing with the Wigg-Cochrane case, Waterfield was far-
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sighted in his prediction that this question had endless possibilities for disputation 
between the awarding body and the staff.  Waterfield had also been anxious since the 
publication of the terms of the Treaty about the phrase ‘in consequence of the change 
of government’.  This phrase was not in the 1920 act and again was one that invited 
litigation.61   
Waterfield decided to press ahead with the original committee which, 
accepting that the provisional government would not attend, was necessarily only 
concerned with the Northern Ireland civil service.  The last meeting of the committee 
was held in London on 16 May 1922.  MacMahon refused to attend and sent a note 
questioning the legality of the meeting.62  Sam Sloan, who had transferred to Belfast 
was regarded as the staff representative of the committee.  The Irish civil service 
associations immediately revoked his appointment but Sloan had already decided to 
be unavoidably detained and arrived late to the meetings.  With a quorum sufficient to 
do its business the committee was able to wrap up the allocation of the staff to 
Northern Ireland and tidy up that part of its remit.63   
The only departments that continued to present difficulty were the reserved 
departments of the ILC and the Registry of Deeds where the staff, many of them 
highly skilled, refused to be transferred north, even those that had been working in the 
Ulster counties.  Though this may have been distaste at working under the Unionist 
government it was also prompted by the fact that in the Free State they had rights 
under article 10, rights which disappeared if they transferred north where the ILC 
remained a reserved service.  As none were ‘rabid Ulstermen’ Waterfield could only 
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suggest that the Belfast government bribe them with promises of promotion.64    
Once the question of the allocation of staff to the north had been dealt with, 
the provisional government committee working on the financial aspects of the Treaty 
put in a claim for compensation for the amount of pension liability in excess of that 
which would have fallen on the Free State if there had been ‘a complete and equitable 
allocation of all-Ireland staff based on the separation of work as contemplated by the 
Government of Ireland Act’.65  Though Waterfield took the view that that was entirely 
the fault of the provisional government that had torpedoed the transfers north it was 
recognised that the Dublin government had incurred a much heavier liability for 
pensions than had Belfast, where most staff were newly recruited.66  The Irish and 
British sides were agreed that though the civil servants ‘should not be left in the lurch’ 
the provisional government should not be trapped by article 10 for more than a just 
portion of the civil service.67    
By November Waterfield was winding up centuries of Dublin Castle rule.  A 
departmental circular and newspaper advertisement advised that ‘the office of 
Treasury Remembrancer and Treasury Assistant Secretary in Ireland will be closed 
and the post abolished in consequence of the change of government, as from 1st 
November next’.  The notices in the newspapers, at advertisement rates, were to 
prevent anybody ‘making malicious political capital’ from the notice.68  Waterfield’s 
last official act was to agree compensation for the destruction of O’Neill’s Irish House 
in Tipperary by crown forces.69  The last word may be left to an anonymous colleague 
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of Waterfield who contributed a piece on his experiences as a “Temporary Irishman” 
to Red Tape. Despite the lurid accounts of irregular activity in the English newspapers 
the last months in Dublin were, he wrote, characterised by a ‘delightful lack of 
formality and stiffness’ along with ‘a staggering degree of responsibility’ though 
unfortunately without any extra pay for assuming it.  The months spent working for 
the provisional government were ones he would ‘always remember with fond 
nostalgia’.70  One group that could not conceal their delight at the winding up of 
Treasury (Ireland) was the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons.  
Again and again they ask Sturgis and Waterfield to confirm that department after 
department had been transferred to the Free State and that the demands of the Irish 
government on the exchequer were indeed at an end.71       
Coinciding with the establishment of the Irish Free State the civil service was 
experiencing a fresh growth in organisation.  In March 1922 delegates of the Irish 
branches of the Customs and Excise Federation, which included Derry and Belfast, 
met to form an Irish association; the Customs and Excise Association (CEA).72  The 
government repression of the September strike in the Post Office helped to create the 
powerful Post Office Workers’ Union (POWU), through the amalgamation of the 
smaller postal workers unions in June 1923.73   
The IPCS revised and amended its constitution, deleting all references to 
“H.M.’s Civil Service” but retaining the name of the institution as “ The Institution of 
Professional and Technical Civil Servants (Ireland)”, implying either a hope for 
retaining an all-Ireland organisation or a refusal to accept the title “Saorstát” for the 
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state.74 However, recognising the fact of national partition, the IPCS admitted that, of 
necessity, it had to be primarily occupied with defending the interests of the 
professional civil servants in the Irish Free State as in reality there was little or 
nothing that it could do for those professional and technical civil servants transferred 
to Northern Ireland.75  The IPCS council also urged professional civil servants to re-
organise in response to the emergence of the Free State.  Thus the Inspectors in the 
Department of Education were encouraged to amalgamate the senior, divisional and 
junior inspectorate associations into a new Association of Inspectors.  The established 
and un-established officers of the former DATI were also encouraged to amalgamate 
into a new Association of Professional and Technical Officers of the Department of 
Lands and Agriculture.  Prison Governors were admitted as professional civil 
servants.76   
In February 1923 a conference of Irish civil service organisations formally 
recognised the Irish Civil Service Federation (CSF), which had been formed early in 
1922, to act as a single voice in negotiation with the government.  The Federation was 
an alliance of various staff federations that grew out of the ad hoc “Executive 
Committee of the Conference of All Associations of Irish Civil Servants” that had met 
with Collins.  Thus the Federation in its structures sought to act as an umbrella 
organisation for the many autonomous and diverse civil service organisations.77  The 
IPCS joined the initial steering committee of the CSF and though IPCS delegates 
contributed to the discussions, it remained deeply split on whether it should actually 
join the Federation, finally deciding by the narrowest majority to remain outside.  The 
CSF was therefore dominated by the ordinary clerical and executive civil servants, 
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most of them nationalist and many of them Gaelic League members.  To the still 
instinctively unionist IPCS members the defiantly nationalist Federation was probably 
distasteful company.  More fundamentally, the IPCS was always conscious that it 
represented an outlook very different to the mass of the civil service.  For most of the 
clerical and executive grades their work involved the application of known and 
established procedures in a familiar hierarchy of responsibility.  For professional and 
technical civil servants work involved the application of specialist knowledge in 
unfamiliar and novel situations in which responsibility was assumed rather than 
conferred.  Despite their title professional civil servants were probably the only civil 
servants who had not planned on being civil servants.78   The POWU, smarting after 
the defeat inflicted by the government on pay reduction, also remained outside the 
Federation.  The CEA was initially enthusiastic on joining the Federation, but the 
heavy financial commitment that entailed and the refusal of the CSF to offer a lower 
affiliation fee led to the decision to withdraw.79  At its height the CSF organised 
sixteen associations representing just over one thousand five hundred civil servants.80  
This poor level of saturation in a potential membership of approximately six thousand 
requires explanation.  The civil service associations’ poor level of support reflects in 
part the loss of leadership due to retirements and promotions, the disruption of the 
government departments, which were the organisational base, the concentration on the 
rights of retiring officials, but especially the failure to achieve a replacement for the 
Whitley Councils.    
The pre-war leadership of the Irish civil service associations continued into the 
time of the provisional government but was then reduced by retirements and by 
promotions.  Michael Smithwick continued to act as secretary to the AEO until he 
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was promoted and transferred to act as secretary to the Dáil Éireann Courts (winding 
up) Commission, from which he was transferred to the Revenue Commissioners.  
Thomas A. Murphy was promoted first as secretary to the Douglas Commission on 
the postal service, then to the secretaryship of the Civil Service Commission (despite 
the protests of Gregg at favour being shown to a ‘prominent trade unionist’).81  
W.F.Nally became a principal officer in the Department of Finance.  Mortished 
served on the constitution committee and then took article 10 retirement and began a 
successful career in labour organisation outside of the civil service.82  Sam Sloan went 
to Belfast and Michael Gallagher was promoted to the executive grade.83  The only 
pre-independence leader of the associations not to enjoy success was Conn Murphy.  
However the associations had sufficiently deep roots to generate a new cadre of 
leadership with relatively little difficulty.  The experiences of the world war and 
independence struggle also encouraged a more aggressive and less deferential style of 
leadership.  This was in fact a general European phenomenon as white-collar trade 
unions and professional associations of the middle classes gave the lead in post-war 
industrial unrest.    
The British civil service organisations were very helpful to the Irish civil 
service and played a vital role in setting them on secure foundations.  The 
Confederation, which was the umbrella organisation for most civil service 
associations, reckoned that it had lost about eighteen thousand members as a result of 
the establishment of the Irish Free State.  This was a significant loss in a total 
membership of 63,994.84  Coming as it did in the same year that saw a hostile press 
campaign, the Geddes cuts, cuts in civil service pensions, deferment of re-
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organisation and abolition of the Civil Service Arbitration Board, the practical and 
financial help given was a remarkable gesture of solidarity by the British civil 
servants.85  Michael Gallagher was in London three days after the Castle was taken 
over by the provisional government.  When he asked the executive committee of the 
COA for assistance in setting up a separate association for the Irish Free State he was 
given an immediate grant of fifty pounds.86  The expressions of regret at the loss of 
the vigorous Irish membership were genuine and heartfelt.  The general secretary of 
the AEO happened to be in Dublin the day after the Treaty and was in place for a 
series of discussions on the future direction of the organisation in Ireland.  The ad hoc 
committee headed by Murphy and Gallagher was introduced to the organisations that 
remained outside of it and general meetings of the civil service in Dublin were 
organised.  When the Irish AEO disaffiliated from the British organisation it was 
agreed to keep it supplied with copies of executive minutes and of the British Whitley 
Council meetings.87  When the Dublin branch of the POEU set up an independent 
Irish union in March 1922, the British organisation agreed in conference to give £319 
as a proportional allocation of its cash assets to the new IPOEU ‘as a gesture of true 
brotherhood’ and agreed that if the Northern Ireland members should succeed in 
establishing an independent union it would receive a like donation.88  The Irish CEA 
received an immediate grant of fifty pounds to assist in setting up, followed by a 
further £160, as representing the Irish share of the cash assets of the British 
Federation.89 
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 Apart from dealing with the postal workers’ strike the government was 
more concerned initially with regularising the few civil servants that had been carried 
over from the Dáil administration than with the civil service inherited from the Castle 
administration.  In July 1923, in the last days of the third Dáil, a superannuation and 
pensions bill to grant them civil service pensions was enacted.90  The government also 
responded to pressure to reinstate those civil servants that had been dismissed by the 
British government because of nationalist sympathies or activities in the period from 
the 1916 Rising to the Truce.  These civil servants were well organised in the 
Association of Victimised Civil Servants in Ireland and vocal in their demand for 
reinstatement and compensation for lost income.91  Following a cabinet decision that 
these men and women were entitled to re-employment, if the dismissal was indeed for 
nationalist activities, a committee of senior civil servants chaired by P.S. O’Hegarty 
reinstated about two hundred of the four hundred original claimants.  Pension 
entitlements were restored as if there had been no break in service but without 
compensation for loss of earnings.92  The actual number of reinstated civil servants is 
an elusive figure due to the rapid political changes.  For instance, Seán O Ceallacháin 
was dismissed after participating in the 1916 Rising.  He was reinstated in 1922, but 
was then dismissed again in 1923 for anti-Treaty activity.  He was then once again 
reinstated in 1928, but on a lower clerical officer scale as a form of discipline.  With 
the return of the Fianna Fáil government in 1932 he was promoted to the grade that he 
would ordinarily have reached after his years of service.93  The Cumann na nGaedheal 
government reinstated one hundred and twenty nine civil servants who had lost their 
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post due to disloyalty to the British regime.94 A further issue relating to the civil 
service that came up at most, if not all, cabinet meetings was that of identifying 
sympathisers of the republican irregulars and dismissing them if already appointed or 
excluding them from civil service examinations.   
In order to deal with its obligations under article 10 of the Treaty the 
provisional government established its own advisory committee on compensation for 
discharged and retired civil servants.  Collins asked Justice Wylie to act as chairman 
of the committee, emphasising that it would be advisory only and also that its work 
would not include the allocation of staff north and south.95  Chaired by Wylie, the 
committee had an official side of two senior officers nominated by the Department of 
Finance and a staff side of two representatives drawn from the Civil Service 
Federation.  Gregg and Hugh Kennedy proposed alternative terms of reference for the 
advisory committee, with Gregg laying down a more restricted brief.  Despite the 
reputed dominance of the finance department it was Kennedy’s terms which were 
adopted; ‘to enquire into and advise as to the compensation and all matters 
consequent thereon which should be paid under Article 10 of the Treaty to any civil 
servant or other public servant or officer of the Irish government who may be 
discharged or may retire in consequence of the change in government’.  Wylie was 
told that, though his committee was purely advisory, the government could offer a 
commitment that his advice would be accepted and followed in every case, so long as 
the compensation was not more generous than would have granted under the 1920 
Act.96   
Gregg and Gordon Campbell were both so worried at the government’s failure 
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to restrict the Wylie committee’s latitude in rewarding compensation that they asked 
for specific instruction a week before the public announcement of the committee’s 
establishment.  Under the 1920 act any civil servant could opt to retire and be granted 
seven extra years on his pensionable service.  The only restriction on such a civil 
servant was that he could not exercise his right to retire for a period of six months.  
The heads of departments at their meeting on the committee had expressed the view 
that the government should not allow civil servants to retire on enhanced pensions if it 
could be avoided as the future liability was unknowable and the departments were in 
danger of losing a cohort of experienced officers. They argued that the words in 
article 10 “in consequence of the change of government” imposed a new condition 
that was not in the 1920 Act and that an applicant for retirement should be made 
explain what exactly there was in the change of government that justified him asking 
to go out on pension.  The memorandum concluded that it ought to be made 
mandatory on the Wylie committee to actually establish, rather than simply accept, 
that the retirement ‘is in consequence of the change of government’.  But as this 
raised the question of an interpretation of an article of the Treaty the senior civil 
servants wanted a direction from the politicians.97   
The executive council was unwilling to grasp this particular nettle.  Cosgrave 
circulated the memorandum amongst the executive council, but only Walsh actually 
penned a response.  It may have been that the ministers felt that Gregg and Campbell 
were exaggerating the danger, or that it was inspired by pique after rejection of 
Gregg’s advice by the executive council.  It was also the case that the executive 
council was fighting for its survival in the depths of civil war and after the death of 
Collins and Griffith.  Walsh, predictably, supported the memorandum and urged that 
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the Wylie committee should be instructed to make it as difficult as possible for civil 
servants to resign.98  When Gregg brought this issue to the initial meeting of the 
Wylie committee the staff side strongly maintained that the Treaty carried forward 
unaltered the rights they had won in the 1920 act and they would not allow any 
questioning of motives nor the implication that an applicant entertained ‘traditional 
prejudice against a native government’ which had to be then proved.99  Wylie used his 
casting vote to engineer a compromise; he agreed that the phrase ‘in consequence of 
the change of government’ implied a new condition.  He therefore proposed that the 
form of application for retirement would require that the applicant would be asked 
‘On what basis is compensation claimed?’ and ‘If retirement, state is retirement in 
consequence of the change of Government?’  What Wylie would not do was grill each 
individual applicant as if he were the defendant in a court of law.  Gregg and 
Campbell asked that Cosgrave himself should meet with the heads of department and 
impress upon them the government’s view as to the importance of the key phrase, 
instructing them to brief, in utter confidence, the official side to the Wylie committee 
on ‘the merits of the individual applicants by reference to the new condition’. 100  
What exactly Gregg meant by individual merits is not clarified in the written 
memorandum.  Based on Walsh’s response and the original memorandum what seems 
to have been envisaged was that if the applicant was someone the department was 
happy to be rid of, then the application would not be contested.  If it was an 
experienced officer that the department wanted to retain then, unless he was a rabid 
unionist, Protestant, and had always expressed extreme loyalist views, it would be 
contested.  It was therefore up to the heads of the departments to supply the material 
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for the official side on the committee to make a case that the application was not ‘in 
consequence of the change of government’ but due to some other cause, such as a 
desire to retire before the age of sixty-five with seven years of unearned increments 
and bonus added.  Gregg and Campbell and the departmental heads were aware that 
the treatment of the postal workers and the hostility toward the civil service that the 
dispute had revealed had created a great deal of resentment within the service.  There 
were already signs that civil servants were intent on a mass exodus on the generous 
terms available under Article 10, rather than suffer what were clearly going to be a 
hardening of conditions under the new government.  The operation of the Civil 
Service Committee (Compensation) was announced to the service by a ministry of 
finance circular and began operation on 12 October.101  Smyth, Fitzgibbon and 
Smithwick of the CSF represented the staff side.102 
The civil service associations had their own concerns about the Wylie 
committee.  Firstly, it would only deal with those civil servants who were leaving the 
service and thus would have nothing to say on those who remained and secondly, it 
assumed that the recently created Civil Service Federation represented all civil 
servants even though the IPCS and the POWU remained outside the Federation.  It 
was also of concern that the committee would be advising the minister of Finance on 
compensation rather than making a firm determination.  A minister is always free to 
reject advice.  
In June 1922 the IPCS council summarised their concerns in a formal 
‘Statement Relative to the Effect of the Treaty on the Position of Professional and 
Technical Civil Servants In Ireland’, which was printed and forwarded to the 
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provisional government.103  Unfortunately for the Institution this coincided precisely 
with the attack on the Four Courts and the beginning of the Civil War.  Nor would it 
have helped that the ‘Statement’ consistently refers to the state as “Southern Ireland”.  
Not surprisingly therefore the government was tardy in its response.  The Statement 
described the civil service as ‘beset by doubts and perplexities’, some of which were 
shared by all in the service and some of which were peculiar to the professional and 
technical grades.  First and foremost was the status of those civil servants who 
remained.  Of necessity professionals entered the civil service later in life than the 
ordinary civil servant, having spent years acquiring qualifications.  Under the British 
service the Superannuation Act of 1859 acknowledged this and conceded added years 
for qualifications.  The IPCS wanted the new government to re-enact those benefits.  
On these anxieties the Department of Finance could offer an explicit assurance that all 
civil servants carried with them into the new government all their existing rights in 
regard to superannuation, salary scales and conditions of service.  On the other 
problems, the number of un-established men who had been employed for many years 
in a temporary capacity and the unfinished re-grading in some of the professional 
posts, the Department of Finance could only offer the Wylie committee, which was 
then being established.  As the Wylie committee was only dealing with those civil 
servants who opted to retire, or were dismissed, the Department of Finance was in 
effect saying that those civil servants of uncertain status who opted to stay in the 
service of the Irish Free State would have to take their chances.  However, the 
department did promise that though the Civil Service Federation would ordinarily 
represent the staff, whenever the committee would be dealing with a special class then 
one of the representatives of the Federation would stand down and be replaced by a 
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representative of that class.  Under this arrangement the IPCS would have a 
representative on the committee when it came to deal with any of its members.104 
 As is so often the case promise and performance were far apart.  In an 
interview with Ernest Blythe the IPCS council discovered that they would only be 
invited to attend the committee hearings if the chairman Wylie thought it fit.  He, in 
turn would only agree if the other members of the committee agreed.  In an intensely 
argumentative meeting with Wylie the IPCS council were dissuaded from pressing 
their entirely legitimate claims to representation.  Wylie’s advice, which actually 
proved the wiser course, was that it would be more useful to the staff side to trust the 
accumulated experience and continuity of representation of the CSF in the complex 
negotiations that the committee demanded.105  
Under the terms of the 1920 Act there were three categories of applicant to the 
committee; those discharged by the government, those seeking permission to retire 
and those opting to retire under the statutory conditions provided by Act.  The precise 
details of qualification and compensation were laid out in the eighth schedule to the 
Act.  The initial intent of the government was to use the Wylie committee to purge the 
administration of the more obnoxious of the Castle civil servants.  There were some 
departments that the government simply cleared out.  The Marlborough Street 
Teacher Training College was closed down and the entire staff of fifty-three 
discharged, from professors to charwomen.106  The Catholic and Church of Ireland 
authorities had rejected Marlborough Street, as a non-denominational training college, 
and most of its graduates were from, and were employed in, the area of Northern 
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Ireland.107  The departments where the number of discharges was highest were the 
legal and judicial departments and the LGB. All thirty-six Resident Magistrates were 
also discharged, as were the Petty Session Clerks and staff of the Supreme Court.  In 
the LGB thirty of the senior staff were discharged, including Barlas who had led the 
negotiations that had won the eighth schedule.  In other departments the government’s 
intent was to simply get rid of the more awkward senior staff; two in the CDB, three 
in the DATI, and none at all in many other departments.108  MacMahon, who had 
smoothed the waters for the transfer of authority, was given two weeks to clear out of 
the under secretary’s lodge in the Phoenix Park.109   
But the government did intend that the Wylie committee would be simply a 
prelude to a thorough re-organisation of the civil service.  The bloodless purge of the 
civil service was preparation for the installation of the Free State and the beginning of 
the new administration.  Professor Henry Kennedy was asked to study recruitment in 
the civil service generally and to suggest a system of recruitment for the Irish public 
services.  He studied the British, American and Commonwealth systems.  He 
suggested a simplified organisation for a single local and central civil service and that 
recruitment and control of the civil service should lie with a single Public Service 
Commission.  This was very much in the Sinn Féin tradition.  This reasonable 
suggestion was rubbished by salvoes from Gregg, Bewley, Brennan, Flynn and 
Gilbert of finance who dismissed the report as uninformed, mistaken and even 
unconstitutional in its suggestions.  The best system in the world, as they suggested 
and as J.J. Walsh agreed, was the British system where the Department of Finance 
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reigned supreme on establishment matters. That this was a recent doctrine in 
Whitehall and one that was still contested was not admitted.  Kennedy’s report, holed 
below the waterline, sank without trace.110   
As a purge of the senior ranks the Wylie committee was clean and effective 
and the civil service of the new state was comparatively free of the ‘silverbacks’ of 
the old administration, especially in the legal and local government departments.  The 
Free State began with new men in new positions in most departments.  But the quiet 
revolution in administration that was effected by the Wylie committee was not as 
contained and clean as the government had intended.  What the government was not 
prepared for, though Gregg and Gordon Campbell had warned them, was the flood of 
applications for statutory retirements from all ranks which soon overwhelmed the 
comparatively few cases of discharged officials.  In the DATI there were twenty-three 
retirements, as compared with only three discharges.  In the National Education 
Office, where there were no discharges, there were thirteen retirements.  In the OPW, 
where again there were no discharges, there were fifteen retirements.  In the vital 
revenue department there was only one discharge, but twenty-one retirements.  The 
DMP had only two dismissals but had five hundred and seventy-eight resignations 
and the policing of Dublin seemed close to collapse.  For many of the DMP it was not 
only the attraction of a pension but also a real distaste at serving under men 
responsible for the death of comrades.    The postal services suffered six hundred and 
fifty four retirements but only two dismissals.  It was the revenge of the postal 
workers on the government that smashed the strike.111  Blythe was later to express 
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regret that the government had not dismissed the postal workers, or allowed them to 
stay out on strike and so dismiss themselves.112   
In every department the number of voluntarily retired civil servants far 
exceeded the number of discharged, running at the ratio of five to one.113  What had 
been intended to be a relatively swift and surgical purge was in danger of turning into 
an administrative rout.  Wylie refused to summon applicants for cross-examination, as 
Gregg wanted, instead the committee simply agreed the correct calculation of benefits 
and recorded a decision with the applicant never actually having to attend, leaving it 
to the associations on the staff side to guard their interests.  The civil service soon 
came to regard the eighth schedule of the 1920 Act, along with Article 10 of the 
Treaty, as their Magna Carta and even to sing the praises of their predecessors, men 
such as Barlas and Leech of the LGB, who had won it for them.114     
 The loss of civil servants due to article 10 retirements and discharges, 
especially from the upper ranks, opened up the civil service to vistas of opportunity 
and promotion that it had never seen before.  There had been no examination for the 
executive and administrative classes since before the World War so there was no 
cohort of candidates ready to fill the gaps.  In April 1922 the provisional government 
invited heads of departments to make recommendations, and higher clerical and 
executive officers to offer themselves, for consideration by a promotional pool to fill 
the rapidly widening gaps in the departments.  The board, made up of senior civil 
servants (rather than politicians as was happening in Northern Ireland at the same 
time) P.S. O’Hegarty, Pierce Kent and H.J. Smith, chose to interview all applicants 
rather than just those recommended by the departmental heads.  Fifty-nine higher 
grade officers were interviewed.  Seven were identified as exceptional including 
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Arthur Codling and E.P. McCarron.  Fifteen were classed as very good and to be 
promoted, this group included some of those who rose to senior rank in the 
Department of Finance, which seemed to have first pick; such as J.T. Lennon, J.L. 
Lynd and T.S.C. Dagg.  A further thirteen were classed as good and to be promoted as 
soon as the class above was exhausted.  In the meantime they could be redeployed in 
more useful posts.  Twenty-two were classed as adequately placed in the grade and 
department in which they were employed.   
The Board also interviewed one hundred and fifty clerical officers and 
classified thirty-one as ‘fit for promotion’; thirty-two as ‘very promising’; thirteen as 
‘promising’; twenty-four as ‘good’ and fifty as ‘to remain at present grade’.  Included 
in those recommended for promotion were many of the leaders in the civil service 
associations such as Gallagher, Mortished (though in fact he took an article 10 
retirement), Smithwick and Mulvin.  The interviews, necessarily short, valued 
evidence of initiative and energy.  Knowledge of Irish was noted, but does not seem 
to have been as important as knowledge of book-keeping and accountancy.115  A brief 
survey of the key Department of Finance in 1925, just three years after the surrender, 
illustrates the point; G.P. Fagan, 31 years of age, with 11 years of service, and J.L. 
Lynd, 41 years of age, with 16 years of service, had both progressed in three years 
from clerk class 1 to assistant principal; J.E. Hanna, 36 years of age, with 17 years of 
service, progressed in three years from junior executive to assistant principal; T.S.C. 
Dagg, 49 years of age, with 28 years of service, had progressed in three years from 
staff clerk to assistant principal; M.J. Beary, 33 years of age, after 14 years of service, 
progressed in three years from higher executive to assistant principal.  E. O’Neill, 48 
years of age, with 28 years of service, progressed from first class clerk to junior 
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administrative officer.  John Leydon, 30 years of age, after 10 years of service, 
transferred from London and progressed from higher executive to assistant principal 
and then later went on to become departmental secretary.116  
 The civil service associations, doubtful of the idea of a board that decided 
promotions, were hesitant in their reactions.  The CSF, recognising that a pool board 
was an improvement on former nepotistic practices, was prepared to allow it time and 
await judgement.117  The CEA was disappointed that their members were excluded 
from applying for the board, but were assured by O’Brien that this was simply 
because the new customs service would need all the men available and would, in any, 
case offer greater opportunities for the customs service.118  In fact the customs service 
was one of the first departments to be staffed by examination entry in the Free State, 
though most of the posts were reserved to pre-truce, ex-national army candidates.  
Mulcahy was particularly anxious that ‘our men would realise just now that we are 
paying attention to the matter of providing openings for them’.119  The CEA recruited 
these new officers to the association even though there was some unease as to their 
special entry status.120  Of all the associations the AEO was the one most uneasy at 
the pool board and also the one most open to a completely new civil service 
organisation based on the old Sinn Féin ideal of a single national service with a single 
grade and a simplified class structure to reflect ability and responsibility.  The “one-
grade” service remained an ideal but as promotions were used to fill the gaps in the 
existing structure it was an ideal that looked less and less realisable.121   
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The Cumann na nGaedheal government missed an opportunity to create new 
structures for the civil service of an independent Irish state.  None of the civil service 
associations were enamoured of the Waterfield reorganisation, which was largely a 
paper reorganisation in any case, and all were prepared to negotiate something new.  
The only condition that they expressed was that change should be agreed and that the 
civil service would be assured that they would suffer no worsening of conditions.  
Apart from that, anything was possible.  The clerical and executive grades would 
have agreed to a much more streamlined and flattened civil service, the so-called 
“one-grade” service.  The professional civil servants were hopeful that the more 
senior administrative posts would be opened to their grade.  Because of its quasi-
colonial status Ireland had no administrative class to speak of.  The leadership of the 
associations were nationalist to some degree, and some to a greater degree than 
others.  They would have made great efforts to carry the membership with them in 
changes, even revolutionary changes.  But the government, challenged by the 
republicans as to its legitimacy, responded with an aggressive display of 
effectiveness.  The postal workers and the civil service generally were unfortunate in 
that they provided the opportunity for the government to show that it was in charge.  
The government deliberately used the postal strike in September was to rally public 
opinion behind a government that was showing a determination to prevail over all 
opposition.122     
Under the Cumann na nGaedheal government the state was to be used to 
stabilise Irish society in the direction already established by the British.  The failure 
to remember that it was a revolution that brought the party to power meant also a 
failure to recognise the potential of the state to redirect Irish society.  The Treaty that 
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was meant to be a beginning, a stepping-stone, became an end.  This failure was not 
without resistance within the party, where it was identified with the remnants of the 
old regime in the Department of Finance.123  However, the positive aspect of this 
failure was that the state escaped the fate of many de-colonising regimes where the 
bureaucracy becomes an instrument of the ruling party.124  Hardly any of the 
revolutionaries inserted themselves into the civil service.  It is very striking that the 
revolutionaries that remained in politics almost all chose the path of engagement in 
the uncertain world of electoral politics.  Only two, P.S. O’Hegarty and Diarmaid 
O’Hegarty, chose what must have been the tempting option of a permanent career in 
the emerging bureaucracy.  In 1925 the civil service, including postal workers, stood 
at 20,262.  Of these 125 were former Dáil officials, 166 reinstated former officers, 
and 1,803 were new entrants.  Of the new entrants 1,563 had entered by limited or 
open competition and 240 by special certificate.  Despite the discharges and 
resignations the vast majority of the civil service of the new state were officers 
transferred from the previous regime.125  The creation of a relatively incorruptible and 
professional civil service must rank as a major achievement of the Free State.  
Despite the lingering doubts of the civil service associations about other matters, the 
independent state was well on the way to finally achieving what had been the rhetoric 
of civil service reform for over sixty years; meritocratic entry, promotion by ability 
and an apolitical culture of service to the state.126     
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However the expectation of the Cumann na nGaedheal government that the 
civil service could be kept at a distance from the changes in the state were not only 
unrealistic but also counter-productive.  The civil service was ready to embrace 
revolutionary changes with only the barest safeguards.  Nationalists uncritically 
accepted the denigration of the pre-independence civil service, not reflecting that, 
amongst many achievements, it had successfully transferred the land to the tenants, 
democratised local government, set up a local health service through the dispensary 
system, transformed the western areas of greatest poverty and oversaw the 
construction of one of the densest railway networks of Europe.  The success of the 
autonomous boards, operating locally and financed centrally, despite the problems of 
nepotism and cronyism in recruitment and promotion, was forgotten.  The 
opportunity passed and instead of building up a civil service suited to the needs of an 
independent Irish state; less hierarchical, decentralised, an agent of economic change, 
focused on development rather than administration; the government allowed a 
Whitehall to emerge with all the faults of the original but of Lilliputian dimensions.  
The “Skyresh Bolgolam” of this Lilliput was H.P. Boland, head of the establishment 
division in the Department of Finance, transferred from Whitehall in September 1924.  
Boland came from the same mould as Waterfield.  Within the Whitehall tradition 
senior civil servants’ status was measured by their closeness to the minister.  In his 
meetings with the civil service representatives, and in his advice to his minister, 
Boland treated the idea of personal meetings between them as a personal affront.  
Neither did he bother to conceal his contempt for the lower grades of the civil 
service.127 Some years later, during the currency commission hearings, Boland in one 
of his many personal letters to Brennan wrote of another reason why finance control 
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of the civil service was so important.  Boland warned Brennan that this reason was 
one that could not be quoted as it might ‘do us more harm than good’.  He wrote, ‘the 
position that our department occupies in the mind of the service generally and the 
respect they show for our minister’s authority must obviously be very largely affected 
by the feeling that ours is the minister and the department who in so large a sense can 
control and determine the fortunes of individual civil servants.  I need not enlarge on 
this point’.128  For Boland, and for Brennan, finance dominance was more a matter of 
power and prestige than one of efficiency.  That is why Boland insisted that civil 
service organisations could not have non-service general secretaries to represent them 
on the representative council; ‘such outsiders would be at liberty in the council to 
express opinions and adopt an attitude not open to a civil servant’.129    
The constitution guaranteed the right to join unions and organise.  The POWU 
and the CSCU were affiliated to the ITUC and to the Labour party.  But the 
combination of the 1925 Treasonable Offences Act, the 1927 Trade Union Act and 
the Treasury circular ‘civil service (approved associations) regulations’ 14/1927 were 
designed to suppress any public display of civil service discontent, which would 
almost certainly lead to dismissal.130  It was only by overcoming the deference and 
inherent conservatism of the civil service that the political and labour affiliation could 
prove to be of use.131   
The failure of the Cumann na nGaedheal government to reshape state 
structures was mirrored by the failure of the civil service to escape the model of 
organisation inherited from the British associations.  The Irish departments and 
grades were too small to accommodate the organisational structures of the British 
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service.  ‘Colonial cringe’ and habit reproduced the British model of organisation 
where the total membership of the Irish association was less than that of a single 
branch of its sister organisation in Britain.  In 1932, when the civil service had been 
experienced eight years of retrenchment and a ban on promotions, the grades and 
numbers were;132 
Administrative & Executive (max excess of £500) 333 
Junior Administrative (University graduates) 24 
Higher Executive     176 
Junior Executive     429 
Staff Officer      170 
Clerical Officer     2065 
Writing Assistant     640 
Writing Clerks     175 
Temporary Clerks     219 
Superintendent of Typists    13 
Shorthand Typists     271 
Typists      287 
Inspectorial, Professional, Technical.   1601 
Subordinate staff posts (mostly postmen).  7872 
Industrial classes.      2998 
Other (PO staff and C&E staff)   6000. 
Total       23,273. 
The better arrangement for the civil service would have been to organise on the basis 
of method of entry in at most four organisations; postal workers, professional and 
technical grades, and the establishment grades organised in at most two associations 
above and below the clerical officer grade, rather than the sixteen that sat as the staff 
side at the CSRC. The only new association formed in the Free State was the Civil 
Service Clerical Union (CSCU) in 1930.  It aimed to recruit all civil servants of the 
clerical and lower grades, which would have put it in conflict with the CSCA.  
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However it was in fact simply a re-naming of the former Non-Permanent Government 
Clerks’ Association (NPGCA) with a total membership of 323.  Logically this 
association ought to have simply merged into the CSCA, which already organised the 
same grades and was proving an aggressive advocate of their interests.  The problem 
was that the CSCA refused to attend the CSRC and Humphreys, general secretary of 
the NPGCA, liked being at the council.  The new CSCU applied for the seat at the 
representative council formerly held by the NPGCA and were encouraged in this by 
Boland.  Although this might look like a ‘yellow’ union, set up to break the CSCA, it 
was in fact more vanity and the glamour of rubbing shoulders with the top political 
and administrative levels that prompted the CSCU to apply for the council seat.133      
Having reviewed the failures of the Irish civil service associations during the 
Cumann na nGaedheal governments, it is time to turn to the only success.  This was 
achieved by a united service using neither the CSRC, nor a new agitation, but by 
using the rights won by their predecessors that were now enshrined as constitutional 
rights, in the legal battle over the Wigg-Cochrane case.  
                                                






‘THE WORST ARTICLE IN THE TREATY’; 
THE WIGG-COCHRANE CASE. 
 
  
As the Cumann na nGaedheal government settled into normal politics the civil service 
unions faced the task of mobilising membership on two opposed fronts.  On the one 
hand they had to fight to defend the interests of the civil servants who opted to remain 
in the civil service of the Free State whilst on the other hand fighting for the best 
terms possible for those who wished to retire under the Treaty provisions.  As could 
be expected any concentration on the rights of those who were “deserting the ship” 
led to tensions and disagreements with those who remained on board.1  The 
associations also suffered a constant drain of experience as the article 10 retirements 
and the consequent promotions led to loss of leadership.2   
The CSF re-affiliated with the British Civil Service Confederation, joining 
Malta and West Africa as overseas affiliate organisations.3  The British organisations 
maintained an interest in the Irish service.  Changes in Irish conditions and the advent 
of wage cuts or new differential scales were reported, as well as snippets from Dáil 
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Éireann debates.4  W.J. Brown attended the CSCA annual meeting in 1927 and 
reported extensively on the shabby state of the Irish organisations as a warning to the 
British associations on the results of apathy.5    
The civil service associations also began to develop contacts in the Oireachtas 
and to revive the practice of political lobbying in the newly independent state.  For 
lobbying purposes the IPCS generally favoured former Unionists.  At general 
elections the membership were urged to press the claims of the civil service if 
canvassed.  However, although the IPCS may have been instinctively Unionist it also 
was a strong supporter of trade union principles of solidarity.  Thus in the Dáil by-
election in Dublin South in February 1926 the IPCS placed advertisements in the 
daily papers urging support for William Norton the successful Labour Party candidate 
and leader of the POWU.6  Norton then proved a staunch defender of the civil service 
in the Dáil chamber.   
The CSF in its journal Iris Seirbhishe An Stáit, maintained a close watch on 
political changes and was not afraid to publicise its grievances.7  In Dáil debates 
Major Bryan Cooper (ex-Unionist), Thomas Johnson (Labour) and T.J. O’Connell 
(Labour) often reflected the Federation viewpoint.  O’Connell was the invited guest 
speaker at the annual general meeting of the CSCA in May 1925.8  With the election 
of Norton as a Labour TD the POWU had a powerful voice in the Dáil. 
The civil service associations as a body generally identified with and 
supported the Irish Labour Party.  The clerical officers had been members of the 
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ILPTUC since 1920 and their first fulltime general secretary, Archie Heron, was a 
Labour party activist.  The CEA, as soon as it was formed, affiliated to the Labour 
party.  The POWU had, of course, William Norton the later leader of the Labour 
Party, as its first fulltime general secretary.  Given that there were significant 
differences in the status and labour power of civil servants and the working class the 
links between them were surprisingly strong and the civil service union motions for 
debate at Congress were generally supported.9  The CSF also affiliated to the 
international organisation of civil service trade unions, the International Federation of 
Public Officials.10 
In August 1923 the ‘Constituent’ third Dáil dissolved and the general election 
returned the Cumann na nGaedhael government led by W.T. Cosgrave.  Although the 
immediate threat from the anti-Treaty forces was defeated the Cumann na nGaedheal 
governments remained deeply influenced by the crisis of legitimation that continued 
to surround the state in Ireland.  When republicanism, crushed as an armed force, re-
emerged in the political party of Sinn Féin and later Fianna Fáil, it proved both 
popular and resilient despite denying the legitimacy of the Cosgrave government. The 
Cumann na nGaedheal governments were in fact all minority administrations 
empowered by the abstention of republican TDs.11 
This fourth Dáil, which continued until June 1927, laid down the foundations 
for the relationship between the Irish Free State and the civil service free of any 
constitutional constraints.  With the Treaty and the Constitution now safely passed the 
government could, if they wished, give whatever shape it liked to the civil service.  
Also, for the first time, the Department of Finance was no longer shared with any 
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other office and Ernest Blythe was free to concentrate on finance affairs exclusively.  
The legislation enacted by the fourth Dáil, which included the Civil Service 
(Regulation) Act, 1924 and the Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924 offer an insight 
into how the Cumann na nGaedheal government intended to build new state 
organisations and how the new state would relate to the civil service. 
Under the British regime the various boards and commissions in Dublin 
Castle, including those that recruited professional and technical officers, worked to a 
budget and recruited and paid their own staff.  The Irish government’s Civil Service 
(Regulation) Act of 1924 swept aside all of these boards and brought their staffs into a 
single civil service under the control of the Minister of Finance.  Yet, surprisingly, the 
bill was also described as continuing ‘the system with which we are familiar’.12  
Continuity of the state was now portrayed as a virtue by the former revolutionaries.  
The provisional government and the first executive council of the Free State had 
recruited many temporary civil servants to handle the volume of work associated with 
the changeover from the British administration and to process the many claims for 
compensation for war damage and land act transfers, but no permanent civil servants 
had been recruited.  The Civil Service (Regulation) Act of 1924 established the Civil 
Service Commission to recruit future civil servants by open competitive 
examinations.  The act also empowered the Minister of Finance to make, change or 
revoke regulations for establishing the classification, remuneration, conditions and 
terms of service of the civil servants.  Thus while the Civil Service Commission 
controlled recruitment the minister would remain solely responsible for management 
of the civil service.  In line with the general expectation for a minimal state apparatus 
Blythe expected that the Commission would have very little work to do and the 
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commissioners would be very much part-time positions.13   The first commissioners 
were the Ceann Comhairle of the Dáil and the secretaries of finance and of education, 
the two departments most directly involved.  The CSF was aghast at the appointment 
of the Ceann Comhairle to chair the commission as his was a political position.14 
In the Dáil the opposition, whilst approving of the Commission, proposed that 
it ought to report to the Dáil rather than to the Minister for Finance and that control of 
the civil service ought to lie ultimately with the Dáil as the legislative assembly rather 
than with the executive.  The intent was to make the management of the civil service 
of the new state subject to a detailed code enshrined in legislation rather than to 
ministerial prerogative.  Although this was rejected as unpractical it does underline 
the extent to which the Labour party, which led the debate, was determined to de-
politicise the question of recruitment and control of the civil service.15  During the 
debate on section 9 of the bill, which empowered the Minister of Finance to make 
regulations for the control of the civil service, Blythe used this debate to express an 
‘ultra-montane’ view of the relationship between the state and the civil service.  Major 
Cooper and Thomas Johnson returned to the issue of Dáil control of the civil service 
by suggesting that the Oireachtas ought to have laid before it all regulations made by 
the minister, with the power to annul them.  Blythe, who had already began imposing 
wage cuts on the civil service, citing the recent difficulties in the postal services, 
articulated a concept of absolute sovereignty for the state in dealing with the civil 
servants, essentially denying any contract.  It was his view that the executive could 
brook no interference in dealing with civil service organisations.  The debate was 
actually threatening to become an interesting and sophisticated analysis of executive 
and democratic control of the state apparatus in which the hopeless position of the 
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civil service under minister Blythe began to win sympathetic consideration.  Blythe 
relented in so far as he agreed to lay any regulations on the table of the House for 
scrutiny by TDs.16  Johnson, unfortunately rather late in the day, hit the nail on the 
head when he pointed out that Blythe wanted to import into his ministry the 
customary authority of the crown over the civil service in Great Britain.  However, 
unlike in Britain, where civil servants were entirely ‘at the pleasure of the crown’ the 
Irish civil servants had certain statutory rights and not merely personal rights.  Their 
conditions were not variable at the whim of the minister.17  The executive council 
strongly supported Blythe’s resistance to attempts by the Dáil or Senate to interfere in 
his control of the civil service.18   
In 1925 the Senate rejected an amendment to the regulations that proposed to 
allow the Civil Service Commission to restrict admission to certain examinations to 
men only.  This was one of the few legislatives acts subject to the suspensory power 
of the Senate, preventing its enactment for 270 days.19  This had arisen out of attempts 
by Blythe to restrict candidates for the first recruitment of the administrative class, out 
of which future departmental heads would arise, to men only.20  Blythe made it 
obvious that he disliked having women in the civil service and used his power to 
direct that female civil servants were to retire on marriage.  The first examinations for 
the clerical class were confined to men with army service.  The standard was 
deliberately kept low to accommodate men who had been a great many years out of 
school.  Nevertheless the failure rate was high; 571 from a field of 1244.21  Thus, at a 
time when the demobilisation of the army was causing great difficulties leading to the 
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so-called “army mutiny”, the civil service provided a useful avenue to siphon off 
discontent, whilst retaining competitive entry.22   In the pursuit of economy Blythe 
also used his powers to cut the salary scales for new entrants to the service.    
The Ministers and Secretaries Act centralised the departments of government 
in an executive of twelve ministers.  The ministries were conceived as essentially 
administrative or executive.  The governing Executive Council was made up of the 
executive ministers only.23  Cosgrave described the bill as second only to the 
constitution in importance in laying down the foundations of the state.24  He also saw 
the bill as rationalising the inheritance of two former governments; one that was 
young and inexperienced but enjoyed popular support and the other unpopular and 
disorganised but handed over with certain treaty rights.25  The broad principle of the 
bill was to take the multiplicity of boards and commissions of the inherited 
administration, and reorganise them into a few ministries under ministers described as 
“corporation sole”; in other words the minister was the department and all acts of the 
civil servants of that department were done as if directly ordered by the minister.  For 
many civil servants this represented a loss of the personal autonomy that marked the 
more casual and decentralised Castle administration.26  The key department was that 
of finance, which took charge of the administration and business of public finances 
and to which was assigned the civil service commission.  Although each department 
continued to appoint their own civil servants each appointment required the express 
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permission of the Minister of Finance.  The former departmental autonomy of the old 
British regime had truly passed beyond recall.27   
The Dáil debate on the key section of the bill on the role of parliamentary 
secretaries reveals the lingering suspicion within the executive council about the 
reliability of the inherited civil service and doubts about its willingness to embrace the 
revolution that had swept over it.28  Taunted by the contradictions between his calls 
for national economy and his plans for an extra layer of paid ‘assistant ministers’, 
Blythe was quite frank in expressing his doubts about the willingness of the civil 
service, ‘which was not created as a Civil Service for an Irish State’, to accept 
ministerial control.29  Within the Cumann na nGaedheal party Milroy voiced a general 
suspicion about the ‘rump of officialdom of the old regime’ which was still in power 
in the civil service.30  In what was becoming a predictable contribution to any debate 
on the civil service the Farmers’ Union TDs used the bill to demand cuts in civil 
service pay.31  It is also clear that it was generally accepted that the state would seek 
to reduce its presence in Irish society and that, after the initial pressure of 
reconstructing the state was complete, the Oireachtas would have little to do and 
might meet at most for three or four weeks in two or three sessions a year.32  The only 
TD to offer some relief to the civil servants was the eccentric Darrell Figgis who 
suggested that the state required fewer politicians and more civil servants.33    
One further piece of legislation of 1925 illustrates the attitude of the Cumann 
na nGaedheal government to the civil service; the Treasonable and Seditious Offences 
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32 Ibid., col 1649, 11 Dec 1923. 
33 Ibid., col. 1651, 11 Dec 1923. 
 310 
Bill included a paragraph that ‘every person who incites any person in the civil 
service (other than a police force) of the Government of Saorstát Éireann to refuse, 
neglect, or omit to perform his duty or to commit any other act in dereliction of his 
duty, shall be guilty of felony.’  Denying the right to organise a strike was simply the 
logical extension of the denial of the right to strike.     
 These debates showed a depth of unthinking hostility to the civil service 
which never abated and which all parties indulged in to a greater or lesser degree.34  
Even the Labour Party joined in.  William Davin TD and Richard Corish TD, in the 
July 1924 debate on the estimates, attacked the civil service as an unreformed and 
domineering “Castle” apparatus that needed to be ‘cleared out bag and baggage’.  In 
the same debate the government TD Grattan Esmonde suggested replacing ‘the old 
regime’ of inherited civil servants in finance with a panel of experts. 35  Even from 
within the executive council support for the civil service was conditional and 
qualified.36  The Farmers Union regularly attacked the civil service, one branch 
calling for 5,000 redundancies in 1925.37  Assailing civil servants fast became a 
regular ritual of the Dáil debates and the failings of the civil service a cliché of 
political discourse in independent Ireland. 
The underlying assumption of these pronouncements was that the civil service 
of the Irish Free State ought to be a minimalist one and certainly would be smaller 
than that handed over by the Treaty.  However the tradition of a large section of the 
civil service in Ireland was ‘maximalist’.  Under the British regime Ireland had 
developed a large and decentralised corps of non-political experts whose objective 
was the transformation of Irish society and economy through government action.  In 
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the last decades of the British regime many civil servants were recruited to run the 
autonomous institutions being developed as a solution to the problems of Irish 
society, especially its chronic poverty and under-development.  Inheriting pre-
independence nationalist suspicion of the Castle apparatus as an alien intrusion, 
government policy was to reshape the civil service into a smaller, centralised 
administrative rather than executive bureaucracy.  The civil service of the newly 
independent state was viewed as an essentially administrative machine that dealt with 
simple repetitive tasks rather than as a source of expertise and advice.  The resentment 
of the political classes toward the civil service was a revival of the pre-independence 
attitude of nationalist opinion to the Castle regime.  In that, the Cumann na nGaedheal 
party was the inheritor of Redmondism and the Irish Party rather than Griffith and 
Sinn Féin. 
 Justifiably proud of its success in stabilising the state and enacting the 
constitution, the Cumann na nGaedhael government increasingly relied on its ability 
to prudently manage the meagre state finances to assert its legitimacy to the 
electorate.  Relentless economic retrenchment became a form of ideological 
compensation for the retreat from the inspirational policies that had led the national 
revolution.  Also, despite the efforts of a deeply divided Labour Party to mount an 
active opposition to these policies, the more significant opposition influence on the 
government came in fact from the right-wing farmer and business parties that pressed 
for even greater cuts.38  In May 1923, as an investigation into the financial position of 
the Irish Free State revealed a deficit of £1.2 million for the current year, the 
departmental heads were instructed to find economies.39  In pursuit of a balanced 
budget, and fearful of the hyperinflation that was sweeping Germany, the Cosgrave 
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government cut old age pensions, blind pensions and teacher salaries.40  The National 
Army also faced cuts as numbers were reduced from 55,000 to 18,000 men, leading to 
a threatened mutiny by dissident officers.  In this pursuit of an aridly conservative 
economic strategy the civil service was an obvious target for reductions in 
expenditure.41 
  The Department of Finance’s review of the budget position late in 1923 
identified the civil service as being ripe for “economy”.  The review identified a two-
pronged approach to lower costs by, firstly, scrapping inessential services and ending 
the ‘unnecessary multiplication of departments as an obvious source of waste’ and, 
secondly, by cutting the cost of the services then remaining.  The objective of the 
review was to ensure that the costs of the public services would reflect the diminution 
of work that was necessarily consequent on the ‘exclusion of the six-counties’.42  As 
economy in the public service emerged as an insistent theme of government it was 
linked to the cost of compensation for civil servants dismissed or resigned under 
article 10 of the Treaty.43  The Labour party suggested withholding superannuation 
payments from the retired officials of the former British administration, saving money 
that would be better spent on social needs.44 
In 1924, as part of its economy drive and also to assert control over the civil 
service, the government substantially reduced the basic salary scales and annual leave 
for new entrants to the clerical and executive classes.  It also introduced a new 
differentiated scale between married and unmarried civil servants, with an additional 
children’s allowance.45  This was a pet project of Blythe’s.46  Blythe’s marriage 
                                                
40 NAI, G2/3 executive council minutes, 27 Oct. 1923. 
41 NAI, FIN 1/826/2 reply to circular F4/PMG. 
42 Ibid., 1/826/ 5-6 financial statements, 5 Oct.; 2 Nov. 1923. 
43Dáil Éireann debates, vol. 1, cols 1367, 6 October 1922. 
44 Mitchell, labour in Irish politics, pp 181-2. 
45 NAI, G2/3 &4 cabinet minutes, 15 May, 10 Oct. 1924.  
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differential was carefully designed so that a single woman would not reach the 
maximum of the scale until after forty years of service, that is retirement age.  The 
unmarried man would begin to notice the differential at about the age of twenty-three 
to twenty-five, the age when he ought to thinking of marriage.47  It would thus operate 
as a social engineering mechanism, encouraging marriage in young men whilst using 
women to replace single men as cheaper labour.  A complicated scheme, it required 
departmental heads to keep track of their officers’ marital status and procreational 
activities.  For fear of established officers going out under article 10 it was applied to 
new recruits only.48  P.S.O’Hegarty, never lost for an opinion, strongly supported 
Blythe and denounced ‘the modern women’s movement, disguised as a movement for 
equality, [which] is a movement to shirk wifehood and motherhood because 
independence looked more pleasant’.49   
With the enforcement of the differential there were in fact two completely 
different salary schemes in the civil service; for the transferred civil servants protected 
by Article 10 there was a continuance of the old scales, with the new lower scales 
being applied to the new entrants.  However the government imposed a ban on 
promotion and, after 1926, introduced university graduate entry (male only) for the 
top administrative grades.50  For civil servants tied to definite salary scales the only 
avenue to prosperity was promotion.  Without promotion the lower grades became 
dead-ends.  The CSF publicised its objections to these changes introduced without 
any negotiation, which tended to drive experienced officers out from the service 
protected as they were by article 10 of the Treaty and to create resentment between 
                                                
46 NAI, Brennan Commission papers, BC/1, p9, ‘evidence of H.P. Boland’, 24 Nov 1932 
47 NAI, department of finance, E101/7/25. 
48 UCDAD, Blythe papers, P24/376, ‘differential in pay of women..in the civil service’. 
49 NAI, finance, E101/7/25, ‘PSO’H to HPB’ 30 may 1925. 
50 NAI, department of finance, E100/3/26. 
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the old and the new civil servants.51   The AEO picked holes in the scheme in a series 
of carefully crafted questions which included whether the child allowance was equal 
for each child and was it paid from the date of birth and whether a JEO on the 
maximum of his scale would be promoted to the HE scale on receipt of an allowance 
for an extra child that brought him into that grades’ pay range.52 
 As we have seen, in May 1922 Collins had assured a delegation of the civil 
service that though he could not commit any future government to acceptance of the 
Whitley councils he accepted the need for some consultative body.  The Whitley Joint 
Committee was abolished but the departmental councils were allowed continue and an 
ad hoc consultative council of official and staff sides was established for the transition 
period.  The consultative council had six staff side and six official side 
representatives.  All matters that ordinarily came before the Whitley Committee were 
to be dealt with by the consultative council.  It met first on 20 September 1922 and 
monthly thereafter.53  Whilst the staff representatives saw this arrangement as a 
temporary substitute for some future form of reinstated Whitleyism, Collins and the 
provisional government saw this as a purely temporary arrangement to facilitate the 
transition from British to Irish rule.  Whilst the CSF was willing to work the 
consultative council the POWU and IPCS were suspicious as it was clear that as a 
purely ad hoc and temporary body it as no substitute for the Whitley Committee.54  
The CSF continued to hope for a Whitley-like body on which ‘representatives of 
official and staff sides meet, not for mere ventilation of grievances but to give both 
sides co-equal interest and power…a body for action not talk, fostering and 
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52 NAI, department of finance, E101/7/25. 
53 CEA, executive committee minutes, 25-6 Oct 1922. 
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developing in the staff that spirit of co-operative responsibility which was the guiding 
principle in the Irish-Ireland movement’.55       
A year later, with the transition period complete and the Civil Service 
Regulation Act in force, the civil service associations continued to demand the 
reinstatement of something like the departmental Whitley Councils.  However in 
February 1924 the Whitley Committee was formally abolished with the government 
offering, at a meeting with civil service representatives, nothing more than a promise 
to establish new machinery ‘more suited to Saorstát Éireann conditions’.56  This 
rhetorical flourish might have seemed promising to the more nationalist members of 
the civil service, but few were convinced and most of the associations continued to 
press for a restoration of a Whitley-type committee.  For the civil service the Whitley 
Councils had the positive advantage that they introduced an ambiguity was to who is 
the employer.  The civil service in Ireland, especially since it had been opened to 
Catholic recruitment, regarded the general public as their employer, not the Minister 
of Finance or the Treasury.  Ideally the service would have preferred that a panel of 
ministers and other politicians, along with a non-governmental representative but with 
no senior civil servant, would constitute an official panel.  In December 1923 Blythe 
met with a delegation of the CSF and invited them to formulate a scheme for his 
consideration.57  Meanwhile the CSF began to organise a political campaign on the 
demand for a replacement for the Whitley Councils.   
In the Dáil deputies Bryan Cooper and Johnson’s repeated questioning of 
Cosgrave and Blythe on the Whitley Councils got vague and non-committal replies.  
Within cabinet however, and eventually in a statement to the Dáil, Cosgrave took the 
view that sole power to determine pay and conditions within the civil service lay with 
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56 NAI, S. 6247/FO/1, department of the taoiseach. 
57 Iris, Jan 1924. 
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the government and that therefore only a consultative body could be allowed.58  The 
CSF was attacked from within the CSCA for its supine attitude and its failure to 
prevent the filching of civil service privileges, though a motion to secede from the 
Federation was rejected by the membership.59   
In December 1924 Blythe issued without discussion or consultation a scheme 
for a purely consultative representative council for the civil service made up of 
official and staff sides, composed of civil servants, with no political representative.  
The chairman of the council was to be a nominee of the minister but with no vice-
chair nominated by the staff side, as had been the case with the Whitley Committee.  
The chairman had full control of the agenda and also the report of the proceedings to 
the minister.  The minister also forbad any non-service members, thus thwarting the 
recent decision of the POWU and the CSCA to appoint full-time general secretaries 
and professionalise their representation.  In every aspect the ministerial proposal was 
a rejection of the Whitley system.60   
 At this point the civil service was organised in three main blocs; the CSF, the 
POWU and the IPCS.  Unhappy at the retreat from the Whitley Councils, a 
provisional staff side was drawn together equally from the three bodies and a meeting 
with the Minister of Finance was requested. Initially the joint approach worked well.  
When the minister, predictably, refused to meet the provisional staff side it was 
pointed out to the government that it had already broken a pledge to consult the 
service and that any scheme drafted and put into operation by one side only lacked the 
first element of conciliation, agreement by both sides.61 
                                                
58 Dáil Éireann debates vol 8, cols 1028-9, 10 July 1924; cols 1540-2200, 17 July 1924. 
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 Within a few weeks however the unity of the service associations was 
broken.  The CSF, assured by the minister that the conciliation scheme could be 
revised to remedy any defects that might emerge once it was working, agreed to give 
it a trial.  In fact the Federation, as the largest and most nationalist organisation in the 
civil service, had come under considerable pressure to work the government scheme.  
The CSCA, after a divisive debate, agreed to work the scheme but only under 
protest.62  The POWU and the IPCS decided to stick with the decision that the scheme 
was completely unacceptable and both protested at the Federation’s decision to break 
ranks with the rest of the service.  Confident that the other associations would have to 
eventually come on board the government pressed ahead and the Civil Service 
Representative Council (CSRC), without either the POWU or the IPCS, held its first 
meeting on 15 March 1926.  The fragmentation of the civil service organisation is 
evident in the range of associations on the CSRC.  The only general service classes 
represented were the executive officers (AEO) and the clerical officers (CSCA).  The 
rest of the staff side was made up of fourteen associations, many with less than a 
hundred members.63  The POWU description of the scheme as ‘utterly worthless’ 
proved correct.  Whilst the civil servants might have continued to refer to it as a 
“conciliation” council the minister, correctly, referred to it as a “representative” 
council.  From the beginning the CSRC proved unsatisfactory and the “recognised” 
associations within the CSF unanimously pressed an unconvinced minister to accept 
that the constitution had to be revised.64 
The year 1927 was crucial in stabilising the Free State.  In the aftermath of the 
murder of Kevin O’Higgins, the republican Fianna Fáil party was manoeuvred into 
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Dáil Éireann to form a constitutional opposition.  To the civil service associations 
Fianna Fáil seemed to be more sympathetic to their complaints and with the 
government facing into two elections in 1927 they tried once again to build up a 
single service voice.  In February 1927 a hurriedly called conference between the 
Federation, the CSCA, the POWU and the IPCS discussed a five-point programme 
that included demands for; 
1. Provision for departmental councils or committees to deal with departmental 
matters. 
2. The chairman of both local and central councils should not have the right to 
decide what matters should be placed on the agenda for discussion. 
3. The councils should have the power to come to decisions. 
4. Provision should be made for the attendance at council meetings of the full-
time officers of associations. 
5. An appeal body should be set up to which matters on which disagreement had 
been reached might be referred.65 
 
The IPCS replied that the first four points had already been included in the earlier 
demands that had been put to the Minister for Finance many times and had been 
rejected by him and that the fifth point was not practicable.  The POWU proved 
equally dismissive.  In truth neither the POWU nor the IPCS were interested in 
joining what was clearly a sinking ship.66  By the end of the year the CSCA had 
seceded from both the CSF and the CSRC and so therefore, as the Federation was 
breaking up, the so-called ‘Representative Council’ now represented a minority of 
civil servants.67  
Although the cross-service federal organisation was crumbling the individual 
civil service organisations still worked closely together on issues of pay and 
conditions. The IPCS continued to co-operate with the POWU on the way in which 
the cost-of-living was calculated and on which the amount of the “bonus” depended.  
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It also worked with the CSCA and the POWU in continuing to press the demand for 
proper conciliation machinery and in their attempts to make it a political issue.  The 
POWU, the CSCA, and the smaller unions of the CEF and the Association of 
Inspectors of Taxes formed an umbrella organisation, the Civil Service Joint 
Committee to form a united front in negotiation with the government, however the 
IPCS remained aloof.68   
It has to be admitted that the efforts of the various civil service associations 
and unions to unite and defend the interests of those civil servants that chose to 
remain in the civil service of the Irish Free State bore little fruit.  In terms of influence 
and solid gain the most effective organisation that the Irish civil service had ever 
generated was the pre-independence GCICS.  That committee had recognised that the 
civil service of the state had, despite departmentalisation, a single employer with 
unique power to shape their working conditions.  It followed that the civil service 
ought to be associated in a single organisation to speak as one in dealing with the 
state.  It was when the civil service turned to defend the gains won by the GCICS that 
it discovered the unity and success that previously had eluded them.  In defending the 
interests of those civil servants that chose to retire under article 10 of the Treaty, the 
civil service unions built and maintained cross-service unity and achieved a defeat of 
the government that re-opened the whole Treaty debate and brought into question 
national sovereignty.  Described by Thomas Johnson in the Senate as ‘the turning 
point in the whole constitutional relationships between Great Britain, the Irish Free 
State and the British Dominions’, this was the Wigg-Cochrane case.69 
The IPCS remained dissatisfied at its lack of representation on the Wylie 
committee and continued to demand a right to represent members during its 
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deliberations.70  Unhappy at many rulings of the committee, the IPCS council began 
looking for legal advice on challenging it in the courts.  The main question centred on 
how the “bonus” was being included when calculating the pension.71  Originally, 
thinking that the wartime inflation was a temporary difficulty only, the British 
Treasury in introducing the bonus in 1916 explicitly stated that it would not count for 
pension or gratuity under the Superannuation Acts.  As the war bonus became in fact 
a regular part of the pay of civil servants pensions emerged as anomalous and unfair.  
In April 1919 this was temporarily addressed in a memorandum of agreement 
between the Treasury and the civil service associations.  Under this agreement 
subsequent pension awards would include a war bonus related supplementary 
pension.  In the post-war period as the bonus, though temporary and fluctuating, had 
become in reality part of the pay of civil servants the National Whitley Council for the 
civil service turned its attention to the continuing problem of pensions.  The Council 
agreed that in addition to the normal calculation of pension there would be added 
three quarters of the bonus paid at the time of retirement and that in calculating the 
lump sum gratuity the bonus would be added on. The Treasury, without agreement or 
legislation, then decided that the part of a pension of retiring civil servants that was 
based on the bonus would, just like the bonus itself, be subject to periodic quarterly 
adjustment based on the cost of living calculation, and would be subject to an over-
riding maximum. A Treasury minute introduced a notional maximum for the bonus 
element that would allow the bonus to fluctuate downward but prevent it fluctuating 
upwards beyond a certain percentage.  The notion of a ‘maximum’ was introduced to 
prevent the total annual sum payable in pensions exceeding the statutory proportion of 
the total salary on which civil servants pensions were calculated because, it was 
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conceivable, the bonus element of the pension might in time rise to exceed the actual 
basic salary paid to a civil servant on retirement.   
The legality of an Act of Parliament, the Superannuation Acts, being altered 
by an order of the Treasury ought to have been queried, but it wasn’t.  These changes 
were effected by a Treasury minute dated 20 March 1922, that is in the period 
between the provisional government taking over Dublin Castle on 16 January, when 
Collins forbade any alterations in personnel or conditions, and the 1 April 1922 when 
the civil service in Ireland was formally transferred to the provisional government.  
Justice Wylie, at the first sitting of the compensation committee, indicated that he 
intended to allow this Treasury minute to govern the compensation payable under the 
Treaty, that is to say to take the view that the transfer of the civil service had occurred 
on 1 April 1922.72  Curiously enough the civil service committee set up under the 
1920 Act, which had been blocked in its operation by the civil service associations 
and by the provisional government, had agreed that the compensation payable under 
the eighth schedule of the Government of Ireland Act would be subject to a variable 
element related to the current rate of bonus on the salaries of serving civil servants.  
This was intended to act as a disincentive to voluntary retirement because of the 
danger of a diminishing pension in the future.  Had the provisional government 
allowed the committee function it may never have faced the difficulties it was about 
to encounter.73   
By early January 1923 the IPCS council, dissatisfied with some of its 
decisions, decided that it would have to fight the Wylie committee in the courts and 
instructed the member associations to forward to the council a list of the cases past 
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and pending in the committee.  These were then carefully monitored.74  Meanwhile a 
“Treaty Pensioners Association” was formed to act as the organisation of the civil 
servants affected. This association, funded by the civil servants in the IPCS who 
remained in service, travelled to London to lobby the British government on the issue 
of the compensation and pensions.75   At their request the House of Lords attempted to 
insert into the ‘consequential provisions’ an explicit guarantee that the British 
government would undertake responsibility for the pensions under Article 10 if the 
Irish government reneged, but this was rejected by the Commons.76  
It is ironic that the 1920 Civil Service Committee, had it functioned, would 
have had an absolute authority to determine  ‘fair compensation’ and so therefore 
would not have been amenable to judicial review.  The provisional government, 
determined to assert its sovereignty, made the Wylie committee a purely advisory 
committee.  As an advisory committee its decisions, though accepted by the 
government, were neither final nor conclusive in any way. Advice can of course be 
rejected, by either side.  By autumn two cases had emerged as promising vehicles to 
challenge the compensation committee; that of John Howard Wigg and that of Robert 
Oliver Cochrane, both of them members of the IPCS.   
Wigg was assistant architect in the OPW in Dublin on a salary of £430 plus 
bonus of £232.3.0, which, by his date of retirement, had reduced to £119 giving him a 
salary of £549 on retirement.  Wigg had, on 1 April 1922, seventeen years of service.  
The pension awarded to Wigg was £200 on his basic salary plus a supplementary 
bonus of £103.0.9 subject to a maximum of £88.6.5.  This gave him a pension of 
£288.6.5.  Cochrane was a chief executive officer in the OPW on £415 plus bonus of 
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£194.5.6 with twenty-six years service on 1 April 1922 giving him a final salary of 
£609.5.6.  Robert Cochrane had actually served on the executive of the 1893 civil 
service committee that had drafted the code on civil service compensation rights.  
Cochrane was awarded £206.5.0 basic pension plus a supplementary bonus £106.5.2 
subject to maximum of £91.1.7 giving him a final pension of £297.6.7.  In both cases 
the pensions were calculated in the normal manner, taking account of years of service 
and added years.  However, following the Treasury minute of March 1922, the awards 
carried the conditions that the supplemental pension would be subject to quarterly 
reassessment based on the cost-of-living figure and that at no time would the 
supplemental pension exceed its prescribed amount at the date of retirement, the 
“over-riding maximum”.    Had the 1920 terms been applied the basic salary and 
bonus would have been considered together as “pay”, the pension would have had no 
periodic reassessment and the over-riding maximum would not have applied.   
On 15 November 1923 Wigg-Cochrane issued a writ in the High Court.  In 
their writ Wigg-Cochrane asked that the High Court declare that the compensation 
awarded them was not “fair compensation” inasmuch as part of the compensation was 
put on a sliding scale, the quarterly cost-of-living reassessment, which would not have 
been the case under the 1920 Act.  The central argument hung on the words of article 
10 of the Treaty, ‘the government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair 
compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 
1920…to public servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the 
change of government…’.  Wigg-Cochrane argued that terms less favourable than 
those accorded by the 1920 Act were in fact being imposed by the Irish government 
because in 1920 there was no “maximum” and no adjustment of the bonus element of 
the pension.  What they wanted was that the courts should declare that ‘bonus was 
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part of the salary formerly enjoyed and that in calculating the superannuation 
allowance a fixed award should be made, and that no part of such allowance should be 
put on a sliding scale’.77  They also asked for a declaration that the Treasury minute of 
22 March 1922 did not apply because they were at that moment under the authority of 
the provisional government, not the Treasury.  The three month gap between the 
handing over of the Castle to the provisional government, when Collins ordered that 
there should be no alteration in conditions, and the transfer of authority on 1 April, 
opened up the question of where the authority of the state lay for that period.  If the 
Irish government argued that the Treasury minute did apply then they argued that the 
provisional government was not a state, it was only an administration empowered by 
the British government and the talk about the “surrender of the Castle” was no more 
than empty rhetoric.   
As the question was contested far bigger issues began to emerge from the 
dreary arguments about dates and definitions.  Looming behind the molehill of 
pensions was a mountain of constitutional confrontation with implications for the 
entire British Commonwealth of Nations.  The government defence was that the 
Minister of Finance of the Irish Free State had inherited the authority of the former 
British Treasury.  Under that authority civil servants were employed at pleasure and 
had no legal right to a pension.  The decision as to the amount of any pension that lay 
formerly with the Treasury lay now with the Minister of Finance.  Therefore the 
action of Wigg-Cochrane was not sustainable and ought to be dismissed.  In the High 
Court however the judgement, delivered on 18 July 1924 by Mr Justice Meredith, 
former President of the 1920 Dáil Éireann supreme court, found not only that the 
pensions of Wigg-Cochrane ought to be calculated as they had argued under the 1920 
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Act, with a sliding scale but no over-riding maximum, but also that their pensions, 
and by implication that of all transferred civil servants established or temporary, were 
guaranteed by the constitutional incorporation of the Treaty.  What was at issue was 
not superannuation entitlements but constitutional guarantees.  Rights that were 
secured in the constitution could not be governed or qualified by a Treasury minute, 
or by a decision of the Minister of Finance, or even an Act of the Oireachtas.  The 
pensions of dismissed or retiring transferred officers were not a gift of the Minister of 
Finance but a constitutional right and therefore enforceable in the courts whose task it 
was to defend the constitution.78 
 The state immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.  Meanwhile Wylie, 
once its authority was questioned, resigned from the committee to take up a position 
as judge of the High Court.  Initially the government was not unhappy at these 
developments and may well have welcomed them, confident that their interpretation 
of the rights of the transferred civil servants would stand.  The official side at the 
Wylie committee had been taking a much more aggressive line and had circulated a 
letter to all applicants demanding an explanation as to why and not merely a statement 
that he was ‘retiring in consequence of the change of government’ and had also 
signalled that they intended to forcefully interrogate the applicants on foot of their 
replies.79 
The decision to abolish the Whitley Councils and the stubborn refusal to 
establish any replacement arbitration scheme made civil servants uneasy and more 
willing to take the money on offer and resign.  The CSF enlisted the British Civil 
Service Confederation to try and make the Colonial Office take action, but this 
produced no results though it did help to re-establish contacts with the British 
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service.80 The government discharged 454 civil servants.  In July 1924, just before the 
High Court delivered its judgement, Blythe revealed that 864 civil servants had 
resigned ‘in consequence of the change of government’ costing a lump sum of 
£208,870 and an annual pension of £124,666, and there were still many applications 
in the pipeline.  These payments were being made against the background of cuts in 
old age pensions and teacher salaries.81  By the end of 1925 the cost of compensation 
under article 10 was running at £254,785 per annum in payments to 1,851 former civil 
servants, DMP and judicial officers with a further 2,139 still pending.82  Even before 
the High Court case Blythe described article 10 as ‘the worst article in the Treaty’.83  
The High Court decision and the resignation of Wylie allowed the government to 
suspend all the pending cases and halt the flow of resignations.  Civil servants who 
wished to retire were now in a limbo as the government refused to process any claims 
until the courts clarified the position.84   
For the civil service associations the purpose of the Wigg-Cochrane case was 
not to enforce the rights of retired former civil servants, but to compel the government 
to reinstate some form of Whitley Councils, to determine pensions in the first instance 
but ultimately to re-establish arbitration as a permanent part of the transferred civil 
service industrial relations.85  The civil service made a direct connection between the 
rush of resignations, six hundred in six months, and the aggressive attitude of the 
government, saying; ‘it will not do to tell us we have no right to strike and deny us at 
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the same time adequate conciliation and arbitration machinery for the settlement of 
legitimate grievances’.86   
The initial hope was that with the High Court decision in their favour the 
government would not appeal but would look to establishing what was the true 
objective of the litigation, a properly constituted statutory arbitration scheme.  When 
the government did decide to appeal the decision of Meredith to the Supreme Court, 
and the case made its slow progress toward that appeal, it was noted with anxiety that 
the government was not bothering to replace Wylie and was refusing to name a date 
for the reconstitution of the compensation committee.87  The financial implications for 
the civil service associations of a further appeal were a worry, but unavoidable, once 
the government decided to go to the Supreme Court.88   
Early in 1925, as it became clear that the government was going to pursue the 
case of Wigg-Cochrane all the way to the Supreme Court, the IPCS combined forces 
with the POWU, the CSF and the Irish Treaty Pensioner’s Association to form the 
Transferred Officers’ Protection Association (TOPA).89  The object of TOPA was to 
‘safeguard the rights of members under article 77 and 78 of the Constitution of 
Saorstát Éireann and article 10 of the Treaty’.90  The driving force behind TOPA was 
William Norton, general-secretary of the POWU and later leader of the Labour Party.  
It was Norton drew up the initial memorandum detailing the decline in service 
conditions under the Free State government and inviting the other associations to join 
forces.91  The twelve-member executive of the TOPA was made up of four appointed 
                                                
86 Iris, July 1923. 
87 IPCS (Ireland) council minutes, 3 Oct. 1924; 17 Feb. 1925; Dáil Éireann debates, vol.9, col 642, 
1394, 4 & 21 Nov. 1924; vol.11, 14 May 1925, Questions; vol.12. cols.1390, 1403, 19 June 1925. 
88 IPCS (Ireland) council minutes 25 Nov. 1924. 
89 Irish Labour History Museum and Archives (ILHS), MS.10/TOPA/1-3[TOPA records are part of the 
deposition of the Communications Workers Union].; IPCS council minutes, 17 Feb., 23 Mar., 9 Apr. 
1925. 
90 ILHS, MS.10/TOPA/1; Iris, vol.3, no.5 (May) 1925. 
91 ILHS, Norton papers, ‘rough drafts of a constitution and circulars for a treaty officers association’. 
 328 
by the POWU, four by the CSF and four by the IPCS.92  Thus TOPA was a much 
more unified organisation of the civil service than the Federation and, as virtually all 
civil servants in the Free State were “transferred officers”, might well have proved a 
base to build cross-service unity but, as we shall see, it never became more than an 
organisation to fight the Wigg-Cochrane case.  Nevertheless, as such, it was an 
undoubted success.  It is therefore ironic that the civil service unions and associations 
that had failed to build a unified platform to negotiate on behalf of those civil servants 
staying in the Free State came together to fight the cause of those who were retiring.   
Civil servants who were going to stay in the civil service of the Free State, or 
recently recruited civil servants, were understandably reluctant to finance a court case 
that would benefit those who were retiring and create hostility to those who remained.  
It was alleged that TOPA was solely concerned with those civil servants who intended 
to retire under clause 10 but had not got a chance to go because the Wylie committee 
was hamstrung since the court case and the resignation of the chairman.  It was also 
alleged that TOPA was being run by people whose sympathies were British rather 
than Irish and that TOPA was motivated by a desire amongst ‘the usual garland of 
Poppies sustained by Freemason wires’ to humiliate the native government.93  
In the Supreme Court the government won and so it might have seemed that 
that was the end of the case.94  The decision of the majority of the court was that, 
bluntly, a civil servant under the Treaty had no pension rights as such which are 
enforceable by law and that the Minister of Finance was the sole authority to 
determine matters between the State and the civil service.  Consequently a civil 
servant must accept whatever the minister offered and had no right of action against 
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the minister whatever.  This was consistent with the British tradition under which all 
civil servants were employed ‘at pleasure’ and had no rights, properly speaking.  But, 
in a dissenting judgement, one of the three judges raised the question as to the status 
of the Treaty and the other legislation establishing the new government.  Whilst the 
other two judges, O’Connor and Fitzgibbon (a former leading Dublin Unionist) 
accepted the government argument for continuity of authority, and therefore 
superannuation and compensation powers, the third, Justice Johnston, dissented 
arguing that the Treaty had completely displaced the Act of 1920 and had ‘brought to 
an end the whole existing administrative, executive and judicial machinery of the 
country and made suitable provision for the substitution of something different’.95  In 
his view the case of Wigg-Cochrane was not about the power to determine 
superannuation but about fundamental constitutional rights as guaranteed by the 
Treaty agreed with Great Britain by Dáil Éireann and the constitution that it 
subsequently enacted.  If the government, he argued, could disregard article 10 of the 
Treaty then it could equally disregard any other article of the Treaty, the constitution 
and the orders transferring authority to the Free State, making them no more than so 
much waste paper.  In a paradoxical reversal therefore the government of the Free 
State was now arguing that what had taken place was not a revolution whereas the 
civil servants were arguing that it was.  Breaking through the question of pension 
rights was the status of the Treaty itself.96 
Even before the High Court judgement the civil service associations had 
discussed the possibility of invoking a controversial and contentious avenue of appeal 
if the decision went against Wigg-Cochrane.  This was an appeal to the Judicial 
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Committee of the Privy Council in the British House of Lords.97  The appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not mentioned in the Treaty, but had 
been included in the Irish Free State Constitution (article 66) at the insistence of the 
British government.98  Article 66 of the constitution implied wrongly that there was an 
existing right of appeal, there wasn’t, but it was decided that it would not be wise to 
reveal that error and to allow the article stand as first written.99  The British 
government viewed the appeal to the Privy Council as a vital expression of 
Commonwealth unity and British judicial supremacy within the Dominions.100  It 
derived from the Judicial Committee Act of 1844, which gave statutory validity to the 
right of the crown to hear appeals from any colonial court.101  The British government 
wanted the Privy Council to be seen, and act, as the supreme court of the empire and 
dominions.  Collins and Griffith had objected to the appeals procedure on the grounds 
that three of the judges of the Privy Council were vehemently unionist and opposed to 
Irish self-determination; Lord Carson, Lord Sumner and Lord Cave.  Judges who 
already expressed strong views on the Irish constitution might be invited to interpret 
that constitution.  The British government had offered an assurance that in any 
controversy of a political nature on Irish appeals these judges would be considered as 
disqualified and stand aside.102  A further assurance was offered that in an Irish case 
the procedures would follow the more restrictive South African rather than Canadian 
precedent; that is an appeal to proceed would require that it be permitted by the Irish 
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Supreme Court and would be only in cases that affected a great number of people.103  
Around the time that TOPA was being formed the judicial committee had already 
breached these understandings by hearing the case of Lynham vs Butler, which dealt 
with the powers of the Irish land commissioners.104   At the 1926 Imperial Conference 
the appeal to the Privy Council came under fire from both Canada and the Free 
State.105  The existence of such an appeal, and its exercise, was considered an insult to 
the Irish Supreme Court and the competency of the Irish judiciary.  By appealing the 
Supreme Court decision to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the civil 
service of the Irish Free State, through TOPA and Messrs Wigg-Cochrane, was asking 
a British court to overturn the Irish Supreme Court’s interpretation of article 10 of the 
Treaty and thereby undermining the Irish Supreme Court and Irish national 
sovereignty.   
 The appeal to the Privy Council, heard by Lord Cave (despite the assurances 
offered in June 1922) along with Lords Haldane, Finlay, Dundedin and Shaw, went 
even better than it could have been imagined.  The Privy Council decision, delivered 
3rd May 1927, overturned the Supreme Court decision and gave Wigg-Cochrane the 
compensation and pensions they had demanded by agreeing that the rights of the 
transferred officers were constitutional rights.  The claims of the civil servants rested 
on the Treaty, the Transfer of Functions Order of 1922 and the Constitution of the 
Irish Free State, and not on any superannuation act.  In response to the government 
argument that the Civil Service Committee had never been established and therefore 
the power of the committee reverted to the Minister of Finance, the judges found that 
the powers in fact reverted to the courts, which were the proper authority to determine 
constitutional rights.  The judges also found that the Treasury minute of March 1922 
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was not binding as the civil service had been transferred to the provisional 
government on that date.  As a coup de grace the judges also found that the over-
riding maximum was unfair as it allowed a pension to fluctuate downwards but 
limited its upward movement.106 
This judgement sent shock waves through the governments in Dublin and in 
London.  Under the British administration civil servants were by law employed “at the 
pleasure of His Majesty” and status and pensions were by gift rather by right.  It was 
also the British view that the Irish Free State was not the creation of revolution but 
was a devolved government, created by Westminster legislation, continuous with the 
former administration.  The Privy Council decision implied that the Irish Free State 
was in fact a break with the former British administration.  Far more seriously, from a 
financial point of view, the decision also meant there was now a group of civil 
servants within the British and Irish system whose status and security were far 
superior to their colleagues and were in fact under-pinned by constitutional 
guarantees.  The law lords had determined that transferred civil servants now enjoyed 
a status far better than any they would have enjoyed had there never been a Treaty and 
were now entitled to more favourable treatment than they would have enjoyed had 
they remained under the British administration or had they been recently recruited in 
the civil service of the Free State.  The British associations were themselves intrigued 
by civil servants successfully suing the state and extracting explicit legal guarantees 
as to their rights.107 
For the Dublin government the decision of the Privy Council was the last 
straw.  The Wigg-Cochrane decision was now far more than a dispute about pensions.  
In fact most of the civil servants that had applied to retire under Article 10 had 
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accepted the decision of the committee and there were only about four hundred 
disputed cases outstanding.108  The right to resign as a consequence of the change of 
government had a seven-year limit and would run out in December 1929.  There was 
a reasonable fear that the civil service might now see a rapid collapse over the next 
year as officials seized upon the Wigg-Cochrane decision to retire on what were 
extraordinarily favourable terms.   
But the main objection to the Wigg-Cochrane decision was on constitutional 
grounds.  The Irish government had already objected at the Commonwealth 
conferences to the claims of the Privy Council to act as an imperial supreme court.  
By the Wigg-Cochrane decision the Privy Council, dominated by the most reactionary 
of the Tory legal establishment, now claimed an authority to interpret the Treaty itself 
against the Irish Supreme Court.  The government’s argument that the Treaty, in the 
words of Michael Collins, gave the “freedom to achieve freedom” now rang hollow.  
Even before the decision of the judicial committee Blythe announced that the 
government had no intention of complying with the decisions of a ‘bad, useless and 
unnecessary court’ whilst other deputies attacked the ‘disloyal, unpatriotic and 
rapacious civil servants’.109   
 However, constitutionally eccentric as the decision may have been, neither the 
British nor the Irish governments could simply ignore it.  Blythe’s response was 
uncharacteristically terse, ‘The judgement in the Wigg-Cochrane appeal raises not 
merely financial but constitutional questions, and I think a quick decision is not to be 
looked for’.110  Whilst the Irish government was primarily engaged on the 
constitutional aspects of the decision the British government was itself quite alarmed 
at the Privy Council decision that some civil servants would be better treated and have 
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definite rights as a result of the Treaty. Clearly it was to the advantage of both 
governments to come to an understanding on the way of retreat from the decision.  
Both governments were also trying to ignore the fact that the compensation terms of 
Article 10 of the Treaty and the eighth schedule of the 1920 act were not in any sense 
part of the superannuation code, which of course remained the responsibility of the 
Treasury or Minister of Finance, but were part of the Treaty.   
The Irish civil service, through TOPA and the CSF, looked for assistance from 
the British civil service organisations, though it might have preferred that the British 
Confederation did not couch its support with such an enthusiastically imperialistic 
resolution; 
 That this meeting of the executive Committee of the Civil Service 
Confederation accords its full support to those ex-British Civil Servants 
who are resisting the action of the Irish Free State Government and the 
British Government in seeking to avoid the consequences of the Privy 
Council judgment in the Wigg-Cochrane case.  It is of the opinion that 
such action raises the following vital issues:- 
(1) The effect of such legislation on the constitutional legal fabric of the 
British Empire. 
(2) The question whether the parliament should usurp the power of the Courts 
in interpreting Statutes. 
(3) The denial of justice to those who adopt the ordinary legal procedure of 
the Empire. 
(4) The refusal of the rights under the Treaty to Civil Servants; and that for 
these reasons the contemplated action should not be proceeded with by the 
respective governments’.111  
 
 On 22 February 1928 Blythe announced to the Dáil the government’s response to the 
decision of the Privy Council was to re-constitute the Wylie Committee as a statutory 
rather than an advisory committee, to apply the controversial Treasury minute and to 
make its decision absolute.112  In short the government would ignore the decision of 
the Privy Council.  The next day Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the 
                                                
111 Warwick University MRC, mss 232/ civil service confederation, seventh annual report 1927-1928. 
112Dáil Éireann debates, vol.22, col. 109, 22 Feb. 1928. 
 335 
Dominions, in a statement that precisely echoed that of Blythe’s, told the House of 
Commons that it was clearly inequitable that the transferred civil servants of the Irish 
Free State should receive more favourable treatment than if they had remained in the 
British civil service and, as the decision of the Privy Council did not reflect the 
intention of those who made the Treaty, it would co-operate with the Irish 
government’s intent to change the law so that the decision of the Privy Council would 
be avoided.  This was an extraordinary statement as the interpretation of statute law 
(the Treaty was statute law) lay with the courts and not parliament.  The British civil 
service associations continued to take a keen interest in the struggle between the 
courts and the government, touching as it did on the authority of the Treasury over the 
salaries and conditions of the civil service.113    The Civil Service Confederation took 
up the Wigg-Cochrane case with the British Labour Party, which was actually rather 
wary of the issue and would go no further than saying that the Irish civil service must 
be no worse off as a result of the Treaty, which was precisely the view of the Irish 
government.114   
At this point the Irish government, instead of pressing ahead with this agreed 
strategy, allowed itself to be drawn into a farcical pantomime the point of which was 
to allow the British government to escape the consequences of defying the Privy 
Council decision.  Carson, the former Ulster Unionist leader, took up the cause of the 
civil servants.  What offended him was that the two governments were clearly 
conspiring to alter the terms of compensation without consulting the aggrieved party, 
the civil servants themselves.  In April, in an acrimonious debate in the House of 
Lords on the decision, with sharp exchanges between Carson and the law lords, Lord 
Birkenhead (F.E. Smith, one of the British signatories of the Treaty) solemnly 
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announced to the assembled Lords that the recently deceased Lord Cave, who had 
delivered the controversial judgement, had summoned the Prime Minister to his 
deathbed and confessed to him that the judgement in the Wigg-Cochrane case was 
wrong in law and that his conscience could not allow him to die without discharging 
the painful duty of admitting his error.  The Marquess of Reading then rose to suggest 
that the Privy Council be asked to reconsider the opinion expressed earlier and thus 
allow the error to be corrected without the necessity of legislation and debate.115  
Cave had indeed been troubled about the Wigg-Cochrane case, not because it was 
wrong but because a draftsman had made an error in the written judgement referring 
to the question of the mode of calculating the bonus and the date on which the civil 
service had actually been transferred.  On the essential point of the rightness of 
Meredith’s judgement, Cave had signalled no doubts whatever.  But, having died in 
late March, he was not there to contradict Birkenhead.116  Rather than insisting that 
the law in the Irish Free State is that of its Supreme Court the Irish government 
allowed itself to be persuaded to return once again to plead in a court it had already 
rejected as bad, useless and an infringement of national sovereignty.  Once again the 
Privy Council heard the case and once again, contrary to the naïve expectations of 
both governments, it found for Wigg-Cochrane and against the Irish executive.117   
The government might fulminate that the civil servants were not going to get a 
farthing more than they were entitled to under the Supreme Court decision but clearly 
the pension entitlements of transferred officers need to be taken out of the courts and 
dealt with by legislation.  Any legislation would have to be agreed between the Irish 
government, the British government (because any new law on Article 10 would be a 
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renegotiation of the Treaty) and the transferred Irish civil servants (to persuade them 
to abandon further litigation).  Finally, reluctantly and with bad grace the Irish 
government sat down to negotiate with, rather than bully, the civil service.118 
Complex negotiations began between the Irish government and TOPA and 
between the Irish government and the British government.119  The result of these 
negotiations was the Civil Service (Transferred Officers) Compensation Act 1929.  
This act was paralleled by the British Irish Free State (Confirmation of Agreement) 
Act, 1929 [20 Geo. 5, c.4].  These two acts were, in constitutional terms, a re-
negotiation of Article 10 of the Treaty by the British and Irish governments by which 
the Irish government conceded the better terms won by the Wigg-Cochrane case and 
the British government agreed to repay to the Irish government the additional moneys 
involved.120  This little-known case was in fact the first revision of the hitherto 
sacrosanct Treaty.   
Under the 1929 Act a statutory committee of a judge, representatives of the 
Minister of Finance and representatives of the transferred officers, was established 
with sole jurisdiction to determine compensation under Article 10.  Written into the 
Act were the retirement conditions of the 1920 Act, thus securing the better terms of 
the 1920 Act for civil servants.  Picking up the cost of these higher awards was the 
British government who agreed to compensate the Irish government for the “excess” 
in the pension bill.121  Thus honour was saved and the Irish, if not the British, public 
purse left no lighter after nearly ten years of litigation and frustration.  Finally a 
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definite resolution had emerged to the whole vexed issue of civil service pensions but 
it left a residue of hostility to the civil service within the Dáil and public opinion.122   
The Wigg-Cochrane case spurred on the government to mount a consistent 
attack at the Commonwealth conference on the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council as a court ‘obnoxious because it is an extra-State institution exercising 
judicial control over the internal affairs of the State without any form of democratic 
sanction’.123  During the debate on the Civil Service (Transferred Officers) 
Compensation Act Blythe had argued that the bad decision in the Wigg-Cochrane 
appeal illustrated the anti-Irish bias on the English bench and that it ‘has become more 
and more clear every day that this appeal to the Privy Council is an anomaly’.124  The 
British government refused to yield to demands to abolish the appeal to the Privy 
Council, the last institution that made the Commonwealth a legal rather than simply a 
diplomatic unit and it was a Fianna Fáil government that finally deleted the right to 
appeal from the Free State constitution in 1933.125  The final irony of the Wigg-
Cochrane case was that in an appeal brought by the British government the Fianna 
Fáil decision to forbid appeals beyond the Irish Supreme Court was declared lawful 
by the same Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.126    
 The compensation panel finally assembled in early January 1930 under Judge 
Cahir Davitt, the son of the Land League founder and a judge in the revolutionary 
courts of the 1919-22 period.  The tribunal expected to deal with about 1,600 cases, 
many of them of civil servants who had retired but whose compensation and pensions 
had been delayed by the Wigg-Cochrane case.127  Blythe appointed Messrs Boland, 
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Doolin, Redmond and Leydon to represent the Department of Finance.  A panel of 
twenty-five nominees represented the civil service trade unions and organisations.128  
In dealing with any case the court was limited to five members, two each for the 
department and the civil service along with Davitt the Chairman.  The very first case 
was the high profile Drennan, the Secretary of the Land Commission.  Judge Davitt 
treated his case with great courtesy and care. However, as the months dragged on and 
the cases of the lower ranks of the civil service were being dealt with, the tone of 
Judge Davitt became more caustic and sneering.  As he was a government appointee 
there is no reason to doubt that in doing this he was faithfully reflecting the official 
mind.129  Lowly postmen and junior civil servants, many of them women, had to 
endure sarcasm and heckling from Judge Davitt.  He rubbished the logical argument 
that as the Fianna Fáil party were committed to destroying the Treaty, and as they 
were likely to form the next government, it was reasonable to assume that the 
guarantees contained in article 10 would not long survive such a change of 
government.130  Davitt was particularly sneering when dealing with the stock claim 
made by nearly all applicants (who echoed mantra-like the phrase of Article 10) that 
their wish to retire was “due to the change of government”.  The national and 
provincial press picked up and echoed his hostility.  The Clare Champion 
editorialised against the ‘lickspittle British-backed civil servants’ as offering 
gratuitous insults to the elected representatives of the ‘unfortunate people who will 
have to pay out to them money that has not been earned’.131  It was true most of the 
applicants simply wanted to seize an opportunity that few would let pass, to retire 
early on a decent pension and enjoy a life of leisure.  However there was also a 
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general feeling that the service had become degraded, supervision stricter (if not 
bullying), hours longer and pay shorter under the Free State with every sign that the 
future under Fianna Fáil would be worse.  As one inarticulate woman telegraphist, 
who simply wanted out, put it ‘it is atmospheric conditions’.132  Davitt was ruthless in 
interpreting the terms under which retirement was claimed and the civil service 
unions, who had bought in, could not opt out.  By the end of March the court had 
heard 461 cases and allowed only 250, rejecting 160 with 51 withdrawn.  Thus nearly 
one half of all cases ended up either withdrawn or rejected.133 
The complaints of the civil servants at the Davitt court reflect the 
transformation of the Irish civil service from an informal, casual and poorly 
supervised collection of Boards to a centralised and ruthlessly-driven state machine.  
The nostalgia that many felt for the old days of the British regime was however 
misplaced for those days had long passed in Britain as well as Ireland.  For the 
professional grades in Britain the expected benefits of the 1920s Reorganisation, the 
Whitley Councils and the Civil Service Arbitration Board had all had proved illusory.  
An attempt to force a re-grading of the professional classes was resisted by the 
Official Side with irrelevant and evasive arguments or simply blank refusals.  The 
final report on re-grading the professional classes of the British civil service, 
delivered in 1925 after one hundred and fifty-seven meetings, offered meagre 
improvements.134  The Whitley Councils were far less successful than the Irish civil 
service liked to imagine.  Meetings were either chilly gatherings of the mute or red 
hot rows due to Official Side resistance to the whole concept of negotiation.135  Nor 
was the gain of a Civil Service Arbitration Board any more useful than the Whitley 
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Councils.  In 1922 the “Geddes Axe” that aimed to secure cuts in government costs 
simply and unilaterally abolished the Arbitration Board.136  It was restored in 1925 
after a political campaign by the civil service unions, but without Official Side 
approbation it proved ineffective.137  
The time and effort of the Wigg-Cochrane case had the effect of identifying 
the civil service organisations with those civil servants who were retiring and 
therefore being of little relevance to the vast majority that were staying on.  The 
CSCA, which was the largest organisation of the lower grades, virtually ignored the 
judgement.  Civil service organisations had won the battle on the rights of retiring 
civil servants, but lost the war on the rights of those who continued to serve.  As soon 
as the case was won the pillar upon which civil service unity had been built collapsed, 
undermined by the extent of its success.  The Privy Council awarded the civil servants 
all of the costs incurred in fighting the case.  The Irish Treaty Pensioners Association 
that had initiated and first put up funding for the struggle accused TOPA of pocketing 
the award of costs and allowing the Pensioners Association share to ‘go west’.138  The 
IPCS in turn sneeringly described the Pensioners Association as a bankrupt 
organisation dependent on the “serving service” to find the money to establish its 
right to jump ship and retire on pension.139    
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FIANNA FÁIL AND THE CIVIL SERVICE 
 
The year1931 was one of reinvigorated organisation and protest in the Irish civil 
service.  The renewal of campaigning was a response to economic depression, the 
example of successful agitation by British civil servants and the prospect of a general 
election in which the pay and conditions of civil servants would be an issue.  In 1931 
the economic situation in Ireland was bleak.  The 1929 Wall street crash had become 
a global depression cutting off emigration, then running at 33,000 a year, and 
therefore raising unemployment.  A bad harvest, stagnation in trade and a decline in 
tax revenues led to fears of a budgetary crisis.  The Department of Finance urged 
reductions in pensions and in the pay of teachers, civil guards and army both as a step 
toward a balanced budget and as a signal to employers to reduce pay and salaries in 
the private sector.1   
In Britain, in response to civil service agitation, the Labour minority 
government elected in 1929 set up the Tomlin Royal Commission to inquire into and 
report on the structure and organisation of the civil service, its recruitment and 
remuneration; on differential rates of pay for men and for women; on arbitration 
machinery and on conditions of retirement from the civil service.  Whilst the Tomlin 
committee investigation continued the Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed to 
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postpone the reduction in bonus due when the British cost-of-living figure fell from 
65 to 60.   
Many of the Irish civil servants still looked to the British service, from which 
they had been severed for less than ten years, as the standard for comparisons in 
conditions and the model for organisation.  Hence the Tomlin Commission was 
followed closely and its conclusions examined.2  Tomlin’s report, published in the 
summer of 1931, to the bitter disappointment of the British civil service, rejected 
almost all of their claims.  However on the issue of the war bonus Tomlin accepted 
that analogous employments outside the civil service did not have their salaries 
fluctuating in accordance with changes in the cost of living and that there was no 
good reason for continuing to fix the wages of the civil service on a basis different to 
that generally adopted in other employments.  He recommended that the bonus system 
should be abolished and the bonus and basic pay be consolidated into a single salary.  
For civil servants in Ireland watching the British agitation this in itself was a 
significant advance and one they were determined to achieve for themselves. 
The renewed agitation within the Irish civil service was driven by William 
Norton of the POWU, Archie Heron of the CSCA and T.J. Hughes of the CSF, who 
all jointly led the cross-service Cost-of-Living Bonus Joint Committee.  More than 
anything else it was the campaign for a fairer bonus forged unity and fighting spirit 
across the civil service.  A republican veteran of 1916 who was married to James 
Connolly’s daughter Ina, a northern Protestant, and a Labour party activist, Archie 
Heron had become the full-time general secretary of the CSCA in December 1928.3  
The appointment of Heron was in response to the subtle, and less than subtle, 
intimidation visited on the CSCA executive by H.P. Boland.  It was felt that a 
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permanent general secretary would be free to talk as an equal with the senior civil 
servants.  The CSCA also decided to publish a monthly journal as a vehicle for 
information and to heighten its profile.4 The journal, An Peann, was a quality 
production with regular reports on branches, executive council meetings, meetings 
with officials, Dáil reports, updates on the fortunes of civil service in other countries, 
pieces in Gaelic and regular reports of civil service sports activity.   
Together Norton, Hughes and Heron organised a mass demonstration by the 
civil service in opposition to the government cuts in the cost-of-living bonus.5  In 
December 1929 Norton invited Heron and Hughes, along with the IPCS, to join 
together in a new permanent Joint Council of Civil Service Organisations.6  The 
emergence of Norton and Heron as leaders marks a new strategy for civil service 
agitation.  In the absence of an arbitration forum they decided that the issue of the cost 
of living bonus would be politicised by lobbying TDs to support the single demand 
for a new calculation of the bonus figure.  Blythe was to be harassed by constant 
questioning by sympathetic, well-briefed Labour and other deputies.  An Peann urged 
all civil servants to question candidates in the next general election on their attitudes 
and policies on civil service pay, an action that was censured by the cabinet as overtly 
political.7  At the same time a publicity campaign on civil service pay and conditions 
was launched aimed at the newspapers to educate public opinion.  The Department of 
Finance was sufficiently alarmed at this very public washing of dirty linen to caution 
the civil service representatives not to write to the press on official matters.   The 
                                                
4 Ibid., vol. 1, no. 1, Sept. 1927. 
5 Ibid., vol.111, no.3, Nov 1929. 
6 CSCA, executive council minutes, 19 Dec 1929. 
7 NAI, CAB 1/3, ’30 July 1931’. 
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correspondence was interpreted as a clumsy attempt at censorship and, of course, 
immediately published in the civil service journal.8    
In August 1930 a cross-party deputation of TDs and senators met the Minister 
for Finance to urge that he meet the cross-service Joint Committee.  The delegation 
included the Cumann na nGaedheal TDs Peader Doyle and T.P. Hennessy; the Fianna 
Fáil TDs Sean Lemass and Gerry Boland and T.J. O’Connell and Senator Thomas 
Johnson of the Labour Party.9  Blythe, whilst indicating a willingness to discuss these 
issues with the civil service, stuck by his refusal to meet any representative of the civil 
service who was not himself a civil servant.  The problem was that Archie Heron and 
William Norton were both full-time union organisers, and not civil servants.  Blythe 
maintained that as non-civil servants they would have access to confidential 
information but would not be bound by the rules of secrecy and disclosure that 
ordinarily covered public servants.  The more pressing reason was that, as was 
becoming evident, both Heron and Norton were gifted organisers and skilled 
negotiators.10  H.P. Boland, who clearly had a fetish about controlling access to the 
minister, had suggested that the service representation might be recast on the model of 
Northern Ireland.  There the departments directly elected their delegates, emasculating 
the associations.11   
The campaign around which the civil service was successfully building a new 
cross-service unity was on the operation of the “war bonus” and the demand for an 
arbitration board.  When the bonus had been first determined in 1920 it stood at 130, 
that is the purchasing power of £100 in 1914 was represented by £230 in 1920.  
However only the lower civil service salaries were fully compensated for this inflation 
                                                
8 CSRC, minutes 28 March 1930; Iris, May 1930. 
9 Ibid., 29 Aug 1930. 
10 NAI, CAB 1/3, ’31 Dec 1930’. 
11 NAI, department of finance, E107/12/25, ‘HPB memorandum on SCRC’ 17 May 1932. 
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by a bonus of 130 per cent.  As part of the contribution of the civil service to restoring 
the national economy, higher officers had their bonus reduced therefore forgoing full 
compensation.  Only the first £91.5.0 of a civil servant’s salary attracted the full 130 
per cent bonus; the next £108.15.0 received 60 per cent and the next £300.0.0 
received 45 per cent.  These rates had been further cut by the “supercut” of September 
1921.  The bonus had risen initially but with the onset of the post-war depression, and 
especially as prices collapsed after the great depression following the Wall Street 
crash, the bonus had fallen.  A civil servant on a basic salary of £300 had, in July 
1920, an inclusive salary of £537 because of the application of the war bonus.  By 
July 1925 that had fallen to an inclusive salary of £467.  A civil servant on a basic 
salary of £500 in July 1920 got an inclusive salary of £831.  By July 1925 this had 
fallen to £733.  Thus civil servants’ actual income had declined year on year since the 
foundation of the state. This decline had initially been most severe for those on higher 
salaries because of the “supercut” of 1921 but since then the application of periodic 
percentage cuts, rather than lump sum cuts, had particularly hit the lower paid.  In 
addition the civil service, since the foundation of the state, had also to accept the 
general increase in income taxation and longer hours of work with shorter holidays.12  
An extraordinary innovation was introduced in 1925 when the government imposed a 
differential scale for married and unmarried civil servants whereby single men and 
women were paid less than married men, who also got an additional allowance for 
any children.13           
   In March 1931 the Labour deputies Richard Sidney Anthony of Cork 
Borough, who had seen off a challenge by a National Labour candidate, and William 
Davin, the poll-topper in Leix-Offaly, brought forward in the Dáil the motion ‘that in 
                                                
12 Iris, July 1931. 
13 NAI, department of finance, E.109/13/26 “civil service staffs memorandum on numbers, pay and 
allowances for travelling and subsistence”.  
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view of the discontent prevalent amongst the lower grades in the Civil Service, the 
Dáil is of the opinion that the Executive Council should set up a Commission of 
Enquiry to investigate and report on the present method of computation of the cost-of-
living bonus and its application to civil servants’ salaries and wages’.14  Fianna Fáil 
had straddled the fence in the populist anti-civil servant campaigns being driven by 
provincial newspapers, farmer organisations, chambers of commerce and some local 
authorities, by combining attacks on the pay of higher civil servants with sympathy 
for the lowly paid staff under them.  In February 1927 the party newspaper The 
Nation whilst insisting on the absolute necessity of reductions in the size and cost of 
the public service, using 1914 as the datum line for numbers and salaries, was sure 
that cuts of a general application were more welcome than ‘the dismissal of some 
poor struggling, perhaps temporary, officials’.15  In the Dáil debate on the Anthony 
and Davin motion it was the Fianna Fáil speakers made the best speeches.  Anthony 
tended to ramble off the subject and be repetitive in his speech though he did manage 
to make the point that the fundamental problem was the absence of any acceptable 
form of conciliation and arbitration within the civil service.  MacEntee and Lemass 
spoke on the Fianna Fáil side in speeches that were sharply focused and well 
researched.  MacEntee made the point that an inequitable and unfair method for 
calculating the government’s cost-of-living figures had an impact on the industrial 
relations between all employers and employees throughout the country and not just 
within the state service.  He then went on to discuss the historic roots of the cost-of-
living figure to show that it never had any scientific or defensible method for its 
calculation, that it was based on the household accounts of a few unrepresentative 
working class families, that a representative budget from the household of a civil 
                                                
14 Dáil Éireann Debates, vol.37, col 978, 4 Mar. 1931. 
15 The Nation, 5 Feb 1929, quoted in Iris, vol.7,2 (Feb 1929). 
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servant had not been attempted and that the demand that it be re-examined was 
therefore eminently reasonable.  Lemass in turn attacked the fact that the minister, by 
refusing to deal with the service in a reasonable manner and create acceptable forms 
of arbitration, had forced the civil service into public agitation and allowed the 
question to be politicised.  Both Fianna Fáil speakers drew a distinction between what 
MacEntee called the ‘private and corporals in the cuff and collar brigade’ and the 
higher civil servants.  Lemass explicitly gave it as party policy that though the lower 
grades were being shabbily treated many of the higher civil servants were being paid 
far too much and that the party would seek to level out salaries.  Blythe and Gilligan, 
the Minister for Industry and Commerce, spoke for the government.  Blythe, perhaps 
still smarting from the Wigg-Cochrane case, insisted that the cost-of-living bonus was 
part of the inherited conditions of the transferred officers and that any attempt to 
change it would simply unravel the while issue of their Treaty rights; good or bad 
they were stuck with it.  That the Whitley Councils and the arbitration board were also 
inherited conditions was ignored.  The government ministers both drove home the 
point that the civil servants’ real objective was the restoration of the Whitey Councils, 
and this they were not going to get.  The motion was defeated 57 to 42 but the 
grievances of the civil service got a good airing and Fianna Fáil gave every sign that a 
better deal could be expected from them.16  The civil service demand for an 
investigation into the cost-of-living bonus and for an arbitration board had also 
received a degree of support in the national newspapers.17  What the debate had failed 
to clarify was that the objection of the civil service was not to the method of 
calculating the bonus but rather to its application.  In particular they objected to the 
                                                
16Dáil Éireann debates, vol.37, cols 979-89, 4 Mar. 1931; vol.39, cols 144-60, 10 June; cols 288-321, 
11 June; cols 338-55, 12 June 1931. 
17 Iris, July 1931. 
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diminution in the upper end of salary scales by the reduction in the proportion of 
salary entitled to full compensation for the rise in the index. 
The civil service joint committee decided to step up the campaign against the 
bonus cut through well-publicised mass meetings of the civil service.18  With the end 
of the seven-year transition period the Treaty right to retire ‘as a consequence of the 
change of government’ had ended.  The threat of mass resignation, however unreal it 
might have been in reality, was no longer available.19  The agitation would include 
high profile public meetings of the impoverished wives and families of civil servants 
with advertisements in the press, placards, sandwich men and handbills. The CSCA 
also brought the issue to the ITUC.  With a further cut in the bonus due at the 
beginning of September a mass meeting of civil servants was called at the 
Metropolitan Hall in Abbey Street Dublin.  The meeting, addressed by Norton, 
Hughes and Heron passed the motion that, ‘having regard to the hardship involved, 
especially in the case of the lower paid classes, calls for the suspension of the 
impending reduction in the cost of living bonus and an immediate inquiry into the 
coat of living index figure and its application the Civil Service’.  The meeting also 
asked that ‘steps should be taken to institute suitable conciliation and arbitration 
machinery for the Service’.20  The journal of the CSCA An Peann maintained the 
campaign, carrying articles and letters critical of the government record on pay and 
promotions and urging members to come out in support of the Labour Party in the 
next general election.  There the campaign focussed on the demand for an inquiry into 
the war bonus and the method of its calculation.  It would have wiser, as we shall see, 
to have concentrated on the application of the bonus, rather than its calculation.      
                                                
18 CSCA, special delegate conference minutes, 5 Dec 1930; An Peann vol.iii, no.12, Aug 1930. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Iris, vol.9 no.9 (Sept. 1931). 
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In November 1931 Blythe proposed to meet a projected deficit of £900,000 by 
a combination of increased taxes along with cuts in the salaries of the public service.  
Before the cuts could be implemented the government dissolved the Dáil and called a 
general election.  The governing Cumann na nGaedheal party campaigned on a shrill 
anti-communist law and order platform.  Fianna Fáil on the other hand campaigned on 
economic development, an end to emigration and full employment.  As part of this 
strategy of concentrating on economic issues, Fianna Fáil introduced the threatened 
cuts in civil service pay as an election issue.21  In a speech in Rathmines in Dublin 
South, a middle class suburban constituency where many civil servants lived and 
where Seán Lemass was the party candidate, de Valera promised that though public 
service pay would have to be examined those civil servants on salaries below £300 or 
£400 a year would not be cut.  Furthermore he stated it as his belief that ‘it is only 
right that there should be an Arbitration Board for the Civil Service to deal with 
matters between the Service and Executive.  We would be prepared to agree that an 
Arbitration Board be set up and would assent to an inquiry into the basis on which the 
cost-of-living bonus was calculated’.22  Fianna Fáil’s courting of the public service 
was in part a reassuring gesture towards civil service fears (fears that were shared 
with the army and the Gardaí) that if elected it would be a target for attack by the 
former anti-Treatyites.  But it was primarily a shrewd attempt to win the support of 
the massed lower ranks of an increasingly disgruntled civil service.  The threatened 
cuts in salaries, the generally sympathetic attitude of Fianna Fáil, along with the 
promise of an arbitration board meant that most civil servants welcomed the change 
of government in February 1932, especially as the minority Fianna Fáil government 
depended on the support of the Labour Party, now led by William Norton of the 
                                                
21 T.J.O’Connell, 100 Years of Progress: the story of the Irish national Teachers’ Organisation 1868-
1968 (Dublin, 1968), pp 265-6. 
22 Irish Press 2 Feb. 1932 
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POWU.23  The election of Fianna Fáil also marks an end to the crisis of the state that 
began in 1886.  For the first time since 1886 a government was elected that reflected 
the popular vote of a people and since was 1918 was free of intimidation and the 
threat of war.    
   Speaking in the Dáil, Sean Lemass once described Fianna Fáil as the ‘slightly 
constitutional’ party.24  Entry to power was quickly to prove that it was also only 
slightly a revolutionary party.  Initially de Valera moved to assure the senior civil 
servants that he had no intention of dismissing any of them and that Fianna Fáil were 
not about to introduce a spoils system into public service employment.  De Valera 
was at the time under intense pressure from the IRA to purge the civil service of the 
old regime.25  However, unlike the Cumann na nGaedheal government, Fianna Fáil 
shared with the civil service associations a dislike of the senior civil servants in the 
Department of Finance; men described by MacEntee as ‘intensely hostile to Fianna 
Fáil…unalterably and fanatically attached to the English interest’.26  In Tod Andrews’ 
more colourful description they were seen as ‘a crowd of Free State bastards’.27  De 
Valera was himself afraid that the civil service would not cooperate with Fianna Fáil 
government and had prepared a list of former students of Blackrock and Rockwell 
Colleges, now in the civil service, on whom he felt he could rely.28  John Moynihan, 
assistant editor of the Irish Press and not a civil servant, was brought in to head the 
President’s Department.29  But in fact the only civil servant dismissed by Fianna Fáil 
                                                
23 NAI, CAB 1/3 30 July 1931; Regan, Counter-Revolution, pp295-6. 
24Dáil Éireann debates, vol.22 col. 1615, 21 Mar. 1928. 
25 MacMahon, Republicans and Imperialists, pp23-7. 
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was E.P. McCarron in local government, and that was not until late in 1936 and 
reflected personal difficulties with his minister rather than with the government.30  
Fianna Fáil did move quickly to placate one group; the dismissed civil 
servants of the civil war period.  After the most cursory examination of their case a 
committee reinstated those civil servants of republican sympathies who had been 
dismissed or had resigned from the British government, or from Dáil Éireann, the 
Provisional Government or Saorstát Éireann.31  The declaration of allegiance to the 
state that had been demanded of civil servants by the previous government was 
dropped.  Also the preference that had been accorded to ex-members of the army in 
public service employment was discontinued.32  Many civil servants welcomed 
indications of the end of the dominance that the Department of Finance previously 
enjoyed.33  The May 1932 budget, far from retrenching, promised increases in road-
building, housing, unemployment benefit and pensions. 
 The Fianna Fáil government moved to meet their commitments to the 
civil service on the bonus and on an arbitration board.  Two committees were 
announced, a committee to enquire into the principles and methods of the calculation 
of the cost of living index figure under Senator Thomas Johnson, the former Labour 
Party leader, and a Commission to enquire into ‘the method by which arbitration can 
best be applied for the settlement of questions relating to pay and conditions of 
service’ under Joseph Brennan, former secretary of the Department of Finance.34  The 
department had tried to limit the brief of the Brennan commission to ‘the machinery 
for discussion and settlement of questions relating to pay and other conditions of 
                                                
30 Daly, The Buffer State, 163-7. 
31 NAI, CAB1/4, ‘5 July 1932;  S.3406 H “committee of inquiry into resigned or dismissed civil 
servants”. 
32 Ibid., 12 Mar., 5 July 1932; 
33 Fanning, Department of Finance, 216-8 
34 NAI, CAB 1/4 12 Apr., 2&13 May 1932 
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service’ so the explicit reference to arbitration seemed to signal a victory for the staff 
over the department.35 
The promise, as it seemed, of a new era of state-civil service relations 
galvanised the civil service associations.  The CSCA now dominated the organisation 
of the lower grades.  The POWU had of course their own general secretary Norton 
elected to the Dáil as a Labour TD.  The IPCS April 1932 annual general meeting saw 
earnest speeches on the valuable contribution made by civil servants to the state and a 
long discussion on the future policy of the Institution.  Membership numbers began to 
climb again with new members joining from across the service.36  The IPCS met with 
the CSF to compare their proposals for an arbitration scheme and bring them both into 
line so as to ensure the maximum of cross service unanimity in meetings with the 
Brennan Commission.  At the same time the IPCS executive circularising the 
membership to obtain data on family budgets and increased costs since 1922 for 
submission to the Johnson Committee.37 
Neither of these commissions lived up to the hopes of the civil service.  There 
was disappointment that the Johnson commission had a narrow brief that precluded 
examining the application of the cost of living bonus rather than simply its 
calculation.  Any examination of its application would have to look at the injustice of 
the reductions in bonus at the higher salaries.  The campaign by the civil service 
associations failed to make this distinction clear.  Instead their campaign seemed to 
suggest that they suffered because the index was based on a working class rather than 
middle class budget with the attendant extras of insurance, higher rents and the cost of 
maidservants.38   
                                                
35 Ibid., 12 Apr., 13 May 1932. 
36 IPCS (Ireland) council minutes, agm 28 April 1932; 13 May, 3, 24 & 26 June 1932.  
37 Ibid., 24 June, 26 July14 Sept. 1932. 
38 NAI, Brennan commission BC/4, 2 Aug 1934, for Brunicardi’s discussion of his household budget. 
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At the Brennan commission hearings Boland worked to keep the discussion 
confined to the abstract principle of determining responsibility within the state for the 
civil service.  He was quite prepared to admit that what he termed ‘the fleshpots of 
Whitleyism’ were of great value to the civil servant, but he was also absolutely sure 
that it was bad for the state.  The ability to make decisions ought to be reserved to the 
highest circles of the state and it would be unacceptable that lower staff should have a 
hand in that process.  It was in this light also that Boland chose to explain the 
objection to a non-civil servant acting as a representative of the civil service.  Boland 
also suggested, without being explicit, that Whitleyism was a relict of the former 
British regime and that the demand for it was primarily from transferred officers who 
pined for the old days.   
Boland was prepared to talk at length about the problems that might arise, but 
it was clear that the main problem was that there was no mechanism by which a non-
civil servant could be controlled by the state.  To admit a right to the civil service to 
decision-making, or to choosing its own representative, would be a surrender of 
control by the state.39   Lord Glenavy ( Gordon Campbell, secretary of the Department 
of Industry and Commerce) was dismissive of this abstract argument and was quite 
clear that the problem was that the civil service had no access to the minister, mainly 
because of Boland, though he did not make this explicit.  William O’Brien, the doyen 
of the service, tended to agree with Glenavy and cited the view of the customs staff 
that the reports of the CSRC were always treated with silent contempt by finance.  
O’Brien, who had run a department under the old regime, felt that the administration 
of the Free State had become utterly centralised under finance and matters that would 
                                                
39 Ibid., BC/1, 20 and 26 Jan 1933. 
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have been decided at departmental level before were now entirely in the hands of 
finance.40   
The staff side representatives, on the other hand, kept their contributions 
focused on concrete issues of salary levels and their determination.  They scotched 
Boland’s assertion that the civil service was well paid compared with other similar 
employments, as well as the “article of faith” that civil service conditions were 
inherited from the British regime and were preserved by article 10 of the Treaty and 
any interference would be unconstitutional.  The view of the association 
representatives was that the state ought to be a model employer.  The main problem so 
far as they were concerned was the dominance of the Department of Finance on staff 
matters, which never looked beyond cost.  Their recommendation was a specialised 
department of the state should take over but that the pay and conditions of the civil 
service should not be in the hands of elected politicians.  The model for arbitration 
that was available was the Wylie compensation committee, which in their view 
worked efficiently and to the satisfaction of staff and state.41  
The civil service associations were thrown by the line of questioning that they 
met at the hearings of the Brennan Commission.  The terms of reference of the 
commission clearly implied that the principle of arbitration had been conceded and 
that the job of the inquiry was simply to arrive at how arbitration would best operate.  
Instead the civil service representatives found themselves being compelled to argue 
the case for arbitration in principle.  Brennan in particular repeatedly threw in the 
point that under the Constitution the Executive Council bore responsibility to the Dáil 
for the administration of the public service, a responsibility that could not be taken 
                                                
40 ibid. BC/2, 9 Mar 1933. 
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away, and therefore any arbitration tribunal that bound the Executive Council to any 
payment without the approval of the Dáil would be unconstitutional.  In particular the 
responsibility of the Minister for Finance for the budget would be compromised.  In 
fact the Brennan Commission had been thoroughly ‘stitched up’ by Brennan and 
Boland.  Brennan’s own correspondence shows that he and Boland were in complete 
agreement that any form of arbitration would fatally undermine the control that the 
department had over the civil service.  By preparing and rehearsing questions before 
the daily sittings of the commission Boland and Brennan between them developed the 
strategy of the constitutional block and used it ruthlessly to destroy the principle of 
arbitration, despite the promises of the Fianna Fáil government.42  The commission 
hearings thus turned into a pantomime with Brennan and Boland having cosy chats on 
why arbitration was impossible and Brennan then aggressively challenging the civil 
service representatives with attempting to make the Executive Council act in an 
unconstitutional manner.43  It is worth noting that the cabinet agreed to pay Boland a 
gratuity of £450 for his services to the Brennan commission, which suggests that the 
cabinet was not unhappy at his success in undermining a government pledge.44  The 
IPCS soon recognised the futility of the effort and decided early in the proceedings to 
make no further statement to the commission.45 
The Johnson committee proved as disappointing.  Limited to the operation of 
the cost of living figure Johnson was convinced by the argument of the civil servants 
that the figure was based on a cost of living of a working class rather than a middle 
class family.  However such a figure would not in fact alter the final result of the 
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calculation, the general tendency to fall was simply confirmed via a different route.  
He recommended that a middle class figure might be usefully compiled as a 
reassurance to the civil service and that alcoholic drink ought to be added to the 
basket of goods used in reckoning the cost of living.  The Department of Finance were 
relieved at these findings.  The real weakness of the figure was that it was based on a 
countrywide computation that made no allowance for the very significant difference 
between Dublin and the rest of the country in, for instance, rent.  The fear that 
Johnson might recommend a separate figure for Dublin from that of the rest of the 
country was not borne out.  The department could delay on establishing the middle 
class cost of living figure in the expectation that the basic plus bonus salaries of the 
civil service would probably be consolidated into a single figure within ten years. 
Effort could now concentrate on ensuring that consolidation occurred at the lowest 
figure possible.46 
The civil service associations did get their face-to-face meeting with the 
minister, but in circumstances they had not expected.  A decision by the government 
to impose salary cuts created an unprecedented unity across the entire civil service, 
embracing even their former nemesis Boland. The Brennan and Johnson commissions 
took place against a background of further salary reductions.  The withholding of the 
land annuities to Britain launched the ‘Economic War’ and threatened an immediate 
financial crisis.  A cabinet committee recommended cuts in public service pay ranging 
from 2 per cent on a salary of £200 to a staggering 20 per cent on a salary of £1,500.47  
These cuts were not simply reductions in the bonus but cuts in the basic salaries, 
which had hitherto been sacrosanct.  These cuts were not designed to deliver any 
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substantial savings to the exchequer, nor could they.48  Instead they should be seen as 
an implementation of the long-standing Fianna Fáil axiom of cheap government, 
frugal comfort and egalitarian poverty as the basis for the national economy.  In the 
Dáil de Valera had threatened to ‘cut off the top hats’ and his belief that ‘no man is 
worth more than £1000’ was not dented by the experience of office.  His first act as 
president of the executive was to reduce his own and his ministers salaries.49  De 
Valera was a man who liked sacrifice.  The cuts in public service pay which the 
Cumann na nGaedheal government had proposed as an economic measure were 
revived by Fianna Fáil but now as a social measure designed to effect a general 
levelling of incomes across Irish society.50  All branches of the state service were to 
experience reductions in pay, all officers in state enterprises such as the ESB were to 
also have their salaries reduced, those civil servants protected by article 10 and the 
judiciary were to offer voluntary reductions.51 
Not surprisingly the proposed cuts, contradicting as they did the whole tenor 
of the election campaign and the promise of the Brennan and Johnson inquiries, met 
with an implacable opposition from the civil service.  Those opposed included the 
most senior departmental heads in the civil service who now found themselves on the 
receiving end of the rhetoric they had been delivering to their staff.52  The national 
school teachers, the Gárda Síochána and the army all rejected the cuts and the chances 
of the judiciary volunteering to accept salary cuts were so remote as to be 
immediately discounted.  The IPCS indicated that ‘the view of this Institution is that 
the professional division of the service is already underpaid compared with those in 
outside employment and that it does not fall to this division to make any further 
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sacrifice over and above that which it is called upon to make due to the increase in 
tax’.53 
In June MacEntee indicated that to the civil service organisations that he 
would be available to the CSRC to discuss staff reaction to the cuts if the POWU, 
CSCA and the IPCS would rejoin the representative council.54  The three 
organisations met to co-ordinate a response.  The IPCS was very reluctant to re-enter 
a CSRC that they rejected as an inadequate forum but because the issue of cuts was 
one that affected the whole service and was therefore one on which a united cross 
service fight was possible the decision was made to re-join.  The CSCA were tempted 
if only because the minister had raised no objection to Archie Heron being their 
delegate.  The POWU, led by William Norton, was now the only civil service 
association that still refused to re-join the CSRC.  But with Norton now in the Dáil 
and with Fianna Fáil needing the support of Labour, it may have seemed to the 
POWU that it had the better forum for negotiation.55   
 Predictably the minister was unable to attend, although the presence of 
McElligott in the chair did signal that the meeting was being treated seriously.  
Hughes, Heron and Brunicardi objected that they had returned to the CSRC and 
prepared statements on the assumption that the minister would be present to hear 
them.  Despite the soothing promises of McElligott, Heron and the CSCA delegation 
immediately left the meeting but the IPCS delegation, whilst expressing their 
disappointment that the minister was not present, decided to stay.  Hughes of the 
Federation led the attack on the proposed cuts.  Sceptical of the assurances that the 
cuts would be for one year only, he underlined the inconsistency of the government 
initiating two inquiries into the pay and conditions of the civil service whilst 
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prejudicing any conclusion they might reach by imposing a salary cut.  Brunicardi 
dealt more briefly on the low rates of pay that the professional civil servants received 
when compared to those in private practice, pointing out that the only advantage that 
the state offered in return was certainty of income.  With the government now 
proposing to cut salaries this single assurance was now worthless.  What was perhaps 
surprising to the staff side representatives was the vehemence with which the official 
side agreed with them in attacking the cuts, although this was hardly unexpected as 
the official side was composed of the most senior and highly paid civil servants in the 
government departments.  Henry O’Friel from the Department of Justice; who had 
refused to take an oath of allegiance to the crown in 1918 and had been an active Sinn 
Féin judge and leader in Dublin County Council, predicted that it would lead to a loss 
of the senior civil servants under article 10 retirements due to a worsening of 
conditions.  Even Boland joined in the attack.56  Boland was however still very 
nervous of the consequences of the minister meeting the staff side and that the CSCA, 
an ‘aggressive’ association, would succeed in its attempts to coerce the minister into 
future attendance.   
At the next meeting of the CSRC the staff representatives finally got to meet 
the minister.  With the minister in attendance the meeting had representatives of the 
full spectrum of the civil service associations, including Heron of the CSCA.  The 
implication of the submission by the associations was there would not be a voluntary 
cut and an imposed cut would damage the public service and certainly lead to a large 
number of resignations under article 10.  Again, despite the presence of the minister, 
the staff side senior civil servants (including Boland) weighed in with substantial 
reasons why the proposed cuts were unjust, unwise and would prove damaging in the 
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longer term.  For his part MacEntee insisted that there would have to be some cuts, 
‘intensely distasteful’ as they might be.57 
 Faced with a wall of resistance the government shelved the cuts and 
established another committee, essentially to gain time, charged with inquiring into 
‘the facts and circumstances regarding the pay of each of the services…with a view to 
definite recommendations being made to government as to what reductions could be 
made’ to achieve a reduction of £250,000 in the current year.58  The O’Connell ‘Cuts’ 
Committee as it became known included a cattle dealer and two farmers, as well as a 
chartered accountant, Donal O’Connor, and the chairman Philip O’Connell, director 
of the Agricultural Credit Corporation.  The O’Connell committee failed to agree on 
the extent to which the civil service salaries ought to be cut.  The farmer 
representatives recommended that the basic salary as well as bonus be cut.  In fact 
they recommended that discontented civil servants be sent to spend ‘some time in the 
beet fields of Leinster, the cow pastures of the Kerry hills or the turf banks of the Bog 
of Allen for £1 a week’ to bring them to their senses.59  The other members of the 
committee reported that the civil servants’ basic salary was already so low that it 
should not be cut but that the variable bonus could bear a further cut.  So far as the 
minister was concerned neither report was useful as neither recommended the level of 
cuts already signalled. 
The civil service associations on the CSRC urged that the O’Connell 
committee should meet in public and hear oral testimony from the civil service.60  
When the ‘cuts’ committee invited written submissions from the associations it was 
decided not to bother.  The associations also asked that the bonus cut due in January 
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1933 should be postponed until the Johnson committee could make its report.61  The 
government agreed that pending the report of the Johnson committee fifty per cent of 
the drop in bonus due to begin in January 1933 should be suspended on basic salaries 
below £2 per week.62    
 By then the Fianna Fáil government was coming under increasing pressure.  
The anger of the larger farmers hit by the Economic War allied with frustration within 
the Cumann na nGaedheal party, led to the creation of the Army Comrades 
Association or ‘Blueshirts’.  Street fights between the Blueshirts and released IRA 
men created a fear of social disintegration.  The government’s attempts to restore 
control of the budget were being frustrated by the civil service and teacher resistance.  
When William Norton, now a TD and leader of the Labour Party, warned in late 
December that his party would not support the public service pay cuts de Valera 
dissolved the Dáil during the Christmas recess. In the shortest possible election 
campaign, exploiting the disunity in the opposition, Fianna Fáil won a clear majority 
of one seat.63   
 The cabinet returned immediately to considering the cuts in public service pay.  
Despite the senior civil servants in the Department of Finance, Boland particularly, 
reminding the minister of the cuts already imposed on the civil service the cabinet 
decided to impose percentage cuts on all public service salaries above £320 per 
annum ranging from 1 per cent to 10 per cent, to last for one year only.64  The bill to 
implement the cuts, the Public Services (Temporary Economies) Bill was brought 
before the Dáil on 24 March.  Deductions from civil service salaries began to be 
applied from 1 April, before the bill had completed its passage into legislation.  The 
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civil service associations co-ordinated a joint strategy of refusing to discuss or 
bargain, only offering an emphatic “no” to the Bill at the representative council, and 
insisting that it be brought to arbitration.65  The IPCS invited the CSF and the CSCA 
to investigate the possibility of mounting a legal challenge to the cuts.  Neither Heron 
nor Hughes however were interested in legal action, and the IPCS was not interested 
in any renewed public agitation.  Probably Heron and Hughes were right.  As Dickie, 
the legal opinion sought by the IPCS, reminded them civil service regulations gave 
the minister full authority to set pay and conditions for the civil service as he saw fit.  
In the absence of any other strategy the civil service associations all returned to 
pursuing the minister from within the CSRC whilst forwarding amendments to the 
Dáil and Seanad to weaken the Bill.66  
In May the Johnson committee reported on the cost of living calculation, 
recommending, as we have seen, that a middle class budget more representative of the 
lifestyle of the civil service should be compiled.  The CSRC seized upon this finding 
(although Boland already knew that it would have no effect on the final figure) and 
asked the minister to suspend the cut in the bonus due in June.  Boland warned 
MacEntee that the civil service representative associations were trying to draw him 
into a situation in which, by constant delay and reductions in the cost of living cuts, 
the whole system of the bonus would be undermined and consolidation achieved at a 
higher rate than was correct or justified.  The associations had already achieved a split 
in the cost of living cut in January 1933 when salaries below £2 enjoyed a lower rate 
of bonus reduction.67  At the CSRC meeting the civil service staff side spoke briefly 
and to some effect on the uncertainty that the recent cuts; 1 January, 1 April and now 
impending on 1 July; were having on civil service morale and suggested that a delay 
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on imposing the July cut would go a long way to allay discontent.  Despite Boland’s 
memorandum MacEntee agreed to defer any further cuts for six weeks to allow the 
staff associations to consider the Johnson committee report.  He did however firmly 
indicate that all discussions on civil service issues must remain within the CSRC and 
that the government had banned the public meetings that the Federation had planned 
to protest against the economies bill.68         
It was at this point that Article 10 once again came to the rescue of the civil 
service.  TOPA had been kept in being as the organisation to supply the staff side to 
the compensation committee.  The right of civil servants to voluntary retirement had 
lapsed after seven years.  But the right of civil servants to retire due to worsening of 
conditions had been retained in the 1929 Act.  This form of discharge, equivalent to 
today’s ‘constructive dismissal’ was rarely cited, the compensation board had decided 
only five cases since its original establishment.  The compensation terms were the 
same as ordinary discharge and therefore better than voluntary retirement due to the 
change of government.  In November 1933 TOPA successfully argued that in the case 
of Harry Lisney of the Valuation Office the cut in basic salary, not just the bonus, was 
a worsening of conditions.  Under to the 1920 Act’s eighth schedule Lisney, who was 
fifty years of age with thirty years of service, was entitled to an added ten years of 
actual service.  Lisney, on receiving the courts judgement, which under the legislation 
was not contestable by either side, went immediately to his office and handed in his 
resignation.  He went on to employ his skills as a valuer in establishing a very 
successful auctioneering and valuation business that continues to this day.  The result 
of the Lisney judgement was an immediate rush of 132 applications of which 109 
succeeded.  Most of these were senior officers, forty-six of them from the Department 
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of Finance, which was the department to suffer the greatest loss of senior officers.  
Neither claimant nor state could contest the decisions of the compensation board.  The 
final cost was an annual pension charge of £29,645 and a lump sum payment of 
£48,675.69   The result of the government’s determination to assert its authority over 
the civil service was a considerable addition to the pensions bill of the state.70  The 
gains of the temporary economies were wiped out and the cuts were restored in the 
next year.71    
When the Brennan Commission report failed to propose an arbitration scheme, 
and in fact raised doubts as to whether any arbitration scheme for the public service 
was constitutional, the CSF asked that the government call a special conference of the 
service representatives to finalise their own scheme of arbitration.  The government 
replied suggesting that the Federation raise the Brennan report at the CSRC, ignoring 
the fact that Brennan had in fact no proposal for an arbitration board.  The Federation 
then withdrew from the CSRC, leaving the IPCS as now the only substantial service 
association on the council.72  Without any formal decision the government allowed 
the CSRC to decline by extending the time between meetings, or simply failing to 
hold or call any meetings.73  
   Article 10 had one last and rather shabby outing in 1938, in the aftermath of 
the passing of the new 1937 constitution.  During the debate on the constitution the 
civil service associations had expressed their unease that their rights under the Treaty 
and under the Saorstát Éireann constitution would be abolished.  This would mean 
that the only protection was that provided by the 1929 Transferred Officers 
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(Compensation) Act.  As this was legislative and not constitutional protection a 
government would be perfectly able to alter or abolish it.74  Peter Hegarty, an assistant 
inspector of National Health Insurance, represented by TOPA, brought a claim to the 
compensation board on the basis that the constitution of Éire discharged him from the 
service of Saorstát Éireann and that he was entitled to compensation under his 
retained rights.  At the hearing John A. Costello, representing Hegarty, argued that the 
constitution was a revolution in as much as it ended one state and initiated another. 
The government found itself having to argue, contrary to its rhetoric during the 
constitutional debate, that the constitution introduced no innovation and that Hegarty 
had the same employer before and after the passing of the constitution.  On 17 August 
the board found that though Hegarty was not discharged by the National Health 
Insurance he was discharged by the government of Saorstát Éireann and therefore was 
entitled to his compensation claim.75  There were still 6,000 transferred officers in the 
civil service immediately affected, but the judgement of the board could be read as 
implying that the entire civil service of Saorstát Éireann had been discharged and 
therefore might be entitled to compensation.  The government immediately issued an 
official circular to all civil servants stating that the government would not pay 
compensation and would introduce legislation to remedy the situation.76  The circular 
indicated that these measures would not affect any claim which was lodged before 29 
June, six months after the coming into operation of the constitution.  When the Dáil 
reassembled government moved the Public Services (Continuity of Service) Bill, 
1938.  Section 5 of the bill set 26 October 1938, and not 29 June, as the final date on 
which the board could have heard and determined compensation.  Norton closely 
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questioned MacEntee as to how that date was arrived at and MacEntee was clearly 
uncomfortable and evasive.  He was easily persuaded to amend the section in order to 
allow any claim be heard that was submitted before the introduction of the bill on the 
31 October.77  At the heart of this episode was the only other case that had been 
agreed as a consequence of the Hegarty decision; that of T.J. Hughes of the AEO and 
secretary of the CSF.       
The decision to go to the courts in the Hegarty case was controversial within 
the civil service associations.  The IPCS objected to TOPA undertaking what might 
prove a costly claim without fully consulting the membership, as had happened.78  On 
the other hand the Cork engineering branch of the POWU was very enthusiastic after 
the successful hearing and urged Norton to use it to full effect in Dáil debates.  The 
Cork branch was nearly moribund and it was hoped that the publicity would attract 
new members.79  The British Whitley Council staff side offered to help TOPA in 
whatever way they could, suggesting it might bring up with the British government 
the question of the Treaty being unilaterally altered.80  However the British 
government had already signalled to the Irish government that it had no interest in the 
issue.81   TOPA was in fact quite in the dark on the Hegarty case.  Although it had 
been usual for the executive of the association, made up of representatives of the CSF, 
POWU and IPCS, to be kept updated on the progress of cases the Hegarty hearings 
had been kept confidential.  The compensation board held closed hearings in June and 
early August, which were unknown to TOPA.  When, on the insistence of the IPCS, a 
meeting was held Hughes, who represented the CSF on the staff side of the 
compensation board, refused to attend or to divulge the likely result of the Hegarty 
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hearing.  This was despite the momentous impact it would have on the transferred 
officers.  It was when the reward was announced that the reason for Hughes’s 
reticence became apparent.  Hughes had made an application to the compensation 
board himself for permissive retirement terms.  When the likely result of the Hegarty 
decision became apparent, with the permission of the board and the Minister for 
Finance, he withdrew his application for permissive retirement and re-applied for 
retirement on the same grounds as Hegarty, confident now that he would win.  He had 
been a civil servant since 1913.  He went out with twenty-five years service and ten 
years added, giving him a pension based on thirty-five years service plus a lump sum.  
It was clear a sordid bargain had been made.  Hughes kept the rest of the civil service 
in the dark on the likely positive outcome of the hearing and in return was allowed 
resubmit his own application.82  That is why there were only two civil servants who 
succeeded in getting the last judgements under article 10, Hegarty and Hughes.  
Hughes had in fact applied for and been appointed to the post of general secretary of 
the British Institution of Professional Civil Servants, worth £750-900 a year.  He left 
the Irish service with a generous pension and moved to London to take up his new 
post.  It ought to be recorded that he was not a success in the new post and his 
contract was terminated in 1943.83     
Hughes, secretary of the AEO and of the CSF, was a central figure in civil 
service trade unionism since the establishment of the Free State and was clearly 
wearying of the struggle.  In his evidence to the Brennan Commission he suggested 
strongly that it would be in the public interest, and not only that of his members, if the 
power of the Department of Finance over the civil service was transferred to another 
department of state such as Industry and Commerce.  He also felt that the salary cuts 
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being pursued by the Fianna Fail government had little to do with economics but had 
a lot to do with the view that it ‘would be a desirable thing that people in this country 
generally should adopt a simpler standard of living’.84  Hughes had decided that a 
more useful and less frugal future lay elsewhere.  As secretary of the staff side of the 
CSRC he had overseen a decade and a half of siege warfare.  The only significant 
ground gained by the civil service unions had been through the courts and not the 
representative council, using a weapon forged by the pre-independence organisation.  
It was perhaps appropriate that he should have been the last to wield it.  
Although the civil service had to wait another generation for arbitration and 
conciliation and thus some control over the conditions, their status was changing as a 
more dynamic Fianna Fail replaced the passive Cumann na nGaedheal.  In fact de 
Valera consistently defended the civil service against the demands from within the 
party and the IRA leadership for a purge of senior officials.85   Under Fianna Fáil the 
role of the state was to actively redirect Irish society and the economy.  This ideology 
of a strong state driving national development gave a central role to an expanding 
civil service.86  The pace of activity in the departments accelerated and soon there 
were complaints that the civil service was failing to keep pace with the demands of 
policy initiatives.87  The civil service found the channels of promotion that had been 
closed under the previous government, were being opened up.  Departments were 
instructed not to block mobility and allow civil servants move to ‘whatever posts their 
services are most likely to be of the highest value to the state’.88  An unplanned 
consequence of the opening up of mobility was greater opportunity of promotion.  
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The Irish civil service had very few university graduates recruited directly into the 
higher administrative class, the equivalent of the former first division, and higher 
posts were generally filled by competitive exams in the lower executive grade.  Civil 
servants of the clerical and executive classes crowded into the B.Comm at TCD, 
which was timetabled to cater for their working day.  Thus the Irish civil service, 
apparently in an unplanned way, achieved the open path to the higher classes and 
grades that had been the ideal for the lower ranks and for the old Griffithite Sinn 
Féin.89   
The number of civil servants rose under Fianna Fáil and opportunity opened 
up in the new state-owned companies in the areas of electricity generation, sugar beet, 
industrial alcohol, peat production, civil aviation and industrial credit where the 
leadership of these innovations in state-directed development was recruited primarily 
from the civil service.  These new state-owned industries were essentially a re-
invention of the unjustly despised boards of the old regime.  This developmental 
leadership also brought the civil service back to a role that reflected its own view of 
itself.  This new form of state power necessitated a new image of the civil servant; 
professional and technocratic, and the shedding of the old image of a colonial 
remnant.  It also represented a re-connection with the traditions of the pre-
independence era when the state viewed the civil service as an engine of social 
change, to be used to reshape Irish society and economy.  In this, curiously enough, 
de Valera was the inheritor not only of Griffith but also of the Balfours.   
 
                                                






The Civil service, the State and the Irish Revolution. 
 
  
The historical development of the Irish state provides the point of departure 
for understanding continuity and change in the civil service and assessing its response 
to, and its place in, the process of revolutionary state-formation.  The research has 
traced the steps toward Irish independent statehood, beginning with the 1886 home 
rule proposal, which introduced an uncertainty into the relationship between the state 
and the civil service.  This uncertainty led to the first organisation of the Irish civil 
service as a single entity, made conscious of its ‘apartness’ within the United 
Kingdom and its essential unity as a colonial-like service.  The Balfours’ counter to 
home rule, constructive unionism or “killing home rule by kindness”, in setting it the 
task of making the British state popular by transforming the Irish economy, 
transformed the civil service.  It grew in absolute numbers at an exceptional rate and 
also became more professional and technical in its membership.  The successes of the 
Irish civil service in the areas of land reform, regional development, local government 
and health services it has been argued, would have been hailed in another context.  
However these were small successes when stood alongside the failure to make the 
British state popular.  Despite the fact that Castle government was a political rather 
than an administrative failure, opinion in Whitehall began to find agreement with the 
long-standing view of nationalists that saw the Castle government as itself the ‘Irish 
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problem’.   A consensus emerged on the necessity of administrative reform whilst 
disagreement continued on political reform. 
The third home rule crisis and the emergence of proposals to partition the 
country, the outbreak of World War and then the 1916 Rising, were all state-
transforming moments that deeply questioned the relationship between the civil 
service and the state in Ireland.  Proposals for home rule with partition led to a 
sustained but low-key political campaign by a united civil service organisation that 
succeeded in transforming their sectional interests into legal rights.  The 1916 Rising 
revealed the extent to which sections within the civil service had ceased to identify 
with the state, though it has been noted that the response of the state was surprisingly 
muted.  Meanwhile the demands of world war created different influences within the 
civil service in Ireland.  The marginality of Ireland to the war effort, the pressure on 
civil servants to enlist, the recrudescence of sectarianism in the higher reaches of the 
Castle that accompanied the growing power of the unionists in government; all served 
to further weaken the British state in Ireland.   
1918-22 saw the final phase of the development of Irish statehood that 
involved the creation of two different Irish states through partitioning the former state, 
whilst a rival counter-state waged a war against it.  It has been argued that the success 
of the revolutionary forces had more to do with the now chronic weakness of the 
British state in Ireland than with the actions of the IRA.  The belief that the new state 
inherited a thoroughly modernised and reformed civil service, a belief that is based on 
a favourable assessment of Waterfield’s reform of the Castle, has been refuted.  
Waterfield’s attempt to fit the Irish civil service to the Whitehall mould created more 
turmoil than reform.  More significant was the debate that was that taking place in 
cabinet between the die-hards who were prepared to overthrow civil government 
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completely in favour of military rule and those who clung on grimly to civil 
government, however imperfect.  It was a close-run contest and Ireland might well 
have made the transition to self-government under a military regime.  Self-
government and democratic government were achieved at the same moment.  
Even before home rule the Irish civil service had displayed a precocious 
ability to organise.  It was also adept at cultivating political support to counter the 
dominance of the Treasury.  Home rule transformed organisation, firstly by permitting 
cross-class and grade combination in a unified Irish civil service association, and 
secondly by tolerating intensive political lobbying by that association.  This level of 
organisation and political activism would, in any other context, have been considered 
subversive of the state and been suppressed.  The civil service used each opportunity 
presented by political division to protect its interests in advance of change.  The 
objective was to ensure that any government that might emerge out of the struggle for 
control of the state would find it difficult and expensive to make significant unilateral 
alterations in the conditions of the civil service.   
During the post-war period the Irish civil service got swept up in the wave of 
organisation mobilising the British civil service into trade unions.  That meant 
importing into the relatively small Irish service the organisationally sophisticated 
structures of classes and grades of the very much bigger and more complex British 
service.  Whilst the civil service organisation formed to secure rights under home rule 
treated the prospect of partition as an opportunity to bargain for further security, the 
leadership of the Irish civil service trade unions actively worked to prevent or at least 
subvert partition.    
The newly independent state retained the hierarchical structures of the former 
power.  Hierarchy was the simplest way to subordinate the inherited bureaucracy to 
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the new executive.  However it has been argued that it was not the best nor the most 
appropriate relationship between the civil service and government of the newly 
independent state.  The Cumann na nGaedheal government brought its key 
Department of Finance civil servants from Whitehall.  These men brought into the 
Irish system the Whitehall attitude toward civil service trade unions.  Still carrying the 
pre-independence nationalist contempt for the Castle bureaucracy, and acquiring the 
Whitehall view of the necessity of Treasury dictatorship in dealing with civil servants, 
the Cosgrave government failed to recognise the civil service as an agent of 
modernity.  
The final transformation of the independent state was the accession to power 
in 1932 of Fianna Fáil.  The party that formerly had denied the legitimacy of the state 
enacted a new constitution that re-established the same state as the expressed will of 
the Irish nation and not the British parliament.  Under Fianna Fáil the civil service 
was reinvented as the state institution that transformed the political aspirations of the 
executive into economic and social outcomes.  Put simply, if the state was to develop 
the nation then it had to turn to the civil service because there was no other institution 
of the state capable of such a task.  The achievement of a self-sufficient and sovereign 
Ireland, which was the goal of the Fianna Fáil party, would be the achievement of the 
civil service and would integrate the civil service into the national revolution.  
The question of the survival of the civil service in an era of revolutionary state 
change has been addressed.  The executive, legislature, army and police force of the 
new state were all newly formed out of the revolutionary forces.  The conventional 
view that saw more of restoration than revolution and that sought to detach the civil 
service from the revolution has been challenged.  The revolution established a new 
kind of state and therefore required a new kind of civil service.  Contrary to Brennan’s 
 375 
statement of anodyne continuity there was in fact a rapid purge of the personnel of the 
senior ranks, paralleled by an even greater exodus through voluntary retirements.  
New men were brought rapidly to the fore in a short-lived blossoming of promotions.  
The civil service was also reorganised into a centralised and hierarchical structure of 
departments under finance control and answerable to politicians.  This was the sort of 
structure that the British reformers had tried and failed to achieve.  Whether that 
model was appropriate for the new state was not considered by the new government.    
There is no doubt that article 10 of the Treaty and its attendant enactments 
created constitutional rights out of the vested interests of civil servants, the question is 
did it operate to block desirable reforms?  The answer is a conditional yes, with the 
caveat that the reforms pursued by Cumann na nGeadheal were not the reforms that 
were desirable.  Instead of seizing the opportunity to create a civil service more suited 
to the revolutionary conditions (less hierarchical, more dynamic) the government 
attempted to create a cheaper version of the Whitehall model.  This was not the sort of 
reform that the civil service anticipated or that the revolution had signalled, nor was it 
even desirable.  The Irish civil service was confident of its ability to deliver on radical 
policies and was in fact characterised more by enthusiasm and ambition than by fear 
or hostility to the new state.  An opportunity to engage in truly revolutionary state 
transformation was lost.   
What did the civil service want from the revolution?  The demand that was 
voiced was actually a modestly negative ‘no worsening of conditions’.  The difficulty 
with the Irish civil service under the old regime was the persistence of nepotism and 
sectarian recruitment patterns, a difficulty that persisted in Northern Ireland.  The 
leadership of the Irish civil service associations had become thoroughly nationalist, 
mainly through the influence of competitive recruitment and the cultural movements.  
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For them the British model clearly embodied hierarchical and social principles that 
were anathema.  The more complex the civil service structures, the more hierarchical 
they are.  The Irish civil service was prepared to embrace a more simplified and 
therefore more egalitarian structure.  Locked out of the process of decision-making 
the civil service adopted a non possumus attitude.  The relationship between the state 
and the civil service became a matter not of negotiation but of constitutional law, 
fought out in the Wigg-Cochrane case that led to the first revision of the Treaty.  
However the hostility of the political classes to the civil service was purely reflexive 
and not the result of any coherent alternative vision, after all they had no difficulty 
steering their children into the civil service for careers and employment. 
The ability of the state to conceive, plan and execute policies of social and 
economic transformation depended on the ability of politicians to shed the persistent 
view that the civil service was simply a legacy of British domination.  Ireland had in 
fact a modern and appropriate civil service and the despised boards of the British 
regime, ‘enough to make a coffin for Ireland’, were effective agents of social and 
economic transformation.  The Irish civil service could deliver a modernising Ireland, 
what it could not do was make British government popular.  Nor could the civil 
service of the Free State deliver cheap administration.  Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
campaign to cut salaries and worsen conditions, running the state as if it were a corner 
shop, merely antagonised the civil service and drove a significant number to choose 
early retirement.  However the Cumann na nGaedheal governments did resist party 
pressure to use the civil service as an instrument of political patronage and avoided 
party penetration of the state apparatus and the evil of cronyism that has infected 
many decolonised states.   Fianna Fáil was the first government party able to re-
imagine the civil service as an agent of state-driven change and so begin to re-invent, 
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through the semi-state corporations, the boards of the British state.  Under the Fianna 
Fáil government, especially in the department of Industry and Commerce under Seán 
Lemass, the civil service was given the task in which the native entrepreneurial 
classes had failed, the development of the nation.  This is perhaps best illustrated by 
the most significant plan for state-directed economic change in independent Ireland 
being popularly known for the civil servant who drafted it, T.K. Whitaker.   
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Table 1: The Civil Service General Committee 1911 by Departments 
Department Number of Officers Number of delegates 
Irish Land Commission 576 6 
Department of Agriculture 1270 6 
Local Government Board 262 5 
National Education Office 221 4 
Office of Public Works 650 3 
Public Record Office 35 3 
General Valuation Office 221 3 
Stamps and Duties Office 72 3 
Registry of Deeds 92 2 
General Post Office 303 6 
Intermediate Education Office 33 2 
Congested Districts Board 199 3 
General Prisons Board 31 2 
Endowed Schools Commissioners 2 1 
Registrar’s General office 44 1 
DMP Office 5 1 
Teacher’s Pension Office 6 1 
Charitable Donations & Bequests 8 1 
Stationary Office 16 1 
Registry of Petty Sessions Clerks 16 1 
RIC Office 23 1 
Chief Secretary’s Office 29 1 
Paymaster General’s Office 11 1 
Estate Duty Office 38 1 
Solicitor’s Office Inland Revenue 20 1 
DMP Court 12 1 
Ordnance Survey Office 450 2 
Associated Petty Sessions Clerks 405 2 
Customs & Excise Federation 600 3 
29 departments + C&E Federation Total Officers    5650 Total delegates       68 
   
Source: National Archives London, TS 18/235:Treasury solicitor’s general series papers, civil service 
provisions under the Government of Ireland Act 1912 
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Table 3: Irish civil service witnesses to the MacDonnell commission on the civil 
service. 
Local Government Board  
Assistant clerks 
John J. Duffy, Mr Andrew, Mr Walsh. 
 
General Register’s Office  
Second division clerks 
Patrick McGuinness 
 
General Valuation and Survey Office 




Valuers and surveyors 
F. Oliver Lyons, George Warwick. 
 
DATI 
Second division clerks 




Board of Works 
Assistant clerks 
F.J. Donnellan, Mr Brennan, Mr Maloney. 
 
National Education Board 
Second division clerks 
W.J. Cairns, J.M. Flood. 
Assistant clerks 
Mr Haydock, Mr Hearne, Mr McCarthy. 
 
Irish Land Commission 
Second division clerks 
Mr Anstead, R. Kent, Mr Ball.  
Assistant clerks 
Mr Dempsey, Mr Duffy, Mr Gleeson. 
Survey & Mapping Department staff 
W.G. Parrott, Mr Parr. 
Non-pensionable indoor officials 






Irish Temporary Clerks Association. 
G. Murphy (president), Messrs Duggan, Richardson, A.E. Ashley, Fleming, Somers, McCRaith, Myles. 
 
Association of Post Office Women Clerks 
Miss L.M. Cale. 
Source: Royal commission on the civil service second appendix to the fourth report of the 
commissioners, minutes of evidence 9 Jan. 1913-20 June 1913 with appendices Parl. Papers 1914, XVI 
[Cd.7340] 363. (MacDonnell Commission). 
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Table 4: General Committee of Irish Civil Servants. 1917 
Department name of delegate 
Land Commission 
G.Y. Dixon  J.T. Drennan  R.E.T. Richey  C.Whelan  A.G. Lewis  
S.Wilson. 
Dept of Agriculture T.W.Lyster  A.Kelly  A.Attridge  E.J.C.McEvoy  J.Dowling S. Sloan 
Local Government Board A.R.Barlas  J.W. Drury  C.McCarthy  W. O’B Reidy 
National Education Office W.H.Welply  W.Bright  W.G. Mulvin  M.N. McCaffrey 
Board of Works T.M.Batchen  J.J.Healy  F.Kane 
Public Record Office Herbert Wood  H.O.Campbell  J.J. Tucker 
Valuation Office C.J. Boland  R.J. Mortished  R.F. Murphy 
Stamps and Taxes W. Abbott  M.J. Brady  T.O’Beirne 
Registry of Deeds Mark Leonard  Henry Gill 
Intermediate Education Office R.C.B. Kerin  S.A.O. Fitzpatrick 
Congested Districts Office H.R.Vereker  F.S. Sheridan  C.Glass 
General Prisons Board J.J. Rafter  H.P Bell 
Endowed Schools Commission S.Murphy 
Registrar-General’s Office P.McGuinness 
DMP Office W.A. McGill 
National Teacher’s Pensions S.Clein 
Charitable Donations & Bequests Thomas Bodkin 
Stationary Office W.G. Smyth 
Registrar of Petty Sessions Clerks Office Andrew Bell 
RIC Office W.J. Rundle 
Chief Secretary’s Office W.P. Henry 
Paymaster—General’s Office E.Fahy 
Reformatories & Industrial Schools R.Clarke 
Estate Duties Office P.F. Sheehan 
Solicitor’s Office Inland Revenue B.Collins 
DMP Courts Office P.J. Troddyn 
Ordnance Survey Office A.J. Byrd  H.D. Whyte 
GPO Secretary’s Office P.J. Keawell 
GPO Accountants office T.Delany  H.J. Knowles  C.J. Elliott  Miss E.E. Harris 
GPO stores J.H. Reeves 
GPO Telegraph Office E.F.Sweeney  B.C. Bergin 
GPO Telephone Dept. T.J. Early  Miss B.M. Brennan 
National Health Insurance J.Houlihan  P.Dempsey  M.J. Gallagher  Miss M.T. Finlay 
Dept of National Service J.J. White 
Ministry of Munitions H.Mulvaney 
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Department Name of Delegate 
Wages Board R.J. Purcell 
Ministry of Labour Miss B. Stafford  J.J. Keane  J.J. O’Sullivan 
Petty Sessions Clerks Assoc W.Mehaffy 
Women Clerks Assoc. Miss T. McCollum  Miss M.A. Dunne 
Second Division Clerks Assoc. R.F. Russell  D.O’Sullivan  R.J. Twohig 
Assistant Clerks Assoc. F.J. Donnellan  J.T. Kelly  J. Fitzpatrick 
Irish PO Clerks Assoc. J. McManus  J.T. Cleary  R.D. Hogan 
Postmen’s Federation C.P. Kelly  M.T. Lally  E.W. Mahon 
Postal Inspectors Assoc. C.G. Panton 
CDB Clerks Assoc. J.O’Loghlin 
Staff Officers Assoc. C.J. Murphy  T.A. Murphy  J.E. Highton 
PO Clerical Assistants Assoc. &Third Class 
Clerks W.Rankin  D.A. O’Loghlin  C.G. Sutcliffe 
Four Courts Officers E.P. O’Toole 
Tax Clerks Assoc. P.F. Walls  A.Power 
Tax Surveyors Assoc. R.F. Browne 
Labour Exchange Managers Assoc. J.P. Keady 
Assoc. Unemployment Insurance Clerks James Henderson  John Dunne 
PO Amalgamated Engineering & Stores 
Assoc. W.C. Connolly 
Surveyors (GPO) Clerks Assoc. P. McMenamin 
Telephone Supervising Officers Assoc. A.G. Hawthorne 
PO Engineering Society A.E. Dawson 
Source: ‘Statement by the General Committee of Irish Civil Servants as to their position in view of 
further legislation affecting the Government of Ireland. 
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Table 5: The Irish Provisional Joint Whitley Committee, July 1919. 
Official Side Irish Provisional Joint Whitley Committee. 
Gordon Campbell                                                                          Ministry of Labour  
S.G.Forsythe                                                                                General Post Office 
T.P.Gill                                                           Dept Agriculture & Technical Instruction 
Maurice Headlam                                                                 Treasury Remembrancer 
Gerald Horan                                                                                          Law Courts 
James MacMahon                                                         Under-Secretary for Ireland 
Sir Henry Robinson                                                              Local Government Board 
Patrick Ryan                                                                                    Ministry of Labour 
J.Simpson (replaced by S.E.Minnis)                                                       Inland Revenue 
Sir George Stevenson                                                                  Board of Public Works  
Frederick Wrench                                                                      Irish Land Commission.   
 
Staff Side Irish Provisional Joint Committee. 
J.Dowling Association of Unestablished Civil 
Servants 
Miss M.A.Dunne Federation of Women Clerks  
John Dunne Ministry of Labour Employment 
Department Clerks’ Association 
Michael. J. Gallagher Assistant Clerks’ Association  
E.W.Mahon Union of Post Office Workers 
Ronald.J.P. Mortished Irish Civil Service Union 
W.Gerald Mulvin Irish Civil Service Alliance 
Thomas.A. Murphy Staff Clerks’ Association 
W.Nally Association of Irish Post Office Clerks  
P.A. Rodgers Customs and Excise Federation 
Sam. Sloan Dublin Second Division Clerks’ 




Table 6: Dáil Éireann Civil Service, January 1919-Jan 1922.                 [214 Total] 







Department of Finance 









Lyons, Miss E. 
Mason, Jenny. (Later married Tom Derrig) 
Mason, M. Miss. 
McCluskey, Mrs. 
McCluskey, Seán 
McGrath, George. (Accounting Officer) 
McGrath, Seán.(Banc ar siúil). 
Murphy, Fintan 
O’Donoghue, David. [O’Donnchadha, Daithi] 
O’Donovan, Dan. 





Staines, miss M. 
Thunder, Frank. 
Toal, Miss. 
Tobin, miss S. 
Wheatley, Thomas. 
Department of Publicity 
Gallagher, Frank. 




Department of Foreign Affairs 
Austin, miss. 
Bolger, J. 
Bhriain, Maire ni. 
Carty, J. 
Dunnes, J. 










O’Byrne, miss E. 
O’Donovan C. 
O’Reilly, Count G. 
Power, miss N. 
Walsh, J.P. 
Department of Defence 
Doyle, M. 
Kennedy, miss K. 
O’Dwyer, miss K. 
Sheppard, Kevin. 
Sloan, miss. 




















Department of Fisheries. 
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King, R.F. 
Department of Local Government 
Office Staff: 
Archer, miss E 
Bevan, Kathleen. 
Carraghamhna, maire ni. 
Carron, Mary. 
Cearnaigh, Eilis ni. 














McArdle, Thomas J. 
McCann, Tom. 
McCarthy, Daniel 














O’Reilly miss B. 
O’Reilly P. 
O’Reilly, miss M. 
O’Shannon, Maire. 
Parker, Augustus. 
Redden, K. Miss 
Robbins, Lorcan. 
Saunders, Seán 










De Lacy, Michael. 
De Staic, Seán. 
Dunne, Thomas. 
Dwyer, W. Dr. 
Geraghty, James. 
Gleeson, S. 
Hernon, Patrick J. 




Meagher, Francis G. 
Moynihan, Simon J. 
O Muchadha, Seamus. 
O’Carroll, Eamon. 
O’Donovan, David. J. 
O’Dwyer, Nicholas. B.E. 
O’Kelly, D.L. Dr. 
O’Kelly, Patrick. 

























Department of Labour 
Cotter, Dick. 
Mee, J.(ex-RIC) 
Riain, Eilis Ní. 
Directory of Trade and Commerce. 
Byrne, miss M.B. 
Chartres, John. 




Wrafter, miss M.J. 
Department of Home Affairs. 
Browne, Daniel J. 
Clifford, Madge. 
Connolly, miss Bridget. 
Crilly, miss Edith. 
Crump, P.J. 










    President’s Office 
Harling, Seán. 
Dáil Éireann secretariat. 
Burke, Alec. 
Saunders, Liam. 
    Department of Finance 
Conlon, Bob 
O’Reilly, Joe. 
    Department of Home Affairs 
Jordan, Joe. 
Murphy, M. 
    Department of Agriculture 
Byrne, P. 
Caffrey, Seán. 
    Directory of Trade and Commerce 
O’Connor, Jimmie. 
    Department of Labour 
Markey, Mick. 
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    Department of Defence 
Craig, Leo. 
    Department of Local Government 
O’Mara, Paddy. 
O’Neill, Martin. 
Department of Education and Fine Arts. 
Redmond, Seamus. 
      GHQ STAFF,  IRA 
O’Hanrahan, Paddy. 
Source: NAI, bureau of military history witness statements, 501 T.J. McArdle, 817 
Seán Saunders, 375 Diarmuid O’Sullivan, 1728 Nicolas O Nuaillain, 643 Cathleen 
Napoli-McKenna, 1725 Padraig O’Keeffe, 512 Seán McCluskey, 548 Daithi 
O’Donoghue, 889 James Kavanagh, 1050 Vera McDonnell, 683 Hugh Hehir, 460 
Joseph Thunder, 680 Nicolas O’Dwyer; DE 5/72; “Early E files” E1/8, E40/1, E43/8, 
E50/47, E50/11, E86/116(ii) & 118, E108/1, E108/4/24, E117/2, E137/10, E231/9; 




PRIMARY SOURCES.   
MANUSCRIPTS. 
National Archives Ireland. 
Chief Secretary’s Office Registered Papers (CSORP) 
Dáil Éireann 1919-1922:  
DE1. Cabinet minutes 
DE2. General secretariat files. 
DE4. Proceedings of First and Second Dáileanna and related documents. 
DE5. Departmental staff files. 
DELG. Dáil Éireann Local Government department files. 
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